

IV COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS,¹ DOUBLE
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND METACONSCIOUSNESS
(UNCONSCIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS) IN KANT AND
SOME POST-KANTIANs

(1a) It is well known that Herder in his polemics caused by Kant's reviews of his *Ideen*, but directed against Kant's *Idee* called Kant an Averroist.² He motivated this by saying that Kant differentiates between the perfection of the human race and that of the individual and speaks of a destiny (education) of the human race not coinciding with the destiny (education) of the individual. This, said Herder, is tantamount to the doctrine that the human race possesses one soul only (and one not of the highest order at that).³

Herder's objection is palpably correct⁴—although it is more than doubtful whether Herder, being an historian himself, i.e. of necessity making mankind at large the subject of history, was entitled to raise it.⁵ Moreover, it seems

¹ When dealing with medieval philosophy, we rendered νοῦς by intelligence and turned the attention of the reader to the fact that both *intelligentia* and *intellectus* are ultimately translations of one and the same term, although the use of the two words instead of one only suggests a solution of some difficulties attendant the doctrine of the productive intelligence. As we now turn to modern philosophy, we should be prepared to meet a number of terms, all ultimately going back to the concept of the νοῦς. *Geist*, *esprit*, mind, *raison*, reason, *Verstand*, *Vernunft*, etc. are the best known. But we have to add one more — the term consciousness. Seemingly this should not be done, as consciousness seems to be wider than νοῦς, as the former contains not only the rational aspects of the life of the mind, but also the emotional and even the sensual ones, so that in the concept of consciousness the difference between ἀσθησις and νοῦς seem to be relegated to the background. But in fact, some of the problems of consciousness are entirely identical with the problem of the universal or unique intelligence. The term even brings out the fundamental problem inherent in that concept with greater clarity in that it demands as its counterpart the term unconscious.

² The conflict between Kant and Herder over the former's philosophy of history found its best presentation in R. Haym, *Herder* (1st ed. 1880/5; many later editions, the most recent by Harich, Berlin 1954). The main documents are: Herder, *Ideen zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie der Menschheit*, vol. I (1784); Kant's review of it (1785) and Kant's *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (1784); Herder, *Ideen* . . . vol. II (1785); Kant's review of it (1785). The subsequent quotations from Kant refer to the *Akademie-Ausgabe*; those from Herder to the edition by Suphan. The problem in question is essentially identical with that of Dante's Averroism.

³ Herder, *Werke* 13, p. 345f. (the crucial passage is omitted in the 1785 edition).

⁴ Cf. T. Litt, *Kant und Herder als Deuter der geistigen Welt* (2nd ed., Heidelberg 1949).

⁵ A point Litt is unfortunately unable to see. His whole book is written under the spell of the concept of *Gemeinschaft*, i.e. a community in which, as he sees it, the connecting

that Kant was not overly impressed by being called a monopsychist. He defended his point of view by saying that indeed it is not contradictory to say that the human race as a whole can become perfect, although not its members. For, says Kant, human race means the infinite series of procreations and this series asymptotically approaches the line of the destiny of man.¹

It is obvious that Kant either did not understand Herder or refused to understand him. What Herder meant (no matter how he expressed it) is that if the destiny of the race is different from the destiny of the individual, the perfection of the race as a whole means nothing to the individual who is not perfect — and how true this is becomes obvious when one thinks of all the individuals who died (or will die) before the human race will have reached its perfection. But Kant had every right not to understand Herder because the latter did not understand his own objection to Kant — or at least how far reaching its implications actually were. Therefore Kant could gleefully point out that in publications subsequent to Herder's attack on his, Kant's, Averroism, Herder repeatedly made statements clearly indicating that he, too, differentiated between the destiny of the individual and that of the human race and indeed comforted the individual who did not succeed in his own life by pointing out the advantages which accrued from his achievements to the race as a whole.² Unhesitatingly Herder spoke of men as participating in one and the same soul, one and the same reason,³ leaving it to the reader to decide whether this was meant to be a metaphor only. Unhesitatingly he introduced the fatal concept of the genius of the age (used in English according to *OED* for the first time by Boyle in 1665) with the following words: If Averroes [!] believed that the whole human race possesses one soul only, in which every individual participates in his own manner, sometimes actively, sometimes passively [Herder's strange adaptation of the doctrine of the νοῦς ποιητικός and παθητικός], — this kind of poetry [again Herder leaves the reader wondering to what extent Herder is toying only with an idea] I should prefer to apply to the genius of the time and say that we all are under his influence, sometimes actively, sometimes passively. If Herder took the idea of the genius of the age seriously one could almost say that what he did was to replace the collective consciousness of Averroes

