

II THREE NEOARISTOTELIAN AND NEOPLATONIC CONCEPTS: MONOPSYCHISM, MYSTICISM, METACONSCIOUSNESS

(1) IN Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων (*Enn. V 1*) Plotinus undertakes to remind the souls which have forgotten their father-god, of their true origin and nature. First, every soul should contemplate the action of the universal soul as she 'enlivens' the cosmos and rules it. By so doing she will become more aware of her own worth. Afterwards she should realize that she is a kind of word pronounced by intelligence (νοῦς),¹ and that her perfection consists in the contemplation of intelligence. Next, she should learn to appreciate the quality of intelligence by comparing it with its image, viz. the visible universe. Eventually, she should ascend to that which is the cause (αἰτία) of both intelligizing (νοεῖν) and being. This cause is that which is simple or one; whereas intelligence is multiple (intelligizing or being, difference and identity, motion and rest, constitutive of number, quantity and quality). Furthermore, our soul should inquire how that which is simple passed into that which is multiple – a problem of old and much discussed – this passing to be understood as a non-temporal 'event' comparable to the warmth emanating from fire, different but not separated from it.

Having thus introduced his principal triad, Plotinus quotes Plato, viz. what turns out to be the 2nd *Epistle* (everything is related to the king of everything, everything that is second to the second, the third is related to the third), the 5th *Epistle* and the *Timaeus* (the ground

¹ This seems to be the translation which does more justice to the continuity of philosophical terminology from the pre-Socratics to the early modern period than any other (such as intellect, mind, spirit, etc.). Accordingly νοεῖν will be translated by the obsolete 'to intelligize' instead of the usual 'to think'. The advantage of such a translation is obvious. 'Thinking' usually means discursive thinking. But the kind of knowledge peculiar to intelligence is intuitive rather than discursive. For a discussion of the problem of translation see *Les sources de Plotin* (Vandoeuvres-Genève 1960), p. 421-5 (Cilento, Henry, Armstrong).

– αἴτιον – has a father; and by ground Plato means intelligence or the demiurge, who is the 'mixer' of the soul) and the *Republic* (by 'father' Plato means that which is good and transcends intelligence and being) as well as Plato in general ("in many places he calls that which is and the intelligence idea"). He does so to prove that Plato knew that the soul stems from intelligence, and intelligence from that which is one. He, therefore, continues by saying: what I said here is nothing new. It was said not recently but a long time ago, though not explicitly. My present discourses are interpretations of those ancient ones. That they are old is proven by writings of Plato himself.

Even the historic Parmenides, Plotinus continues, already equated being and intelligence. True, he called this intelligence also one, whereas it is many. Plato's *Parmenides* avoids this statement. He discerns a first from a second, and a second from a third. Thus here again we find the doctrine of the three realms (φύσεις).

Anaxagoras calls his intelligence pure and unmixed. He also posits that which is first as being simple and the One as being transcendent (χωριστόν).

Heraclitus recognized that that which is one is eternal and intelligible, whereas bodies are always in flux.

In Empedocles love, the opposite of strife, which divides, is that which is one. And he designated it as incorporeal.¹

In Aristotle we have that which is first and intelligible designated as transcendent. But as he says of it that it intelligizes itself, he deprives it of its firstness. Moreover, as he assumes that in addition to the first intelligible, there are others (each of which moves one of the celestial spheres) his concept of the world of the intelligible differs from that of Plato.² Admittedly he based his assumption on probability alone. But is it even probable? It would be more probable to assume that all these spheres are centered on that which is one and first and thus form one system.

It is also a problem whether all these intelligibles stem from that which is first or whether each is a principle in its own right. If the former holds, they all must form one system; if the latter, we have anarchy and it remains unexplained why they should all co-operate

¹ *Enn. V 1* [10] 8,1 – 9,7. Quotations follow the text of the Henry-Schwyzler edition (*Plotini Opera*, Paris-Brussels, vol. I, II [1951, 1959]). There was no need to quote from *Enn. VI*, which will be contained in a volume not yet published in the above edition.

² Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ... χωριστόν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ νοητόν, νοεῖν δὲ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ λέγων πάντιν αὐτὸ τὸ πρῶτον ποιεῖ· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα νοητὰ ποιῶν καὶ τοσαῦτα, ὅποσαι ἐν οὐρανῷ σφαῖραι ... ἄλλον τρόπον λέγει τὰ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἢ Πλάτων (1, 9, 7-12)

to produce cosmic harmony. Why, in such a case, should we assume that the number of intelligibles equals the number of spheres? And how can they be many in spite of the fact that they are incorporeal so that they are not divided by matter?

Thus, all followers of Pythagoras and Pherecydes¹ assumed the existence of that which is one. It is true, however, that some expressed this doctrine in their writings, others only in unrecorded conferences (ἐν ἀγράφοις συνουσίαις), others did not even mention it.²

After this historical digression, Plotinus returns to his topic to repeat the doctrine of the three 'supermundane' principles. These principles are present even in ourselves, to the extent that we are not only members of the sensible world but are, as Plato says, an inner man.³ We have a soul: the soul has intelligence – double intelligence, to be precise – one which thinks (λογίζεται), and another which supplies us with thinking (λογίζεσθαι παρέχων), – incorporeal, operating without a bodily organ⁴ and transcendent (χωριστόν).

Even our soul is not entirely immersed in our body. In part it remains in the world of the intelligible, as Plato indicated when he said that the demiurge wrapped the universe in the soul (as he also hinted by saying that in us the soul dwells in our uppermost boundary, viz. the head).⁵

Thus, when Plato commands us 'to separate' the soul, he only means that also that part of the soul which dwells within the body should turn to the world of intelligibles. The ability of the soul to investigate the justice or the beauty of a particular phenomenon reveals that there is something which is permanently just, something which is permanently beautiful.⁶ They are what stimulates the soul to think about them.

Intelligence differs from the soul also in this that the soul thinks intermittently only, whereas intelligence, containing that which is permanently beautiful, permanently just within itself, *thinks*

¹ Harder (below, p. 13, n. 2) a.l. brackets the name of Pherecydes. It is difficult to see why. Even if we consider the filiation Pherecydes-Pythagoras erroneous, does it follow that Plotinus considered it to be such? Is not e.g. Diogenes Laërtius, probably Plotinus' contemporary, of the same opinion as Plotinus?

² *Ibid.*, 19–32.

³ ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει τριτὰ ταῦτά ἐστι ... οὕτω ... καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ... οἷον λέγει Πλάτων τὸν εἶσω ἄνθρωπον. *Ibid.*, 10, 5–10.

⁴ νοῦς δὲ ὁ μὲν λογίζομενος, ὁ δὲ λογίζεσθαι παρέχων ... οὐδενὸς πρὸς τὸ λογίζεσθαι δεόμενον (scil. τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς λογίζομενον) σωματικοῦ ὄργανου. *Ibid.*, 13–15.

⁵ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐτι ἔξωθεν' φησιν (scil. Plato) ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός τὴν ψυχὴν περιέβαλεν ἐνδεκνύμενος τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ μένον, ἐπὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπιρῶπτων 'ἐπ' ἀκρᾶ' εἶρηκε τῇ κεφαλῇ. *Ibid.*, 21–25.

⁶ Obviously Plato's ideas.

them always. And it is this intelligence *which is present in ourselves.*¹

Finally, the third principle is also present in us.² The manner of its presence within us is comparable to the presence of the center of a circle with regard to the multiplicity of radii, converging on it. In other words, there is something point-like in us with which we touch that which is one, are united with it, and depend on it (ἀνηρημέθα).³

That which is one, intelligence, and even the soul, each of them *uninterruptedly exercises its peculiar kind of activity* (this is the reason the soul is called that which 'always moves').⁴ *Only we are not conscious of it.*⁵ Thus our task becomes to turn our consciousness towards it.^{6·7}

Here our review ends. We proceed to discuss some of the points made by Plotinus.

(2) PLOTINUS, then, explicitly asserts that the doctrine of the three supersensible principles is not his innovation but an old doctrine professed by all adherents of Pythagoras and Pherecydes and professed in Plato's own writings. All he claims is to have made it more explicit.

The assertion has a polemical ring. Obviously Plotinus was criticized by other Platonists who considered him one of them, on the ground of being an innovator. Only under this assumption does it make sense for Plotinus to insist on not being original, in other words, on not being heterodox.

At the same time, it becomes obvious that for Plotinus Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato, and Aristotle belong to one and the same αἴρεσις whose founders were Pythagoras and Pherecydes.

More will be said later on Aristotle. For the time being we limit ourselves to reminding the reader of two passages in Aristotle fully justifying Plotinus' assertion that the former was familiar with the

¹ καὶ εἰ ὅτε μὲν λογίζεται περὶ τούτων ψυχὴ ὅτε δὲ μὴ, δεῖ τὸν <μὴ> λογιζόμενον, ἀλλ' αἰετὸν ἔχοντα τὸ δίκαιον νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι. *Ibid.*, 11, 4–8.

² εἶναι δὲ (scil. ἐν ἡμῖν) καὶ τὴν νοῦ ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν καὶ θεόν. *Ibid.*, 7.

³ *Ibid.*, 8–15.

⁴ ἐκεῖνα μὲν (scil. νοῦς and its ἀρχή) ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐνεργείαις αἰετὸν, ... καὶ ψυχὴ δὲ τὸ ἀεικίνητον οὕτως (*ibid.*, 12, 3–6). I cannot agree with the interpretation of Henry-Schwyzler which construes (and prints) τὸ ἀεικίνητον as apposition to ψυχὴ.

⁵ οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνομεθα (scil. their activity). *Ibid.*, 1; ... οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ, ἤδη αἰσθητόν. *Ibid.*, 5–7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 12–13.

⁷ Consciousness, to be conscious, etc. corresponds to αἰσθησις, αἰσθάνεσθαι, etc. The use of αἰσθησις to designate, not only sensation, but also consciousness, results in some ambiguities and awkward constructions, but on the whole the context makes the meaning clear. Instead of αἰσθάνεσθαι in the sense of 'being conscious', Plotinus also uses ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. I could have rendered αἰσθησις by awareness, etc.

concept of a 'first' which would be analogous to Plotinus' 'first', had Aristotle not relapsed into treating it as intelligizing. One is from *Περὶ εὐχῆς*: 'Ὁ θεός ἢ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπέκεινά τι τοῦ νοῦ (fr. 49R). The other is from the *Eudemian Ethics*: λόγου δ' ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος ἀλλὰ τι κρεῖττον· τί οὖν ἄν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἴη καὶ νοῦ πλὴν θεός; (Θ 2,1248a27-29).¹ Whether Plotinus actually had these passages in mind remains uncertain. We now return to the treatment of Plato by Plotinus.

To find his three principal realities in Plato, Plotinus must identify intelligence with the demiurge. And in addition to this, another identification must be made by Plotinus, viz. the identity of intelligence with its objects. These objects are ideas. These ideas are, then, not outside intelligence (οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητά; cf. Porphyrius, *Vita Plotini* 18, with the *apparatus* in the Henry-Schwyzler edition).

The identification of intelligence with ideas permits Plotinus to keep the number of principal realities down to three. And it also immediately explains his doctrine that the realm of intelligence is

¹ The principle that god is above νοῦς we find enunciated by Ps.-Archytas in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I 41, vol. I, p. 280 Wachsmuth. After having stated that there must be three principles, viz. matter, form, and a third which is self-moved and first in power, Ps.-Archytas continues: τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ νόον μόνον εἶμεν οὐδὲ ἀλλὰ καὶ νόω τι κρέσσων· νόω δὲ κρέσσον <ἔτι> ἐντί ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν θεόν, φανερόν.

Whether Plotinus knew this passage, whether he was inclined to credit Pythagoreans (or Pythagoras) with the doctrine that god is above intelligence (and criticize them for making him move instead of being only a mover), we don't know. We even cannot be absolutely positive that the Ps.-Archytas passage is pre-Plotinian (though this is most likely).

What is true of Ps.-Archytas is also true of Ps.-Brotinus. Syrianus enumerates him among those who assume a principle superior to the duality of principles (the monad or the One, and the dyad), of which superior principle Brotinus said that it νοῦ παντὸς ... δυνάμει καὶ πρεσβείᾳ ὑπερέχει (Syrianus *In metaph.*, CAG VI/1, Berlin 1902, p. 165, 33-166, 6 Kroll).

Another author in whom we find the same doctrine is Chalcidius (*Platonis Timaeus interprete Chalcidio* ed. J. Wrobel, Leipzig 1876). *Deus summus*, he says, is *intellectus melior* (ch. 176). Furthermore, he designates the 'third god' as *secunda mens intellectusque* (ch. 188). But then his second god must be equal to the first intelligence, therefore the *summus* and *ineffabilis deus* must be above intelligence. Now, R. M. Jones, "Chalcidius and Neoplatonism", *Classical Philology* 13 (1918), p. 194-208 made it at least probable that all sources of Chalcidius were pre-Plotinian. This, on the whole, is also the contention of J. C. M. van Winden, *Chalcidius on Matter*, Leiden 1959. True, when it comes to the question of the Plotinian character of the supreme deity in Chalcidius, Winden seems to waver: cf., e.g., p. 30; 171; 245f. with p. 110f. Cf. W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin 1930, p. 56, note 1.

And in the *Hermetica* we read: ὁ οὖν θεός οὐ νοῦς ἐστὶν, αἴτιος δὲ τοῦ <νοῦν> εἶναι, οὐδὲ πνεῦμα, αἴτιος δὲ τοῦ εἶναι πνεῦμα. . . . (II 14, p. 37, 15 Nock-Festugière; cf. A.-J. Festugière, *Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, vol. 4, Paris 1954, p. 78).

Finally, among the parallels between Origenes and Plotinus, brought to light in K. H. E. de Jong, *Plotinus of Ammonius Saccas?* (Leiden 1941), we find in *C. Celsum* VII 38: θεόν . . . νοῦν . . . ἢ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας . . . εἶναι and in *Exhortatio ad mart.* 47: God is ἐπέκεινα τῶν νοητῶν.

All this makes it extremely improbable that Plotinus should have been the first to elevate his supreme principle above νοῦς.

identical with the realm of being. For, in Plato, ideas and only ideas are that which has true being.

It can safely be said that there is very little in Plato's writings to support the assertion that he identified intelligence with ideas. Plotinus explicitly quotes Parmenides as having taught this identity. But in addition to Parmenides, Plotinus claims as his witness Aristotle. According to him, intelligence and the objects of intelligence coincide (V 9 [5], 5, 30-31).¹ And Plotinus obviously feels entitled to 'correct' Aristotle and identify his intelligibles with Plato's ideas. Thus, the combination of Aristotle's doctrine of the identity of incorporeal objects of intelligence with intelligence and Plato's doctrine of ideas permits Plotinus to describe the realm of intelligence as containing ideas and as that of true being.

We do not mean to deny that the introduction of intelligence and the soul as two of the three principal realities is based on systematic considerations. But we claim as our right to show that even without such systematic considerations the doctrine of Plotinus can be interpreted as a result of a synthesis of Plato with Aristotle, especially Plato's doctrine of ideas and Aristotle's doctrine of the identity of intelligibles with intelligence; furthermore, by combining what is central in Plato, viz. his theory of ideas, with what is central in Aristotle, viz. his doctrine of intelligence.

Of course, when we speak of Aristotle's doctrine of intelligence, we mean this doctrine in its double aspect, which in modern terminology we could call the metaphysical aspect and the psychological aspect. The *locus classicus* of the former is *Met.* A, that of the latter, *De anima* III. Plotinus undoubtedly assumes that it is one and the same intelligence which Aristotle treats in the two works. From the former Plotinus adopts the characterization of intelligence as one of the principal realities (though he blames Aristotle for having overlooked that intelligence, as described by Aristotle himself, can only be the second rather than the first of the three principal realities). From the former and the latter he adopts the doctrine that intelligence and the intelligibles are identical.

¹ The allusion is, of course, to *De anima* III 4, 430a 3-4: ἐπὶ . . . τῶν ἀνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον and to *De anima* III 5, 430a 19-22: τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι, ἢ δὲ κατὰ δύνάμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. The first part of this sentence (ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν - οὐδὲ χρόνῳ) recurs literally in III 7, 431 a 1-4 (as for the second part, see below, p. 11). Cf. *Met.* A 7, 1072b 20-22: αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταυτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν; 9, 1075 a 3: οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία.

Having once adopted Aristotle's intelligence theory in principle, Plotinus, by the same token, adopts some of its other features. When he speaks of a double intelligence, one that intelligizes and another that 'provides' the intelligizing, we immediately recognize Aristotle's doctrine of double intelligence – in his own words ὁ μὲν νοῦς τῶ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῶ πάντα ποιεῖν (*De an.* III 5,430a 13–15). How shall we translate ποιεῖν? We cannot use the word 'to act', because it is an intransitive word. We must use the word 'to produce'. We shall presently see why this problem of translation is of considerable importance.

However we must not assume that Plotinus is satisfied with just two kinds of intelligence. He sometimes speaks of true intelligence as different from so-called intelligence. He also speaks of intelligence acquired by conquest of ignorance. The former he also designates as potential and distinguishes it from the actual and ever being intelligence (V 9, 5, 1–4). For the time being, we simply register all this and shall return to it later (see no. 33).

(3) IN ADDITION to the identification of intelligence with ideas (or as we also could say, the intrinsicalness of ideas with intelligence), Plotinus has, as we have said, to identify the demiurge with intelligence or he would in Plato find more than three principal realities (e.g. that which is one, the ideas, intelligence, the demiurge, and the soul).

Again it could be said that this identification is the result of systematic considerations on the part of Plotinus. But again it could be replied that it could equally well be understood in purely historical terms. Plotinus identifies intelligence with the demiurge, simply because in Aristotle he finds the intelligence referred to in terms which suggest its demiurgic quality – in other words, it is the phrase νοῦς τῶ πάντα ποιεῖν which immediately explains why Plotinus should have asserted that intelligence is identical with Plato's demiurge (ποιητῆς τοῦ παντός: *Tim.* 28C). The verb ποιεῖν is the link permitting Plotinus this identification. In other words, Plotinus' theory that intelligence is identical with the demiurge is another result of his synthesis of Plato with Aristotle.

(4) Now, Plotinus teaches that all three principal realities exist within us. And in this context he specifically states that intelligence differs from the soul in that the latter intelligizes (or, as we should

say in the case of the soul, thinks) only intermittedly; whereas intelligence intelligizes permanently.

Again we are reminded of Aristotle. One of the famous sentences in his *De anima* Γ5, 430a22 reads: ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ.

What is the subject of this sentence? Most, though not all scholars agree: it is the νοῦς.¹ For our purpose it is sufficient to assume that this is at least one of the possible interpretations. Of course, it is the 'productive'² intelligence as distinguished from another kind of intelligence. And of this productive intelligence, we repeat, Aristotle says that it thinks incessantly. We suggest: it is this passage which is the source of Plotinus' statement.

Now, quite obviously such a doctrine is bound to result in difficulties. If intelligence thinks always and if intelligence is inherent in us – how shall we explain that we do not (or, if we prefer to state the problem a little differently, the soul in us does not) think always?

(5) TO UNDERSTAND Plotinus' answer, we must for a while leave the present treatise and turn to another, viz. IV 8.

One of the main difficulties of the system of Plotinus (and of Plato, if we try to reduce his philosophy to a coherent system) is this. The descent of the world-soul (or its effuluration from the intelligence) is, of course, a timeless event. The same is true of its re-ascent. In other words, the descent and the re-ascent take place in some kind of a permanent now. But quite obviously this cannot be said of the

¹ See, e.g., the discussion in R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle, De anima*, Cambridge 1907, a.1. For the full text see preceding note.

Among those who disagree we find M. de Corte (*La Doctrine de l'intelligence chez Aristote*, Paris 1934). How, then, does he interpret the passage in question? This can best be seen from the translation of the crucial passage by I. Thomas, who sides with de Corte: "Knowledge in act is the same as the thing (actually known). But (knowledge) that is potential is, in the individual, prior in time. Absolutely, however, not even in time. Whereas (knowledge in act) does not sometimes know and sometimes not know. . ." (*Aristotle's De anima in the version of William of Moerbeke and the commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas* tr. by . . . Kenelm Foster . . . and . . . Sylvester Humphries . . . with an introduction by . . . Ivo Thomas, London 1951, p. 37). I can leave it to the reader whether this translation and interpretation (which makes the single act of actual knowledge the subject of the sentence "it is not as if it would sometimes think and sometimes not think", and thus amounts to saying "whenever we actually think, we think without interruption") can be justified.

² It is preferable to translate ποιητικώς in this context by 'productive' rather than the usual 'active', 'agent', etc. (in his several writings F. Dieterici for the Arabic equivalent of ποιητικώς used *schaffend*). Such a translation makes it easier to understand why Plotinus equates νοῦς with Plato's demiurge (δημιουργός γὰρ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῶ [scil. Plato]: V 1, 8, 5). Possible alternatives to 'productive': 'efficient' or 'operative'; see below, p. 14, n. 6. On the problem whether Plotinus ever identified the demiurge with ψυχή instead of νοῦς see E. Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen* III/2⁴ (1903), p. 689, note 3.

descent of the individual souls into their bodies. Nor can it be said of their re-ascent – be it while they are still embodied, be it after they have left the body. (The difficulty does not exist for the author of the *Timaeus*, because here the individual souls come into existence by an act of creation different from that by which the cosmic soul came into existence).

With this difference is connected another. The descent of the cosmic soul into the body of the universe implies no deterioration of the status of the soul. And the same is true of the descent of individual souls into celestial bodies. But it is not so with the descent of individual souls into human bodies. This descent implies some deterioration and it is caused by some previous deterioration of the individual souls. Indeed, here the element of guilt and of voluntary fall emerges – an element not easily compatible with the effuluration schema in which everything is involuntary. And as in Plato so in Plotinus we find a pessimistic and an optimistic assessment of the status of the embodied soul (see esp. *Enn.* IV 8, 1. 23–50).

Plotinus tries to have it both ways. On the one hand, the descent of individual souls into human bodies is the result of their *οικεῖος φορὰ* – their own work, as we could say and therefore can correctly be designated as a failing (*ἀμαρτία*). But on the other hand, this *ἀμαρτία* is supposed to be the result of some eternal law of nature (IV 8, 5, 5–12; cf. 7, 21 where the same words are applied to the descent of intelligence), and in some way to be advantageous to somebody or something else. Whether these two ideas can actually be reconciled appears dubious.

Now, after the first fall, the future of the soul depends on the kind of life it leads. Clearly its *ἀμαρτίαι* are of the same kind as the original *ἀμαρτία*, thus not timeless, necessary events. Again we see a radical difference between two kinds of embodiment (*ibid.* 16–20).

But again Plotinus attempts some kind of theodicy – it is only due to the soul's descent that its powers become revealed (*ibid.* 31–35). However, it is not quite sure whether Plotinus is still speaking of the 'innocent' descent or the 'faulty'. Indeed, he now explains why even that which is one had to become many in a kind of unfolding and self-revealing process. In any case, in this context Plotinus states with particular clarity that the reason why the soul produced that which is corporeal was to fashion it and thus to reveal itself. Plotinus also keeps an alternative open: either the *ὕλη* existed from all eternity or it also is the result of an effuluration (6, 18–21).

In the same context, Plotinus describes the soul as *μέσσην τάξιν ἐν τοῖς*

οὔσων ἐπιπροϋσαν – in other words, in lieu of the usual bi-partition, intelligibilia (tripartite) – sensibilia, we suddenly have a tri-partition – intelligibilia – soul – sensibilia (7, 6–8).

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Plotinus himself felt the unsatisfactoriness of his attempt. This is perhaps the reason why he in the end suggests a theory which, he clearly indicates, is a departure from accepted doctrine and original with him. It is the doctrine that the 'fall' of the individual souls is never completed – in other words, that our soul is in some way still not fallen. Only we are not conscious of its 'hidden' life, i.e. of its still being united with the intelligence. Here the concept of the unconscious which originally was introduced to explain the intelligizing intelligence in us is explicitly so enlarged as to contain also the presence of the 'unfallen' part of the soul in us and so take the sting out of the theory of fall.¹

Obviously the doctrine of the unconscious is of prime importance in the system of Plotinus.² By its application, the pessimistic (or as we almost could say, the gnostic) aspects of his and even Plato's philosophy are overcome – or almost overcome. The soul is not really imprisoned in the body. Nor is it really hampered in living on the higher plane of intelligence. We are, if we may say so, simply distracted by all the noise of the sensible world; therefore, we are not aware of the true condition of the soul.

If we now return to our original passage in *Enn.* V 1, we see that it contains the same doctrine of the unconscious activity of the intelligence which in IV 8 is stated in greater detail. But at the same time it becomes obvious – the doctrine of the unconscious, whether we apply it to the soul, or to intelligence, or to both, historically stems from the assertion of Aristotle that the 'productive' intelligence always intelligizes.

(6) But is this not highly conjectural? Could we not say that we might rightly or wrongly find all these doctrines in Aristotle, but that this does not prove that Plotinus found them there? Did he have to read Aristotle the way we do?

The objection is correct. But we can refute it because we can

¹ Καὶ εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δόξαν τῶν ἄλλων τομῆσαι τὸ φαινόμενον λέγειν σαφέστερον, οὐ πᾶσα οὐδ' ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ἔδου, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀεὶ: τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ εἰ κρᾶτοῖ ... οὐκ ἔᾶ αἰσθησθῆναι ἡμῖν εἶναι ὧν θεᾶται τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνω (IV 8, 8, 1–6).

² It is the particular merit of R. Harder (*Plotinus Schriften* übers. von ... , rev. ed., vol. 1b, Hamburg 1956, p. 449; 453 ad 40–41) to have strongly stressed this. See also E. Bréhier, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, Chicago 1958, p. 73–5. But cf. R. Arnou, *Le Désir de Dieu*, Paris 1921, against A. Drews, *Plotin*, Jena 1907.

prove that in the next proximity of Plotinus Aristotle was read the way he was presented above and that in all likelihood Plotinus was familiar with this kind of reading him.

Let us briefly review the interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine concerning what was later to be known as the doctrine of the active (= productive) and passive intelligence as expounded in *De anima* III, 5, by Alexander Aphrodisias.¹

Everybody is born with the possibility (δύναμις) and capacity (ἐπιτηδεύουσα; in the Middle Ages often *praeparatio*) to receive the ἐπιστημονικός and θεωρητικός intelligence. In other words, we could say we are born with the potential intelligence (δυνάμει νοῦς). This potential intelligence is double and the two parts or aspects 'receive' each other. Precisely for this reason this intelligence can be called material intelligence (ὕλικός νοῦς), because receptiveness is a mark of matter.² Material intelligence can be compared with the 'unwritteness' of a blackboard (τῷ τῆς πινακίδος ἀγράφῳ, *tabulae rasum* rather than *tabula rasa*).³

After this material intelligence has been instructed, it is the form and perfection (εἶδος καὶ ἐντελέχεια) of the uninstructed intelligence. In this context it can also be called acquired (ἐπίκτητος) intelligence. Also the term 'activity' (ἐνέργεια) can be applied to it. We can also describe it as ability (ἐξίς).⁴ Whereas the material intelligence can perceive intelligibles (νοητά) only in the presence of sensibles in which they are embodied, the acquired intelligence can perceive intelligibles even in the absence of corresponding sensibles.⁵

Being 'able' to intelligize is more than being capable of doing it but less than actually doing it. When the acquired intelligence actually exercises its ability to intelligize, we speak of intelligence in the active sense of the word (κατ' ἐνέργειαν).⁶

¹ All quotations from Alexander Aphrodisias refer to his *De anima liber cum mantissa* ed. I. Bruns (*Supplementum Aristotelicum*, vol. II, Berlin 1887), p. 1-100; 101-186. Alexander's interpretation is treated in all writings dealing with the history of the νοῦς ποιητικός problem. For a bibliography see E. Barbotin, *La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste*, Louvain 1954.

² 81, 9-26 Bruns.

³ 84, 24-26 Bruns.

⁴ 81, 25-82, 6; 85, 10-11 Bruns.

⁵ 85, 20-25 Bruns.

⁶ 85, 25-86, 5 Bruns. It is therefore possible to say that the νοῦς ἐπίκτητος is the highest phase of the human mind: Zeller III/1⁴ (1909), p. 826, *pace* E. Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 4 (1929), p. 5-150, esp. p. 20, note 1. Gilson expects Alexander to distinguish clearly different kinds of actions of one and the same (human) νοῦς from two different νοῖ (and therefore credits Moslem philosophers, who indeed use the concepts of an *intellectus acquisitus*, *adeptus*, etc., as *separate* kinds of intelligence,

But in addition to this material intelligence in all its aspects and phases, there must exist another, the productive intelligence (νοῦς ποιητικός). It is this intelligence which is the cause (αἴτιος) of the material intelligence turning into 'able' intelligence. This productive intelligence is immaterial. It is an intelligible in the full sense of the word (κυρίως νοητόν), transcendent (χωριστόν), pure (ἀμιγές), changeless (ἀπαθές). In short, this productive intelligence is what Aristotle calls

with more originality than they deserve). Alexander, however, is not primarily interested in this stark distinction between function and substance. In other words, our human intelligence when 'energized' can be called *intellectus agens*, or *in effectu*, whereas the 'energizing' intelligence, which itself is energizing in the double sense of energizing in the intransitive and the transitive mode, can be called *intellectus activus*. Of course there is nothing to prevent a writer from reversing these terms and calling our intelligence after it has been energized, *intellectus activus*, the energizing intelligence, *intellectus* or *intelligentia agens*. As Alexander applies the term 'to energize' both in the transitive and the intransitive sense and as he applies it to the human intelligence, sometimes to express its static condition (we could say, it has been charged by and with the higher intelligence), sometimes its dynamic condition (we could say, it discharges in the act of actual knowledge what it has been charged with), it becomes immediately obvious that in any translation from the Greek, be it into Syrian, Arabic, Hebrew, or Latin, we should be prepared to meet a profusion and confusion of terms, all going back to ἐνεργεῖν and ἐνέργεια.