link is something intrinsic and organic, as opposed to the extrinsic and abstract unity of mankind, as conceived by Kant. But the whole concept of *Gemeinschaft* as opposed to the concept of *Gesellschaft* is entirely spurious. It was F. Tönnies who introduced it (*Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft*, Berlin 1887). In fact, both *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* are collectives, in which to participate or not to participate is entirely left to man's free decision (*Kürwillen*). Neither is more natural than the other. Everything that is wrong in romanticism is contained in this concept of *Gemeinschaft*. Litt's admiration of Herder is ultimately based on his having become convinced by Herder's famous denunciation of cosmopolitanism (*das verschwemmte Herz des müszigen Kosmopoliten*: *Werke* 13, p. 339) though Litt may not be fully aware of it.

¹ Kant, *Schriften* 8, p. 65.

² Kant, *Schriften* 8, p. 61. Cf. Herder, *Werke* 13, p. 373.

³ Herder, *Werke* 14, p. 228.

by a multitude of collective consciousnesses, genii of the several ages.¹

As for Kant, he in spite of his rather tart reply to Herder remained conscious of the problem of the relation between the destiny of the individual and that of the human race – more so than his critic Herder. Indeed he, though a staunch believer in progress and the perfection of the human race as its goal, still designated the implication that men work for something which they themselves will never enjoy, as *befremdend* and *rätselhaft*.² His final remark on this problem (in: *Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis* [1793]) amounted to a kind of challenge. He says: On contemplating all the evil inflicted by man on man in the course of history, we are still entitled to cheer up by embracing the hope that man's future will be brighter than his past, though this future will arrive when we ourselves shall have been dead for a long time. Therefore we enjoy the prospect of that future happiness in an entirely unselfish manner.³

This is Kant's real answer to Herder. We participate in the destiny of the human race by altruism.⁴

¹ Herder, *Werke* 17, p. 77f. (*Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität, 2. Sammlung*, 1793).

² Kant, *Schriften* 8, p. 20.

³ Kant, *Schriften* 8, p. 309.

⁴ The fallacy of this reasoning has been revealed by Lotze. With absolute clarity Lotze says: It is completely useless to talk about a goal of history which mankind approaches or reaches, unless it is shown to us in what manner the individual can avail himself of this goal for himself. To be sure, it is everybody's right to renounce his own claim to the enjoyment of this goal; to be sure, everybody is admirable who says "Though I myself won't live to see mankind reaching its goal, it is enough for me to know that I contributed to the happiness or perfection of others". But, so Lotze insists, we mustn't demand of others that they give up their claim.

But could we make sure, Lotze goes on to ask, that eventually every individual will participate in the ultimate destiny of mankind (be it happiness, be it perfection, as we can add)? Obviously, Lotze answers, this can be done only under the assumption of personal immortality. Unless we make this assumption, the concepts of mankind and of a goal of mankind to be reached in or through history become completely irrelevant to the individual. Just as every individual has a perfect right to renounce his own claim, so every individual has a perfect right to expect and to demand a fair share in the future happiness or perfection of man – and if no guarantee can be given that expectation and demand will be met in some way or other, the individual has a perfect right to turn his back on the very concept of history and its goal and to assert its complete irrelevance (H. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos* [1856–1864], vol. III 7, 2.).

It is incomprehensible that this passage by Lotze is hardly ever referred to in contemporary discussion concerning the meaning of history.

It is perhaps appropriate to remind the reader that the problem stated so succinctly by Lotze is essentially identical with the problem which must emerge in every religion teaching any kind of kingdom of God to be expected in the future (eschatology, apocalyptic). Within the orbit of Judaeo-Christianity the best known statement of the problem is contained in *I. Thess.* 4: 13–18. To their bewilderment the faithful ones who live expecting the advent of the kingdom of God realize that some who shared their expectation died before this advent. Have they waited in vain? Have they been deceived? Is there any guarantee that they who are still waiting will live to see it come and thus participate in it? St. Paul dispels their apprehension. When the kingdom of God comes, the dead ones will rise and thus share in its bliss along with those who happened to live when it came.

But how is altruism possible? How is it possible that one should equate his happiness with that of others? To clarify this point, from the post-critical Kant, we turn to the pre-critical.

In his *Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik* (1776),¹ Kant faces the problem of a direct intercommunication (com-

It should be obvious – the more one is convinced of the importance of history's goal, the more of the quality of God's kingdom it has in his eyes, the more comprehensible the concern of St. Paul's contemporaries should be to him. But then the question should become all-important to him: unless he has some answer comparable to that of St. Paul, unless he can give some guarantee of everybody's participating in history's goal, doesn't this goal become quite meaningless? Now, of course very few historians will be inclined to assert that by some kind of immortality all men who ever lived will enjoy the goal of history. But if so, don't they by implication completely deflate the importance and significance of history?

Another aspect of the difference between the destiny of the individual and that of mankind appears in Kant's *Mutmaszlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte* (*Schriften* 8, p. 107–123). Here Kant interprets man's fall as the first exercise of his freedom (i.e. breaking the bonds imposed on him by instinct, which bonds an animal is never able to break), in that man eats something which to eat he is not prompted by instinct. The first exercise of freedom is at the same time the beginning of man's history. But the exchange of instinct for freedom is bought at the price of misery (loss of paradise) of the individual, as freedom implies the possibility of error. However, it is only through freedom that man achieves the goal of history, the perfection of the human race. Thus, the fall, though accompanied by evil consequences for the individual, is indispensable for the race. We could say, the fall with all its misery for the individual and its glorious consequences for mankind is providential. And it is fitting that the individual should not rebel against or accuse providence.

Obviously Kant's interpretation of history is a secularized version of the *felix culpa* theory. It is less unsatisfactory than the latter in that the *felix culpa* theory amounts to saying "eternal damnation of some is not too heavy a price to pay for the eternal bliss of others" whereas according to Kant it is only *misery* of some which constitutes the price of perfection of others. But for him who does not assume any other kind of misery (or happiness) except that of the present life, Kant's theory must appear as repulsive as the *felix culpa* theory has always appeared to some theologians (whose sincere religiousness is beyond doubt). Instructive is the so obviously inadequate defence of the *felix culpa* concept e.g. in: O. Casel, "Der österliche Lichtgesang der Kirche", *Liturgische Zeitschrift* 4 (1931/32), p. 179–191, esp. p. 187.

Kant himself does not use the phrase *felix culpa* or its German equivalent. But Schiller in his paraphrase of Kant's *Mutmaszlicher Anfang*, i.e. in *Etwas über die erste Menschengesellschaft nach dem Leitfaden der mosaischen Urkunde* (1790) explicitly refers to man's fall as *die glücklichste und grösste Begebenheit in der Menschengeschichte* (*Sämliche Werke, Säkularausgabe*, vol. XIII/1, p. 24–42, esp. p. 26). Cf. Elfriede Lämmerzahl, *Der Sündenfall in der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, Berlin 1934.

In contemporary Protestant thought the problem of *Heilsgeschichte*, which is another aspect of the problem of history in general, is discussed with great intensity. See, e.g., H. Ott, "Heilsgeschichte" in: *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 3rd ed., vol. III (1959). His suggested solution of what he designates as a theological paradoxon is: *es müsste gezeigt werden, inwieferne die Zugehörigkeit in die Solidarität des Gottesvolkes aller Zeiten ein Strukturmoment des Glaubens des einzelnen ist*. In other words, Ott asserts that the true believer will, regardless of whether he will personally participate in the *eschaton*, still participate in it in some way, by some kind of feeling of solidarity with those who will personally experience the *eschaton*. It is strange that Ott should not see that in such a case it is entirely irrelevant, whether the *eschaton* will or will not actually take place – it has already taken place in the mind of every believer in it.

¹ The evaluation of this writing oscillates between two extremes. Relying on the well-known self-deprecatory letter of Kant to Mendelssohn, H. Cohen (*Die systematischen Begriffe in Kant's vor-kritischem Idealismus*, Berlin 1873) dismissed it as in-

munion) of spirits.¹ And in this context he discusses why we, when we find that our *Erkenntnisse* disagree with those of our fellowmen, feel a kind of compulsion to make them return to conformity with our opinions. Kant's answer is that perhaps we feel that our judgements depend on the universal human intelligence (*allgemeiner menschlicher Verstand*).²

And immediately Kant proceeds to discuss as a parallel question: how can we explain that we are capable of moral action?³

The context explains what Kant means by 'moral action'. It is simply altruistic action. In other words Kant asks: how shall we explain that we are capable of valuing the welfare of others above our own?