Furthermore, as Alexander uses the term ἐπίκτητος to indicate the *changed* condition of human intelligence after its having become 'charged' by the productive intelligence, it is possible to use the term ἐπίκτητος simply as an equivalent of 'productive intelligence', because by this 'charge' human intelligence becomes transformed into the productive intelligence (see below, p. 17). Two possibilities of translating ἐπίκτητος into Latin (*via* Arabic and Hebrew) offer themselves. We can speak either of *intellectus adeptus* or of *intellectus acquisitus* and both terms would indicate that aspect of human intelligence which has become identical with the productive intelligence. But as productive intelligence is also designated as νοῦς θύραθεν, often *intellectus acquisitus* or *adeptus* (i.e. the human mind in its most perfect condition) stands for νοῦς θύραθεν with the obvious understanding that it means the 'adventitious' intelligence *qua* having transformed the human intelligence or, which amounts to the same, the human intelligence *qua* having been transformed into productive intelligence. On these terminological problems, see J. Finnegan, "Texte arabe du ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΥ d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise", *Mélanges de l'Université St. Joseph* 33 (1956), p. 157-202, with his criticism of Gilson "Les sources" (above), p. 15; F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, London 1952, p. 90-93; *idem*, "L'intellectus acquisitus in Alfarabi", *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 32 (ser. VIII 7), 1953, p. 351-357, containing an Italian translation of one of the crucial passages of al-Fārābī's *Maqālāt fī ma' āni 'l'aql* (in medieval Latin translations: *De intellectu et intelligibili*, edited by Gilson, "Les sources" [above], p. 115-126; the same in a German translation in F. Dieterici, *Alfārābī's Philosophische Abhandlungen*, Leiden 1892, under the title *Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellekt' ('Vernunft')*). Whether the semi-equation νοῦς ἐπίκτητος = νοῦς ποιητικός was actually professed by al-Fārābī is of no major importance in this context. In any case, we see immediately that we cannot expect a consistent terminology. For that, Alexander kept it too loose and elastic. He particularly did not clearly distinguish between several functions of the same intelligence and several intelligences.

It should be stressed that both *intellectus* and *intelligentia* are translations of νοῦς. Undoubtedly those who used both terms tried to distinguish between two kinds of entities, but one can easily see that the verbal distinctions only cover (or uncover) actual confusion or syncretism. On the whole, *intelligentia* is used whenever the noetics of Aristotle is combined with his astronomy, i.e. where it is taken for granted that each unmoved mover (not only the prime mover) is a νοῦς or a νοητόν (on this combination of astronomy with noetics see below, p. 47, n. 1). In such a case, *intelligentia*

prime cause (τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον).¹ It is present in us in a manner different from the presence of the material intelligence. It is as eternal as the intelligibles. It is the adventitious, extrinsic intelligence (νοῦς θύραθεν).²

Therefore, Alexander concludes, whoever wishes to possess the divine within himself must provide for his being able to intelligize – not only what is usually the object of intelligizing, but also something of this order (διὸ οἷς μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν τι θεῖον ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις προνοητέον τοῦ δύνασθαι νοεῖν τι καὶ τοιοῦτον).³ And indeed, our intelligence, i.e. our material intelligence, when it intelligizes the productive intelligence, becomes productive intelligence – though perhaps it cannot be stated with precision how this transformation takes place (ὅν – scil. τὸν ποιητικὸν νοῦν – ὁ νοῦν νοῦς ... – scil. ὁ ὑλικὸς νοῦς –, ὅταν αὐτὸν νοῆ, ἐκεῖνος πῶς γίνεται).⁴

It is striking that in this context Alexander more than once uses the word 'likening' (in the transitive sense: ὁμοίωσις).⁵ One has the impression that we here have the Peripatetic version of the Platonic concept ὁμοίωσις θεῶ. In other words, Alexander says that man becomes like god (divinizes himself) whenever his material intelligence becomes transformed (γίνεται) into the productive intelligence. Of this will shortly more be said.

(7) OF PRIME IMPORTANCE for the whole chain of thought is Alexander's distinction between intelligibles which are embodied and intelli-

comes to be applied to the movers of the spheres, while *intellectus* designates more and more frequently the productive intelligence and/or the human intelligence in all its phases or aspects (although if the productive intelligence is equated with the lowest of the unmoved movers, it can also be designated as *intelligentia*). We still do not know what moved the medieval translators of Moslem philosophers to render one and the same term ('aql – νοῦς) by two terms. One would guess that ultimately they were motivated by a semi-conscious desire to dissolve the combination of Aristotle's astronomy with its 55 movers (reduced by some Moslem philosophers to 10) with his noetics, this noetics itself being already a fusion of the strictly 'theological' noetics expressed in the *Metaphysics* with the 'anthropological' noetics expressed in *De anima*. However, I do not understand why contemporary interpreters of Moslem philosophy (such as I. Madkour – *pace* his explanation in: *La Place d'al Fārābī dans l'école philosophique musulmane*, Paris 1934, p. 83, note 1 – or Rahman) still keep both terms (intellect, intelligence), giving the impression to their readers that their authors actually used two different Arabic terms for νοῦς. Cf. L. Massignon, "Notes sur le texte original arabe du 'De intellectu' d'al Fārābī", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 4 (1929), p. 151–158, esp. p. 158, Appendix III. – For a different use of these two terms see below, p. 50, n. 2.

¹ 88, 23–89, 12 Bruns.

² 90, 19–91, 4 Bruns.

³ 91, 5–6 Bruns.

⁴ 89, 21–22 Bruns. Cf. below, p. 17, n. 2.

⁵ 90, 17; 91, 8 Bruns.

gibles which are not (ξύλα εἶδη, κυρίως νοητά – ἔνυλα εἶδη).¹ It is only the immaterial intelligibles which are the objects of the productive intelligence. And it is only they which are fully identical with the act of intelligizing them. To a certain extent the intelligibles which the acquired intelligence intelligizes, as long as it intelligizes only ἔνυλα εἶδη, are also identical with the acts of intelligizing them. But full identity takes place only in the realm of the intelligibles properly so called.²

No reader of Aristotle can overlook that the same Aristotle who seems to have cogently proved that Plato's ideas exist only in the sensibles as their immanent form, assumes the existence of transcendent intelligibles (the changeless changers; intelligence in one of its aspects). Many readers of Aristotle consider this a contradiction. Whatever it is, we see that Alexander unhesitatingly assumes the existence of immanent εἶδη, roughly corresponding to Aristotle's forms, i.e. Platonic ideas made immanent, but also of immaterial, transcendent intelligibles (νοητά or εἶδη χωρὶς ὕλης). Indeed, this duality is the pivot on which his interpretation of Aristotle's intelligence doctrine rests.

We now shall discuss the significance of these two doctrines (the desirability of man's intelligence being 'transformed' and the dichotomy of intelligibles) taught by Alexander.

(8) HISTORICALLY and systematically Alexander's doctrine of the possibility and desirability of the transformation of human intelligence by and into the productive intelligence with this doctrine's religious overtones is of great interest. Before us we have the germs³

¹ Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συνθέτων τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τε καὶ τὰ τούτων εἶδη ὁ νοῦς αὐτῷ νοητὰ ποιεῖ χωρίζων αὐτὰ τῶν σὺν οἷς αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ τιὰ ἐστὶν εἶδη, ὡς τὰ καθ' αὐτά, χωρὶς ὕλης τε καὶ ὑποκειμένου τινός, ταῦτα κυρίως ἐστὶ νοητά, ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει τὸ εἶναι τοιαῦτα ἔχοντα ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τῆς τοῦ νοοῦντος αὐτὰ βοηθείας λαμβάνοντα· τὰ δὲ τῆ αὐτῶν φύσει νοητὰ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοητά, δυνάμει γὰρ νοητὰ τὰ ἔνυλα. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοητὸν ταῦτὸν τῷ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νῶ, εἰ γὰρ ταῦτὸν τὸ νοούμενον τῷ νοοῦντι· τὸ ἄρα ἔνυλον εἶδος νοῦς ὁ κυρίως τε καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (87, 24–88, 3; cf. 89, 13–15; 90, 2–11 Bruns). Another way of describing the difference: θύραθεν μὲν γὰρ – scil. for the soul – καὶ τὰ ἄλλα νοήματα, ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ὄντα, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι γενόμενα νοῦς (90, 20–21 Bruns).

This duality is overlooked by F. Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam*, London 1958, p. 13.

² ὅταν δὲ γὰρ τῶν ἐνύλων τι εἰδῶν νοῆ ... οὐκέθ' ὁ αὐτὸς πάντη γίνεται τῷ νοομένῳ πράγματι (88, 10–12 Bruns). All this is said before the concept of the νοῦς ποιητικὸς is formally introduced, but already here it is assumed that the ὑλικὸς νοῦς when fully active becomes identical with the νοῦς ποιητικὸς

³ No more than the germs – *pace* B. Nardi, *Saggi sull' aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI*, Florence n.d. (1958?), esp. p. 127–146, i.e. the section under the title *La mistica averroistica e Pico della Mirandola*, reprinted from *Archivio di Filosofia* 18 (1949), p. 55–75. It seems to me that Nardi reads Alexander entirely in

of what the Middle Ages had known as the problem of the *unio, conjunctio, continuatio, connexio, or cohaerentia* of the *intellectus abstractus* (χωριστός) or *intellectus activus* (agens), i.e. the νοῦς ποιητικός with that *intellectus* which, in some sense of the word, depending on which aspect (phase) of the human intellect we have in mind and what terms we decide to use for these several aspects, can be called human *intellectus* properly so called, whether to this term human intelligence we apply the term possible, potential, material, acquired, etc. and in which *unio* man's beatitude is supposed to consist.¹ The best known

the light of Moslem philosophy. I should like to mention that I arrived at my interpretation linking the problem of the *unio* in Moslem philosophy with Alexander before I became familiar with the writing of Nardi cited above. As I started from Alexander, to find him in Moslem philosophy later, whereas Nardi probably started from Moslem philosophy to trace some of its ideas back to Alexander, I arrived at results slightly different from those of Nardi. Of prime importance are Nardi's references to Albertus Magnus, Henricus Bates, Ulrich von Strasbourg (in this context see G. Théry, below, note 1), Bertold of Mosberg, Eckhart, etc.

¹ See on this e.g. G. Quadri, *La Philosophie arabe dans l'Europe médiévale des origines à Averroes*, Paris 1947, p. 154-164. On the same problem in Jewish philosophy see e.g.: M. Eisler, *Vorlesungen über die jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters*, 3 vol., Vienna 1876, 1870, 1883, esp. vol. II, p. 87-101; vol. III, p. 109-123; L. Husik, *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy*, Philadelphia 1946, p. 322 (on Hillel ben Samuel) and p. 339 (on Gersonides); J. Guttmann, *Die Philosophie des Judentums* (München 1933), p. 216f; 235f; and especially J. Hercz, *Drei Abhandlungen über die Conjunction des separaten Intellects mit dem Menschen*, Berlin 1869, p. VIII, note 4. On Gersonides in particular see also M. Joël, *Lewi ben Gerson (Gersonides) als Religionsphilosoph*, Breslau 1862, p. 30; 36; 38; 40; 43f.; I. Weil, *Philosophie religieuse de Lévi-ben-Gerson*, Paris 1868, p. 49f; M. Steinschneider, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. I, Berlin 1925, p. 233-270. The same problem in Christian philosophy is treated in E. Gilson, "Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 1 (1926/27), p. 1-127, esp. p. 48, note 2; *idem*, "Les sources" (above, p. 14, n. 6), p. 7-22 (on Alexander and Ps. Alexander) and p. 88-92 (on Gundissalinus). Fundamental are still: E. Renan, *Averroes et l'Averroïsme*, Paris 1852; 7th ed. 1922; particularly important for the present investigation are Part I, ch. II, section i, vi-ix; Part II, ch. I, section iii; and S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, Paris 1859; repr. 1927, p. 364f. (on Avicenna); 407-409 (on Ibn Tofail); 448-455 (on Ibn Roshd); *idem*, *Maimonides. Le guide des Égarés*, 3 vv., Paris 1859/6, repr. 1960 with his notes to I lxii, (esp. p. 277, note 3) lxxviii; lxxii; lxxiv and III li (esp. p. 446, note 1). See also G. Théry, *Autour du décret de 1216. II. Alexandre d'Aphrodise*, Le Saulchoir 1926, esp. p. 40, note 2; I. Madkour, *op. cit.* (p. 14, n. 6, above), p. 122-209.

Particularly important for the present topic is Théry's characteristic of al-Fārābī's doctrines concerning the relation between the productive intelligence and the human mind. Al-Fārābī's doctrine, says Théry, *nous achemine vers des conceptions mystiques analogues à celles qu'exprimeront les théologiens catholiques dans leur doctrine du mens*. Equally important is Théry's quotation from Ulrich von Strasbourg. The latter, following Avicenna, uses the term *sanctus* to designate the condition of the human mind after its 'transformation'. This *intellectus sanctus*, in turn, becomes, first, *illuminatus*, and eventually, *divinus* (B. N., ms. 15900, fol. 4 r.). In connection with this text of Ulrich Théry points out the problem of the relation between the mysticism of the XIIth and XIIIth centuries and mentions especially Albert the Great, whose thought, Théry says, to a surprising degree depends on Moslem philosophy, so that he becomes the intermediary between the two (p. 39f.).

See furthermore: M. R. Burbach, *The Theory of Beatitude in Latin-Arabian Philosophy and Its Initial Impact on Christian Thought*, U. of Toronto Thesis, typed, 1944. On Maimonides: S. B. Scheyer, *Das psychologische System des Maimonides*, Frankfurt/M 1845, esp. p. 51-65; 76-87.

documents dealing with this problem are a writing by Ibn Bāḡḡa¹ and four by Averroes.² This union is, if we may say so, the neo-Aristotelian counterpart of the *unio mystica* usually so called.³ In this

¹ M. Asín Palacios, "Tratado de Avempace sobre la union del intelecto con el hombre", *Al Andalus* 7 (1942), p. 1-47, esp. p. 45f., describing the 'ecstasy' (with physical symptoms!) in which this union takes place. In this context see on Ibn Bāḡḡa esp. Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, "The Place of Politics in the Philosophy of Ibn Bāḡḡa", *Islamic Culture* 25 (1951), p. 167-211; on Ibn Bāḡḡa (and Averroes: see next note) also M. Cruz Hernández, *Historia de la filosofía española: Filosofía hispano-musulmana*, 2 vols., Madrid 1957, vol. I, p. 355-7, 367f; Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, Cambridge 1958, p. 158-174.

² *De beatitudine animae* and *Epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti* [= χωριστού] *cum homine* in the Juntina: *Aristotelis Opera* (Venice 1550-2), 11 vols., vol. 9, f. 64r-68r; in the Comino edition (Venice 1560), 11 vols., vol. 10, f. 353r-357v; 358r-360r (the Arabic text ed. by Ahmed Fouād in: *Ibn Rochd, Paraphrase du De Anima*, Cairo 1950, is inaccessible to me). Cf. N. Morata, "Los opúsculos de Averroes en la Biblioteca Escorialense", *La Ciudad de Dios* 134 (1923) 137-147; 292-303; also Rabbi Gerson ben Shlomon d'Arles, *The Gate of Heavens*, tr., ed. by F. S. Bodenheimer, Jerusalem 1953, in which I 12 is a translation of the *Epistola* (see Section III 2); M. Cruz Hernández, *op. cit.* (above, note 1), vol. II, p. 173-176.

The question of the true authorship of these two, partly identical, opuscula does not concern us here. See on this J. L. Teicher, "L'origine del Tractatus De animae beatitudine", *Atti del XIX Congresso internazionale dagli Orientalisti*, Rome 1938, p. 522-27. According to Teicher, the ideas expressed in *De beatitudine* are only a cento from an original which can be reconstructed with the help of *Tagmule ha-nefes* by Hillel b. Samuel of Verona, which original however, is not the work of Averroes but of his son Abdula (cf. on him also Morata, *op. cit.*) and its ideas belong, not to Averroes, but to Ibn Bāḡḡa. I don't think that this is the last word on the question. Cf. also L. Gauthier, *Ibn Roshd*, Paris 1948, p. 251 f. On the third of Averroes' writings see next note; on the fourth (commentary to Aristotle's *De anima*) see Section III 2.

³ For historical perspective and additional literature see P. Merlan, "Aristoteles, Averroes und die beiden Eckharts", in: *Autour d'Aristote*, Louvain 1955, p. 543-566. Add: P. Duhem, *Le système du monde*, vol. 6, Paris 1954, p. 219-223, esp. p. 233 on the necessity of *devenir l'homme en soi* in Eckhart the Younger; H. Hof, *Scintilla animae*, Lund 1952, esp. p. 203; J. Kopper, *Die Metaphysik Meister Eckharts*, Saarbrücken 1955, esp. p. 109-112.

However, I should like to add two points to my paper.

The condition necessary to achieve the union with productive intelligence is described by Eckhart the Younger as *Ledigwerden aller Bilder*. As result of this *Ledigwerden* the passive (possible, material) intelligence becomes incorporeal.

Now, in Averroes' commentary on *De anima* and in the two treatises *De beatitudine* and *De conjunctione* Averroes presents the *unio* in such a way that we are inclined to assume that according to him the passive intelligence in the moment of its *unio* is perfected. The *unio* is, as we could say, the fulfilment of the material intelligence.

However, in his essay part of whose medieval Hebrew translation was done into German by L. Hannes (*Des Averroes Abhandlung: "Über die Möglichkeit der Conjunction" oder "Über den materiellen Intellekt"*, in der hebräischen Übersetzung eines Anonymus, Halle 1892) Averroes approaches the problem in another way. He here explicitly teaches that in the moment of the *unio* the passive (material) intelligence disappears (see Section III 2).

Now, it is one of the most characteristic aspects of this material intelligence that it is full of *formae imaginativae* (φαντάσματα), these being what connects the unique, supraindividual material intelligence with the several individuals. Therefore it seems that it would entirely be in keeping with Averroes' idea to call the disappearance of the material intelligence *qua* individual the disappearance of the *formae imaginativae*. In fact, one disappearance would simply be an aspect of the other.

But if such is the case it is also entirely possible that Eckhart the Younger in his doctrine of the disappearance of *Bilder* - by which disappearance according to him

union the individual is absorbed into the universal, i.e. the supra-personal, and this supra-personal is at the same time characterized as the divine.¹

In other words, we can speak of an *Aristoteles mysticus* (see below) and of an *Alexander mysticus*. On the other hand, for their kind of mysticism we can perhaps use the formula 'rationalistic' mysticism.

Now the term 'rationalist' mysticism has been used, e.g. by Madkour,² to describe the mysticism of al-Fārābī as distinct from that of the Sufis in that the former does not imply, while the latter does, that the climactic moment of man's life (ecstasy in *some* sense of the word) consists in a kind of leap and reversal of the 'natural' cognitive process, so that according to the former ecstasy is a condition of reason in its perfection. With Madkour agrees Gardet³ who also classifies Avicenna's mysticism as 'rational' in this sense. However, I use the term 'rationalistic mysticism' in a somewhat different sense. I mean the term to indicate that the god with whom we are united in

the material intelligence becomes immaterial – is inspired (to the point of sometimes sounding like a translation) by that doctrine of Averroes. *Der Bilder ledig werden*, a concept seemingly so native to German mysticism, could simply be a variant of Averroes' doctrine of the disappearance of the material intelligence in the moment of the *unio*. We could also say that in the moment of the union the material intelligence resumes its transpersonal existence.

There would still remain the difference between Eckhart the Younger and Averroes in that according to the latter the disappearance of the material intelligence takes place only at the end of a road the prior transversing of which is, however, indispensable. There is nothing of this indispensability in Eckhart the Younger. The *Bilder*, far from being the stimuli actuating the material intelligence so that it becomes able to intelligize intelligibles in its condition of being connected with individuals, seem to be from the first to the last obstacles on the way towards the *unio*.

I am quoting the decisive passages from Averroes, adding my own notes in parentheses, whereas the additions in brackets indicate Hannes' supplements.

... *der Intellekt in habitu* (i.e. the human intellect in its highest stage or as we could also say, the material intelligence *qua* appropriated by the individual through the mediation of *formae imaginativae*) geht, wenn ihm der aktive Intellekt (i.e. the productive intelligence) erhebt, zu Grunde und verschwindet in diesem Momente vollständig, und der materielle Intellekt, welcher die absolute Möglichkeit und Anlage ist, alle Formen zu recipieren, conjungiert sich [mit dem aktiven Intellekt]; denn die Wirkung, welche ihn bei seiner Conjunction mit dem Intellekt in habitu [von seiten des aktiven Intellekts trifft,] ist zur Zeit seiner – [des Intellekts in actu] Vollendung [zugleich] seine [des materiellen Intellekts] Erhebung (p. 51; cf. p. 38f.: to reach perfection intelligence – i.e. material intelligence *qua* having become individual property – must die *Einbildungskraft* ... tilgen und vernichten).

For other questions related to this treatise by Averroes see Section III 2.

On the mutual relation of the different writings in which Averroes dealt with the problem of the *unio* see M. Steinschneider, *Al-Farabi . . . Leben und Schriften (Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de Saint-Petersbourg, VII série, tome XIII, No. 4) Saint-Petersbourg 1869, p. 96–107; 104.*

¹ Cf. P. Merlan, *op. cit.* (above, p. 19, n. 3), p. 547.

² I. Madkour, *op. cit.* (above, p. 14, n. 6), p. 186.

³ L. Gardet, *La connaissance mystique chez Ibn Sinā*, Cairo 1952 (= *idem, La pensée religieuse d'Avicenna*, ch. V, Paris 1951), p. 27.

ecstasy is not the God-above-thinking-and-being, but rather one who is thought-thinking-itself. In other words, anticipating later discussions,¹ in Averroes and Ibn Bāḡḡa the *unio mystica* takes place with what Plotinus would call the second god. Quite obviously the absorption into this kind of god is different from the absorption into the ineffable one. What is common to both kinds of ecstasy is loss of personality. But in lieu of the cloud of unknowing, we have in rationalistic mysticism the flood of sheer light. In rationalistic mysticism we have absolute transparency, or, as we could also say, self-knowledge. In an ordinary act of knowledge the object of knowledge is something opaque which knowledge illuminates and makes visible. But in the ecstatic act of knowledge nothing opaque is left, because what is known is identical with what knows.²

Obviously a very careful definition of terms is called for – but also a better understanding of experiences meant by Ibn Bāḡḡa and Averroes when they spoke of union. A study of certain aspects of Freemasonry or of Quakerism would shed considerable light on this kind of mysticism.

And perhaps simply going back to some Aristotelian texts will help our understanding of the ecstasies of rational mysticism.

Who wouldn't be familiar with the opening passage of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*? Starting from the premise that to know is what all men are striving after, Aristotle step by step shows what kind of knowledge will satisfy that striving. In other words, Aristotle clarifies only what obviously everybody instinctively (φύσει) desires. And it turns out that the knowledge men are after is wisdom, i.e. the knowledge of first principles and causes – small wonder, then, Aristotle continues, that many would be of the opinion that it is a kind of knowledge which only a god could possess, whereas man should not aspire to it. But this is wrong, says Aristotle. The knowledge man is and should be after (wisdom) is divine indeed and it is so in a double sense: its object matter is god, because as everybody knows god is a principal cause, and obviously it is the knowledge which god possesses, and divine in this sense. In short: man desires the knowledge of god.

Now, among the qualities which this divine knowledge or wisdom

¹ See Section III 2.

² Therefore, it is not quite correct to stress only the similarity and overlook the difference between these two kinds of mysticism, as is done, e.g. by M. M. Gorce, "Averroisme", *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique* V. Paris 1931, p. 1032–1039, esp. p. 1037. Also I. Goldziher, *Die islamische und jüdische Philosophie = Kultur der Gegenwart* I/IV, Berlin 1909 calls Averroes' doctrine of the *conjunctio* simply a leap into mysticism (p. 65).

possesses it is one which deserves particular attention. As is well known, Aristotle proceeds to deduce these qualities from what men conceive the wise man to be. And the first quality which the wise man is supposed to exhibit is that he knows everything in the way in which omniscience is possible, i.e., without knowledge of details (ὕπολαμβάνομεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὡς ἐνδέχεται, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν).¹

Omniscience – this is the ultimate goal of man's search. It is indeed obvious that the knowledge sought after is divine knowledge. For god most certainly is omniscient, in the sense in which omniscience is possible at all. Thus to know god and to possess divine omniscience coincide.

It is customary to take these words lightly. It seems impossible that Aristotle should actually have expected man ever to become omniscient. But do we have the right to tone his words down?

I don't think so. If we remember the endless discussions concerning the manner of divine omniscience (and, for that matter, the manner of divine providence) we ought to realize that Aristotle meant literally what he said: there is a kind of knowledge which is in some way all-comprehensive. God possesses it – man should try to acquire it. Only when he succeeds, his longing to know will be satisfied. Man desires and is able to divinize himself.

Now, with this passage of Aristotle in mind we are much better able to appreciate the theory of the *conjunctio*. The full *conjunctio* is the moment in which man becomes omniscient. For this moment he knows, he understands as a modern would say, everything – in the manner in which omniscience is possible. In the moment of conjunction man has become god. And though many would feel that all this is preposterous, it takes only a moderate amount of imagination to see that throughout the ages probably many actually experienced a sudden flash of insight, a moment of absolute certainty and absolute clarity, and would describe the object of their insight by the one word "all". This, I take it, is ultimately what is meant by *conjunctio* and its bliss. This is what Alexander has in mind, no matter how weakly he expressed himself. This in any case is the way the passage was later understood.

The experience of "suddenly I understood everything and experienced the feeling of most intensive bliss" – it would not be surprising

¹ *Met.* A 2, 982a 8–10. A few lines later the concept of omniscience is specified as the science of the καθόλου: τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ μάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀκαγακίῳ ὑπάρχειν. οὗτος γὰρ οἶδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα (*ibid.*, 21–23).

if some would immediately class such an experience as characteristic of some pathological condition of the mind, perhaps even an outright indication of a mental malady. Of course we cannot in this context presume to reopen the discussion of the relation between mysticism (be it what we call rationalistic mysticism, be it the other type) and sanity. And we shall even be ready to grant that some descriptions of blissful ecstasy come from persons who by ordinary standards would be classed as mental cases. The best known example is provided by Dostojevskij's *The Idiot* (Part II, ch. 5), where, as an obvious piece of autobiography, the feeling of most intensive bliss preceding an epileptic fit is vividly described. Here, it is true, the stress is not on omniscience, but rather on the experience of perfect harmony. But another author, also considered a mental case by ordinary standards, provides us with a more appropriate example. It is Gérard de Nerval. His *Aurélia* contains this passage in its first chapter: *Je vais essayer . . . de transcrire les impressions d'une longue maladie qui s'est passée tout entière dans les mystères de mon esprit; – et je ne sais pourquoi je me sers de ce terme maladie, car jamais, quant à ce qui de moi – même, je ne me suis senti mieux portant. Parfois, je croyais ma force et mon activité doublées; il me semblait tout savoir, tout comprendre: l'imagination m'apportait des délices infinies. En recouvrant ce que les hommes appellent la raison, faudra-t-il regretter de les avoir perdues? . . .*

The cases of Dostojevskij and Gérard de Nerval are, granted, exceptional cases. But are the ecstasies which they describe not simply normal human experiences having become abnormal within the context of an abnormal personality?

I am perfectly aware of the risk which I run in trying to explain the union with the productive intelligence in the light of fits of malady. Some will indignantly defend the concept of the *unio* from my scurrilous comparisons. Some will with profound satisfaction in what I say find a confirmation of their conviction that any kind of mystical ecstasy is close to insanity. Let me therefore conclude by shifting the responsibility for my interpretation, particularly for its mentioning epilepsy, to Averroes himself.

The problem of the union with productive intelligence has in Moslem philosophy time and again been discussed in connection with the problem of prophecy (revelation). The condition of the prophet and of prophecy is often explained in terms of this union.¹ Now, in his commentary of Aristotle's *De somno*, Averroes explains dreams as the

¹ F. Rahman, *op. cit.* (above, p. 14, n. 6), esp. p. 31–36.

result of the direct action of the productive intelligence on the human mind. And in this context we read the sentence: *Ideo prophetia venit in dispositione simili epilepsie*.¹ This is said by a believer in prophecy, not an irrisor of it.