Let us stress the parallelism of the two questions. Kant treats knowledge or the theoretical aspect of our intelligence and morality or the practical aspect of our intelligence obviously as twin aspects. To use his later terms, he invites us to think of the parallelism between pure theoretical reason and pure practical reason, *through both of which we overcome our theoretical or practical 'egotism'*.

How, then, does Kant answer the question? Whenever we act morally, says Kant, we feel ourselves to depend on the rule of the universal will (*allgemeiner Wille*). From this a moral unity results in the universe of all intelligent (thinking) natures. In other words, Kant says, moral sense is the feeling that our private will depends on the universal (*allgemein*) will.

Universal intelligence and universal will – the terms are characteristic. But perhaps it could be argued that Kant might mean no more than the fact that man whenever thinking according to the rules of reasoning, whenever acting according to the rules of morality, must think, must act in precisely the same way because there is only one set of such *rules*. This, however, would not imply any doctrine of the unicity of theoretical or

significant. On the other hand, L. Goldmann, *Mensch, Gemeinschaft und Welt in der Philosophie Kants*, Zürich, n.d., c. 1945, (who sees its affinities with the neo-Kantianism of the Badenian school – see below) discovers in it the germs of some of the most important concepts of the critical Kant (e.g. his theory of the *mundus sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*) and of his successors, including Lask and even Lukács, specifically the latter's semi-Marxian concept of 'false consciousness', and also of the existentialists, specifically their concept of authentic as opposed to inauthentic existence (here Goldmann seems to be somewhat carried away). I side with Goldmann rather than with Cohen. But for our purpose it matters to see the systematic position *expressed* by Kant, whether or not it was important to him.

For a recent controversy concerning the evaluation of *Träume* see G. Martin, "Kant und Leibniz", *Kant-Studien* 47 (1955/56), p. 409–416, esp. p. 413, criticizing K. Hildebrandt, *Kant und Leibniz*, Meisenheim/Glan 1955, p. 32–34 for overestimating it. Cf. J. Schmucker, *Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, Meisenheim/Glan 1961 p. 154–173.

Perhaps the reader should be reminded that Kant himself (in his letter to Mendelssohn of April 8, 1766 quoted above, *Schriften* 10, p. 66) admits that his writing lacks order, which he explains by the fact that it was written in installments.

¹ *Schriften* 2, p. 333.

² *Ibid.*, p. 334.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 334f. (how the hypothesis that *geistige Naturen fliessen in die Seelen der Menschen* can be made probable; the formula *sittliches Gefühl = empfundene Abhängigkeit des Privatwillens vom allgemeinen Willen*).

practical reason (intelligence) except in a metaphorical sense of the word, for each man may have his own pure (theoretical and practical) reason, even though pure reason was the same in each man (Leibniz!).

But such an interpretation would not do justice to what Kant tries here to establish. The above considerations are undertaken by Kant as a response to Swedenborg's claim that our mind can directly communicate with the community of all other minds.¹ Kant translates if we may say so, Swedenborg's claim into a more sober language. Ultimately, he by implication says, the insights of one mind are not different from the insights of another mind, nor are the practical interests of one mind different from another. To the extent that we belong to the community (communion) of minds (spirits) we do not differ from each other, and it is this factum of non-difference that expresses itself in the submission to the universal theoretical and practical mind. And in some way, says Kant, we know of our membership in this community. Because we know ourselves as such members, we want others to think the way we think and for the same reason we are capable of acting in such a way that our action expresses the identity of our interests with those of our fellow men.

Let us restate the whole problem remaining closer to Kant's wording. Kant starts from what appears to be a fantastic assertion that disembodied spirits (souls) communicate directly with our souls. Admittedly, the human soul, as long as man is in his normal condition (maliciously Kant renders this by *so lange alles wohl steht*) is not conscious of the impressions received from the world of spirits or, to state this more cautiously, ideas instilled in us by these spirit cannot pass into *das klare Bewusstsein des Menschen*. How can such an assertion, Kant goes on to ask, be supported by some kind of evidence so that it could be proven or at least made probable?

To make clear what he is after Kant refers to Newton. Newton discovered the law of universal gravitation. He could, but did not, stop here. He asked "What is the cause of gravitation?" and answered "The force of mutual attraction". How does Kant apply the procedure Newton's to the problem on hand? It is obviously by the device of assuming that we can observe the universal law of moral, i.e. non-egoistic action ruling the conduct of man, but though we could stop here, we are entitled to ask and answer the question "What is the cause of altruism?" And the answer is: the direct communication of spirits. We are citizens of two worlds, that of spirits embodied and that of spirits disembodied. In the latter capacity – in this way we must interpret Kant – we are aware of our solidarity with all other spirits and it is this awareness of solidarity which is the cause of altruism or, as Kant says, of our *sittliches Gefühl*.

Whether Kant made his point is extremely doubtful. As long as there is a plurality of spirits, the question why a spirit should subordinate his egoistic

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

interests to those of others remains open. To make Kant's 'proof' really conclusive it would be necessary to assume that the plurality of spirits is only apparent, that actually all spirits are one, and that we unconsciously or semi-consciously are aware of this unicity of spirits. This dim consciousness of *tat twam asi* would explain altruism. And this unicity of spirits would also explain the universal validity of the rules of thinking.

But in any case, one thing clearly emerges. Kant is ready to admit the existence of a double consciousness, one which we have *qua* disembodied spirits, the other which we have *qua* embodied ones. And some kind of intercommunication is taking place between the two – mainly in the form of 'influence' of the disembodied spirits on us *qua* embodied ones. It should be obvious that by a slight change in terminology all these metaphysical (dogmatic) speculations can be converted into critical ones.

The affinity of Kant's precritical ethics with his critical becomes also obvious in the way in which Kant describes the relation of the two modes of consciousness. I have, says Kant, no *empirical* knowledge of myself *qua* mind – I only can *infer* that I am a spirit.¹ I am, as he says, one subject, but I am two persons.² One subject I am in a non-empirical way. Therefore I have two kinds of knowledge of myself, two kinds of self-consciousness, one empirical, the other non-empirical.³

In pre-critical language we here see the doctrine of the *homo phaenomenon* and *homo noumenon* expressed (or at least clearly anticipated) and together with it the doctrine of the categorical imperative. Because man is not only an empirical person, he possesses in addition to his empirical consciousness, another consciousness. As a member of the community of minds (spirits), he has a consciousness which differs from his consciousness of himself as an isolated private subject. But this consciousness of himself is obviously unconscious knowledge.⁴⁻⁵

Here the concept of the unconscious all but emerges in a highly significant manner. It is obviously meant by Kant to explain that in our conscious life we feel impelled to think and to act as if our thinking and acting were the result of universal reason and universal will. To the extent that I think and act according to universal reason and universal will there is no difference between my thoughts and actions and those of other men. In the community of minds (spirits), so we could formulate Kant's idea, the *principium indi-*

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 337f.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 338f. (*unklares* as distinguished from *klares Bewusstsein*: p. 333).

⁵ For different reasons (*viz.* to account for the fact that the empirical subject does not know that all the objects are nothing but the result of having been posited by a subject) the concept of the unconscious (better: metaconsciousness) has been introduced into post-Kantian philosophy by Maimon. See e.g. K. Fischer, *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, vol. V, I 2nd. ed., München 1884, p. 197f.; W. Dilthey, "Briefe Kants an Beck", *Gesammelte Schriften* IV, p. 310–353, esp. p. 319f.; M. Gueroult, *L'évolution et la structure de la Doctrine de la science chez Fichte*, 2 vv., Paris 1930, vol. I, p. 122; 131.

viduationis no longer holds. Kant almost rediscovers the theory that there is only one intelligence (*νοῦς*) and it is this unicity which explains why there is one universal rule of truth and goodness. For this universal and unique intelligence is not only theoretical but also practical.

We can now restate Kant's categorical imperative. Its sense is: act by universalizing yourself. This is simply Kant's formula corresponding to the formula of Alexander that we should try to transform our human intelligence into the unique separate intelligence. All the religious overtones which we found in Alexander in connection with this demand we find in Kant whenever he speaks of our private will being conscious of the command to transform itself into the universal will. The two passages (*Pflicht . . . Zwei Dinge*) are the well known documents of this 'religious' aspect of Kant's philosophy. Indeed, it seems that it was only for reasons of style that Kant did not say "Whoever wants to divinize himself should, as much as possible, try to unite his private will with that of the universal will".