We mentioned the importance of the concept of universality for the concept of omniscience – be it divine, be it human. It is perhaps appropriate to remind the reader that the question of the mode of divine omniscience – knowledge of universals or knowledge of parti-

¹ Averroes, *Compendium in Parva naturalia*, ed. Aemilia L. Shields and H. Blumberg, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1949, p. 115, 8–10. The context in which this assertion occurs is this. First, Averroes takes it for granted that the *dator of cognitio* in dreams is the *intelligentia agens*. Second, Averroes proves that this *intelligentia agens* expresses itself (or its insights, which are always universal), if we may say so, only in the language of *imaginatioes* (*Vorstellungen*), stored in everybody according to his specific, empirical experiences and the ideas which he has acquired according to the circumstances of his life, etc., and that our dreams are dreams of particulars, not universals. Thirdly, dreams presuppose the more efficient operation of the *virtutes interiores* of the soul, and these *virtutes interiores* in some people work with such vehemence that they check the *virtutes exteriores*. This sometimes results in a fit (*syncopis*). In lieu of *syncopis*, a variant reads: *simile syncopi sicut accidit eis qui dicuntur esse debiles spiritu* (p. 103–115).

It is, of course, impossible here to open a discussion either on the nature of the condition for which the Latin text uses the term 'epilepsy', or on the problem of Mohammed's 'sanity' (see, e.g. the discussion in J. C. Archer, *Mystical Elements in Mohammed*, New Haven 1924, p. 14–23). We must limit ourselves to reminding the reader that in medieval and early modern philosophy the problem of the union with the productive intelligence combines with the problem of prophecy (revelation). See, e.g. H. A. Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy", *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 32 (1941/2), p. 345–70; 33 (1942/3), p. 49–62; F. Rahman, *op. cit.* (above), p. 17, n. 1); R. Walzer, "Alfarabi's Theory of Prophecy", *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957), p. 142–148; H. Gätje, "Philosophische Traumlehren im Islam", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 109 (N.F. 34), 1959, p. 258–285, esp. p. 272–285. Particularly important in this context is: Z. Diesendruck, "Maimonides' Lehre von der Prophetie", *Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abrahams*, New York 1927, p. 74–134.

For the sake of comparison I should like to quote some passages from Cicero's *De divinatione*, referring to theories of divination professed by both Dicaearchus and Cratippus.

... *animos hominum quadam ex parte extrinsecus esse tractos et haustos* (and *pace* K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, Munich 1926, p. 200, note, I cannot help seeing in this phrase anything but the equivalent of Aristotle's νοῦς θύραθεν) – *ex quo intelligitur esse extra divinum animum, humanus unde ducatur – humani autem animi eam partem, quae sensum, quae motum, quae adpetitum habeat, non esse ab actione corporis seungatam; quae autem pars animi rationis atque intelligentiae sit particeps, eam tum maxime vigere, cum plurimum absit a corpore* (I, 32, 70). . . . *quae* (scil. *divinatio naturalis*) *physica disputandi subtilitate referenda est ad naturam deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus, cumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est contagione divinatorum animos humanos commoveri* (I 49, 110). *Nec vero umquam animus hominis naturaliter divinat, nisi cum ita solutus est et vacuus, ut ei plane nihil sit cum corpore: quod aut vatibus contingit aut dormientibus; itaque ea duo genera a Dicaearcho probantur et, ut dixi, a Cratippo nostro* (I 50, 113). . . . *haec me Peripateticorum ratio magis movebat et veteris Dicaearchi et eius, qui nunc floret, Cratippi, qui censent esse in mentibus hominum tamquam oraculum aliquod, ex quo futura praesentiant, si aut furore divino* (how far are we from Averroes' *syncopis*?) *incitatus animus aut somno relaxatus solute moveatur ac libere* (II 48, 100).

culars – was obviously in the center of Academic interests. For in his *Laws* Plato devotes considerable space to disproving the thesis that god knows the universal only and that accordingly his providence is for the universal only. True, he does not use the terms "universal" and "particular" but simply the terms "great" and "small". But this probably is only a question of style. In any case, in this context Plato stresses that the gods know everything which might be the object of either αἰσθησις or ἐπιστήμη (X II, 901d). And it is against the background of this controversy that the concept of divine and therefore also of human omniscience in Aristotle comes fully to life. Indeed, either we must abandon the claim to human omniscience and to man's becoming divine by being omniscient, or interpret the concept of "science" in such a way that this claim retains some possible meaning i.e. limit it to the universal and exclude the particular, which is accessible to sensation only and cannot be an object of science. And it seems that at times at least Aristotle accepted the latter alternative.

To avoid any misunderstandings it should perhaps be said with all clarity: the writer of these lines has never experienced anything even remotely approaching a mystical ecstasy either of the rational or the other type. But he had never had any difficulty in understanding what the mystics of whatever type were describing or what they were after.

(9) It would be surprising if Alexander's doctrine of the transformation of the human intelligence would not have been adopted by Neoplatonists earlier than Ps. Alexander (see no. 13). And indeed it seems that Porphyry became one of its spokesmen. Not so long ago Kutsch published an Arabic fragment, tentatively attributed by him to Porphyry. In Kutsch's translation its first sentence reads: . . . *dasz der seelische Geist* (obviously human intelligence) *wenn er sich mit dem ersten, lauterem und reinen Geist* (πρῶτος, ἀμιγής, καθαρὸς νοῦς) *vereinigt hat, immer denkend ist und nicht bald denkend und bald nicht denkend ist . . . Der Geist . . . ist . . . ihre* (scil. of the human soul) *Form*.¹

Here we have a clear case of Neoaristotelianism. Human intelligence having become united with the productive intelligence acquires its most characteristic quality, that of incessant thinking and in this

¹ W. Kutsch, "Ein arabisches Bruchstück aus Porphyrios ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ und die Frage des Verfassers der Theologie des Aristoteles", *Mélanges de l'Université St. Joseph* 31 (1954), p. 263–286. For the concept of νοῦς as the form of ψυχή cf. not only all the well-known passages in Plotinus, but also the passage in Alexander quoted above, on p. 14 with note 4.

condition, productive intelligence becomes the form of the human soul. True, we cannot be quite sure that the doctrine of the union was indeed professed by Porphyry, and it could be that before us we have a pseudepigraphon or even a piece never attributed to Porphyry. But it is certain that Avicenna criticized him for professing it. In turn Avicenna was criticized by Suhrawardi for rejecting it and Suhrawardi claimed that it is one of the distinctive marks of "oriental philosophy".¹

The fact that if we have before us a new fragment of Porphyry, we are indebted for it to Moslem philosophy, coupled with the fact that, right or wrong, for a characteristic doctrine Porphyry was criticized by some of the Moslem philosophers, gives us a chance to say some additional words on the problem of the union in Moslem philosophy.

(10) OF the great Moslem philosophers the possibility of the transformation (union in this sense of the word) has, it seems, been asserted without hesitation only by Averroes² and Ibn Bāğğa. Others keep

¹ Avicenna's criticism of Porphyry: L. Gardet, *La connaissance* (cf. above, p. 20, n. 3), p. 19f; Rahman, *op. cit.* (above, p. 17, n. 1), p. 16 - cf. p. 28, n. 3. For the main passages in Avicenna, see below, p. 28, n. 4. More will be said on Avicenna later. Cf. B. Hanneberg, *Zur Erkenntnislehre von Ibn Sina und Albertus Magnus*, München 1866, p. 232f.; L. Kennedy, *The Modern Schoolman* 40 (1962), p. 23-37.

² However, I should like to point out that the question of whether Averroes actually always professed the doctrine of union is somewhat controversial. In his short commentary on the *Metaphysics* there is a passage which could mean that he in fact rejected it. This is the way in which this passage has been interpreted by the most recent translator, S. van den Bergh, *Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes*, Leiden 1924. The passage reads: *daher glaubte man wohl, man könnte die Wesenheit dieses Intellekts* (scil. the productive intelligence) *in ihrer Wirklichkeit verstehen, was also bedeuten würde, dass wir mit diesem tätigen Intellekt identisch seien und dass das Verursache wieder in seine Ursache zurückgehen könnte* (p. 127 Bergh; cf. his notes ad p. 119, 1; 126, 1-2; 127, 4). In the translation by Horten (M. Horten, *Die Metaphysik des Averroes*, Halle 1912, p. 181) the passage sounds a little different: *Aus diesem Grunde waren einige Philosophen der Ansicht, dass wir uns diesen Intellekt* (scil. the productive intelligence) *selbst nach seinem ganzen innersten Wesen vorstellen können (nataṣanwar), so dass wir also mit ihm ein und dasselbe (ergänze: wāḥidān) wären, und dass zugleich die Wirkung (unser Geist) identisch würde mit ("zurückkehrte zu") der Ursache (dem aktiven Intellekt, d.h. fit unum cum ipso)*. In van den Bergh's translation the passage sounds as if Averroes was cautiously rejecting the doctrine of *unio*, in Horten's as if he would tentatively accept it.

In this case obviously perfect knowledge of Arabic is required to decide what Averroes actually meant.

But perhaps it is appropriate to mention that the authenticity of the whole commentary has been denied by B. Nardi in his *Sigieri di Brabantie nella Divina Commedia*, Florence 1912, p. 17, note 2 (= *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 3 [1911], p. 532, note 2), precisely because Nardi found in it many doctrines incompatible with some professed in other writings by Averroes. In the preface to his translation Horten objected to Nardi. In his review of another translation of the same writing by C. Quiro Rodriguez (*Averroes. Compendio di metafisica*) C. A. Nallino sides with Horten against Nardi (*Rivista degli studi orientali* 8 [1920], p. 668-685, repr. in Nallino's *Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti*, vol. 6, Rome 1948, p. 350-364).

In this context it is worth remembering that contradictions between this Averroes' *Metaphysics* commentary and the long commentary in its part on *Met.* A have already been asserted by Josef b. Schemtob: see M. Steinschneider, "Josef b. Schemtob's

the term "union", but insist that it means only the union peculiar to every act of knowledge, which sometimes is taken to mean that the "transformation", "identification", "union", etc. is not to be understood as ontic, but only as epistemic union (identity of comprehension). The discussion of these two possibilities is complicated by the fact that according to Alexander the union of the two intelligences is at the same time the full and strict union between the act of knowledge peculiar to human intelligence and its objects of knowledge, especially the *κρίως νοητά*. As we know, this kind of identity is "congenital" with the productive intelligence, whereas it is "acquired" by the human intelligence. Therefore, when admitting or denying the possibility of the "union" ("identity", "identification", etc.) the Moslem authors sometimes think primarily of the problem of the identity of objects of any rational, i.e. non-sensual, knowledge with its objects, which then probably would only mean epistemic union, sometimes of the "union" of the two intellects (ontic union). Therefore, they can admit the union in the former sense, while denying it in the latter. And sometimes one and the same author may waver or actually or seemingly contradict himself. Finally, by "union" of the human intellect with the divine, they often mean only "contact", without transformation. It is obvious that the text of Alexander is vague enough to support any of these interpretations.

(11) ALL these complications can with particular clarity be seen in the case of Avicenna and the controversies among his modern interpreters. It is usual to present Avicenna as having denied the possibility of the union of human intelligence with the productive intelligence.¹ Now, it is the particular merit of Miss Goichon to have turned our attention to the fact that in the passages on which such an interpretation is usually based, in fact Avicenna denies something else, viz., the doctrine that in some acts of knowledge act and object are identical (i.e. Aristotle's doctrine of intelligizing).² But in turn Miss Goichon seems to overlook the close connection of these two "unions" or "identifications". For, if at no moment ever the identifi-

Commentar zu Averroes' grösserer Abhandlung über die Möglichkeit der Conjunction", *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums* 32 (1883), p. 459-477; p. 514-521, esp. p. 472, repr. in Steinschneider, *Schriften* (above, p. 18, n. 1), p. 599-623.

¹ Such presentations are based mainly on two passages. One is contained in his *K. al-Šifā* viz. in the part translated by Jan Bakoš as *Psychologie d'après son oeuvre Al-Šifā* 2 vols., Prague 1956, vol. II, p. 453, the other in his *K. al-Isārāt*, translated as *Livre de directives et remarques* by Miss A. M. Goichon, Paris 1951, p. 447.

² Mlle Goichon, *op. cit.*, p. 442, note 1 and 443, note 1. Cf. her discussion of Avicenna's mysticism, *ibid.*, p. 36; 40.

cation of act and object is achieved, the whole frame of reference within which the union of the human intellect with productive intelligence was professed by Alexander is destroyed. In fact, as he presented it, the union of the two intellects is simply another aspect of the union between the intellect, be it the human, be it the divine, with the *κρίσις νοητά*.

Whether Avicenna was aware of this connection remains unclear. In addition, it seems that Avicenna was not entirely consistent (whatever the reason). In fact he seems to have said that he originally professed the possibility of the union, later to change his mind.¹ But again it remains unclear which union he had in mind.

In addition, when Avicenna speaks of the prophet as a man who united himself with the world of angels and thus represents the highest condition which man can achieve, he seems to mean the union with some intelligence² (angels, of course, equal *intelligentiae separatae*, i.e. *intellectus separati*).

It could even be possible that Avicenna sometimes, in some places, professed both kinds of mysticism, i.e. ecstasy as union with the ineffable One and ecstasy as union with the *νοῦς*.³

Furthermore, the problem is complicated by terminological considerations. The condition of union can be expressed by two Arabic words, viz. either *ittihād* or *ittiṣāl*. Now, again it is the particular merit of Miss Goichon to have insisted that to translate *ittihād* by union may be misleading. Whenever Avicenna speaks of *ittihād*, says Miss Goichon, he means not an ontic union, but simply an epistemic one – communication rather than communion. With all modesty befitting an outsider, I, however, should like to point out that in his treatise on love Avicenna describes the union of the lover with the true object of love, the divine, using the term *ittihād* and explicitly quotes this as a term used by the Sufis.⁴ Now, few will doubt that when

¹ In his *Manṭiq al-maṣriqiya* (accessible to me are only parts translated by C. A. Nallino in his *Filosofia 'orientale' o 'illuminativa' d'Avicenna?* *Rivista degli studi orientali* 10/4 [1925] p. 433–467, repr. in *op. cit.* (above, p. 26, n. 2, p. 218–256) p. 2–4, as quoted by L. Gardet, *La connaissance* (above, p. 20, n. 3), p. 23. Even between the metaphysics and the psychology of *K. aš-Sifāʾ* a contradiction seems to exist: Gardet, *ibid.* p. 20f.

² See his *Dagesh nameh* translated as *Livre de science* by M. Achena and H. Massé, 2 vols., Paris 1955, 1958, vol. II, p. 89f.

³ The latter perhaps in his *K. an-Naḡāt*, of which book II, ch. 6 has been translated as *Avicenna's Psychology* by F. Rahman (above, p. 14, n. 6).

⁴ *R. fī l-ʿiṣq* (i.e. treatise on love, one of the so-called mystical treatises of Avicenna, contained in the collection *Rasāʾil*, ed. by A. F. Mehren, 4 vols., 1889–1899) tr. with commentary by E. L. Fackenheim, *Medieval Studies* 7 (1945) p. 208–228, esp. p. 225 where we read: "The highest degree of approximation (scil. of every single being) to It (scil. the Absolute Good) is the reception of Its manifestation in its full reality,

a Sufi spoke of the union, he meant an ontic union, not only an epistemic one. Unless Avicenna completely misrepresented Sufi thought, the passage proves that Avicenna within his system had a place for the "ecstatic", highly emotional union of Sufi mysticism, and used the term *ittihād* to describe it. Thus, either we shall have to assume that Avicenna was familiar with two types of mysticism, rational and "emotional", and kept the term *ittihād* (of which he approved) reserved for the latter, while using the term *ittiṣāl* exclusively for the former which he, however, understood as a strictly epistemic "contact" or, what to me seems more likely, we shall have to assume that he, at times at least, did neither distinguish between the two types of mysticism nor denied that in rational mysticism an ontic union takes place and, consequently, did not or did not always distinguish between *ittihād* and *ittiṣāl*.¹

i.e., in the most perfect way possible, and this is what the Sufis call unification (*ittiḥād*).

Finally, in the metaphysical part of *aš-Sifāʾ* we find a passage clearly expressing Avicenna's hesitations or doubts. In explaining the delights of the contemplative part of the soul as being superior to the delights peculiar to its lower parts, Avicenna says that in receiving the 'impressions' of the higher realities the recipient *sich so verhält, als ob er jenes Objekt, das in ihn hineindrängt, wäre, ohne dass dieses sich von ihm trennte; denn der Verstand der Denkende und das Gedachte sind eines und dasselbe oder fast eines* (*Avicenna's Metaphysik*, tr. by M. Horten, IX 10, p. 638). And in the Latin medieval 'translation' (actually condensation with many omissions) the corresponding passage reads that in the act of reception the receiver *sit ipsum idem sine discretionem, quoniam intelligentia et intelligens et intellectum sunt unum vel paene unum* (IX 7, as transcribed by The Franciscan Institute St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1948, from the edition of Avicenna's *Opera*, Venice 1520, p. 320).

Unless both Horten and the Latin translator misinterpreted the text, here Avicenna seems to profess or, to use his own words, almost to profess the very doctrine for the espousing of which he, in the psychological part of *aš-Sifāʾ*, blames Porphyry (see above, p. 25, n. 1; p. 26, n. 1).

¹ On these and related problems see: A.-M. Goichon, *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Avicenne)*, Paris 1937, p. 87, note 1; 316–328 (esp. on *ittiḥād* and *ittiṣāl*). On Avicenna's mysticism see *eadem*, *Livre* (above, p. 27, n. 1), p. 36; 40; 330–332; 437, note 2; also J. J. Houben, "Avicenna and Mysticism", *Avicenna Commemoration Volume*, Calcutta 1956, p. 205–221; and the appropriate sections in M. Cruz Hernández, "La significación del pensamiento de Avicenna y su interpretación por la filosofía occidental", *ibid.*, p. 133–146, esp. p. 137.

As to the distinction between epistemic and ontological union I on the whole agree with the criticisms of Gardet by F. Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam* (above, p. 17, n. 1), p. 26, note 27; p. 27, note 29. Rahman denies any sharp or fundamental distinction between the two. I also hesitate to follow Gilson, "Les sources" (above, p. 14, n. 6), p. 79, when he attributes the priority in switching from the concept of the union with the productive intelligence to that of the ecstatic union with the ineffable god, to al-Gazzālī (cf. above, p. 28, n. 4).

On other major controversies among the interpreters of Avicenna cf. E. Bertola, "Studi e problemi di filosofia avicenniana", *Sofia* 27 (1959), p. 327–343; 28 (1960), p. 69–87.

The most recent and thorough investigation of the whole problem is contained in: J. Finnegan, "Avicenna's Refutation of Porphyrius", *Avicenna Commemoration Volume* (see above), p. 187–203. According to Finnegan, Avicenna constantly and consistently opposes the doctrine ascribed by him to Porphyry, according to which a double identity (or identification) takes place, viz. that of the object of knowledge

There is obviously no space in this context to deal with Sufism. But the passage of Avicenna mentioned above clearly establishes a link between Moslem philosophy and Sufism and therefore between Sufism and Neoplatonism.

(12) Is it not to pervert the spirit of Alexander's exegesis and that of his master by making them precursors of any kind of mysticism? What becomes of Alexander's naturalism?

The question is not quite easy to answer. Let us begin with Aristotle. Time and again it has been pointed out that in Aristotle the process of knowledge, the lower stages of which seem to be strictly empirical,

with the act of knowledge (and, in this sense of the word, with the knower *qua* engaged in the act) and that of the human intelligence (or the knower *qua* possessor of it) with the productive intelligence. He does so with particular vehemence, because his own doctrine resembles that of Porphyry, in that it teaches "a mere extrinsic relation of knower to the object known which he named, rather arbitrarily, identity" (p. 198). Extrinsic relation – by this Finnegan understands a relation between the act and the object of knowledge which does not imply (as it, according to Finnegan's Thomism, should) that knowledge is the 'natural' fulfilment of the faculty of knowing (in other words, Finnegan objects to the illumination theory of knowledge). This mistake Avicenna made as a consequence of another, viz. the separation of the productive intelligence from man's intellect (a mistake, that is, by the standard of Thomism which, as is known, teaches that the productive intelligence is part of the human intelligence and that such was the doctrine of Aristotle).

As to terminology, Finnegan seems to assume that Avicenna *always* employs the word *ittiḥād* when speaking of the union which he rejects (i.e. the union of man with the productive intelligence), while using the term *ittiḡāl* when speaking of the kind of union which he admits, viz. between act and object of knowledge (for which union he, according to Finnegan arbitrarily, uses the word identity).

Furthermore, Finnegan asserts that even this kind of identity (or identification) which Avicenna admits (that of act and object) can according to Avicenna take place only in the afterlife. In this life, actually not even this ('weak') identification takes place. It is merely assimilation (p. 200 with note 3). This, Finnegan asserts, is also the doctrine of al-Fārābī. Now, assimilation is the result of the 'natural' capacity of the soul and in this sense even in Avicenna the act of knowledge is not entirely extrinsic, i.e. not entirely the effect of the productive intelligence acting on human intelligence. Thus, Finnegan's Avicenna is on the verge of denying not only the identification of the productive intelligence with the human intelligence, but, for this life at least, the true identification of act and object of knowledge.

It can easily be seen to what extent Finnegan's Avicenna approaches the position of Thomism.

Finnegan several times explains misinterpretations of Avicenna by mistranslations of his Arabic by other Arabists (see esp. p. 189, note 1 and p. 203, note 1). It would be presumptuous to take sides in this controversy. However, I confess that Finnegan's neglect to distinguish between intelligibles embodied in matter and 'pure' ones with the attendant distinction between two modes of cognition (a distinction which a Thomist will, as far as life on earth is concerned, be reluctant to accept) somewhat diminishes my confidence in his interpretation. I also wonder whether the passages quoted by him to prove that al-Fārābī and Avicenna reserved the possibility of full union between the act of knowledge and its object, to the future life (p. 200 f.) are actually as clear and as decisive in this respect as he takes them to be (see below, p. 52, n. 1). On the other hand, it must be admitted that as St. Thomas was infinitely closer to the Moslem philosophers than we are, the application of his categories to them is always enlightening.

seems to culminate in what we could call an intuitive, non-discursive act of intelligence (*νοῦς*). The word emerging again and again in this connection in both Aristotle and Theophrastus is *θυρεῖν* = *θυγγάμεν*.¹ Now, there are two main types to interpret this aspect of Aristotle's philosophy.

Either the objects of this "contacting" are to be *ἀρχαί* indeed, i.e. ultimates, but only in the sense of ultimate *logical* (formal) principles, such as the principle of contradiction. In this case the "contacting" certainly has no religious, mystical, super-naturalistic, non-empirical connotation. It simply describes the immediate grasping of the principles (*ἀρχαί*) of reasoning.²

Or the objects of "contacting" are considered intelligibilia, i.e. in some sense of the word, individuals, substances, immaterials, or whatever word we apply, but in any case considered to be divine or semi-divine, so that the act of "contacting" them is considered some kind of a supra-rational, semi- or quasi-religious, non-empirical experience, or outright a mystical illumination. *Ἀρχαί* would be principals rather than principles.³

¹ Cf. P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* 2, The Hague 1960, p. 186; W. Theiler, "Die Entstehung der Metaphysik des Aristoteles", *Museum Helveticum* 15 (1958), p. 85–105, esp. p. 105. See also H. Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, vol. II, Bonn 1849, p. 410, note; G. R. G. Mure, *Aristotle*, London 1932, p. 213; 219.

² See on this P. Wilpert, "Die Ausgestaltung der aristotelischen Lehre vom Intellectus agens bei den griechischen Kommentatoren und in der Scholastik des 13. Jahrhunderts", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, Supplement, Band III 1–2 (Festschrift Grabmann), Münster 1935, p. 447–462. Such an interpretation is, as Wilpert says, mainly inspired by Aristotle's *Anal. post.* II 19, 99b–end (see W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics*, Oxford 1949, a.l.). On the whole it can be designated as Thomistic. But it will be seen why I cannot agree with Wilpert's interpretation of Alexander whom he takes to interpret Aristotle along the same lines. Cf. below, no. 19; 21; 28.

³ One immediately recognizes the controversy regarding the character of 'illumination' as to whether it is formal only or material ('contentual'), a controversy often connected with the difference between Thomism and Augustinism. If what the productive intelligence intelligizes (and what, therefore, human intelligence after having become transformed into productive intelligence also intelligizes) are *νοητά* in the sense of being individuals (or universals in some very special sense), we have what corresponds to material ('contentual') illumination. If they are only principles of reasoning, etc., we have something corresponding to formal illumination. If among the *νοητά* taken as individuals we find god (or gods, i.e. all the movers of the spheres), we have something corresponding to material illumination including a vision of God. If *νοητά* are taken to be God's thoughts, we have Malebranche's "we see things in God". On these and related problems see: E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin*, Paris, 3rd edition 1949, p. 114–119 (according to Gilson in the light of illumination our intelligence sees the truth of its propositions, e.g. that God exists, but it does not see the objects of its ideas, e.g. God); J. Hessen, *Die Begründung der Erkenntnis nach dem heil. Augustinus* (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* XIX/2), Münster 1916, esp. 94–103 (on the two fundamentally opposed ways of interpreting Augustine's doctrines as either 'theognoicism' or 'abstractionism'); *idem*, "Zur Methode der Augustin-forschung", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 40 (1931), p. 497–503. More recent

Let us call these two interpretations of Aristotle (representing two extremes), the rationalistic, naturalistic, or empiristic one, the supra-rationalistic, supra-naturalistic the other.

Now, the latter recently received strong and unexpected support – unexpected at least for those who refused to accept an Aristotle *platonizans* from Jaeger. In his collection of fragments of Aristotle, Ross included a passage from Plutarch to which contemporary Aristotelian scholarship seems to have been completely oblivious. The passage reads: ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἀπλοῦ νόησις ὥσπερ ἀστραπὴ διαλάμψασα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαξ ποτὲ θιγεῖν καὶ προσιδεῖν παρέσχε. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐποπτικὸν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας καλοῦσιν, καθ' ὅσον οἱ τὰ δόξαντα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ταῦτα παραμειψάμενοι τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἄυλον ἐξάλλονται καὶ θιγόντες ἀμωσγέπως τῆς περὶ αὐτὸ καθαρᾶς ἀληθείας οἷον ἐν τελετῇ τέλος ἔχειν φιλοσοφίαν νομίζουσι.¹

It is easy to trace this passage to the corresponding passages in

literature can be found in: F. Körner, "Deus in homine videt", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 64 (1956), p. 166–217 (unfortunately Körner pays hardly any attention to the historic roots of St. Augustine's epistemology).

The most recent discussion is contained in J. Hessen, *Augustins Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, 2nd ed., Leiden 1960, esp. p. 84–98.

Hessen himself after having rejected 'abstractionism' and (quite successfully, it seems) established the thesis that St. Augustine was an 'intuitionist' distinguishes between mystical and non-mystical intuition, both of which St. Augustine according to him assumes. As to the objects of the former, they are, according to Hessen, the principles and fundamental theorems of logic and mathematics, ethics, and esthetics, i.e. of truth, goodness, beauty (*op. cit.*, p. 105). This is an extension of what is usually considered the objects of 'formal' intuition (especially by including esthetics). 'Contentual' intuition Hessen obviously reserves to mystical intuition.

Hessen's interpretation of St. Augustine was the center of a major controversy. See Caroline Eva Schuetzinger, *The German Controversy on Saint Augustine's Illumination Theory*, New York 1960, esp. p. 62; 77f.

Perhaps on this occasion a few words can be said on an argument often used to prove that illumination in St. Augustine cannot mean 'contentual' illumination. If all things are according to St. Augustine seen in God, so the argument runs, St. Augustine must have assumed that all men permanently have a vision of God. But St. Augustine couldn't have believed this, because quite obviously also evil men see things, whereas they certainly don't see God.

Certainly this argument cannot be valid against the man who in *Civ. d.* XIX 12 said that even war (evil) is made possible by peace (good) and when asked would probably have said that to the extent that evil men see things as they are (e.g. that which is black as black) and thus participate in some truth, they do so only because they see God.

¹ Plutarch, *De Is. and Osir.* ch. 77, 382d-e, first claimed for Aristotle by Jeanne Croissant, *Aristote et les mystères* (Paris 1932), p. 158, this claim accepted by E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, Florence 1936, vol. II, p. 76. [W.] D. Ross, *Aristotelis fragmenta selecta* unhesitatingly assigned the passage to Aristotle's *Eudemus* (as fr. 10). The text above follows that of F. C. Babbitt in the Loeb series (1936, repr. 1957) rather than that of Ross, who reprints the text of Sieveking (Teubneriana 1935). However in the second from the last line, I adopted the Reiske-Sieveking text, reading ἐν τελετῇ in lieu of ἐντελεῖ.

Plato.¹ But how shall we explain that Plutarch attributes this doctrine according to which philosophy culminates in a mystery-like initiation-illumination not only to Plato but also to Aristotle?