Thus, we find in Kant an avatar of the doctrine of the unicity of intelligence. For a moment the doctrine of the unconscious seems to emerge, but it is soon replaced by the doctrine of the empirical and the non-empirical consciousness. Thus, we certainly don't mean to say that Kant simply states the doctrine of the unicity of intelligence or the doctrine that in addition to our conscious intelligence, we possess another unconscious one. But, on the other hand, it is almost there, just as Leibniz' doctrine that our mind thinks incessantly, is almost there.¹

The doctrine of the double consciousness is of considerable importance. One of the two 'consciousnesses' which man has, i.e. his empirical consciousness, is the one which he actually has. The other, non-empirical, for which some would prefer the expression 'unconscious consciousness' is the one which he should have – and to a certain extent does have, but *mainly in the form of an imperative* to transform his empirical consciousness into that meta-empirical one. His meta-empirical consciousness unites him with other men, while his empirical consciousness separates him from them. The tension between these two consciousnesses can be expressed in different ways. In application to the realm of action, one could speak of the difference between the true will, i.e. responsible will and the apparent will, i.e. arbitrariness. With regard to the theory of punishment, one could say that every just punishment is the execution of the true will of the person who is being punished, i.e. in the ultimate resort, that every punishment is self-punishment. And in this sense of the word we could also say that all government is ultimately self-government – with the understanding that self-government is rooted, not in an arbitrary decision as to how the governed ones want to be governed, but in their reasonable decision. In application to the realm of cognition, we could say that one has a duty to think in a meta-personal

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 338, note.

manner, as this is the only way to attain unto truth, just as meta-personal action is the only way to attain unto goodness (Rousseau, Hegel).

(1b) THE replacing of anamnesis by the doctrine of the ever-intelligizing intelligence in which human intelligence participates entails the possibility of two main developments. Let us recapitulate what we said earlier.

The object of Platonic anamnesis were ideas – in some sense of the word substances and their knowledge was, in some sense of the word material knowledge. But the more anamnesis becomes replaced by the doctrine of ever-intelligizing intelligence, historically and systematically two possibilities emerge. Either the objects of the ever-intelligizing intelligence are ultimately taken to be in some sense of the word substances – not universals as Plato's ideas have been asserted by Aristotle to be, but in some sense of the word individual intelligibles. To the extent that acts of intelligizing exhibit some analogy with the acts of sense perception, they are the objects of some kind of vision. Or they are no longer conceived as some kind of successors to Plato's ideas but in some sense of the word as mere forms – forms of thinking, rules of thinking, etc. In other words, we here have the two possibilities of interpreting St. Augustine's illumination as being either formal or material (cf. p. 61 above). If illumination is conceived as material, its objects may be Aristotle's Unmoved Movers, the Unmoved Mover, etc. But if we have something like formal illumination, before us *we have the germs of Kant's theory of the a priori*.¹ Thus this theory receives its appropriate place in the perspective of philosophy. According to Plato we are born with the knowledge of ideas making empirical knowledge possible. It now turns out that we are born with forms making knowledge possible. Of course, no historic connection exists between Alexander and Kant. But from the systematic point of view Kant represents the full growth of what begins with Alexander, continues with Plotinus and Themistius, is rediscovered and adapted by Leibniz. Our empirical knowledge has non-empirical roots. The object of this non-empirical knowledge is sometimes considered to be material (contentual, *inhaltlich*), sometimes formal. The way in which we acquire this non-empirical knowledge is sometimes described as anamnesis, sometimes as direct vision, sometimes as making conscious what we know unconsciously, sometimes as known to us implicitly in every act of empirical knowledge. The differences between all these solutions of one and the same problem – to explain those elements of our knowledge which cannot have come from experience – are very great, no doubt. But it is useful to see what they have in common, and to what extent they are related.

One more question must be asked with regard to Kant. Is what he some-

¹ Cf. S. Aicher, *Kants Begriff der Erkenntnis verglichen mit dem des Aristoteles*, Berlin 1907 (*Das a priori ... ist ein allgemeines Bewusstsein, eine transzendente Apperzeption, die allem individuellen Bewusstsein zu Grunde liegt und dieses erst möglich macht*: p. 105).

times terms *Bewusstsein überhaupt* and which is best described as the seat of the a priori forms,¹ sometimes pure (non-empirical) reason, to be conceived as personal or as impersonal? Is there more than one *Bewusstsein überhaupt*? Does every man have his own set of forms or should we assume that there is only one *Bewusstsein überhaupt* in which everybody shares?