Of course it could be that Plutarch was simply reading something into Aristotle. It could also be that he based his interpretation on a work falsely attributed to Aristotle. But I think it would be rash to rule out the possibility that Plutarch had good reasons to speak of an *Aristoteles mysticus*. It could even be that he made Plato sound more "mystical" than the Platonic texts warrant, because he read him in the light of a passage in Aristotle which was more "mystical" than any passage in Plato. One look at Rose's index shows that Plutarch's Aristotle was much more comprehensive than ours.

It is therefore not altogether surprising to find a passage in Alexander which implies a supra-rationalistic, supra-empirical interpretation of Aristotle.² Nor can such an interpretation be declared to be com-

¹ *Symposium* 210a; *Ep.* VII 344b; *Phaedr.*, 250a–251a; *Phaed.* 69c–d. But it must be said that Plutarch considerably heightened the 'telestic' character of these passages: ἐποπτικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας, a θιγεῖν whose object is τὸ πρῶτον, and εἰλικρινές, and ἀπλοῦν – all this finds no exact parallel in Plato.

On the other hand, it is perhaps not quite superfluous to remind the reader of a famous passage in the *Symposium*. Here Diotima first credits the demons with the efficacy of μαντική, τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη, τέχνη περὶ τὰς θυσίας, τελετάς and ἐπωδᾶς of μαντεία, γοητεία, to continue by saying: ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ, ὁ δὲ ἄλλα τι σοφὸς ὢν ἢ περὶ τέχνας ἢ χειρουργίας τινὰς βάνουσος (*Symp.* 202d–203a) – a statement so clearly subordinating all other kinds of knowledge to religious insight that had this passage been preserved as a fragment only, it would certainly have come under suspicion of being a forgery by a Neoplatonic 'demonologist'.

² This does not mean to say that Alexander's Aristotle is precisely Plutarch's Aristotle. Recently Gigon turned our attention to the problem of the 'vanishing' Aristotle. Cicero still knows the whole Aristotle; Alexander mostly limits himself to the author of our *Corpus* (O. Gigon, "Cicero und Aristoteles", *Hermes* 87 [1959], p. 143–162). Nor must it be forgotten that Alexander declared the *dialogues* of Aristotle as professing doctrines which are not Aristotelian and false (W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*², Berlin 1955, p. 32, note). This passage seems to be forgotten by all those who object to Jaeger's assumption of a Platonic phase in Aristotle. How great must have been the difference between Aristotle's *dialogues* and those writings on which Alexander bases his interpretation if he described the former as presenting un-Aristotelian and false doctrines! It seems that scholars in growing numbers interpret the difference between Aristotle's published and unpublished writings simply by their difference in literary form. This for them amounts to the assertion that we cannot take the Platonism of the *dialogues* seriously. Why shouldn't somebody draw the opposite conclusion, viz. that only the published writings of Aristotle contained the doctrines which he actually professed, whereas the unpublished ones were meant to be mainly for exercise in school – bases for discussions rather than dogmatic assertions, with tentative rather than definitive solutions? I myself think that Jaeger's hypothesis of an Aristotle *platonizans* is still the best working hypothesis (whether or not we explain this Platonism by the developmental method) to account for the contradictions in our *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

I so often objected to Jaeger's interpretations of Aristotle that I feel it my duty to dissociate myself from a certain type of criticism (which seems to become particularly fashionable among Italian scholars), which pays no attention whatsoever to the

pletely un-Aristotelian. And, what is most important for our present investigation – even if Alexander was wrong, this was the way Aristotle was read in the 2nd century A.D. and this, in all likelihood, was therefore Aristotle as Plotinus saw him.

According to Zeller it was Alexander's interpretation which eliminated what Zeller himself called the mystical element in the system of Aristotle.¹ One wonders whether Zeller said this in full awareness of the crucial passage in Alexander's *De anima* treatise. One also wonders whether Zeller took into account Alexander's recognition of two kinds of intelligibilia, one of which, though not Plato's ideas to be sure (anyway, designated as εἰδη by Alexander), correspond to them ontologically and epistemologically. It is very hard to imagine that the transformation of human intelligence into the productive intelligence results in contemplating logical principles of reasoning (see above, p. 31), and that it was this which Alexander recommended. And to γίγνεται πως used by Alexander, Zeller pays no attention whatsoever.

It is by the way highly remarkable that it should be just Ross to recognize the passage in Plutarch as Aristotelian. For Ross with greatest incisiveness asked and answered the question – what, precisely, is the meaning of θεωρία in the achieving of which man's bliss according to Aristotle is supposed to consist? And Ross answers: It is the contemplation of truth in mathematics, metaphysics, and, perhaps, also physics. And perhaps one aspect of this contemplative life would have the character of worship proper to the contemplation of the divine nature, such an assumption based mainly on the famous passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* which speaks of θεὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν as the supreme goal in man's life.² In other words, according to Ross, the climactic moments of man's intellectual life as conceived by Aristotle do not proceed beyond discursive thinking, though perhaps the *Eudemian Ethics* contains traces of a different attitude.

Now, there have always been scholars who suspected the genuineness of the *Eudemian Ethics* precisely because of its theocentric or

problems posed to us by the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and acts as if Jaeger's theories were just arbitrary fancies, not called for by the difficulties inherent in the texts. A classic example is: M. Giorgiantonio, "Come Werner Jaeger ha inteso Aristotele", *Sophia* 27 (1959), p. 378–380; 28 (1960), p. 104–107. Others: A. Iannone, "Les oeuvres de jeunesse d'Aristote et les ΛΟΓΟΙ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΙ", *Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale* 1 (1959), p. 197–207 and even more so his earlier article "I logoi essoterici di Aristotele", *Atti dell'Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti* 1954–1955, vol. 113, p. 249–279.

¹ III/1⁴ (1909), p. 822f. It is always worthwhile to review all the passages in Zeller in which he finds Aristotle's system inconsistent or unsatisfactory: II/2³ (1879), p. 192–196; 234–236; 578f; 801–806. Cf. p. 45, n. 2.

² W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*⁵ (1953), ch. VII, end.

“religious” character.¹ Their Aristotle was more humanistic. And one almost has the impression that Ross would have been glad to persuade himself of the inauthenticity of the *Eudemian Ethics* so that he would not have, as he has done, to “humanize” its theocentric conclusion. It would have left him with an Aristotle whose ideal was actually the life of a scholar, whose θεωρία is almost void of religious connotations. It is obvious to what extent the fragment from Plutarch contradicts such an interpretation. The religious fervor speaking from it can hardly be surpassed. And the non-discursive character of the climactic experience of man is here stated without any ambiguity. Of course it would be ridiculous to assume that the objects of this intuition are principles of logic. Therefore I said that it is remarkable that Ross decided to include it in his collection of fragments. It seems entirely irreconcilable with his interpretation of Aristotle.

By assigning it to the *Eudemus*, Ross indicated that he considers the fragment to belong to the Platonic phase of Aristotle's philosophizing. But it is outside of the scope of the present investigation to enter the discussion concerning the “evolutionary” interpretation of Aristotle.

(13) FOR THE SAKE of perspective it is worthwhile to compare Alexander with the parallel ideas of Ps. Alexander.²

Ps. Alexander agrees with Alexander in distinguishing two kinds of intelligibles, viz. embedded in matter and κυρίως νοητά, which are entirely immaterial. He also agrees with him in assuming that the former exist *qua* intelligibles only in the acts of intelligizing them.³ He furthermore agrees with him in describing the acts by which our intelligence lifts the intelligibles of the first kind from their matter as what we would call acts of abstraction, i.e. finding what is common to several individuals,⁴ whereas obviously no such stripping takes place with regard to intelligibles of the second kind. Finally, Ps. Alexander agrees with Alexander in describing the “transformation” of our intelligence, which takes place in its condition of ἐνέργεια in

¹ F. Dirlmeier is preparing a translation with commentary of the *Eudemian Ethics*. It will assuredly be a landmark of Aristotelian scholarship. Therefore, regarding the genuineness of the *Eudemian Ethics*, it would be better to postpone any further discussion of this problem to the time of the publication of Dirlmeier's work.

² *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria* ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1891 (CAG I). Here p. 697, 17–698, 16 = Alex. *De anima*, p. 85, 11–87, 1 Bruns.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 687, 8–11 and p. 694, 27–695, 8 Hayduck. Κυρίως νοητά are also designated as κυρίως νοί; cf. p. 713, 39–714, 1 and p. 714, 25 Hayduck.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 697, 16–28 Hayduck.

the full sense of the word and by which transformation the human intelligence in some way becomes united with the prime (divine) intelligence, as the identity of the transformed intelligence with its objects (and as a condition of self-intelligizing). Even the characteristic *πως* used for this unification by Alexander appears in Ps. Alexander.¹

But Ps. Alexander stresses the "mystical" aspect of this transformation (unification, absorption) with much greater clarity than does Alexander. Not only is the condition of the union (which we can either describe as union of the human intelligence with the immaterial intelligibles or as union of the human with the divine intelligence) described as the condition of perfect bliss. This bliss, this condition is explicitly designated as ineffable – *λόγω ἀνερμήνευτος* –: only he who has experienced it knows what it means.²

And what is most interesting, Ps. Alexander raises the question of the temporal quality of this mystical experience. The divine intelligence, says Ps. Alexander, is the *εἶδος* of the human intelligence.³ However, every *εἶδος* exists in an atomic now (*ἄτομον νῦν*).⁴ Therefore, in the moment in which human intelligence "touches" and comes to know the first intelligence, it participates in the same atomic now.⁵ In modern language we probably would express this idea by saying that the moment of mystical ecstasy is a timeless moment, or that the soul in this state is exempt from the condition of time.

By whomever and whenever written, the passage is highly significant. Before us we have an *Aristoteles mysticus* with unmistakable clarity.

We still do not know to what extent Ps. Alexander incorporated parts of Alexander's writings. But precisely for the reason for which we cannot attribute with certainty any of the doctrines of Ps. Alexander to Alexander, we cannot exclude the possibility that in

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 697, 10–11 and p. 698, 20 Hayduck.

² *Ibid.*, p. 696, 33–36 Hayduck.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 714, 31–34 Hayduck.

⁴ *Ibid.*, cf. p. 559, 16–18 Hayduck.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 714, 15–34 Hayduck: ὡσπερ ... ὁ ἀνθρώπινος ... νοῦς ... ὅταν ἐνεργήσῃ καὶ τὸ τρισμακάριστον πάθος πάθῃ ... καὶ ... ἐφάπτεται αὐτοῦ (scil. τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ) ... καὶ ... νοεῖ αὐτὸ (scil. τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον = ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς) ἐν ... τῷ ἀμρεῖ καὶ ἀτόμῳ νῦν, οὕτω τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ ἀμρεῖ καὶ ἀχρόνω ... Δῆλον ὅτι ... τῷ ἀνθρώπινῳ νῷ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ (scil. τῷ ἀτόμῳ νῦν, which is the 'time' in which the θεῖος = πρῶτος νοῦς exists) νῦν ἢ τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ γνῶσις καὶ ἀφή ἐπιγίνεται. On the different kinds of 'time' appropriate to the different spheres of being (e.g. that of the celestial bodies, the soul, etc.) see Simplicius' corollary on time (*In Aristotelis Physicorum commentaria* ed. H. Diels, Berlin 1882, 1885 [CAG IX], p. 773, 8–800, 25 Diels).

his mystic interpretation of Aristotle Ps. Alexander remained true to the spirit, the letter, or both of Alexander.¹

But it must also be said: Alexander's mysticism could very well have been different from that which was *perhaps* professed by Aristotle in his exoteric writings of the type of the *Eudemus*. Perhaps it was entirely rationalistic mysticism in the sense in which we explained the term on p. 20. And it may be that this rationalistic mysticism was entirely foreign to Aristotle. If Aristotle was a mystic, perhaps his mysticism was entirely of the other type. And perhaps Aristotle was, after all, no mystic at all and never thought that his doctrine of the identity of the act of intelligizing with its object or his doctrine of the adventitious intelligence could be interpreted "mystically". Finally, perhaps both types of mysticism, rationalistic and non-rationalistic, found their expression in Aristotle's writing. Of none of this can we be sure. Therefore, it seems legitimate to apply to Alexander's Aristotelianism the term Neoaristotelianism. This will become even more obvious from what follows.

¹ Some of the strongest arguments by which J. Freudenthal, "Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles", *Abh. der Preuss. Ak. d. Wiss. Berlin vom Jahre 1884*, Berlin 1885, proved the inauthenticity of Ps. Alexander's commentary was the mystical and neoplatonic character of a series of passages in one part of the commentary related to *Met. A*. In addition to the passages quoted in the preceding notes, Freudenthal (p. 22f.) pointed out the following: 673, 1; 682, 25; 429, 26f.; 432, 32f.; 437, 13f.; 438, 1; 507, 31f.; 534, 8f.; 571, 26f.; 572, 22f., 31f.; 607, 4; 500, 33f. Hayduck. Now, to avoid any misunderstandings, I should like to say that I consider the proofs of inauthenticity to be entirely conclusive. In fact, I myself added one: P. Merlan, "Ein Simplicios-Zitat bei Ps. Alexandros und ein Plotinos-Zitat bei Simplicios", *Rheinisches Museum* 84 (1935), p. 154–160. And in this paper I proved that sometimes Ps. Alexander's interpretation is incompatible with that of Alexander. But as long as we know no passage in Alexander which would be absolutely incompatible with the 'mystical' interpretation of Ps. Alexander, we should keep ourselves open to the possibility that Alexander in his *Metaphysics* commentary might have been more 'mystical' than is usually assumed (cf. also below, p. 71, n. 2).

Perhaps I can use this occasion to correct an error which I myself made in regard to Alexander of Aphrodisias on a previous occasion. In my paper "Metaphysik – Name und Gegenstand", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957), p. 87–92, I tried to prove that Alexander cannot easily be quoted as representative of the interpretation of the phrase *ὄν ἢ ἐν* according to which this phrase designates what we would call the most universal or abstract concept – being in the sense of that which is common to everything that is; just as, say, red designates that which is common to all red things but has no ontic status comparable to the ontic status of concrete things. To make my point I, *inter alia*, quoted a passage from Alexander's commentary on *Met. A* as preserved by Averroes, in the translation of Freudenthal. In my text this quotation reads: *in diesem Buche aber* [scil. *Met. A*] *spricht er* [scil. Aristotle] *über die Prinzipien dessen, was ist, insoferne es ist, das sind die Prinzipien der höchsten Substanz, <und über die erste Substanz, > deren Existenz höchste Wahrheit ist.* Here I, said, Alexander quite obviously equates *die höchste Substanz, deren Existenz Wahrheit ist*, with the *ὄν ἢ ἐν*. In other words, he interprets *ὄν ἢ ἐν* as designating the divine rather than the universal.

Now, I continued, Freudenthal emended the passage by inserting the words *und*

(14) AGAIN let us resume our review of Alexander. The objects of the productive intelligence are eternal. Therefore the productive intelligence is eternal. Their existence is uninterrupted. Therefore the activity of the productive intelligence, its intelligizing is uninterrupted.¹ Though Alexander does not use these words, he obviously means: the productive intelligence thinks always and there is no beginning nor an end to this. All this follows from the fact that the transcendental intelligibles are identical with the acts of intelligizing them. "True," i.e. highest intelligence is self-intelligence. Its being and its intelligizing coincide. It remains for Alexander to justify the application of the term "cause" (αἷτιος) to the productive intelligence in its relation to the material intelligence in virtue of which relation it transforms material intelligence so that it becomes acquired intelligence (intelligence as ability). This causal relation is of the type "whatever

über die erste Substanz (in pointed brackets). The result of this insertion would be to make Alexander distinguish between a *höchste Substanz* which in some way does not designate the divine, and an *erste Substanz* which does. I criticized Freudenthal for this emendation. When we eliminate it, we see that Alexander clearly equates *ὄν ἢ ὄν* with the divine.

Unfortunately I misquoted Freudenthal. The sentence quoted above reads: *In diesem Buche aber spricht er über die Prinzipien dessen, was ist, insoferne es ist, das sind die Prinzipien der ersten Substanz, <und über die erste Substanz, > deren Existenz höchste Wahrheit ist.*

Now it becomes immediately clear that I made an error entirely contrary to my interests. For to say that Alexander speaks here of two kinds of substance, one which can also be designated as *ὄν ἢ ὄν* (and thus could be a universal) and another, designated by the expression *deren Existenz höchste Wahrheit ist* and thus characterized as divine, would be much easier and make the case of Freudenthal much stronger, had Alexander actually used *two* phrases, one reading *höchste Substanz* and another reading *erste Substanz*. But as Freudenthal himself has it, Alexander used the same phrase, *erste Substanz*, twice. Therefore it becomes extremely improbable that it is applied once for *ὄν ἢ ὄν* in the sense of being a universal, the other time to the divine. Indeed my case against Freudenthal becomes much stronger once my error has been corrected.

One of the reasons for which Freudenthal felt that he had to emend the text was that he considered it entirely impossible that Alexander should have spoken of substance as having principles. But what shall we make of the beginning of *Met. A*? Here Aristotle says "our investigation is about substance (οὐσία), because the principles and the causes for which we are searching are principles of substance ... there being three substances, one sensible, one kind of which is eternal, another perishable ... and another that is changeless". (I, 1069a 18-19; 30-33).

It remains to express my gratitude to Prof. A. Mansion who, in a letter to me, turned my attention to the above error.

¹ τὰ γὰρ καθόλου καὶ κοινὰ (i.e. the νοητά which are the objects of the νοῦς ὑλικός) τὴν μὲν ὑπαρξίν ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστά τε καὶ ἐνύλοις ἔχει. νοούμενα δὲ χωρὶς ὕλης κοινὰ τε καὶ καθόλου γίνονται καὶ τότε ἐστὶ νοῦς ὅταν νοῆται. εἰ δὲ μὴ νοῶτο, οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ἔτι: ὥστε χωρισθέντα τοῦ νοοῦντος αὐτὰ νοῦ φθείρεται ... ὁμοία δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁποῖα ἐστὶ τὰ μαθηματικά ... ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον νοεῖται (i.e. νοητά which must always be thought of as such and actually are being thought as such) - ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ὄν καὶ ἀφθαρτον - ἐν τούτοις καὶ χωρισθέν τοῦ νοεῖσθαι ἀφθαρτον μένει καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἄρα: ὁ τοῦτο νοήσας ἀφθαρτός ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁ ... ὑλικός ... (90, 4-14 Bruns).

is eminently some kind of being imparts this kind of being to everything which is less eminently the same kind of being". Light, e.g., being eminently visible is the "cause" of the visibility of everything visible. In other words, light imparts visibility by being eminently visible. Everything else that is visible is, then, less visible than light. Now, the productive intelligence is eminently an intelligible (τὸ μάλιστα νοητόν). Therefore (or in this sense) it causes the material intelligence to become intelligible (which, as we know, the material intelligence becomes by intelligizing that which is intelligible viz. forms-in-matter, though intelligible less eminently than the intelligibles which the productive intelligence intelligizes).

It is obvious that Alexander presents a very particular type of causation. It is as close to what is causality in Neoplatonism as possible.

But Alexander has still another justification for calling productive intelligence cause (αἷτιος). It is cause by causing all intelligibles to be.¹ In other words (they are not Alexander's own), productive intelligence produces the intelligibles. As we know, it does so by intelligizing them. However, this does not mean that they did not exist before they were intelligized. Coming into existence by being intelligized takes place only in the relation between the material intelligence or between acquired intelligence (intelligence as ability) and their (embodied) intelligibles. The kind of intelligibles which these two intelligences intelligize (or think) have no existence independent from or previous to, their being intelligized. But it is different with eminent intelligibles. They are coeternal with their being intelligized.²

And this κυρίως νοῦς Alexander designates as πρῶτον αἷτιον.³

(15) THIS concludes our review of Alexander. I think it can safely be said: his interpretation of Aristotle's intelligence doctrine is the soil out of which grew much of Plotinus' doctrine of intelligence. Much in Plotinus is easier to understand when viewed against Alexander's commentary. It is particularly much easier to understand why and how Plotinus synthesized Plato's idea theory with Aristotle's

¹ ἐν πᾶσιν γὰρ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ κυρίως τι ὄν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἷτιον τοῦ εἶναι τοιοῦτος (the scholastic: *propter quod alia, id maximum tale*) ... καὶ τὸ μάλιστα δὴ καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει νοητὸν εὐλόγως αἷτιον καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων νοήσεως. τοιοῦτον δὲ ὄν εἶη ἂν ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς ... Furthermore εἶη κἀν ταύτῃ ποιητικὸς (scil. the νοῦς θύραθεν) ἢ αὐτὸς αἷτιος τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς νοουμένοις (88, 26-89, 11 Bruns).

² καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἄρα τοῦτο (scil. τὸ ἄυλον εἶδος) νοῦν νοεῖ οὐ γινόμενον νοῦν ὅτε νοεῖται ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ὄντα νοῦν καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ νοεῖσθαι (88, 3-5 Bruns).

³ 89, 17-18 Bruns.

theory of intelligibles. It is much easier to understand why Plotinus developed his doctrine of the presence of ideas, i.e. intelligibles within intelligence. It is much easier to understand why and how he developed his idea of the identity of ("true") intelligibles with intelligence. It is much easier to understand why he identified the realm of intelligence with the realm of being. It is much easier to understand why he identified intelligence with Plato's demiurge. It is much easier to understand why he developed the theory of a type of causality which primarily might have applied only to the causality obtaining between intelligence and soul, but later could obviously equally well be applied to the relation between that which is one and intelligence. What would be common to the causal relation in either case would be that a thing which is eminently something is by this mere fact the cause that other things are also the same "something", though to a lesser degree.*

(16) IT is doubtful whether Alexander succeeded in giving to his Neoaristotelianism all the necessary clarity, coherence, and completeness. Of the gaps in his noetics none seems more obvious than his failure to explain the kind of cooperation or help which the human intelligence receives from the productive intelligence in its acts of stripping the intelligibles from their matter. It is precisely this gap which medieval philosophy filled with the doctrine that the productive intelligence "illuminates" the *φαντάσματα*, i.e. the semi-immaterial residues of the quarter-immaterial sensations, thus permitting human intelligence to extract the species, i.e. Plato's ideas changed by Aristotle into immanent forms, from the sensations. The best known representative of this interpretation is of course St. Thomas. But it could also be asserted that some, most, or part of our knowledge is the result of a direct action of the productive intelligence on the human intelligence. This essentially would be the interpretation of Avicenna and, according to some scholars, the interpretation of St. Augustine.

Furthermore, it remains unexplained how, precisely, the transformation of the human intellect takes place. We saw that Alexander is satisfied with a "somehow". And in historic perspective one can immediately see that there is a possibility to interpret Alexander in such a manner that this transformation does not mean complete identification. Thus, for this problem of transformation the following possibilities emerge:

(A) Those who accept the identification of the productive intelligence with the supreme god (or simply with god or with something

* Cf. E. R. Dodds, *Proclus. The Elements of Theology* (2/1963); pp. 206f; G. Nebel, *Plotinus Kategorien der intelligiblen Welt* (1929) pp. 22f.

divine) can either consider the transformation as a complete divinization of man or insist that what is meant by transformation is, at least in this life, nothing else but the perfection of human intelligence, in other words, a "natural" event. They can even admit that in every act of (true) knowledge this transformation takes place, but that this by no means means any deification in the proper sense of the word. The "bliss" of which Alexander speaks would, then, be simply the bliss attendant the unhampered, full use of the human intellect. "Identification" would be simply the presence of the object of knowledge in the act of knowledge, *secundum modum recipientis*.

(B) For those who reject the identification of the productive intelligence with god (or gods) the same two possibilities are open, though here the concept of an identification of the human intelligence with the productive intelligence would be a concept far less challenging. Still, some would neatly distinguish between union (taking place in every act of knowledge) and identification (transformation) and, while admitting the possibility of the former, deny the possibility of the latter.

And, be it repeated: it remains in Alexander entirely unclear whether and in what manner the productive intelligence aids the human mind in its activity of knowing the intelligibles-in-matter.

(17) I SAID that the distinction between embodied and disembodied intelligibles is of prime importance for Alexander's interpretation. With this distinction went, as we have seen, another, viz. between two modes of cognition of intelligibles. Intelligizing embodied intelligibles creates them – and they exist as intelligibles only in and through the act of intelligizing them. But it is different with eminent (unembodied) intelligibles. Neither do they precede the act of intelligizing them nor are they its result. Their *esse* is their *intelligi*, but this *intelligere* is coeval with them and nothing apart from intelligizing them. They are eternal and their existence is incessant – and so is the intelligizing of which they are the objects. The *esse* of intelligence is its *intelligere*.

It can easily be seen that this dichotomy of intelligibles involves difficult problems. Intelligibles embodied – they are roughly what could be called universals, which exist *as* universals only in what we could call acts of abstraction. But what are the unembodied intelligibles? If they cannot be Plato's ideas, are they Aristotle's Changeless Changers or, as the Middle Ages called them, *intelligentiae separatae*?

And if such is the case, what have the two kinds of intelligibles in common? True, in some sense of the word we can call both immaterial. But in the case of embodied intelligibles this means only that they can by an act of abstraction be lifted from their matrix and given a short life lasting as long as they are intelligized. The intelligibles properly so called, however, have a permanent existence outside any material substrate and are "apprehended" by an act which obviously cannot be an act of abstraction as there is nothing from which we could abstract them. We immediately recognize the origin of the later terms *immaterialia praecisive* and *immaterialia positive* (scil. *sicut dicta*), indicating precisely the two kinds of Alexander's intelligibles.¹

(18) IT deserves to be stressed, both methods of intelligizing intelligibles are activities of intelligence – or as later ages will say, of reason as opposed to senses. But the difference between them is very important. Roughly, the method of intelligizing embodied intelligibles is to "abstract" them from matter. This abstraction (or as it is sometimes called in the Middle Ages, this denudation of *intelligibilia*, or, as they are also called, *species*) according to Alexander takes place by finding what is common (and in this sense of the word universal) to concrete individuals (sensibles). Others will insist that such an abstraction is what Husserl called *ideierende Abstraktion*, i.e. the awareness of the universal in an individual, such an awareness making *possible* the seeing of what is common to many individuals, rather than the other way round. The result is in any case obviously what we today call universals. But the intelligizing of unembodied intelligibles takes place in the form of some direct creative intuition or intuitive creation. We immediately see the emergence of some of the most persistent philosophical problems. Is all knowledge derived from sense perception plus abstraction or is there non-abstractive (rational and intuitive) knowledge? ² It is obviously Alexander's differentiation of two kinds of intelligibles with the two attendant modes of intelligizing them which is at the root of that problem. And we also see that the well known doctrine of the two faces of the soul ³ is, in one aspect at least,

¹ I dealt with this problem with reference to St. Thomas in "Abstraction and Metaphysics in St. Thomas' *Summa*", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 14 (1953), p. 284-291.

² For historic perspective as far as the Middle Ages are concerned, see e.g. J. Rohmer, "La Théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine de Hales à Jean Peckam", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 3 (1928), p. 105-184.

³ Cf. A. M. Goichon, *Distinction* (above, p. 29, n. 1), p. 325, note 6; J. Rohmer, "Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de l'âme", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et*

ultimately traceable to Alexander's two kinds of νοητά with the two attendant modes of cognition.¹

(19) THE EXISTENCE of two kinds of intelligibilia, so we said, is connected with the doctrine of two kinds of intelligizing. We would unhesitatingly use the terms "intuitive" and "discursive" to describe these two kinds of non-sensual knowledge, but it so happens that in ancient and medieval philosophy the term "discursive knowledge" or some equivalent (διανοεῖν) is used without much ambiguity, whereas there is no unambiguous term corresponding to the term "intuitive". One of the most striking consequences of this is the use of the terms *ratio* and *ratiocinari* in St. Augustine to describe, not as we perhaps would imagine, the discursive knowledge alone, but rather non-sensual knowledge in its both aspects, the intuitive and the discursive, or only in its discursive aspect, or, only its intuitive aspect alone.² This is, *prima facie*, bewildering. But the terminological difficulties disappear the moment we see that they are ultimately connected with the distinction between embodied and disembodied intelligibles on one hand, with the inclusion of principles of reasoning among intelligibles (formal intelligibles) on the other.

Now, it is obvious that the moment intelligizing is subdivided into two kinds, one related to νοητά, the other to principles of reasoning, instead of the bipartition sensing-intelligizing, we are likely to meet with a tripartition (more will presently be said on this). This indeed seems to be the position taken e.g. by the Ikhwan-is-safa. They know three degrees of knowledge, sensual, intellectual by abstraction, and intellectual by intuition.³ But the term which they use for what we call

Littéraire du Moyen Age 2 (1927), p. 73-77 (cf. E. Gilson, "Les sources" [*op. cit.*, above, p. 14, n. 6], p. 57, note 1). With all clarity Avicenna says that the face of the soul which looks upwards *versus principia altissima* corresponds to the *virtus contemplativa quae solet informari a forma universalis denudata a materia: Lib. VI Nat.* [i.e. the Latin condensation of the psychological part of *K. as-Sifā'*: see above, p. 28, n. 4] P. I. cap. 5, f. 5v, as edited by Gilson, *ibid.*, p. 58. It is true that Avicenna does not say with equal clarity that for the soul to look downwards also means to extract the universals from matter, not only the 'preside' over the life of action.

¹ The best introduction to the topic of abstraction and intuition, as discussed in the Middle Ages, is a text in the *Summa Theologiae, Part III, Supplement, q. 92* (derived from *In Quartum Sententiarum, Dist. XLIX, q. II, art. 1*). Here the author, siding with Alexander and Averroes and opposing Avicenna and Ibn Bāggā, decides that in addition to abstractive knowledge, intuitive knowledge is both possible and necessary as there are existents other than the sensibles, which (or who) are not abstractible forms (quiddities). True, all this is said with reference to the *visio beatifica* of disembodied souls. But the arguments can easily be lifted from this context and applied to knowledge in this life.

² See e.g. *De quant. an.* 27, 53.

³ A. Dieterici, *Die Philosophie der Araber im IX. und X. Jahrhundert n. Chr. Siebentes Buch. Die Anthropologie*, Leipzig n.d. = *Die Anthropologie der Araber im zehnten Jahr-*

intuitive intelligizing is striking. They speak of “demonstrative” knowledge. This is a highly misleading term, as demonstration seems to imply discursive knowledge. But obviously we here have the same kind of ambiguity as in St. Augustine’s *ratiocinatio*. And the term *demonstratio* is even better than St. Augustine’s *ratiocinatio*, because it connotes an element of intuitiveness. “Demonstrate” is “to show”, not only “to prove” (in German *zeigen*), though “to show” can be in English used for “to demonstrate by proof”, i.e. discursively. We see to what extent Alexander’s treatment of the two kinds of intelligibles helps us to find a path in a jungle of ambiguous terms. Both principles and principals can be demonstrated.

(20) LET US now resume the topic of the identity of intelligence with its objects in Plotinus. Whereas he pays hardly any attention to the relation between the acts of intelligizing related to embodied intelligibles, he in his way tries to make it very clear that the relation of intelligence properly so called to its objects is as Alexander described it – neither is the product of the other, neither precedes the other. True, the introductory statement seems to say something different. Intelligence, says Plotinus νοεῖ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα καὶ ὑφίστησιν.¹ This is precisely what Alexander denies – intelligibles properly so called are not constituted (or whatever translation of ὑφίστημι we prefer) by their being intelligized. But obviously we here only have a case of somewhat careless wording. For a little later Plotinus explicitly declares: intelligence intelligizes that which exists and this neither precedes intelligence nor follows it. Intelligence (νοῦς) is, as it were, νομοθέτης πρῶτος or rather νόμος αὐτὸς τοῦ εἶναι. And this formula he considers the equivalent of both the Parmenidean identification of νοεῖν and εἶναι and of Aristotle’s ἡ τῶν ἀνευ ὕλης ἐπιστήμη ταῦτὸν τῷ πράγματι,² which, as we have seen, is the leitmotif of Alexander’s exposition. And again a little later Plotinus becomes even more explicit and emphatic on this, to the point of formally retracting the word ὑφίστησι. Intelligence, says Plotinus, οὐ νοήσας ἴν’ ὑποστήσῃ ἕκαστα· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἐνόησε θεὸν θεὸς ἐγένετο . . . An important conclusion follows: “Ὄθεν καὶ τὸ λέγειν νοήσεις τὰ εἶδη εἰ οὕτω λέγεται ὡς ἐπειδὴ ἐνόησε (scil. ὁ νοῦς = ὁ θεός) τὸδε (scil.

hundert n. Chr., Leipzig 1871 (i.e. translation of Treatises 22–30 of the Encyclopedia of the Brethren of Purity), p. 20; 39; *idem.*, *Achtes Buch. Die Lehre von der Weltseele*, Leipzig n.d. = *Die Lehre von der Weltseele bei den Arabern im X. Jahrhundert*, Leipzig 1872 (i.e. translation of Treatises 31–40), p. 38. Cf. L. Gardet, *La connaissance* (above), p. 20, n. 3), p. 137.

¹ V 9, 5, 13–15.

² *Ibid.*, 28–31.

some idea = νοητόν) ἐγένετο ἢ ἐστὶ τὸδε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς.¹ Thus, Plotinus turns against what he considers a misinterpretation of the doctrine that ideas are god’s thoughts. So they are, says Plotinus, but this does not mean that god by thinking them creates them. On the contrary, he is god because he thinks them – so could we clarify a little Plotinus’ thought. But the weapons to combat other Platonists have been forged for Plotinus by Alexander.

Another point needs clarification. When Plotinus assents to the formula that ideas are god’s thoughts (and I have for simplicity’s sake used the words “thoughts” and “thinking” in this section instead of intelligence and intelligizing, simply because the formula “ideas are god’s thoughts” is much more familiar than “ideas are acts of god’s intelligizing”) he means by god intelligence and not that which is one. We could also say – according to Plotinus ideas are the thoughts of the second god, because the first god does not think (intelligize), being above intelligence. Later we shall even better see how useful the introduction of the terms “first” and “second god” of which we already made use (cf. above, p. 21) is for our purposes.

(21) THE DICHOTOMY of intelligibles in Alexander, so we said, results from distinguishing forms-in-matter from immaterial “forms”, i.e. forms which are forms of nothing (or of themselves). But we already mentioned that many interpreters of Aristotle felt that to the extent that intelligence is considered a source of peculiar “intuition”, non-discursive knowledge, comparable to sensation, the objects of this intuition are not any individuals (disembodied forms) but simply the principles of all reasoning.² Such an interpretation, (see p. 31, n. 2) we said, was based mainly on the *Analytica posteriora* II 19. Also several well known passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics*³ imply such a doctrine.

Now, even from what was said it should be *a priori* expected that some other interpreters of Aristotle would try to discard nothing and to combine all three kinds of objects of intelligence, viz. forms-in-matter, forms-without-matter, and principles of reasoning and to treat them simply as three kinds of intelligibles. This, indeed, is the case as can with particular clarity be seen in the case of Averroes. He

¹ *Ibid.*, 7, 12–16. Cf. VI 6[34], 19–43; VI 7[38]8, 7.

² Cf. above, p. 31. That these principles of reasoning are the *only* objects of intuitive intelligence which Aristotle should have recognized is asserted, e.g., by Zeller II/2³ (1879), p. 192–6. But see P. Shorey, *AJP* 22(1901), p. 149–64, esp. 157; 161f.

³ *Nic. Eth.* Z 6, 1140b 31–1141a 8.

even uses characteristic terms to designate the difference between the first and third kind of intelligibles. Whether we "abstract" the forms from the matter in which they exist and thus "intuit" universals depends entirely on our will. But it does not depend on our will whether we intuitively recognize the principles of reasoning (such as the principles of contradiction, the principle that the whole is greater than its parts, etc.). We recognize them, as Averroes says, naturally.¹ Needless to say, this combination again is the result of interpretation of texts rather than any genuine philosophical insight.

(22) LET US now go back to Plotinus' equating intelligence with the demiurge. Perhaps some will object to the assertion that this equation is simply the translation of Alexander's term "productive intelligence" (νοῦς ποιητικός). Let us therefore quote one more passage, this time from Ps. (?) Alexander's *Mantissa* (or the so called II. Book of his *De anima* essay), to be more specific, from its section on intelligence, especially from the report starting with the words "I heard Aristotle say".² It is well known that virtually all scholars assume that "Aristotle" is a scribe's mistake for "Aristocles".³ What is important for us is, however, not so much the question of its true authorship as the fact that the section is Peripatetic in character and not Neoplatonic. This, I take it, needs no additional proof. Now, in this passage Aristotle-Aristocles says: The productive intelligence is either the sole administrator of things here or jointly with the orderly motion of the celestials. In the former case, productive intelligence would be the demiurge also of the possible intellect.⁴ In this passage we see the term demiurge applied to the productive intelligence. This should remove any doubt as to the source of the corresponding equation in Plotinus.

Of course, the passage is of great interest in another respect, too; it clearly implies the possibility that the demiurgic qualities should

¹ F. S. Crawford, *Averrois Cordubensis commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, Cambridge, Mass. 1953, p. 496, 491 Crawford.

² 110,4-113,24 Bruns.

³ For a discussion of this problem see P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise exegete de la Noetique d'Aristote*, Liège 1942. However I think that the two assertions of Moraux, viz. that the *Mantissa* is not a work by Alexander Aphrodisias and that we should not change Aristotle to Aristocles have been refuted by Fernanda Trabucco, "Il problema del de philosophia di Aristocle di Messene e la sua doctrina", *Acme* 11 (1958), p. 97-150, esp. p. 117 and 119f.

⁴ οὗτος δὲ ὁ νοῦς (scil. ὁ θεῖος νοῦς, who ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ) ἦτοι μόνος αὐτὸς τὰ ἐνθάδε διοικεῖ . . . ὥστε αὐτὸς καὶ τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ δημιουργὸς ἢ μετὰ τῆς τῶν οὐρανῶν εὐτάχτου κινήσεως (112, 27-28; 113, 3-9 Bruns).

be attributed not only (not exclusively) to the productive intelligence but also to all the other intelligences which are the changeless changers of the planets and the sphere of the fixed stars. In other words, we here in germ have the later Moslem theory according to which the productive intelligence is the last in the series of intelligences and limited in its activity to the sublunar sphere. And what is even more important, as indicated by Alexander, Ps. (?) Alexander, and Aristotle-Aristocles the causality exercised by all these intelligences is similar to the causality obtaining between the productive intelligence and the material (or possible) intelligence.¹

(23) THE GERM of Plotinus' theory of the unconscious, i.e., the theory that (true) intelligence and the (true) soul in us both are incessantly active although we are not aware of it is, so we asserted, the *De anima* passage in which Aristotle says of intelligence which is intelligence by being all-productive (τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν) that it does not intelligize at times only. This assertion still needs additional justification. For, so could be objected, there is not the slightest hint in the Aristotelian passage that this incessant intelligizing takes place in man. Therefore there was for Aristotle no need even to ask the question why *we* do not intelligize without interruption.

Our answer to this objection is simply the reminder that we should not confront Plotinus with Aristotle without a medium. This medium is the interpretation of Aristotle's intelligence doctrine – an interpretation which was started by Theophrastus and of which Alexander

¹ M. Wittmann, *Zur Stellung Avencebrol's (Ibn Gabirol's) im Entwicklungsgang der arabischen Philosophie*, Münster 1906 (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* V/1), p. 45-52, traced certain aspects of Moslem Neoplatonism and pointed out that it contains a peculiar synthesis of Aristotle's noetics with his astronomical theories. Indeed today, few readers of Aristotle would try to do what the Moslems did, viz. equate the νοῦς of which Aristotle speaks in *De anima* with the system of Unmoved Movers or assume that the νοῦς of which *De anima* speaks is simply one of the Unmoved Movers, these themselves being νοῖ. But, as said above, it turns out that the germs of this combination are clearly present in Alexander's *Mantissa*, whoever its author. Indeed, if we admit that Aristotle assumed the existence of *κατὰ νοῦν*, i.e. in his language, of forms which are forms of nothing, if we furthermore admit that these immaterial forms cannot be Plato's ideas – what else could they be but the Unmoved Movers? Thus, when the author of the *Mantissa* says that the divine νοῦς administers things here with the help of the well-ordered movements of the celestial bodies, it is only a very short step from here to the assumption that it is not the movements themselves which 'help' the divine intelligence, but the movers of the celestial bodies. In brief, with one exception, the whole intricate system of intelligences emanating from the first intelligence is already anticipated in the *Mantissa*. The exception is, of course, that many Moslem philosophers cap the world of intelligences by the neoplatonic One, whereas in the *Mantissa* the divine intelligence and the other intelligences have no principle superior to them.

Aphrodisias is the best known representative. It can safely be assumed – the question concerning the relation between man's mind and the intelligence which is eternally active must have been known to Plotinus. We do not know which of the *ὑπομνήματα* by Aspasius, Alexander, and Adrastus were read at the conferences of Plotinus (Porphyrius, *Vita Plotini* 14) but considering Plotinus' interest in the intelligence doctrine on one hand and the interest of the Peripatetics in the same doctrine as expounded by Aristotle it is highly improbable that Plotinus should not have encountered the question mentioned above in Peripatetic writings.

Indeed, later Platonists treated Plotinus' doctrine of the unconscious as just one variant of the several typical interpretations of Aristotle's intelligence doctrine. The *locus classicus* is well known – it is the discussion of the question in both the Greek and the Latin texts of Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* III. Here Philoponus reviews particularly the problem how to interpret Aristotle's passage concerning the uninterrupted and eternal intelligizing of intelligence and in so doing refers to a number of interpreters, among them Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plutarch of Athens, and Marinus. Along with these, also Plotinus appears, as just another interpreter.

It is not the purpose of the present book to deal with the history of the interpretation of Aristotle's intelligence doctrine for its own sake. To indicate clearly Plotinus' contribution to this history we shall limit ourselves to presenting in schematic form some fundamental possibilities as indicated in appropriate passages in Themistius¹ and in Philoponus.²

(A) Either productive intelligence is equated with God (Aristocles, Alexander), with divine intelligence, intelligence of spirits (Marinus), etc., in other words with super-human intelligence. If this is done,

¹ Themistius, *In Libros Aristotelis De anima Paraphrasis*, ed. R. Heinze, Berlin 1890 (CAG V/3).

² It is generally recognized that the Greek text of the commentary to *De anima* III attributed to Philoponus (*In Aristotelis De anima*, ed. Hayduck, Berlin 1887, CAG XV) is the work of Stephanus, most likely his reworking of the original by Philoponus. The original text by Philoponus is preserved in a Latin translation. On all these problems see A. Gudemann, art. Ioannes (21) in *RE* IX/2 (1914); R. Vancourt, *Les derniers commentateurs Alexandrins d'Aristote. L'École d'Olympiodore. Étienne d'Alexandrie (Mémoires et travaux publiés par professeurs des Facultés catholiques de Lille, fascicule LII)*, Lille 1941; M. de Corte, *Le Commentaire de Jean Philopon sur le Troisième Livre du Traité de l'Âme d'Aristote*, Liège-Paris 1934 (contains the Latin text to which reference is made in what follows). On Philoponus in this context see esp. M. Grabmann, "Mittelalterliche lateinische Übersetzungen von Schriften der Aristoteles-Kommentatoren Johannes Philoponos, Alexander von Aphrodisias und Themistios", *SB der Bayerischen Ak. d. Wiss., Philos.-hist. Abteilung* 1929 (München 1929), p. 31–48.

Aristotle's sentence that productive intelligence always intelligizes offers no major problems. A divine being can intelligize without cessation.

(B) Or it is denied that productive intelligence should be equated with God (Themistius,¹ Plutarch of Athens, Philoponus).² One sees immediately how important this denial is for the problem of immortality. Such a denial is usually based on the distinction between the subject matter of *De anima* and that of *Met. A*. The former, it is often said, deals exclusively with man.³ Therefore, productive intelligence as treated in *De anima* is supposed to be human intelligence exclusively; only the intelligence dealt with in *Met. A* is supposed to be divine intelligence.

This denial, however, makes it imperative to interpret the sentence in *De anima* which says that productive intelligence intelligizes incessantly, in a way which takes cognizance of the fact that *prima facie* human intelligence does not intelligize incessantly.

Some fundamental possibilities emerge:

(1) Either it is assumed that the incessant activity of the productive intelligence indicates the operation of intelligence in man indeed – but in man taken not as an individual but as species (Philoponus-Stephanus).⁴ And this is interpreted either:

- (a) as meaning that mankind is eternal *a parte ante* and *a parte post*, so that there is always at least one member of the race in whom productive intelligence operates (Philoponus)⁵ or
- (b) as meaning that several individuals in several parts of the earth intelligize, each some of the intelligibles, in such a way that the sum total of their intelligizing equals the total intelligizing of productive intelligence (Philoponus).⁶

¹ *Op. cit.* (above, p. 48, n. 1), p. 102, 30–103, 19 Heinze.

² *Op. cit.* (above, p. 48, n. 2), p. 536, 10; cf. 536, 16 Hayduck (against Marinus); p. 41 de Corte (above, p. 48, n. 2).

³ Themistius, *op. cit.* (above, p. 48, n. 1), p. 102, 30–103, 19 Heinze.

⁴ *Op. cit.* (above, p. 48, n. 2), p. 538, 32 – 539, 12 Hayduck (ὁ νοῦς ἀεὶ νοεῖ, οὐχ ὡς Πλωτίνιος οἰεῖται, ὅτι ἀεὶ διὰ παντὸς ὁ αὐτὸς νοεῖ ... ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ ἐν ὄλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρώπωνος νοῦς ἀεὶ νοεῖ, καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ μὴ νοῶ ἀλλ' οὖν ἄλλος νοεῖ, καὶ τῆ διαδοχῆ γίνεται τὸ ἀεὶ ...).

⁵ Cf. p. 41 de Corte (above, p. 48, n. 2): *non enim utique quis dicet quod in kathaclimo omnes quidem scientes perierunt. Salvati sunt autem aliquando* ([aut] see below) *contra. Ficticium enim quod tale, sed semper sunt in omni et qui potentia scientes et qui hoc perficientes*. It is obvious that *aut* (above) is impossible and indeed upon my question Prof. G. Verbeke informed me that the word does not occur in any of the manuscripts known to us and seems simply to be the result of de Corte's slip of the pen.

⁶ *Si enim aspiciamus ad totam latitudinem animarum et non ad unum singularem, non utique dicemus quandoque quidem intelligere, quandoque autem non intelligere humanum intellectum, sed semper intelligere, secundum [.] quod etiam dixit 'neque tempore*

(2) Or it is assumed that contrary to what seems to be the case the productive intelligence indeed operates in every man incessantly (Plotinus¹; see below).

Finally, there is the possibility of reconciling A and B by assuming that Aristotle speaks of two kinds of productive intelligence. One, in the singular, would be identical with divine intelligence and it would be this one which intelligizes incessantly. The other, existing in a plurality of exemplars, each belonging to one man and not really transcendent, would not intelligize incessantly.² However, to these productive intelligences the qualities of immateriality and immortality, thus of personal immortality would attach themselves.³

prior est [esse enim] <scilicet> qui potentia eo qui actu (*ibid.*). I corrected de Corte's text only to make its meaning clear. Another possible correction would be *neque tempore prior* [est] esse [enim] <eum> qui potentia eo qui actu, or, in the last phrase, *esse enim* <eum>. The replacing of *prior est* by *priorem* has been suggested by A. Mansion, "Le texte du 'De Intellectu' de Philopon corrigé à l'aide de la collation de Monseigneur Pelzer", *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, Louvain 1947, p. 325-346.

¹ Philoponus, *op. cit.* (above, p. 48, n. 2), p. 535, 8 Hayduck: Πλωτίνος... ἐνεργεία νοῦν ἐνόησε τὸν ἀνθρώπινον νοῦν... Cf. p. 49, n. 4.

² This is perhaps the place to observe that whenever the attempt is made to distinguish between the νοῦς *qua* (in some sense of the word) immanent in men and νοῦς as transcendent, it will be attended by expressing this difference in an appropriate terminology. Typical is in such case the translating of νοῦς in the former sense of the word by *intelligentia agens*, in the latter by *intellectus agens*. See e.g. Petrus Hispanus (John XXI) in M. Grabmann, "Die Lehre vom intellectus possibilis und intellectus agens im Liber de anima des Petrus Hispanus, des späteren Papstes Johannes XXI", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 12-13 (-11?), 1937-1938, p. 167-208, esp. p. 169-199 (strikingly enough, even the *intellectus agens*, i.e. the immanent νοῦς seems to be credited by Petrus Hispanus with incessant intelligizing: see p. 192f.). Thus, once for νοῦς two translations (*intellectus*, *intelligentia*) have been introduced to philosophical terminology (cf. above, p. 14, n. 6), they can be used to express a distinction of νοῦ different from the distinction for which they were originally coined to express. For the way in which these two terms are used by Gundissalinus (*intellectus* = source of *scientia*; *intelligentia* = source of *sapientia*) see E. Gilson, "Les sources" (above, p. 14, n. 6), p. 86-88. For the importance of Petrus Hispanus, see Gilson, *ibid.*, p. 106f.

³ Whether this is the thesis of Themistius is controversial. See on this problem G. Verbeke, *Themistius, Commentaire sur le Traité de l'âme d'Aristote* (1957) p. XLII-LV; LXI; *idem*, "Themistius et le 'De unitate intellectus' of Saint Thomas", *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 53 (1955), p. 141-164.

I myself am of the opinion that the text of Themistius, as it stands, is inconsistent. The whole interpretation depends entirely on whether we read the passage in the light of its opening phrase (which seems to assume only one productive intelligence: 103, 20-24) or in that of its conclusion (which seems to assume in addition to it a plurality of productive intelligences, the latter being, as is known, one of the interpretations of St. Thomas). This conclusion reads: οἱ δὲ ἐλλαμπόμενοι καὶ ἐλλάμπωντες πλείους ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἥλιος εἷς, τὸ δὲ φῶς εἶποις ἂν τρόπον τινὰ μερίζεσθαι εἰς τὰς ὕψεις· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν ἥλιον παραβέβληκεν (scil. Aristotle) ἀλλὰ τὸ φῶς, Πλάτων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ ἀνάλογον αὐτὸν (scil. νοῦν ποιητικόν) ποιεῖ (103, 32-36 Heinze).

Thus it could be that Themistius indeed denied the doctrine of the unicity of the productive intelligence or at least modified it, either by replacing that unicity by a plurality of 'illuminated' productive intelligences or by supplementing it with it.

One more possibility of dealing with the text of Aristotle must be mentioned for reasons which will be clear later. In some manuscripts of *De anima* the decisive sentence omits the οὐχ and thus reads: ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ (scil. the human νοῦς).⁴ Thus, the sentence becomes perfectly clear – almost too much so. What could be more obvious than the fact that man sometimes thinks, sometimes does not? For our purpose it is not necessary to explain the reason for this omission. But obviously this omission amounts to a very radical operation, leaving the patient either crippled or restored to full health.

This is a typology of interpretations of the passage in which Aristotle speaks of the uninterrupted intelligizing of intelligence. Let it be repeated, each of them can be found in some commentator of Aristotle, who lived between the time of Alexander Aphrodisias and that of Stephanus. From our point of view it is particularly remarkable how

However, I should suggest that the whole passage introducing the plurality of productive intelligences is not by Themistius but a marginal note by a reader critical of Themistius. This reader quite obviously reinterpreted the light parable used by Themistius. Themistius opposed to the unicity of light the plurality of ὕψεις in order to explain the unicity of the productive intelligence as different from the plurality of individual acts of intelligizing. The critical reader said that precisely by this parable Aristotle intended to express the idea of a plurality of productive intelligences. Had Aristotle actually meant to teach the unicity of the productive intelligence, the critical reader said, he would have compared it, not to light, but to the sun, as Plato did. In other words, the critical reader wanted to say: there are productive intelligences comparable to light which, however, is always split into plurality, and a productive intelligence comparable to the (unique) sun, the source of light.

The best proof that we here have an insertion and not a statement by Themistius seems to consist in the fact that immediately after having formulated the doctrine of the plurality of productive intelligences, the text as it stands explicitly *restates* that we all are reducible to *one* productive intelligence (103, 36-38; cf. 100, 16-101, 4 Heinze). This doctrine Themistius bases on the distinction between 'man' and the 'essence of man' (ἄλλο... τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ ἐμοὶ εἶναι: 100, 18 Heinze). In the former sense, I am not the (unique) productive intelligence; in the latter I am the (unique) productive intelligence. It does not seem that Themistius would have said this if he wanted to teach that there are as many productive intelligences as there are men.

One is tempted to translate the doctrine of Themistius concerning the difference between 'I' and 'the essence of me' into Kantian terms and to say every man is at the same time *homo phaenomenon* and as such different from any man, but he at the same time is *homo noumenon* and as such does not differ from any other man. And it even seems that this would indeed perfectly express what Kant had in mind (see Section IV).

In other words, the doctrine of Themistius is to be found only in the passages 103, 20-24 (one νοῦς, one φῶς) and 103, 36-38 (we all are reducible to *one* productive intelligence; cf. 100, 17-101, 4). The passage 103, 32-36 Heinze (the πρώτως ἐλλάμπων νοῦς should be compared not with φῶς which is in some way always divided in ὕψεις, but rather with the sun, which is one) is a gloss.

The above interpretation agrees with that of H. Kurfess, *Zur Geschichte der Erklärung der Aristotelischen Lehre vom sog. ΝΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ und ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ*, Tübingen 1911, p. 23 and also with his assumption that the text of Themistius is perhaps interpolated by later commentators (*ibid.*, note 26).

⁴ See the *apparatus* to *De an.* III 5, 430a 22 in any critical edition, e.g. that of [W.] D. Ross, Oxford 1957; Zeller II/2 (51963), p. 571, note 2.

well Plotinus fits into their company. For, as indicated, the interpretation listed above under B 2 is that of Plotinus and Philoponus-Stephanus explicitly credits him with it.

True, Philoponus-Stephanus neglected to explain how Plotinus could assert that human intelligence intelligizes incessantly. But from our analysis of the relevant texts we know that explanation. Plotinus said that *man often remains unconscious of this intelligizing*.

In other words, a firm grasp of the problems in Alexander, Plotinus, and Philoponus makes it possible to present long stretches of ancient and medieval philosophy in what could be called an *a priori* manner. By simply combining and recombining ideas, terms, etc., we create niches into which fits a great number of theories represented by many ancient and medieval writers. This makes a survey of the history of philosophy much easier and clearer. True, this is to a certain extent done at the expense of our respect for these authors. For, time and again we find that what we have before us is often a mere shuffling and reshuffling of concepts, a new combination all right, but not always accompanied by new insight.¹

¹ Before leaving the Moslem philosophers, a few words may be said on al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and al-Gazzālī in relation to the topics of the present investigation. Al-Kindī seems to be the first Moslem philosopher who introduced the fourfold division of νοῦς, corresponding to Alexander's νοῦς ἐν δυνάμει, ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐπίκτητος (ἐν ἔξει), ποιητικός (adding, it seems, what he calls demonstrative intelligence). And in al-Kindī we also find the doctrine of the identity of intelligizing with its intelligible, but strangely enough he seems to assume that no such identity exists on the level of productive intelligence. The sentence in which something like the infusion of intelligibles into the human mind seems to be expressed anticipates a characteristic doctrine by Avicenna. See A. Nagy (ed.), *Die philosophischen Abhandlungen des Ja' Q'ub ben Ishāq al-Kindī*, Münster 1897, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* II/5, p. 5, 6-11; 7, 10-12 but also Finnegan, "Texte" (above, p. 14, n. 6), p. 161.

Al-Fārābī attracts our attention particularly because he seems to base his interpretation of the concept of the productive intelligence on an edition of Aristotle's *De anima* in which the crucial sentence omitted the οὐχ, thus denying that intelligizing is an incessant activity (cf. above, p. 51). But this gives him a good reason to ascend to the creator of the productive intelligence and also to the whole astronomical cosmos. For productive intelligence, precisely because of the intermittedness of its action, is imperfect (although this imperfection is ultimately due to the imperfection of the human mind on which the productive intelligence acts). Thus productive intelligence is considerably lowered in rank and has above it other intelligences, viz. the celestial movers. In addition, al-Fārābī distinguishes between νοῦς in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which he identifies with the first deity under the prime mover, from the νοῦς of which Aristotle speaks in *De anima*. We immediately recognize the corresponding positions of the Greek interpreters of Aristotle (cf. above, p. 48 and p. 47, n. 1). It would be remarkable if the profound change which has resulted in the combination of Aristotle's noetics with his astronomy (see above, p. 46, n. 4) would at least partly have been caused by a variant in Aristotle's text (on all this see: Fr. Dieterici, *Alfarabi's philosophische Abhandlungen*, Leiden 1892, esp. the third *Abhandlung*, "Über die Bedeutungen des Wortes 'Intellect' ('Vernunft')", and here particularly p. 71 with p. 216; p. 77f.; Gilson, "Les sources" [above, p. 14, n. 6], p. 124, line 326-7.

In his *Musterstaat* (*K. al-madīna al-fādila*) we find the identification of the first

(24) THERE is one more aspect of Plotinus' doctrine of the unconscious. In *Enn.* IV 9 he tries to establish the thesis of the unicity of all souls. And while such a doctrine explains what we call occult phenomena such as the efficacy of magic, incantations, etc., it seems to be contradicted by the fact that the content of my consciousness is not identical with that of other men. But this objection Plotinus refutes by the assumption that we are not always conscious of the full content of our mind. In modern terms: man's mind contains a conscious part and an unconscious one. Again it is obvious how important the concept of the unconscious is within the framework of the system of Plotinus.

intelligibles – which probably means intelligibles of the lowest degree – interpreted as principles (F. Dieterici, *Der Musterstaat von Alfarabi*, Leiden 1900, p. 71f). This, of course, does not mean that the other two kinds of intelligibles are abandoned. Thus Alexander's bipartition of intelligibles (forms-in-matter; 'pure' forms) becomes a tripartition, with principles of reasoning as the third part (cf. above, p. 43). Furthermore al-Fārābī here assumes the possibility of the union with the productive intelligence resulting in man's happiness (p. 93f. Diet).