¹ The classical passages: *Prolegomena*, §§ 20; 22; 29. Cf. H. Amrhein, *Kants Lehre vom Bewusstsein überhaupt und ihre Weiterbildung bis auf die Gegenwart*, Berlin 1909, esp. p. 85–93; F. Paulsen, *Kant* (Stuttgart 1898; many later ed.), p. 265–268 and J. Guttmann, *Kants Gottesbegriff*, Berlin 1908, but see F. Paulsen, "Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik", *Kant-Studien* 4 (1900), p. 413–447, esp. p. 420 (empirical, individual reason is *Ausfluss aus der Urvernunft*) and p. 428f. (with the impressive formula: *an intellectus archetypus hat unserem nachdenkenden Verstand vorgedacht*).

Though approached from a different point of view, the problem here treated appears in G. Martin, *Immanuel Kant*, Köln 1951. For our purposes its § 28 is most important. Martin asks: Did Kant assume that there is a non-empirical subject (person, consciousness) related to the empirical, "knower" in the same way in which a non-empirical subject (person, consciousness) is related to the empirical agent ("doer")? This question by Martin we could also render by asking: is Kant's *homo noumenon* exclusively related to the *homo phaenomenon qua moral agent*? Or to rephrase it once more: Is empirical consciousness accompanied by a non-empirical consciousness only in the moments when we perform an action which has a moral quality? Are we citizens of two worlds only as agents?

Martin is inclined to answer all these questions in the negative. What is the meaning of the subject *qua knower* (*das erkennende Subjekt*), he asks? It can mean three things he answers. Either it simply designates the empirical subject. Or it designates the universal human reason. Or it designates a transcendental subject (Martin adds *das nur logisch zu verstehende transzendente Subjekt*, obviously afraid that he could be suspected of charging Kant with belief in the existence of a metaphysical entity). But, says Martin, it does not really matter, which of the alternatives we accept. If Kant's subject is simply the empirical subject, still he means by the subject the thinking subject. But *qua thinking*, the subject becomes universal (in other words, though Martin does not use them, the subject is transpersonal in the act of thinking). If we assume either the equation 'the subject of knowledge = universal human reason' or the equation 'the subject of knowledge = the transcendental subject' (a logical construct, as Martin seems to understand it), these two cases amount essentially to one and the same thing, because neither the existence of a universal human reason nor that of the transcendental subject are empirical facts.

In other words, Martin says, the subject of knowledge is not the empirical subject. It is, as he says, the pure (*reine*) subject. But, Martin says, though it is a non-empirical subject, it still is an individual subject. In other words, Martin is as close as possible to the theories of Themistius and Leibniz. He only is not fully aware that by introducing the concept of a pure subject he essentially is introducing the concept of a double consciousness.

It does not seem that Martin ever asked himself the question: what is the *principium individuationis* accounting for a plurality of pure subjects?

I am aware that strong objections could be raised to any interpretation of Kant which introduces as a companion to the transpersonal moral consciousness a transpersonal theoretical consciousness. One could even say that such an interpretation subverts the very foundations of Kant's philosophy. For Kant introduced the transpersonal moral consciousness only to extend man's grasp beyond the realm to which he as knower is confined, viz. the realm of phenomena. By endowing man with any kind of non-empirical theoretical consciousness we would be in danger of reverting to the dogmatic assertion that our knowledge grasps things-in-themselves. But on the other hand, by identifying the theoretical *homo noumenon* with a set of forms we avoid any kind of dogmatism.

Martin's interpretation of Kant in this respect is essentially that of Amrhein (whose book is most important for the present topic) and generally of all 'criticist' or anti-

It seems that Kant gravitates towards the latter assumption. It is very difficult to conceive what differentiates one pure reason (or pure consciousness or *Bewusstsein überhaupt*) from another. And the more we limit the content of the *Bewusstsein überhaupt* to forms, the less reason there is to assume a plurality of pure consciousnesses.

But on the other hand, the assumption of a personal immortality is so clearly essential to Kant's system of ethics that had Kant faced the problem of the relation between *Bewusstsein überhaupt* and immortality of the individual soul, he would probably have sided with the glossator of The- mistius and with Leibniz.