Finally al-Fārābī professes the doctrine of monopsychism and the doctrine of the unity of the human race in the sense in which it was assumed in Philoponus-Stephanus (above, p. 49). Thus for him the incessant intelligizing of the productive intelligence is equated with the thinking of the human race in its totality – and by totality al-Fārābī means totality in space and time (p. 100 Diet.). We shall see later that Averroes in this respect is greatly indebted to al-Fārābī.

But strangely enough, al-Fārābī combines with his monopsychism, the belief in the immortality of individual souls. He even describes the *communio* of the blessed ones. The greater the number of the blessed ones, the greater the beatitude of every single soul (p. 103 Diet.). In other words, al-Fārābī seems to assume the same kind of bliss for embodied souls as for disembodied ones and in both cases the beatitude is the result of the *unio* with the productive intelligence. Only this beatitude cannot be shared with others as long as man lives, whereas it can be shared with others after his death, and this sharing increases the beatitude. R. Walzer, "Al-Fārābī's Theory of Prophecy and Divination", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957), p. 142-148, esp. p. 144, unhesitatingly classes al-Fārābī with those who deny the possibility of *unio* in this life. His main reference is to a passage in the *Musterstaat*, p. 73 Diet. (and as far as secondary literature is concerned, to Munk, *Mélanges* [above, p. 18, n. 1], p. 348, note 3 and to Steinschneider [above, p. 19, n. 3], p. 102), to which he also could have added another passage on p. 91f. Diet. But he does not mention the passage referred to above (p. 93f. Diet.). Let us compare the texts.

Man's Endvollendung ist das Glück. Es besteht darin, dass die Seele des Menschen in der Vollkommenheit ihres Seins so weit gelangt, dass sie zu ihrem Bestehen eines Stoffes nicht mehr bedarf . . . Nur ist dabei festzuhalten, dass die Stufe dieser Seelen (scil. living an immaterial life) noch unter der Stufe des schaffenden Intellects (productive intelligence) steht (p. 73 Diet.).

Dieser Mensch (scil. the philosopher king) steht auf der höchsten Stufe der Menschheit und ist er (sic) im höchsten Grad des Glücks. Seine Seele ist vollkommen, sie ward in der von uns geschilderten Weise (scil. having become matter in relation to the productive intelligence) zu eins mit dem schaffenden Intellect (p. 93f. Diet.).

The same problems appear also in another writing of al-Fārābī, his *Staatsleitung* (P. Brönnle, ed., *Die Staatsleitung von Alfarabi* [i.e. K. as-siyāsāt al-madaniya] . . . aus dem Nachlass . . . F. Dieterici, Leiden 1904). Here the productive intelligence is also designated as holy spirit (p. 2 Diet.; on this concept cf. Section V sub Avicenna) and this

Now, the title of Plotinus' essay is not "On the unicity of the soul". It is simply "Are all souls one?"¹ But we rendered this question by the words "On the unicity of the soul" on purpose, to indicate the historic perspective which here opens. The famous doctrine of the unicity of

productive intelligence also contains the souls of the celestial bodies (p. 5 Diet.). These souls are more perfect than ours, because they have always been 'actual' souls, which means that they are thinking souls. But on the other hand, we read that the perfect man is *close* (only close) to the productive intelligence (p. 7 Diet.). This seems to imply that al-Fārābī does not believe in the union with productive intelligence, in this life (p. 8 Diet.). However, only a few lines later, al-Fārābī speaks of the man who has become divine, and this divinization seems to presuppose the union (*ibid.*). It is by no means clear that divinization here means man's condition after death. And all these considerations are capped by the description of the bliss of disembodied souls, which becomes greater for every single soul in proportion to the increase of the number of other souls with whom they share their bliss. This sharing, this *communio sanctorum* has no *numerus clausus* (cf. below, Section III 1, p. 91, n. 5). And none of the saintly ones remains indifferent to the increase in their number.

I do not feel entitled to express an opinion as to the consistency of al-Fārābī's doctrines. It was in one respect at least denied by Averroes (see below); in recent times by I. Madkour, *op. cit.* (above, p. 14, n. 6), p. 129. Of prime importance for an interpretation of al-Fārābī is in addition to this work of Madkour, p. 122-209, L. Gardet, (*La connaissance* [above, p. 20, n. 3], p. 16 note 1; 17f. [ontological transformation in al-Fārābī: *Phil. Abh.*, p. 46; 75]; 20; 27, note 3).

Furthermore, as Rahman's translation of *De intellectu et intellectione* (above, p. 14, n. 6) makes it clear, al-Fārābī elaborates Alexander's point that the νοῦς ἐπίκτητος can intelligize intelligibles even in the absence of the matter in which they are embedded and from which they have become abstracted. He attributes to these νοητά an independent ontic status acquired by their being abstracted and their being intelligized by the νοῦς ἐπίκτητος as an act of self-intelligizing.

Furthermore al-Fārābī sharply distinguishes the νοητά embedded in matter (whether 'present' only in the stage in which the νοῦς still has not become νοῦς ἐπίκτητος or in this latter stage) from κυρίως νοητά. It is obvious - as these νοητά have never been abstracted and exist always only as intelligized (οὐκ ἔξω νοῦ) - to intelligize them must mean to become the νοῦς which always intelligizes them.

Concerning al-Gazzālī, a passage of some interest occurs in the Latin translation of his *Metaphysics* englished by J. T. Muckle (*Algazel's Metaphysics*, Toronto 1933, i.e. the metaphysical and physical parts of his *logica et philosophia = Maqāsid al-Jalāsifa*). Here in *Pars II, Tractatus V, 3* we find an inquiry *quomodo fiunt in anima intellectus abstracti et intenciones universales* (p. 184, 14-15). The term for the *unio* is *coherencia* and it appears on p. 185, 6 Muckle, but it remains unclear what al-Gazzālī thinks of it.

For al-Gazzālī's denial of the possibility of the *unio* in any form see M. Asín Palacios, *El justo medio en la creencia. Compendio de teología dogmática de Algazel*, Madrid 1928 (i.e. *K. al-Iqtisād fi 'l-i 'tiqād*), also containing excerpts from al-Gazzālī's *K. al-Maqṣad* under the title *Libro del más subltme designio, que explica el sentido de los bellísimos nombres de Dios* (p. 458-471).

In any case let it be stressed that we are not primarily interested in ascertaining who professed which doctrine. We rather try to construe all doctrines which could have been professed and to order them in a systematic or semi-systematic fashion, so that they present something like essences, while it remains contingent who actually professed them, thus giving them existence. This does not mean that we try to write an *a priori* history of philosophy, because our starting point are existences rather than essences, viz. doctrines actually professed by some philosophers, in our case mainly Alexander, Plotinus, and Themistius.

¹ That all souls are one, in Plotinus means that they are not separated, though they are and always remain differentiated. On the difficulties of this concept see Zeller, III/24 (1903) p. 597, note 1. The *locus classicus*: VI 4, 4, 34-45.

intelligence (usually going under the name of Averroes) has often been designated as the doctrine of monopsychism. And indeed, it is fundamentally one and the same problem - "Is there only one intelligence common to all men?" and "Is there only one soul common to all men?" It can safely be said: When Plotinus asserted that there was only one soul common to all men, he *ex fortiori* asserted that there was only one (higher, true) intelligence common to all men. The three essays V 1, IV 8, and IV 9 can be summed up as teaching the doctrine of the unicity of the (productive) intelligence *and* the soul. It is one and the same soul, one and the same intelligence which is present in all men. This unique soul, this unique intelligence operates incessantly, though we are not conscious of it. Plotinus is, in other words, simply another representative of the famous doctrine *de unitate intellectus*, and of monopsychism. And he buttresses it by his doctrine of the unconscious.

Now, in our century we can appreciate these doctrines of Plotinus much better than many other centuries could, because our century provided us with a concept linking the concepts of the unicity of intellect and/or soul with the concept of the unconscious. It is of course Jung's concept of the collective unconscious.

I do not mean to say that Jung's concept of the unconscious is identical with that of Plotinus. Nor is his collective mind precisely Plotinus' unique intellect or soul. But for a student of the history of philosophy who might be inclined to consider the problems of the unicity of intellect (and monopsychism) as having merely historical interest, these problems suddenly might come to life in the light of the theories of Jung. And once this has happened to him, the student of philosophy will be much better equipped to assess such theories as Kant's transcendental consciousness, Fichte's non-empirical Ego, and Schopenhauer's unicity of the will (see Section IV).

(25) I AM by no means the first to link the problems of monopsychism and the unicity of intelligence. The contrary is proved by a paraphrase from Themistius' commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*. There is, says Themistius, nothing strange in the assumption that we all hark back to one productive mind nor in the other that we all derive our being from that one intellect. If we don't make this assumption, how could we explain the existence of ideas common to all men? How could we explain that we all without instruction have a similar understanding of fundamental terms and of fundamental

axioms? Indeed, men could not even understand each other, unless there was one intelligence in which we all participate.

A little later Themistius adds: And the question asked by some modern and some ancient ones whether all souls are one should be rephrased to read: Are all intelligences one? ¹

Of the commentators of Aristotle whom we mentioned in the preceding pages some were still pagan, some already Christian. Philoponus, who chronologically comes last, died already after the birth of Mohammed. And legend connected him with the conquest of Alexandria by the Arabs and has it that he asked the conqueror to grant him its library. The symbolic significance of this legend is too obvious to need explanation.² Soon the Moslems were to take more than physical possession of the Helleno-Christian world. In the 13th century the doctrine of the unicity of intellect was to become a center of controversy. But the positions of the philosophers, Moslem, Jewish, and Christian, do hardly more than restate the positions which by the end of the 6th century Graeco-pagan and Graeco-Christian philosophers had established. To these forerunners of the Middle Ages also Plotinus belongs.³

(26) It is not only Jung's doctrine of the collective unconscious of which we feel reminded on reading Plotinus. His twin ideas, one that the human mind intelligizes incessantly, the other that we, however,


¹ εἰ δὲ εἰς ἓνα ποιητικὸν νοῦν ἅπαντες ἀναγόμεθα οἱ συγκείμενοι ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου ἐστίν (here, then, the productive intelligence clearly is the cause of our existence), οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν. πόθεν γὰρ αἱ κοιναὶ ἐνοιαὶ; πόθεν δὲ ἡ ἀδίδακτος καὶ ὁμοία τῶν πρώτων ὄρων σύνεσις ...; μήποτε γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ συνιέναι ἀλλήλων ὑπῆρχεν ἂν? εἰ μὴ τις ἦν εἰς νοῦς οὐ πάντες ἐκoinωνοῦμεν (103, 36-104, 3 Heinze) ... καὶ τὸ παρὰ τινῶν ζητούμενον καὶ νεωτέρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, εἰ πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ μία, κάλλιον ἂν ἐζητεῖτο εἰ πάντες οἱ νοῖ εἰς (*op. cit.* [above, p. 48, n. 1], p. 104, 14-16 Heinze).

This passage reminds us that indeed everybody who denies the unicity of intelligence will have to explain why the many intelligences agree. See in this context the solution of St. Augustine, resumed by John Pecham (there is only one God who illuminates us): J. Rohmer, *op. cit.* (above, p. 42, n. 2), p. 179; cf. Appendix II. At the same time, the passage in Themistius immediately leads us to St. Thomas (and to any interpretation of the illumination in St. Augustine which asserts that this illumination is purely formal). For the content of the unique intelligence is, according to Themistius, limited to principles of reasoning and does not imply the contemplation of any entities.

² On the origin of the legend, see A. Gudemann, *op. cit.* (above, p. 48, n. 2). But we must not forget that later Platonists of the school of Alexandria indeed witnessed the Arab conquest of 642. To some of them perhaps the statement applied with which Averroes concluded his *Destructio destructionis*. The philosopher, he says, should choose the best religion of his period; therefore just as the philosophers in the Roman Empire accepted Christianity when the religion of Jesus was introduced there, so the philosophers in Alexandria rightly became Moslems, when Islam reached them.

³ For the sake of convenience it might be appropriate to indicate the filiation of Platonists since the time of Plutarch of Athens.

are not always conscious of it, reappear in most significant form in Leibniz – in fact they serve as pivots of his philosophical system.¹ As Leibniz knew Plotinus, it is entirely possible that it was the latter who inspired him in this respect, though the way in which he utilized (or might have utilized) the decisive passages in Plotinus was entirely original.² In fact, what could be called the Plotinian strand in Leibniz is offset by an anti-Plotinian one. For Leibniz declares himself most emphatically an adversary of the doctrine of the unicity of intelligence, identified by him as a doctrine of Averroes.³ In other words, when he says that the human mind thinks incessantly though it is not conscious of it, he is thinking of the human mind in strictly individual terms. It is true, the contents of this unconscious thinking are the so-called inborn ideas and these ideas are identical in all men. But this identity



On the relation between Platonism, Christianity, and Islam (and probably also Zoroastrianism in the period under Chosroes) see e.g. M. Meyerhof, "La fin de l'école d'Alexandrie d'après quelques auteurs arabes", *Archéion* 15 (1933), p. 1-15; H. D. Saffrey, "Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'École d'Alexandrie au VI^e siècle", *Revue des Etudes grecques* 67 (1954), p. 394-410; R. Walzer, "New Studies on Al-Kindī", *Oriens* 10 (1957), p. 203-232, esp. p. 218-223; 228f. For additional literature see: P. Merlan, in *Gnomon* 12 (1936), p. 531, note 1; I. Düring, "Von Aristoteles bis Leibniz", *Antike und Abendland* 4 (1954), p. 118-154, esp. p. 132-139.

¹ See, e.g. *Nouveaux Essais* I, *Avant propos*; I 1; II 1; *Princ. philos. ad princ. Eugen.* No. 21 (p. 196f. – for the formula *l'esprit pense toujours* – 208; 225 – for the formula *l'âme pense toujours actuellement* – 706 Erdmann). On the concept of the unconscious in Leibniz see R. Herbertz, *Die Lehre vom Unbewussten im System des Leibniz*, Halle 1905, not superseded by I. Döhl, *Bewusstseinsschichtung*, Berlin 1935.

² On other aspects of Leibniz' indebtedness to Plotinus see G. Rodier, "Sur une des origines de la Philosophie de Leibniz (Plotinus)", *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 10 (1902), p. 552-564, repr. in: *Etudes de philosophie grecque*, Paris 1926, p. 338-351.

³ *Considérations sur la doctrine d'un esprit universel* (p. 178-182 Erdmann). It is worth remembering that J. Thomasius, one of Leibniz' teachers, wrote a *Programma de intellectu agente* (in: *Dissertationes LXIII*, Halle 1693, p. 290-300, made available to me in microfilm through the courtesy of Prof. F. Dirlmeier, Heidelberg). Though referring to the doctrine of *intellectus agens* as *saepulta paene in scholis*, he briefly reviews some representative interpretations. On the relations between Thomasius and Leibniz, see I. Düring, *op. cit.* (above, p. 56, n. 3), p. 154.

of content Leibniz does not explain by the identity of the subject which thinks these contents. We all, and this means each of us individually, possess the same inborn ideas, but these ideas originated as many times as there are individuals. We could say that Leibniz to a certain extent sides with Plotinus, but when he rejects his doctrine of the unicity of intelligence, he sides with the philosophic position which we found expressed in Themistius (and with which we tentatively credited an anonymous glossator: see p. 50, n. 3).

But it seems that we can even use Leibniz to clarify a point in Plotinus.

After having stated the identity of intelligence with intelligibles, Plotinus feels entitled to say – therefore the anamnesis doctrine is correct.¹ There is something puzzling in the connection of these two ideas. What has the anamnesis doctrine in common with the doctrine that intelligence and intelligibles are one? Now, it could be that Leibniz provides us with an answer. For he feels that his theory of incessant though unconscious thinking permits him to restate Plato's anamnesis doctrine so that it becomes correct. It would be of no use, Leibniz says, to try to explain the origin of any piece of knowledge by assuming that we simply recollect an experience which we (or our soul) had in a previous existence. For, immediately the same problem would emerge for this prior existence – how shall we explain the origin of some knowledge which we acquired at that time? A *regressus in infinitum* can be avoided according to Leibniz only if we assume that the true meaning of recollection is that a knowledge which we have always possessed, although unconsciously, becomes conscious.²

Now, it would be entirely possible that already Plotinus was on the verge of such a reinterpretation of Plato. Indeed, if intelligence which intelligizes incessantly and intelligizes everything simultaneously is in some way present in us, there is no need to assume that the soul recollects what she had experienced before her incarnation. It is perhaps this idea which underlies the passage in which Plotinus states that the *θέα* which is the concomitant or the result of purification has been in the possession of the soul, though in a condition of inactivity or perhaps as a result of the fact that intelligence is not foreign to the soul, or foreign only in the sense that and when it is inactive. The whole passage seems to play down the importance of the anamnesis doctrine

¹ V 9, 5, 28–33: 'Ο νοῦς ἄρα τὰ ὄντα ὄντως ... ὀρθῶς ἄρα ... καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀνευ ὕλης ἐπιστήμη ταυτὸν τῷ πράγματι ... καὶ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις δέ.

² See the so-called *Metaphysical Discourse* (1689), ch. 26, p. 73 f. Lestienne; *Nouveaux Essais* I 5.

in favor of the doctrine of the unconscious. It is obviously the latter which answers the alternative: the soul either εἶχεν or ἀναμνησκειται (scil. the *θέα*).¹

(27) WE had a chance to mention St. Augustine. But here it once more becomes obvious that his epistemology is simply permeated by problems stemming from the synthesis of Alexander, Plotinus, and Themistius. It should particularly be obvious that his doctrine of memory is rooted in the concept of the unconscious mind (and soul) in Plotinus and that in him, precisely as in Plotinus, the doctrine of anamnesis-memory tends to be displaced by its alternative, the (unconscious) presence of all objects of cognition in the human mind (soul), thus making the doctrine of metempsychosis superfluous.² Leibniz helps us to understand better not only Plotinus but also St. Augustine.

(28) As we now more than once referred to St. Augustine, it may be desirable to summarize some of the main problems of his epistemology, particularly the ones the interpretation of which is controversial.

(1) Does St. Augustine teach that God is the object of human knowledge? As St. Augustine repeatedly says that the ideas are God's thoughts and as he also says that ideas are the object of all true knowledge, the question seems to demand an affirmative answer. As on the other hand St. Augustine is second to none in stressing the transcending character of God, such an answer would seem to contradict the spirit of his religious convictions. Furthermore, though the formula of the ideas as God's thoughts is entirely Platonic or neo-Platonic, we must not forget that Neoaristotelianism's first God and neo-Plato-

¹ *Enn.* I 2 [19] 4, 18–27) ... τὸ γινόμενον αὐτῆ (scil. τῆ ψυχῆ) ... θέα ... Οὐκ ἄρα εἶχεν (scil. ἡ ψυχῆ) αὐτὰ (scil. the objects of the *θέα*) οὐδ' ἀναμνησκειται; "Ἡ εἶχεν οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα ἀλλὰ ἀποκειμένα ἀφώτιστα ... Τόχα δὲ καὶ οὕτω λέγεται ἔχειν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἀλλότριος καὶ μάλιστα δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριος, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπη· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ παρὼν ἀλλότριος. Here as Harder says, the doctrine of the unconscious *klingt an*, lack of illumination and inactivity and 'estrangement' being the equivalent of *ἀναίσθησία*.

² Cf. F. Körner, "Deus in homine videt", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 64 (1956), p. 166–217. Particularly interesting is the passage in which Körner establishes the thesis that *memoria* in St. Augustine would best be translated by *Unbewusstes* (p. 193–196). He sums up the epistemology of St. Augustine by saying that in it God (the source of illumination) is with regard to the soul both transcendent and immanent (p. 197). What else is this but one of the variants found in the interpretation of the relation of the productive intelligence to human intelligence?

Cf. M. N. Bouillet, *Les Ennéades de Plotin*, 3 vol., Paris 1857, 1859, 1861, ad *Enn.* IV 3 [27], 11, p. 239, note 2, with the reference to L. Thomassin, *Dogmata theologica* vol. I, Paris 1684, p. 144; as intelligence did not actually descend, there is no need for anamnesis. Thomassin's work was well known to Leibniz.

nism's second God *is* the ideas which He thinks. In other words, the reverse of the formula ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω νοῦ τὰ νοητά could be expressed thus: ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τῶν νοητῶν ὁ θεός.

(2) To what extent and in what sense are these divine ideas ideogenetic with regard to the human mind? Three answers can be given to this question. (A) Either it is asserted that according to St. Augustine all our ideas are "generated" directly by the ideas in God, which act of "generation" can also be called illumination by God. (B) Or it is asserted that as far as the content of these ideas is concerned, they are not generated by the divine ideas at all, but acquired by the human mind under the impact of sensible things. This answer in turn admits of two interpretations. Either it is asserted that the reaction to this impact is what we would call abstraction (either in the sense of collecting what is common to many sensibles or by intuiting the form present in any sensible) or that this impact is more in the nature of an occasion, a reminder in the Platonic sense of the word, leading to an act of anamnesis (and it can, of course, be asserted that St. Augustine changed his opinion from believing in anamnesis to one of believing in illumination). (C) Or finally it can be said that ideas as norms (or forms, i.e. standards, such as rules of logic, etc.) are "generated" by illumination, while as far as their content is concerned they are not so generated.

Generally, the theory that all human knowledge is based on abstractions is often called Thomistic and thus Thomistic epistemology is often contrasted with St. Augustine's theory of illumination. But the assertion that St. Thomas teaches that abstraction is the only way to knowledge ought to be qualified. This becomes obvious when we think of what is usually called the subject matter of special metaphysics.

(3) To the extent that the doctrine of anamnesis is of course inacceptable to St. Augustine inasmuch as it implies the doctrine of metempsychosis, St. Augustine replaced it by his doctrine of *memoria*. But *memoria* means something peculiar in him. It is *memoria* in the ordinary sense of the word, i.e. the receptacle of our empirical experiences. But it also is the depository of all that we would call *a priori* knowledge (*verae rationes*). The former are forgotten though they can be recalled from oblivion. The latter are, if we may say so, forgotten from the very beginning or we are not conscious of them. We could say: the former are subconscious, the latter supra- or metaconscious (see Section IV). Both, however, are unconscious.¹

¹ *De imm. an.* 4, 6: *Manifestum etiam est, immortalem esse animam humanam, et omnes veras rationes in secretis eius esse, quamvis eas sive ignoracione sive oblivione aut non habere aut amisisse videtur.*

(4) To νοῦς in St. Augustine sometimes *intelligentia* and *intellectus*, sometimes *ratio* correspond. In turn, *ratio* is διάνοια, but sometimes its result, θεωρία.

(5) One more complication is the result of the fact that sometimes the intelligibles of Aristotle are interpreted neither as forms-in-matter nor as subsistent, unembodied forms, but as principles of reasoning (supreme principle of logics, etc.: see above, p. 31). We have the impression that in St. Augustine intelligible knowledge (i.e. all knowledge other than by sensation) comprises all three kinds of intelligibles – a very heterogenous mixture, to be sure (cf. no. 21). In other words, while some philosophers will try to limit the concept of intelligibles to two kinds, viz. forms-in-matter and logical principles (see above, p. 31, n. 2), some others will assume three kinds. This threepartition we e.g. find in Avicenna: he not only distinguishes between embodied νοητά and which have never been embodied, but he adds what he calls clearly principles of reasoning.¹ This, of course, is simply the result of a contamination of the interpretation of Aristotle's noetics in the light of his *Analytica post.* II 19 with the other interpretation, based mainly on *Met. A* and *De anima* III.

It was not our purpose to present some problems of the interpretation of St. Augustine for their own sake. Rather, they were meant to illustrate the fact that most of these problems are clearly related to problems and their solutions shared by Plotinus with Alexander.

(29) BUT let us return to Leibniz and conclude this section with a question clearly establishing the historic connection between him and Plotinus. In his letter to Hansch Leibniz says:

*Porro quaevis mens, ut recte Plotinus, quemdam in se mundum intelligibilem continet . . . Sed . . . in nobis paucissima distincte noscuntur, caetera confuse velut in chao perceptionum nostrarum latent . . .*²

Quaevis mens in this place indicates the individual intelligence (by now νοῦς can be rendered either by *intelligentia* or by *mens*). And this individual intelligence contains in itself the whole κόσμος νοητός, i.e. the impersonal intelligence with all its intelligibles, only we are for the most part unconscious of this κόσμος νοητός, i.e. of the incessant intelligizing which takes place in us. Be it repeated: Leibniz makes free use of the ideas of Plotinus, but the historic link is clearly present.

¹ Cf. F. Rahman, *op. cit.* (above, p. 14, n. 6), p. 33, 20–25; p. 34, 22–33. Cf. above, p. 31; 45.

² P. 445–447, esp. p. 445f. Erdmann.

The main difference is that the presence of *the same κόσμος νοητός* in each and every individual is explained by Plotinus and by Leibniz in different ways.

(30) SO FAR we turned our attention to the two lower of the three principal realities of Plotinus. We now shall turn to the highest – that which is one. In order to do so, we shall begin by reviewing some parts of the *Epitome (Didascalicus)* by Albinus.¹ The *Epitome* purports to be a presentation of the main doctrines of Plato. It attributes to Plato (ch. III 1, p. 9 Louis) a tripartition of philosophy, viz. theoretic, practic, and dialectic (logic). The theoretic is subdivided into theology (concerning itself with what is unmoved, with first causes, and with the divine), physics, and mathematics (ch. VII 1, p. 41 Louis). This subdivision is the well known Aristotelian division. Albinus adopts it as a matter of course. He obviously does it with perfect conscience (just as he in presenting Plato's logic credits him with a series of Aristotle's logical distinctions). Under the heading of theology Albinus first (ch. VIII 1–2, p. 47 f. Louis) presents the concept of matter (ὕλη). Among its predicates we find “neither body (σῶμα) nor incorporeal (ἀσώματον)”, “potentially (δυνάμει) body”, etc. Matter is one of the principles (ἀρχαί). But in addition to it there are two others (ch. IX 1, p. 51 Louis). They are the paradigmatic principle, viz. the ideas (ιδέαι) but also the father and cause (αἰτιον) of everything, god. This latter principle (god) Plato virtually calls (ch. X 1, p. 55 Louis) ineffable (ἄρρητος). Still, it is possible to approach its concept in the following way. Better than the soul is intelligence (νοῦς). However, there are two kinds of intelligence, potential intelligence and actual (νοῦς ἐν δυνάμει – νοῦς κατ' ἐνέργειαν). The latter is better than the former. It can be described as thinking everything, thinking in a non-discursive manner (ἄμα) and always (ἀεί). Better than the actual

¹ The text of the following quotations is that of P. Louis, *Albinus, Épitomé*, Paris 1945. The more recent literature on Albinus can easily be found with the help of J. H. Loenen, “Albinus' Metaphysics”, *Mnemosyne* Ser. IV, vol. 9 (1956), p. 296–319. It will be seen from my analysis of the text why I cannot accept Loenen's interpretation of Albinus. According to Loenen, Albinus professes one consistent doctrine teaching the existence of a god identified by him with νοῦς (thus, there would be no anticipation of the supranoeitic principle of Plotinus in Albinus) and of a world-soul (one aspect of whose activity Albinus also designates as νοῦς) – this second νοῦς, however, not being something like a hypostasis mediating between the soul and god (thus, there would be no anticipation of the triad of principles of Plotinus in Albinus either). It seems to me that to interpret Albinus as teaching that there is only one νοῦς as a hypostasis (or whatever Loenen would call it) and that where he *prima facie* seems to speak of another νοῦς he actually means only the noetic activity of the world-soul finds no support in the text of Albinus.

intelligence is its cause (αἴτιος). And if there is something still better than any of the preceding ones (i.e. than soul, intelligence, and the cause of intelligence) – it would be the first god.¹ This god is the cause that intelligence always intelligizes or is always active. This intelligence (just one degree lower than the supreme god) is the intelligence of the entire heavens (οὐρανός). The supreme god moves while he himself remains unmoved. In the same way in which the object of desire moves him who desires but itself remains unmoved; in the same manner this intelligence moves the intelligence of the entire heavens.²

For a moment we interrupt our report to stress that the same supreme deity which a few lines before was designated as *above* intelligence and its cause is here clearly called an *intelligence* above the cosmic intelligence.

This supreme intelligence (or this supreme deity) intelligizes nothing but himself. This activity of intelligence is called *idea*.³

To this first deity these attributes belong: he is eternal, ineffable, self-sufficient, perfect. He is divinity, beingness, truth, symmetry, that which is good. And all these designations do not designate specific aspects of the supreme deity – they rather should be thought of as strictly one.⁴

Another predicate which has been applied to him is that of father. He can be so called, because he is the cause (αἴτιος) of everything and because he orders (κοσμεῖ) the cosmic intelligence and the world-soul. By the word “orders” is meant that he makes intelligence and soul refer to him and to his acts of intelligizing (νοήσεις). It is he who turned (scil. towards himself) and as it were wakened from its slumber the world-soul, because he is the reason why intelligence is present in the soul. And it is this intelligence which having received its order from the supreme deity now in turn orders the cosmos.⁵

¹ ἐπει δὲ ψυχῆς νοῦς ἀμείνων, νοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἐν δυνάμει ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πάντα νοῶν κα ἄμα καὶ ἀεί, τούτου δὲ καλλίων ὁ αἴτιος τούτου καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων ὑφέστηκεν, οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος θεός (ch. X 2, p. 57 Louis).

² ... οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος θεός, αἴτιος ὑπάρχων τοῦ ἀεί ἐνεργεῖν τῷ νῷ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ. ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἀκίνητος αὐτὸς ἂν εἰς τοῦτον, ὡς καὶ ὁ ἥλιος εἰς τὴν ἕρπασιν ... καὶ ὡς τὸ ὄρεκτον ... τὴν ὄρεξιν ... οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς κινήσει τὸν νοῦν τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ (*ibid.*).

³ ἐπει δὲ ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς κάλλιστος, δεῖ καὶ κάλλιστον αὐτῷ νοητὸν ὑποκεῖσθαι ... ἑαυτὸν ἂν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ νοήματα ἀεί νοοῖ, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ἰδέα ὑπάρχει (ch. X 3, p. 57 Louis).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ πατήρ δὲ ἐστὶ τῷ αἴτιος εἶναι πάντων καὶ κοσμεῖν τὸν οὐράνιον νοῦν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ νοήσεις. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ἐμπέπληκε πάντα ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἐπεγείρας καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέψας, τοῦνοῦ αὐτῆς αἴτιος ὑπάρχων. ὅς κοσμηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διακοσμεῖ σύμπασαν φύσιν ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ (*ibid.*, p. 59 Louis).

(31) WHAT we here have before us is a contamination of two different systems of principles. On one hand, we have the triad god – ideas – matter, on the other the triad god – intelligence – soul. The first triad is, however, on the verge of becoming a dyad, because the ideas are at the same time described as god's acts of intelligizing (νοήσεις). At the same time, these ideas are with reference to us called first objects of our intelligizing (νοητὸν πρῶτον). In being so described they assume similarity with the first νοητά of Alexander Aphrodisias, which we described as a counterpart to Plato's ideas. In other words, what distinguishes the two non-material principles of Albinus from the "noetic" principle (or principles) of Alexander is mainly the fact that Albinus does not forthwith identify god with intelligence.

But in connection with the introduction of the triad god – ideas – matter, Albinus familiarizes us with a proof of the existence of ideas. And this proof starts with the words: whether we say of god that he is intelligence or an intelligible, he entertains (or as we also could translate: he contains) νοήματα (viz. ideas).¹ Here the equation god=intelligence is clearly formulated. Though Albinus does not commit himself to this equation, he certainly is familiar with it. It is not unfair to say – the formula of Plotinus, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω νοῦ τὰ νοητά is here all but literally expressed.

In other words, we find in Albinus passages preparing us for the identification of god and intelligence. But we find in him also passages in which god is elevated above intelligence. True, this is again counteracted by the tendency to attribute intelligizing to him.²

Now, the intelligence is by Albinus designated as the intelligence of the cosmos (οὐρανός).³ We therefore could assume that in some way Albinus equates what he calls intelligence with the unmoved mover of the cosmos (οὐρανός) of Aristotle. He, then, would place still another god over the god of Aristotle. But unexpectedly Albinus takes a different turn. He suddenly starts speaking of his first god as if he were another intelligence, which is the unmoved mover of the intelligence presiding over the cosmos (οὐρανός). And it is now this unmoved intelligence which by intelligizing "creates" the ideas.⁴

¹ εἶτε γὰρ νοῦς ὁ θεὸς ὑπάρχει εἶτε νοερὸν, ἔστιν αὐτῷ νοήματα (ch. IX 3, p. 53 Louis).

² Cf. above, p. 62, n. 1. The god above νοῦς (ch. X 2, p. 57 Louis) is a little later called ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς (ch. X 3, p. 57 Louis); a little later he is again designated as πρῶτος θεός (*ibid.*), who is ἀρρητος (*ibid.*; cf. X 4, p. 59 Louis).

³ Ch. X 2, p. 57 Louis: νοῦς τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3, p. 57 Louis: ὁ πρῶτος θεός ... ἐνεργεῖ ... ἀκίνητος ... οὕτω γὰρ δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς κινήσει τὸν νοῦν τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ ... ἐαυτὸν ἀν οὖν ... ἀεὶ νοοῖται καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ἰδέα ὑπάρχει (ch. X 2–3, p. 57 Louis).

In all fairness to Albinus it can be repeated that in him we find two different interpretations of the relation between the supreme deity and intelligence. Sometimes he speaks as if the deity were above intelligence, sometimes he equates the supreme deity with intelligence, viz. its highest degree. The lower degree of intelligence he designates as celestial intelligence. In so doing he obviously attributes to it at least some of the qualities of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. But in addition to the celestial intelligence he assumes the existence of a cosmic soul. Aristotelian and Platonic concepts blend – but it is a very imperfect blend. However, precisely for this reason it illustrates Plotinus' objections to Aristotle. On one hand, Plotinus says, we find in Aristotle the concept of a supreme deity, higher than intelligence. On the other, he attributes intelligizing to this supreme deity, i.e. again depresses it to the level of intelligence (*Enn.* V 1, 9). What Plotinus describes is exactly what we find in Albinus. At the same time, precisely because Albinus on one hand professes that ideas are god's νοήματα, on the other sometimes equates god with intelligence, he anticipates the doctrine of Plotinus that intelligibles are interior to intelligence (*Enn.* V 5).

Albinus calls the second intelligence celestial intelligence. We could therefore expect to find in him also the term "transcelestial" applied to the supreme deity. And this precisely is the case. In discussing the problem of "becoming like god" (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) Albinus asks: but like which god? And he answers "of course like the god in heavens; most certainly not like the transcelestial one (θεὸς ἐπουράνιος, θεὸς ὑπερουράνιος)." ¹ What he here calls celestial god (ἐπουράνιος), he elsewhere calls celestial intelligence. Once more we have the same ambiguity for which Plotinus blamed Aristotle. Is there a principle above intelligence? No quite clear answer can be found in Albinus. It will be only Plotinus who will make this sharp distinction, which, however, won't prevent him from calling intelligence god – e.g. VI, 5, 1. But as we said, Albinus was on the verge of making it. And the way in which he describes the supreme deity often fits the One of Plotinus much better than Aristotle's Unmoved Mover who intelligizes himself and in virtue of this fact is no longer simple. Accordingly we find in Albinus the famous four *viae ad cognitionem dei* (*per negationem, per abstractionem, per analogiam, per eminentiam*).² It hardly needs proof that these *viae* are more appropriate for the cognition of an ineffable deity than for

¹ Ch. XXVIII 3, p. 137 f. Louis: τέλος ... τὸ ἐξομοιωθῆναι θεῷ ... δηλονότι τῷ ἐπουρανίῳ μὴ τῷ ... ὑπερουρανίῳ ...

² Ch. X 5, p. 61 Louis.

an intelligence intelligizing itself (in spite of the fact that here again it is called first intelligence¹ by Albinus). And thus we won't be surprised to find enumerated among the qualities of the supreme deity that of being ἀμερές. This is not quite literally Plotinus' that which is one – but certainly approaches it.

Among the *quattuor viae* the one by analogy deserves special mention. After having designated the supreme principle as the first god,² Albinus also designates him as first intelligence.³ The second of the "ways" he now explains by saying: ὁ ἥλιος πρὸς ὄρασιν καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα = ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, i.e. ὁ πρῶτος θεός, πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νόησιν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα.⁴ This means: without being νόησις (just as the sun is neither ὄρασις nor τὰ ὀρώμενα) the first intelligence παρέχει τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τοῖς νοητοῖς τὸ νοεῖσθαι.⁵

Now, the derivation of this passage from Plato is too obvious to need any elaboration. But it is worthwhile to realize the difference. Plato says that ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα (which we non-committally translate as "that whose nature it is to be good" rather than "idea of the good") is related to the νοῦς καὶ τὰ νοούμενα as the sun is to the ὄψεις καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα.⁶ Plato never as much as hints at the possibility that ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα could be interpreted as νοῦς or its activity as νόησις. But precisely in this respect Albinus differs from Plato. Having once introduced the term, πρῶτος θεός to designate the supreme principle, he all but identifies it with the other term, πρῶτος νοῦς. In other words, we almost though not quite yet have Alexander's νοῦς ποιητικός, before us, to which much is transferred that Plato says of his ἀγαθόν. Plato's analogy ἥλιος: ὀρώμενα = ἀγαθόν: νοητά has become ἥλιος: ὀρώμενα = πρῶτος νοῦς: νοῦς ψυχῆς. But on the other hand, in Albinus there is still enough left of Plato's ἀγαθόν, which is above νοῦς and therefore closer to the One of Plotinus. Albinus stands precisely midway between Alexander and Plotinus.

To compare Albinus with Plotinus in order to ascertain to what degree the former prepared Neoplatonism has now become standard procedure. But it seems that the comparison becomes much more meaningful, if we read Albinus in connection with Alexander.

Of course, everybody who compares Albinus with Plotinus is

¹ *Ibid.*

² Ch. X2, p. 57 Louis.

³ Ch. X3, p. 57 Louis.

⁴ X 5, p. 61 Louis.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Rep.* VI 19, 508–509.

painfully aware of a missing link. We know that Plotinus read Alexander. But we do not know whether he read Albinus. The closest we can come to is our knowledge that he read Gaius and that Gaius was the teacher of Albinus.¹ The reconstruction of the teachings of Gaius has been attempted on the basis of the similarity between the doctrines of Apuleius and those of Albinus.² Though since such a reconstruction has first been attempted, another girder was added to brace it,³ it still is not completely firm. We therefore cannot claim with complete certainty that Albinus historically prepared the way for Plotinus. But from the systematic point of view no doubt seems possible.

Iamblichus⁴ quotes Albinus for a central problem, viz. the reason of the fall of the souls.⁵

(32) ONE of the most characteristic doctrines of Plotinus is that both the lower principal realities fully become what they are by turning towards that which is higher than they. Thus the soul turns to the intelligence, intelligence turns to that which is one.⁶ It seems that in some way this idea too is anticipated by Albinus when he says that "the father" orders (κοσμεῖ) the celestial intelligence and the cosmic

¹ See, e.g. [K.] Praechter, "Gaius", *RE*, Suppl. III (1918).

² By Sinko as quoted by P. Thomas (below, p. 69, n. 1).

³ H. Diels, *Anonymer Kommentar zu Platons Theaetet*, Berlin 1905, p. XXIV–XXVII.

⁴ I cannot convince myself that the Iamblichus, mentioned by Porphyry (*Vita Plotini* 9) as the father-in-law of Amphicleia, one of Plotinus' devotees, could be anybody but Iamblichus of Chalcis. Now, the *Vita Plotini* was written after 301 and most probably before 305. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Aristo, the son of Iamblichus, was married in 300. If we furthermore assume that he married when at least twentyfive and that his father begot him when twentyfive himself, we shall have to assume that Iamblichus was born c. 250. If we assume the marriage and the begetting having taken place when son and father were only twenty, the birth of Iamblichus would have taken place c. 260.

Both dates (250 and 260) can be reconciled with what we know about the date of Iamblichus' death. He did not survive his pupil Sopatros who after his death went to the court of Constantine and was by him later executed. This execution took place after Constantine had transferred his court to Byzantium, and before the death of Constantine, i.e. sometimes between 328 and 337. Thus Iamblichus could have died several years before 328 and must have died before c. 336. If he was born in 250, he therefore died either before he reached seventyeight or at an age of c. eighty-six. If he was born c. 260, the ages become sixtyeight and seventy-six, respectively. See on all this Eunapius, *Vitae* 461f.; Christ-Schmid-Stählin II/2, Munich 1924, p. 1052, note 3; O. Seeck, "Sopatros" 11, *RE* III/1 (1927); R. Beutler, "Porphyrios", *RE* XXII/1 (1953); J. A. Philip, "The Biographical Tradition – Pythagoras", *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 90 (1959), p. 185–194, esp. p. 190, note 5.

⁵ In Stob. 49, 32, p. I 375, 10 W; cf. [A. J.] Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, vol. III, Paris 1953, p. 208 with note 3; R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, Cambridge 1937, p. 137–139.

⁶ V 2, 1, 10–11, 19.

soul "towards him and his acts of intelligence,"¹ and then explains it by saying that he awakens the cosmic soul and turns it (*ἐπιστρέφει*) towards him, which he does by implanting intelligence in the soul. The same idea returns a little later. What is meant by the making of the soul, says Albinus, is, of course, not a temporal process. God orders (*κατακοσμεῖ*) the cosmic soul, he awakens her and turns her (*ἐπιστρέφει*) as well as her intelligence towards himself. Now the soul can contemplate his intelligibles (*νοήματα*) and fill herself with ideas and forms, as she desires those intelligibles.² All this is not too clear, but again it comes as close as possible to the great principle of *ἐπιστροφή* (*Enn. V 2, 1*).

(33) WE mentioned the fact that Albinus speaks of different kinds of intelligence. It should also be obvious, how the Aristotelian distinction of two kinds of intelligence by the time of Plotinus has been so re-interpreted that we can find almost any number up to eight (*παθητικός, ὑλικός, δυνάμει, ἐνεργῶν, ἐν ἕξει, ἐπίκτητος, ἐνεργεία, ποιητικός*) distinguished in different ways by different authors. Small wonder that Plotinus' terminology is neither quite clear nor quite consistent. In the long run he anyway decided that potentiality cannot be applied to the concept of intelligence and insisted that there is only one kind of intelligence, always "energizing." He felt that to distinguish between "energizing" and "dynamic" intelligence was uncomfortably close to increasing the number of hypostases, i.e. to the principles of gnosticism (cf. no. 2).³

(34) WE noticed the importance of there being two kinds of *νοητά* according to Alexander and therefore two kinds of intelligizing. Albinus is perfectly familiar with this dichotomy.⁴ He divides intelligibles into two classes, one being the *ἰδέαι*, the other *εἶδη ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης*. We here have what we found in Alexander: the doubling of the idea-theory, so as to reconcile the Platonic concept of the transcendent idea with Aristotle's concept of the immanent form, which later concept undoubtedly was meant by Aristotle to replace the concept of idea rather than to be added to it. And having thus differentiated between transcendent *νοητά* (intelligibles) = *ἰδέαι* and immanent

¹ Ch. X 3, p. 59 Louis.

² Ch. XIV 3, p. 81 Louis.

³ II 9, I, 23-27.

⁴ Ch. IV 7, p. 19 Louis.

The best known formula for this dichotomy is that in Seneca, *Ep. 58, 20-21 (exemplar - forma)*; cf. *Ep. 65, 7 (deus exemplaria omnium inter se habet)*.

intelligibles = *εἶδη*, Albinus quite consistently continues: to these two kinds of intelligibles two kinds of intelligizing belong, one the subject matter of which are the ideas, the other the subject matter of which are the *εἶδη*. The way in which he describes the two kinds of intelligizing, however, differs from that of Alexander. Ideas are "judged" (*κρίνονται*) by intelligence *οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου* and by some kind of total grasp (*περὶληψις*) rather than discursively. The *εἶδη* are "judged" by *ἐπιστημονικός λόγος* not unaided by intelligizing. As we see, the difference between the intuitive and the discursive method of intelligizing exhibits less of a contrast in Albinus than it does in Alexander. But it becomes immediately obvious that both, Alexander and Albinus, hark back to a philosophic position which was bound to emerge, once the synthesis of Plato's transcendent ideas with Aristotle's immanent forms was achieved. Here are the beginnings of the dichotomy intuition vs. abstraction - with the understanding that both are activities of intelligence as opposed to sensation.

In somewhat abbreviated terms: the transcendent ideas are according to Albinus grasped intuitively by intelligence, but in some way this intuition is aided by discursive intelligizing; the immanent ideas are objects of discursive intelligizing but the latter is aided in some way by intuition. It can easily be seen that what seems to describe a static condition can be used to describe a changing one: "lower" intelligizing is always guided by "higher" intelligizing, but men can attain to "higher" intelligizing only through the exercise of this "lower" intelligizing. One immediately recognizes the problem of the relation of what will later be called suprarational insight, to the rational faculties of man. One immediately also anticipates two possible solutions of this problem. According to one, suprarational insight can be thought of only as the crowning achievement of rational insight, according to the other, suprarational insight would be accessible without any mediation, be considered something like a special gift, which some might even possess who do not possess rational insight (nor even its organ, "lower" intelligizing).

(35) NOT unexpectedly, we find Apuleius in agreement with Albinus.¹ But he also supplements Albinus in an important respect. First, he introduces as the three fundamental principles god, ideas,

¹ The text quoted is that of P. Thomas, *Apulei Platonici Madaurensis de philosophia libri*, Leipzig 1908. On the relation between Albinus and Apuleius see K. Praechter, *op. cit.* (above, p. 67, n. 1). Cf. P. Courcelle, "De Platon a Saint Ambroise", *Revue de Philologie* 37 (1961), p. 15-28, esp. p. 16, note 5.

and matter,¹ and when he says *initia rerum esse tria*, he almost anticipates the title of Plotinus' essay. But a little later Apuleius restates the doctrine of the principles.² This time, he states them in a different way. There are two realms of being, he begins, the intelligible and the sensible. The former realm, he continues, is subdivided. *Et primae quidem substantiae vel essentiae primum deum esse | et mentem formasque rerum | et animam.*³ Here we simply have the Plotinian triad – a first god, intelligence and ideas, and the soul. Of course, we do not know what Apuleius conceives the relation between *mens* and *formae* to be. Are they outside the intellect? Are they within it? In any case, the similarity with Plotinus is obvious and the separation of the first god from intelligence accomplished. The fact that he counts only three kinds of intelligible substances certainly is best explained if we assume that Apuleius identifies intelligence with intelligibles.

It must be admitted, however, that the term "first god" may be ambiguous. Is he first with regard to intelligence or first with regard to other gods? Apuleius speaks of an ultramundane god⁴ – clearly the counterpart of Albinus' transesternal god. Under him Apuleius locates as a second kind of divinity the stars. With which of these gods would he have identified the Unmoved Mover? We do not know. Still, the step separating his from Plotinus' first god who does not think and is above thinking intelligence is very short. Apuleius suffers from an *embarras de richesse* with regard to his concept of divinity and he is not the man to give up an impressive formula for the sake of consistency. He rather adds a number of such formulas without actually asking himself whether they are addible. Plotinus brings order into the confusion. But it does not seem that Plotinus does more than that.

(36) THUS, from a comparison of Plotinus with Alexander and Albinus-Apuleius it becomes clear that it is only Plotinus who achieves a complete blend of two sets of ideas stemming from Aristotle's psychology on one hand and from his metaphysics on the other. In Albinus-Apuleius we have hardly more than a juxtaposition of these sets. Therefore the concept of the soul in their writings appears twice. It appears when the principles of the intelligible reality are enumerated, but here it is hardly more than mentioned. It is fully treated in an-

¹ I, V 190: *deus, materia, formae*. On the description of *formae* see P. Merlan, *op cit.* (above, p. 31, n. 1), p. 125 f.

² I, V, 193.

³ I, V 193.

⁴ I, XI 204.

other topic devoted to the soul independently of her connection with the realm of the intelligible. We could almost say – in their writings the soul as a metaphysical principle and the soul as part, aspect, essence of man sometimes look like two different entities. It is different with Alexander. Although his investigation is firmly rooted in human psychology (after all it is a commentary on *De anima*), it reaches out into the field of metaphysics.¹ On reading Aristotle alone, one has to establish the identity of intelligence spoken of in *Met. A* with the intelligence spoken of in *De anima*, almost on the basis of the identity of the word alone. And in fact, as we have seen before, there were commentators of Aristotle who insisted that the distance separating the two treatments of intelligence is very great indeed in that only *Met. A* speaks of the divine intelligence whereas *De anima* limits itself to the speaking of human intelligence. Alexander links these two aspects much more firmly than Aristotle himself. But the decisive step is taken by Plotinus only. The soul from the very beginning is treated as one of the three supreme metaphysical principles but at the same time it is this soul which is particularized, if we may say so, into the world soul and the human souls. Ultimately the difference between psychology and metaphysics disappears. The same is true of intelligence. In Plotinus, intelligence is one of the highest principles but there can be no doubt that it is at the same time in some way present in man. We can try to reduce the differences to a brief formula. Plotinus reimmerses metaphysics in psychology. In Alexander, metaphysics barely rises from psychology. In Albinus-Apuleius, metaphysics occasionally reaches into psychology.²

¹ It is therefore remarkable that Ps. Alexander in his commentary on *Met. A* copies passages from Alexander's commentary on *De anima* as can easily be seen from the apparatus of the CAG edition of the latter. See above, p. 35, n. 2.

² The present investigation was completed when through the courtesy of the author I received A. H. Armstrong's "The background of the doctrine that 'the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect'", reprinted from *Sources de Plotin, Entretiens Tome V* (Vandoeuvres-Genève n.d., c. 1960). There is wide agreement between his conclusions and mine with regard to the point that the doctrine of Plotinus indicated in the title of his essay is rooted in the noetic of Aristotle as interpreted by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Cf. also Audrey N. M. Rich, "The Platonic Ideas as the Thoughts of God", *Mnemosyne* Ser. IV, vol. 7 (1954), p. 123-133, esp. p. 133, for a different approach to the problem of a synthesis of Plato with Aristotle.

On the problem, still unsolved, of the origin of the doctrine which interprets ideas as God's thoughts see M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, 2 vv., 2nd ed., Göttingen 1959, 1955, vol. II, p. 132; H. A. Wolfson, "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 22 (1961), p. 3-32.

Another attempt to link Plotinus to Alexander was recently undertaken in: P. Thillet, "Un traité inconnu d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur la Providence dans une version inédite", *Actes du Premier Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale: L'Homme et son Destin, Louvain-Paris 1960*, p. 313-324. This treatise, says Thillet, Plotinus, the

(37) But let us once more return to the relation between Plotinus and Albinus.

If it is true that in Plotinus we find traces of a devaluation of anamnesis in favor of memory (cf. above, p. 58) then the question emerges whether he initiated this turn. It seems we ought to answer in the negative. For, in Albinus we find a doctrine clearly anticipating it.

There are two kinds of νόησις, says Albinus. One is that exercised by the soul before its embodiment, the other after it. And whereas only the former is (or what Albinus seems to mean, ought to be) called νόησις, the latter is called φυσική ἔννοια. What are the objects of these two kinds of νόησις? For the former it is the ideas; for the latter inborn notions of such things as goodness and beauty. And these inborn notions serve us as standards by which we judge whether something is good and beautiful or not.

Before us we have something like a climax of Albinus' syncretism. As we have seen, he recognizes ideas-without-matter and ideas-in-matter. In other words, he combines Plato with Aristotle. But he also recognizes ideas as objects of the prenatal intelligizing *plus* ideas as inborn notions, or rather as we could say, carefully distinguishing

author of *Enn.* III 2 and III 3 might have read (p. 322). With some surprise, Thillet notes that the treatise by Alexander has a distinctly neoplatonic flavor. This, Thillet explains by assuming that it is the effect of the Neoplatonism of the translator from the original Greek (p. 322; 316f.). While I do not mean to deny that this explanation may be correct, perhaps future investigation will reveal an Alexander anticipating Neoplatonism in some fields in addition to those mentioned in the present book. For still another aspect of Plotinus' relation to Alexander see P. Merlan, "Plotinus *Enneads* II 2", *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 74 (1943), p. 179-191.

Perhaps I can use this opportunity to point out that there seems to exist some connection between the treatise by Alexander which Thillet has found and what Pinès presented to us as a new fragment by Aristotle: M. Pinès, "Un fragment inconnu d'Aristote en version arabe", *Bulletin de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* 1955, p. 387-395. In the Aristotelian fragment we find the doctrine that acts (divine or human) are superior if they are undertaken for the sake of the doer rather than for the sake of another being. This is applied to the problem of providence. God exercises his providence not by actions undertaken for the sake of other existents - in other words he exercises his providence only in an indirect manner. Now, it is precisely the same doctrine which we find in the new treatise by Alexander. I quote what seems to be Thillet's translation: *Les actes qui conviennent le mieux à la nature divine sont ceux qui ont pour but l'essence même de Dieu et non pas le salut des choses de ce monde* (p. 320, from f. 95 r of the Arabic manuscript 798 Esc.). This Thillet explains by the phrase that providence *ne peut non plus procéder d'une 'intention première'*. Unfortunately it is not clear whether this phrase *intention première* is a translation or Thillet's own. If it is the former, it is remarkable that it can also be found in Pinès' Aristotelian fragment. Thus it would seem to be a phrase which Alexander took from Aristotle. By the way, I would think that the Greek corresponding to *intention première* would be, not as Pinès suggests, *πρώτως* or *κυρίως*, but rather *προηγούμενως*, so that Aristotle-Alexander would teach that divine providence takes place *μη̄ προηγούμενως* (*intentione obliqua* rather than *intentione recta*).

between acts and their objects, inborn notions the object of which are standards, i.e. quite obviously something like 'earthly' counterparts of ideas, serving precisely the same purpose which ideas serve according to Plato. It seems certain that we have before us a combination of Platonism with Stoicism.

And now comes the decisive term. According to Albinus this φυσική ἔννοια is by Plato sometimes called μνήμη.¹

Again it is useful to distinguish between the act and its object. Μνήμη here obviously means μνήμη *with its object* - in other words, ideas as objects of μνήμη rather than anamnesis, or κοινὰ ἔννοιαι replacing ideas. Ideas are to anamnesis, what 'common notions' are to memory.

Can we find this doubling of ideas into ideas proper and ideas as κοινὰ ἔννοιαι with the attendant doctrine of memory as the 'double' of anamnesis in an author preceding Albinus? It seems that we can answer this question in the affirmative. There at least are traces of this bifurcation in the author who is the source of Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes*, Book I.

One section of this book is devoted to the proof that our soul is divine.² The soul sharply differs from the principle of life in plants or animals - one of the reasons being that it is endowed with memory.³ *Memoria* is different from *recordatio*.⁴ Now, it is possible that according to the author in question *memoria* means memory in the ordinary sense of the word, i.e. that its objects are knowledges empirically acquired. But if this was meant, would our author deny that animals have memory? ⁵ And would he express himself as follows: The soul (*animus*) *habet primum memoriam et eam infinitam rerum innumerabilium: quam quidem Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitae*. Is it not clear that the author is reinterpreting Plato's concept of anamnesis? True, he quotes the classical passages from *Meno* to illustrate the meaning of *recordatio* - but again we find the formula *ex quo effici*

¹ There is a νόησις διττή, one preceding the ἐνωμάτωσις, the other following it. The latter is φυσική ἔννοια viz. νόησις τις οὐσα ἐναποκειμένη τῇ ψυχῇ. And this φυσική ἔννοια Plato sometimes calls ἐπιστήμη ἀπλή και πτέρωμα (or according to other mss. πλήρωμα or περίπτωμα) ψυχῆς, ἐσθ' ὅτε δὲ και μνήμη. As to the use of the φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι: Τῷ γάρ ἔχειν ἔννοιαν φυσικὴν καλοῦ και ἀγαθοῦ τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενοι και ἀναφέροντες ἐπὶ τὰς φυσικὰς ἔννοιας ὡς ἐπὶ μέτρα τινὰ ὄρισμένα κρίνομεν εἴτε οὕτως ἔχει τὰδε τινὰ, εἴτε και ἐτέρως (*Epitome*, ch. IV 6, p. 17 Louis; IV 8, p. 21 Louis).

² XXIV 56-XXVII 67.

³ XXIV 56-57.

⁴ XXIV 58-59.

⁵ This denial is implicit in the contrast between plants and animals on one side, man on the other. What they have in common is *appetere* and *fugere*; what distinguishes the latter from the former is in the first place (*primum*) memory (XXIV 56-57).

VULT *Socrates ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi recordari*. Again the sentence sounds as if the author would not quite subscribe to it. And in reporting the other classical passage from *Phaedo* he says: . . . *nec vero fieri posse ut a pueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones, quas vocant, haberemus, nisi animus, ante quam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset*.¹ Here quite obviously the *κοινὰ ἐννοιαί* are treated as alternative term to the term ideas (*species*).

And immediately the author (or Cicero) continues: but even more than anamnesis I admire *memoria*.² And one of the theories of *memoria*, according to which it is the result of impressions made on some kind of stuff comparable to wax is explicitly rejected. We have the impression that we are on the threshold of the theory of St. Augustine (see above, p. 59), according to which some of the objects of memory have always been present in it.

It must be admitted that all these connections are somewhat elusive. No Platonist was ready to abandon explicitly and entirely the theory of anamnesis in favor of memory, i.e. of unconscious inborn ideas – ideas having already the modern connotation, as best known from Locke's and Leibniz' usage. But we have the impression that all three, Cicero's authority, Albinus, and Plotinus are on the verge of professing it. Plato's ideas become not only god's thoughts – they become, or are on the verge of becoming, innate ideas in the modern sense of the word.

It will, of course, be asked who the author of Cicero's is. For the time being I must confine myself to the somewhat dogmatic assertion that it cannot be either Antiochus or Posidonius. A brief survey of the whole book shows that it is an ardent Platonist who speaks – and his Plato is the successor of Pherecydes and Pythagoras³ – in comparison with whom the rest of philosophers who disagree with him are *plebei*.⁴ He quite obviously without reservations counts Aristotle among Platonists – and his Aristotle is the *Aristoteles exotericus*, entertaining among others the belief that the soul consists of the same kind of 'stuff' of which the stars and the gods consist, viz. ether – an element which somehow is non-material (reminding us somewhat of Descartes' pineal gland), a stuff the essence of which consists in *ἐνδεδεχέα* i.e. perpetual self-movement, corresponding to Plato's assertion that the soul is that

¹ XXIV 57–58.

² XXIV 59.

³ XVI 38; cf. XXI 49. Cf. above, p. 6, n. 1.

⁴ XXIII 55.

which is self-moved and therefore imperishable.¹ He is highly critical of Stoics, including Panaetius, who believe in only a limited survival of the soul.² He is a strict dualist,³ also in matters of epistemology⁴ and limits the survival of the soul to its reasonable part (*mens*) – a theory which he attributes to Plato.⁵ As we have seen, he elevates soul (*animus*) to a rank much higher than the mere principle of life.

If *Acad. post. I* 13–42 present the point of view of Antiochus, *Tusc. Disp. I* cannot do it. It is sufficient to remind oneself that according to Antiochus man consists of body and soul *both of which* belong to his essence, so that his whole system of ethics is built on the recognition of the importance of the body⁶. On the whole we could venture to say while Plotinus could not have been attracted by Antiochus, he, with one exception, viz. the doctrine of the quintessence, would have been much more in sympathy with Cicero's authority. And it seems equally impossible to reconcile the doctrines of the *Tusculanae Disputationes I* with Posidonius' concept of *σμπάθεια*, which welds parts of the universe into one whole.

But whoever Cicero's authority – what he, Albinus, and Plotinus represent, sums up to a characteristic synthesis. The juxtaposition of anamnesis and memory with the extravagant praise bestowed on the latter; the juxtaposition of Plato's ideas and Stoic 'notions' (*ἐννοιαί*); the introduction of the concept of unconscious intelligizing – all this prepares the replacing of the transcendence of Plato's ideas by their immanence. Immanence in one of its aspects means immanence with regard to the divine intelligence (ideas as God's thoughts). But in another it means immanence in the human intelligence, this intelligence itself being with regard to the human intelligence semi-trans-

¹ X 22; XVII 41; XVIII 41; XXVI 56. He knows very well that the two disagree on the problem of the eternity of the universe and on the problem whether god is an effector or only a moderator of the universe, but he obviously considers this of no major importance (XXVIII 70).

² XXXI 77; XXXII 79–XXXIII 80.

³ XXII 51; XXIV 58; XXXI 75.

⁴ XX 46–47.

⁵ XXXIII 80.

⁶ The starting point of any discussion of the Antiochus problem are the following recent publications: W. Theiler, *op. cit.* (above, p. 8, n. 1); Elsa Birmelin, "Die kunsttheoretischen Gedanken in Philostrats Apollonios", *Philologus* 88 (1933), p. 149–180; 392–414, esp. 402–406; F. Cumont, "Antiochus d'Athènes et Porphyre", *Université Libre de Bruxelles, Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire orientales*, vol. II (1934) = *Mélanges Bidez*, p. 135–156; L. Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius", *American Journal of Philology* 57 (1936), p. 286–325; R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, Cambridge 1937; Annemarie Lueder, *Die philosophische Persönlichkeit des Antiochos von Askalon*, Göttingen 1940; K. Reinhardt, art. "Poseidonios", *RE* XVIII/2 (1949); G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos*, Bern-Stuttgart 1953; M. Pohlenz, *op. cit.*, above, p. 71, n. 2.

endent, semi-immanent. It can easily be seen that with the loss of the transcendence of intelligence, Plato's ideas are reduced to objects of human intelligence. Still to call them ideas makes the term rather ambiguous. Different languages react to this ambiguity in different ways. In German we prefer to speak of *Vorstellungen* rather than *Ideen*; in Italian we find *rappresentazione*. In English we tend when speaking of Platonic ideas to capitalize 'idea' or use the term 'form'. The terminological difficulties and ambiguities are complicated by the fact that idea (as the German *Vorstellung*) may mean either the mental act 'intending' the idea as its object or this object itself, a difference which plays so conspicuous a role in the mathematical philosophy of Frege or in Husserl's phenomenology. Plato's ideas – inborn ideas – ideas, these are three steps toward immanence. Inborn ideas, but unconscious and therefore calling for being elevated into consciousness and this unconsciousness being either personal or collective, this 'elevation' being an act of memory, analogous to Plato's anamnesis – here we have another set of terms and problems, strictly related to the former.¹ In all these combinations we can find an appropriate place for some of Plotinus' theories.²

¹ Cf. R. Eucken, *Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie* (Leipzig 1879, repr. Hildesheim 1960), p. 199–201; Pohlenz, *op. cit.* (above, p. 71, n. 2), vol. I, p. 244, with notes; vol. II 117; 126; 132.

² Two more passages deserve mention in this context.

Plotinus interrupts his discussion of memory (IV 3, 25–IV, 4, 17) to distinguish a *μνημονεύειν ὃν ἔχει* (scil. the soul) *συμφύτων* from memory in the usual sense of the word. These *σύμφοτα* the soul possesses, without actually 'exercising' them. To those souls which actually 'exercise' them, the ancients attributed the 'exercising' of memory in the sense of recollection (I write and construe: *ταῖς ἐνεργούσαις ἃ εἶχον οἱ παλαιοὶ εὐλασιν προστιθέναι ἐνεργεῖν μνήμην [καὶ] ἀνάμνησιν*, i.e. I take *ἀνάμνησιν* to be an apposition to *μνήμη*; cf. the apparatus in H.-S. and the translation by Harder, *op. cit.* [above, p. 13, n. 2], which omits the *καὶ*). How different this kind of memory-recollection is from memory, can best be seen from the fact that it has nothing to do with time. In other words, according to Plotinus memory-anamnesis is not subject to the conditions established by Aristotle for both memory and what he calls anamnesis, which, however, in him means nothing more than recall of past mental or sensible experiences, both memory and anamnesis being based on images (*φαντασάται*), which accompanied the mental experience and are essential to every sensation (IV 3, 25, 27–34 as contrasted with Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscencia*). When Plotinus speaks of the timelessness of anamnesis he seems to mean that the condition of this kind of remembering should not be expressed by the formula 'I remember the ideas I once saw' but by another, viz. 'I now am conscious of seeing the ideas which I have always seen, though unconsciously'. In other words, we do not really remember ideas, we see them and precisely in virtue of the same faculty by which I saw them before incarnation. And this faculty should not, of course, be called memory. Thus, anamnesis is actually the raising of unconscious knowledge to conscious one. This seems to be the gist of the passage IV 4, 5, 1–11.

Another characteristic passage we find in Nemesius. In a chapter the first part of which quotes Origenes' definition of memory, Nemesius (i.e. his source) attributes to Plato the distinction between two kinds of *νοεῖν*, one of which could be called *διανόησις*,

(38) All this leads us to the question – what is, if we may say so, the style of Plotinus philosophizing? To what extent are his doctrines the outgrowth of something like a genuine philosophic insight, to what extent are they the result of philological interpretation of texts – an interpretation motivated at least partly by the desire to synthesize Plato and Aristotle? To determine precisely the relation between intelligence and god? And it seems to me that the philological aspects of the philosophy of Plotinus are considerably more important than it would appear at the first glance. Perhaps we could risk the assertion: the philosophical insight which Plotinus expresses by his doctrine of the three principal realities he has acquired by trying to synthesize texts. His insight is derivative rather than original.

(39) THE close proximity of Plotinus to Alexander becomes obvious in still another of his essays, viz. *Περὶ τῶν γνωριστικῶν ὑποστάσεων καὶ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα* (V 3 [49]), particularly in those parts which deal with the problem of self-knowledge (ch. 1–5). The texts are sometimes rather difficult; extensive literal quotations are indispensable.

The discussion starts with the question how intelligence knows itself. But before answering it, Plotinus in ch. 2 turns to the problem of the self-knowledge of the soul, soul here meaning the human soul, not the cosmic one, with the words: *πρότερον δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ζητητέον, εἰ δοτέον αὐτῇ γινῶσιν ἑαυτῆς* (2, 1–2).

But again he interrupts the train of thought by returning to the concept of *νοῦς* and concentrating on just one aspect of him.¹ He describes his actions and asks: *καὶ νοῦς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς μέχρι τοῦδε ἰστάμενος*

while only the other is *κυρίως νοεῖν*. To the former ordinary memory belongs (i.e. obviously memory presupposing the continued existence of *φαντασάται* by which this *νοεῖν* was accompanied); to the latter a memory *sui generis*, anamnesis in the strict sense of the word. Its objects are ideas, equated by Nemesius (i.e. his source) with *φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι*. An example of such innate 'ideas' is the knowledge that God exists (*De natura hominis*, ch. 13, 92; *PG* 40, p. 661 B–C Migne).

In all likelihood, Origenes here quoted by Nemesius is not the Christian Origenes (whom Nemesius quotes in two other places) but Plotinus' fellow-pupil (cf. W. Jaeger, *Nemesius von Emesa*, Berlin 1914, p. 56–66). And it is possible that the whole theory of two kinds of *νοεῖν* to which two kinds of memory belong, together with the other combining Plato's theory of ideas with the Stoic doctrine of *notitiae communes* belongs to him. But even if the passage belongs to the Christian Origenes (I find it entirely incomprehensible that some scholars still believe in the identity of the two), it would be very pertinent to the present topic – the replacing of Plato's ideas by inborn 'ideas' in the modern sense of the word and the attendant change of anamnesis from recollection in the ordinary sense of the word to raising of an unconscious 'memory' (actually inborn knowledge) to a conscious one.

¹ I shall refer to the *νοῦς* as hypostasis by 'he'. Plotinus uses *ἐκεῖνο* and *ἐκεῖνος* indiscriminately.

τῇ δυνάμει ἢ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν στρέφεται καὶ γινώσκει ἑαυτὸν; (i.e.: is this the maximum of what *human* intelligence can achieve or shall we attribute self-knowledge to human intelligence?). And the answer is: "Ἦ ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνεκτέον τοῦτο (2, 14-16).

In this last sentence the νοῦς spoken of is obviously no longer the human νοῦς. It is the νοῦς ὁ ἄκρατος as he is here called and self-knowledge is attributed to him.

This idea is taken up in ch. 3¹: self-knowledge is the attribute of the νοῦς καθαρός. And now in a style so lively that we almost feel that we are reading the record of a class discussion, the relation of this νοῦς καθαρός to the human soul is explained.

Τί οὖν κωλύει ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦν καθαρὸν εἶναι;

Οὐδὲν, φήσομεν.

Ἄλλ' ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν ψυχῆς τοῦτο;

Ἄλλ' οὐ ψυχῆς μὲν φήσομεν, ἡμέτερον δὲ νοῦν φήσομεν – ἄλλον μὲν ὄντα τοῦ διανοουμένου καὶ ἐπάνω βεβηκότα, ὅμως δὲ ἡμέτερον, καὶ εἰ μὴ συναριθμοῦμεν τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς ψυχῆς;

Ἦ (i.e.: or perhaps rather) ἡμέτερον καὶ οὐχ ἡμέτερον, διὸ καὶ προσχρώμεθα αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ προσχρώμεθα – διάνοια δὲ αἰεὶ – καὶ ἡμέτερον μὲν χρώμενον, οὐ προσχρώμενον δὲ οὐχ ἡμέτερον;

Τὸ δὴ προσχρῆσθαι τί ἐστίν;

Ἄρα αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνο γινόμενος, καὶ φθεγγόμενος ὡς ἐκεῖνος;²

Thereupon the answer (or the correction, if the above is an assertion rather than a question): No – not ὡς ἐκεῖνος.

Ἦ (i.e.: perhaps rather) κατ' ἐκεῖνον· οὐ γὰρ νοῦς ἡμεῖς.

Κατ' ἐκεῖνο οὖν τῷ λογιστικῷ πρώτῳ δεχομένῳ (scil. αὐτόν: i.e.: we 'follow' him, as the λογιστικὸν receives him – and it is the first to receive him).

Thus κατ' ἐκεῖνον as opposed to ὡς ἐκεῖνος seems to be the key phrase. The γινόμενος ὡς ἐκεῖνος is rejected.

But to this an objection is raised.

Καὶ γὰρ αἰσθανόμεθα δι' αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· (i.e.: How can we say that it is not *we* who know ourselves but only νοῦς? And that '*we* know ourselves' can be said only in the sense that we 'obey' that νοῦς? – see the apparatus in H.-S. – <οὐχ> before ἡμεῖς with Theiler Harder Cilento not necessary). And the objection continues with the words: ἄρ' οὖν καὶ διανοούμεθα οὕτως καὶ διὰ νοῦ μὲν (H.-S.

¹ Cf. Zeller III/2 (51923), p. 634, note 1.

² But it may be that the ἄρα is here an ἄρα affirmativum. In this case an interrogation mark at the end of the sentence should be replaced by a period. The reason why γινόμενος is underscored will become obvious later.

instead of καὶ διανοοῦμεν οὕτως; (i.e.: Just as we say '*we* sense through αἰσθησις', so we should say '*we* intelligize through νοῦς').

To this objection the answer seems to be: As a matter of fact, in both cases (sensing and intelligizing) 'we' designates only the διάνοια, which is 'fed' from above by the νοῦς, from below by the αἰσθησις. Only, in the case of αἰσθησις we easily say 'we' because it is always taking place. Νοῦς δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ ὅτι μὴ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ (scil. προσχρώμεθα) καὶ ὅτι χωριστός· χωριστός δὲ τῷ μὴ προσνεύειν αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον πρὸς αὐτόν εἰς τὸ ἄνω βλέποντας. Αἰσθησις δὲ ἡμῖν ἀγγελος, βασιλεὺς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐκεῖνος (3, 21-45).

Thus, the doctrine that 'we' are not the νοῦς seems upheld.

But ch. 4 takes an unexpected turn.

Βασιλεύομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅταν κατ' ἐκεῖνον (in other words: to the extent that our λογιστικὸν acts *according* to νοῦς, we also participate in his royal quality)· κατ' ἐκεῖνον δὲ διχῶς (this is obviously a new idea, as in ch. 3, 30-32 no two kinds of κατὰ were distinguished). What, then, are these two kinds?

ἢ (a) τοῖς οἷον γράμμασιν ὡςπερ νόμοις ἐν ἡμῖν γραφεῖσιν,

ἢ (b) οἷον πληρωθέντες αὐτοῦ ἢ καὶ δυναθέντες ἰδεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι παρόντος (the subject of ἰδεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι is 'we', the object obviously the νοῦς χωριστός or καθαρός).

Καὶ γινώσκουμεν δὲ αὐτοὺς (1) τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ὁρατῷ τὰ ἄλλα μαθεῖν [τῷ τοιοῦτῳ] ἢ (2) καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν γινώσκουσαν τὸ τοιοῦτον μαθόντες αὐτῇ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ (3) καὶ ἐκεῖνο γινόμενοι.

The explanations of self-knowledge under (1) and (2) we can here leave aside. But as to (3) it is striking that this mode of self-knowledge is attributed to us in virtue of our *becoming* the νοῦς χωριστός, which is precisely what under ch. 3, 30-31 was excluded for the reason that it would imply that *we are* νοῦς (i.e. not only make use of him). In other words, Plotinus here admits the possibility of 'us' *becoming* νοῦς χωριστός.

Thus he continues:

ὡς τὸν γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν διττὸν εἶναι,

(1) τὸν μὲν γινώσκοντα τῆς διανοίας τῆς ψυχικῆς φύσιν,

(2) τὸν δὲ ὑπεράνω τούτου, τὸν γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἐκεῖνον γινόμενον.

The repeated use of the word γίνεσθαι permits no doubt: in (2) Plotinus here discusses (and admits) the possibility of some kind of transformation (γένεσις) of 'us' into the νοῦς χωριστός. And the extraordinary quality of such a transformation is indicated by what follows:

κάκεινον ἑαυτὸν νοεῖν αὐτὸ οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἔτι, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἄλλον γενόμενον (!) καὶ συναρπάσαντα ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ ἄνω μόνον ἐφέλκοντα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄμεινον, ὃ καὶ δύναιται μόνον πτεροῦσθαι πρὸς νόησιν, ἵνα τις ἐκεῖ παρακαταδοῖτο ἃ εἶδε (4, I-14).

Here for the transformation (γένεσις) the term συναρπάζειν is used – indicative of some ecstatic quality of the experience here envisioned by Plotinus.

Having thus established the possibility of self-knowledge for man, based on our having become νοῦς χωριστός, Plotinus appeals to that faculty in us which stands midway between νοῦς and αἰσθησις (which intermediate faculty is here as often termed τὸ διανοητικόν), to recognize that there is something above it, something better than it: <δ> οὐ (I accept this emendation by Ficinus) ζητεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔχει πάντως δήπου. Indeed the διανοητικόν will easily see that it, in some way, acts according to the νοῦς (here, as in ch. 4, 2-4, the νοῦς is compared to a writer, the διάνοια to his tablet; one wonders whether this is not Plotinus' transportation of the Peripatetic simile since Aristotle used to explain the relation between the νοῦς ποιητικός and the νοῦς παθητικός – *tabula rasa* – and an application of this simile to the relation between νοῦς and διάνοια). But, Plotinus continues, let him who doesn't know better stop here and with this kind of self-knowledge: Εἰ οὖν λέγοι (scil. ἡ διάνοια), ὅτι ἀπὸ νοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ δεύτερον μετὰ νοῦν καὶ εἰκὼν νοῦ ... ἄρ' οὖν στήσεται μέχρι τούτων ὃ οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐγνωκώς.¹ Ἡμεῖς δὲ (i.e. we who want to acquire a higher kind of self-knowledge) ἄλλη δυνάμει προσχρησάμενοι νοῦν αὐτὸ γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν κατοφόμεθα ἢ ἐκεῖνον μεταλαβόντες, ἐπεὶ περ κάκεινος ἡμέτερος καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐκεῖνου, οὕτω νοῦν καὶ αὐτοῦς γνωσόμεθα.² To become νοῦς is to acquire self-knowledge, for νοῦς not only has self-knowledge, he is self-knowledge.

This, then, is true self-knowledge: to become νοῦς χωριστός, in whom there is no difference between knower, object known, and the act of knowledge.

Ἡ ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως, Plotinus concludes, εἴπερ γνωσόμεθα, ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν νῷ "αὐτὸ ἑαυτό."

The last two words express the nature of true and full self-knowledge, peculiar to the νοῦς χωριστός.

Once more Plotinus explains how even we (in whom as a rule only ordinary self-knowledge takes place, in which knower and that which

¹ Thus, I interpret the ἄρ' οὖν στήσεται (4, 22) as an affirmation. Therefore after ἐγνωκώς (4, 23) I put a period.

² Period rather than interrogation mark after γνωσόμεθα.

is known still differ) can attain to true self-knowledge:

"Ἔστι δὴ νοῦς τις αὐτὸς γεγονώς (!), ὅτε τὰ ἄλλα ἀφείδ ἑαυτοῦ τούτου καὶ τοῦτον βλέπει, αὐτῷ δὲ ἑαυτόν (4, 20-29).

Man becomes transformed into the νοῦς, when he through the νοῦς sees the νοῦς and by that νοῦς whom he sees when he becomes νοῦς, he acquires full and true self-knowledge. When I become that which is self-knowledge I know myself. The κατ' ἐκεῖνον is replaced by ὡς ἐκεῖνος.

(40) THROUGHOUT the discussion the Aristotelian overtones are clearly perceivable.¹ The νοῦς of whom Plotinus speaks is not only the second hypostasis of his system. It is at the same time Aristotle's divinity in his metaphysics, Aristotle's νοῦς χωριστός or θύραθεν of his psychology, and the νοῦς which when intelligizing that which is immaterial is in this act of intelligizing identical with his object, of his epistemology. In the first of these three capacities he is sheer self-knowledge. In the second, he cannot be described as part of the soul proper, because he is adventitious, pre- and postexistent. In the third, he represents the disappearance of the subject-object dualism, essential to other kinds of knowledge. Although the quotations and semi-quotations from Aristotle are in part enunciated by Plotinus only in the later parts of the essay (δεῖ τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτην εἶναι τῷ θεωρητῷ, καὶ τὸν νοῦν ταύτην εἶναι τῷ νοητῷ: 5, 21-26), clearly the principle of Aristotle's noetics in all its three aspects is presupposed by Plotinus throughout the essay.

With all this, it would be next to impossible to find in Aristotle a doctrine teaching the possibility of man (or man's mind) transforming himself into the νοῦς χωριστός and thus acquiring the complete transparency which the latter possesses or rather is. But we cannot say that this doctrine is entirely original with Plotinus. Before him the desirability and possibility of this transformation into the higher, divine intelligence was taught by Alexander.

On the other hand, the ecstatic (mystic) aspect of this transformation is quite clearly expressed only by Plotinus. He refers to it by the term συναρπάζειν (the best known passage in which ἀρπάζειν is used in connection with an ecstatic experience is of course 2. Cor. 12,4). What is particularly interesting about this is the fact that this kind of ecstasy is not identical with the better known which is the *unio mystica* with the One. In this latter union, no νόησις takes place, because the

¹ Including the tentative identification of man with his νοῦς: Eth. Nic. X 7, 1178a2; IX 4, 1166a16, 22; 8, 1168b28.

One is not intelligence but superior to it. In other words, the two types of mysticism which we distinguished above and one of which we called rational or rationalistic mysticism (we could also have called it intelligence mysticism) to indicate that it culminates in the union with intelligence rather than with the ineffable One, are both present in Plotinus. And this rational mysticism is clearly anticipated by Alexander.

It is also worthwhile to observe that Plotinus describes the condition under which man becomes united with the νοῦς χωριστός using the words that he first must τὰ ἄλλα ἀφιέναι ἑαυτοῦ. We are reminded of the much more famous formula concluding the essay, viz. ἄφελε πάντα. The formulas are similar enough. But only the latter refers to the union with the One, whereas the former relates to the union with intelligence.

(41) WE noticed that the whole problem of the identification of man with the νοῦς χωριστός is discussed by Plotinus in the context of the problem of true self-knowledge. Here again the link connecting Plotinus with Alexander is visible, though not quite clearly. In one passage of his discussion concerning the different aspects of the human mind as opposed to those of the νοῦς ποιητικός Alexander barely mentions that as man's mind rises to the level on which he is able to perceive embedded νοητά even in the absence of the sensibles in which they are embedded, he becomes capable of self-knowledge.¹ What Alexander means is clear enough in the context of Aristotle's epistemology. For, as according to it, in every act of knowledge of something immaterial the difference between the act and its object disappears, man's intelligence in perceiving an immaterial νοητόν perceives itself. But, Alexander adds, this kind of self-knowledge is only incidental self-knowledge (κατὰ συμβεβηκόσ). For, what in such an act man's mind knows *modo recto* (προηγούμενως) is only the immaterial νοητόν; that he himself is this νοητόν, man perceives only incidentally.²

Here Alexander concludes his discussion of self-knowledge. But it seems more than likely that in some other writing Alexander continued along the same line and said that only when man has transformed himself into the νοῦς ποιητικός his self-knowledge no longer is only incidental, because it is the essence of the νοῦς ποιητικός to be true and

¹ *De an.* 86, 17-18 Bruns. Alexander's starting point is of course Aristotle's *De anima* III 4, 429b 9: καὶ αὐτὸς [scil. ὁ νοῦς] δὲ αὐτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν. In his recent edition [W.] D. Ross emended the passage to read καὶ αὐτὸς δι' αὐτοῦ τότε δύναται νοεῖν (*Aristotle, De anima*, Oxford 1961) but whether the emendation is correct or not, it seems obvious that Alexander read δὲ αὐτόν, not δι' αὐτοῦ.

² *Ibid.*, 86, 20-23; cf. 86, 27-29 Bruns.

full self-knowledge. In fact, he is even in *De anima* on the verge of saying it. For when he says that our intelligence becomes the κυρίως νοῦς as it intelligizes him and that in this moment the θύραθεν νοῦς 'comes to exist' in us as ἀφθαρτος,¹ he certainly did not forget that this κυρίως νοῦς is νόησις νοήσεως. In terms almost identical with those of Plotinus (see above p. 78), he also underscores that even when in us, the νοῦς κυρίως is not another δύναμις ψυχῆς.² His self-knowledge therefore most certainly is different from the partial self-knowledge of the human intelligence, viz. no longer *per accidens*, as the νοητά which he intelligizes are identical with him.

Thus, we see, both Alexander and Plotinus are rationalistic mystics themselves and precursors of this kind of mysticism in the Middle Ages.

But let us stress it: what is distinctly Plotinus' own contribution is the doctrine of the unconscious, explaining the present absence or the absent presence of the divine νοῦς in us. The mystical union consists in making conscious what is unconscious in us.

(42) THROUGHOUT the present study the term 'unconscious' and 'unconsciousness' were used. It was done so partly not to complicate matters. For, as already noticed, these terms have more than once been applied to the philosophy of Plotinus, be it to assert that it was a philosophy of the unconscious, be it to deny it, be it, as it is done presently, cautiously to suggest it. But perhaps in concluding a rectification of our terminology should be appropriate.

The unconscious as understood by both Freud and Jung is the repository of *irrational* forces, drives, images. In terms of Plato it represents the nether parts of man's soul. In modern terms it represents the chthonic aspects of man. But when Plotinus teaches that the intelligence which thinks incessantly is present in us although we are not (or are not always) conscious of it, he obviously thinks of the unconscious in terms of the divine and upper world.³ It is unconscious with regard to us. We are unconscious of it. But *per se* this intelligence cannot be described as unconscious, because it is eminently *rational*. Therefore we should apply to it the term *metaconsciousness* rather than *unconsciousness*. This, then, explains the word as it appears in the

¹ *Ibid.*, 89, 6-22 Bruns.

² *Ibid.*, 91, 2-3 Bruns. Of course Alexander speaks of δυνάμεις, Plotinus of μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς.

³ Cf. Hazel E. Barnes, "Katharsis in the Enneads of Plotinus", *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 73 (1942), p. 358-382; *eadem*, "Neoplatonism and Analytical Psychology", *Philosophical Review* 54 (1945), p. 558-577.

title of the present study. Plotinus teaches the unicity of the soul and, *a fortiori*, the unicity of intelligence (*intellectus*). He teaches the possibility and desirability of the transformation of our ordinary intelligence into that higher intelligence. He teaches that such a transformation or union takes place in an ecstatic experience – *different from the ecstatic experience in which the union with the One is achieved*. The higher intelligence, though it transcends our intelligence is in some way present and (incessantly) active in us, though we are not conscious of its presence or activity. But obviously when we become united with it a *sui generis* enlargement of our consciousness takes place. This enlarged consciousness we could call metaconsciousness. The enlargement on one hand consists in our depersonalization, as the divine intelligence is impersonal. On the other hand the enlargement concerns the content of consciousness as the divine intelligence obviously in intelligizing all intelligibilia is in some sense of the word, omniscient. Quite obviously this newly acquired consciousness is a consciousness of a higher order. In the moment of union it is no longer we who intelligize – it is the superior intelligence which intelligizes in us. Of course it could also be said that only in this moment it is actually we who intelligize, viz. our true we. In this condition man has divinized himself and this means that he has truly become man. Monopsychism, mysticism, metaconsciousness – these three terms indicate why man can and should divinize himself, thus reaching his full stature as man, and the road leading to the goal of becoming divine.

III THREE AVERROISTIC PROBLEMS

I COLLECTIVE IMMORTALITY AND COLLECTIVE PERFECTION IN AVERROES AND DANTE

In his *Great Commentary* to Aristotle's *De anima* Averroes¹ teaches that there are three intelligences – the productive (he says: *agens*), the material (he often says: *possibilis*), and what he calls the speculative.² The speculative intelligence is the result of the 'energizing' ('actuating') of the material intelligence by the productive intelligence (which itself is energizing or actuating in the intransitive sense of the word). This energizing of the material intelligence is not an act of direct 'illumination' of the material intelligence by the productive intelligence (nor is it the result of a direct action of intelligibles on the material intelligence).³ Rather, the productive intelligence illuminates the *formae imaginativae*, i.e. the residues of sensations, existing in the human mind. After these *formae* have been illuminated, they act on the material intelligence.⁴ As a result of this action, material intelligence becomes transformed into what Averroes calls speculative intelligence.⁵

After what was said on the preceding pages, only a minimum of commentary seems to be required. What Averroes here calls speculative intelligence is obviously essentially identical with Alexander's νοῦς ἐπικτητος, i.e. human intelligence transformed into productive intelligence. Now, according to Averroes both the productive and the material intelligence are immortal,⁶ whereas the speculative intelligence is on one hand perishable on the other imperishable (immortal).⁷ And Averroes stresses that this doctrine is

¹ F. Stuart Crawford, *Averrois Cordubensis commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, Cambridge, Mass. 1953.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 389, 80 (one aspect of it is the *intellectus in habitu*: p. 438, 1); 437, 8–438, 31.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 438, 41–439, 57.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 398, 334–5; 401, 402–410; p. 406, 556–562; p. 411, 693–702.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 384, 46.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 401, 424–426.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 389, 80–81; 406, 569–574; 407, 595–6.