His successors, on the other side, who like Fichte tried to devaluate the personal immortality came much closer to the doctrine of the unicity of intelligence be it under the designation of a *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, be it under the designation of a super-ego.³

(2) FROM the point of view of the present investigation one of the most interesting aspects of Kant's philosophy has above been characterized as that of adding to the theoretical aspect of the productive intelligence that of the practical one. On the whole, the *intellectus agens*, the *νοῦς ποιητικός*,

metaphysical interpreters of Kant. Amrhein is convinced that Kant's *Bewusstsein überhaupt* is only a *Grenzbegriff*, or a regulative idea, or a logical norm, etc. In no case is it supposed to possess any kind of (non-empirical) reality. As we could also put it: when we say of cognitions that they are true and of actions that they are moral, we describe them *as if* they were cognitions and actions of a *Bewusstsein überhaupt* (p. 91-93; 207-209; cf. also Vaihinger's *Geleitwort* to Amrhein's book). Of course, one of the classical passages supporting Amrhein's and Vaihinger's interpretation is the passage from the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "... *dasz jedermann tue, was er soll, d.i. alle Handlungen vernünftiger Wesen so geschehen, als ob sie aus einem obersten Willen, der alle Privatwillkür in sich oder unter sich befasst, entsprängen*". It can easily be seen that for *tun, handeln, Willen*, etc. the terms *erkennen* and *Vernunft*, etc. can be substituted. The key term *als ob* would remain.

This is not the place to decide between the 'criticist' and the 'metaphysical' interpretation of Kant's *Bewusstsein überhaupt*. However, if the metaphysical interpretation is correct, if Kant *in nuce* at least was ready to grant it some ontic status, to treat it as some kind of metaphysical reality, his system in this respect would essentially be Averroistic. In any case, to approach Kant via the doctrine of the unicity of intelligence considerably clarifies the whole problem, on which also see T. Litt, *op. cit.* (above, p. 114, n. 4), p. 110-116; 120.

A good discussion of the whole problem can be found in: K. Delahaye, *Die "memoria interior" - Lehre des heiligen Augustinus und der Begriff der "transzendentalen Apperzeption"* Kants, Würzburg 1936. Delahaye says: *Meint Kant mit der synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption das Wesen des menschlichen Geistes, das in allen Einzelindividuen das gleiche ist, diese also voraussetzt, oder jenes, das in allen Einzelmenschen dasselbe ist, diese also erst ermöglicht* (p. 103)? Delahaye follows Amrhein in assuming that Kant originally accepted the first member of the alternative, but by and by came to accept the second, remaining unconscious of the change in his opinions.

However, it seems that Delahaye is unfamiliar with the doctrine of the unicity of intelligence and therefore would it find next to incredible that Kant could have entertained a doctrine which amounts to the assumption of a supra-individual ego, almost a semi-divine man (p. 107; 138; 159).

³ A. Nyman, "Über das 'Unbewusste'", *Kant-Studien* 34 (1929), p. 151-166, esp. p. 154, note 1 on the interpretation of Fichte by Windelband and Höffding.

etc. - they are purely theoretical activities. This is keeping in tune with Aristotle who excluded the realm of action from that of highest wisdom, because highest wisdom is related only to that which is unchangeable whereas action concerns the realm of the changeable. But in that Kant divides pure reason into pure theoretical and pure practical reason, something new is introduced into the realm of philosophic thought. And as is well known, Kant's tendency is to subordinate theoretical reason to practical.

Now, it can almost be guessed that once the doctrine of the unicity of intelligence has been transformed into the doctrine of the unicity of theoretical *and* of practical intelligence, a philosophy is bound to emerge which will lay its stress on the unicity of the practical instead of the theoretical aspect of man's mind. This is indeed what comes to the fore in the philosophy of Schopenhauer. The kernel of his philosophy undoubtedly consists in teaching the unicity of will.

To be sure, we would not recognize in Schopenhauer's will intelligence. Schopenhauer's will is, as we know, blind will, the source of intelligence, but unintelligent itself. What we would be inclined to describe as intelligence is nothing but one of the forms in and by which blind will expresses itself. But though the difference is undeniable, the similarity also exists: Schopenhauer's blind will is a unique will, operating in all individuals though they are not conscious of it. Indeed, whether we speak of the unicity of the intellect, of the unicity of practical reason, or, finally, of the unicity of the will - in all cases we have the doctrine that behind the life of the mind which seems to be strictly individual is a completely impersonal life of what-ever turns out to be the essence of this life. Monopsychism is not exactly unicity of the intellect, nor is this unicity or monopsychism exactly identical with the *monoboulésis*, if it is permissible to coin a new term. But the similarity of the three points of view is unmistakable.

The concept of *monoboulésis* enables Schopenhauer to explain a number of occult phenomena, especially in his *Über den Willen in der Natur*, section *Animalischer Magnetismus und Magie* and in *Versuch über Geistersehen und was damit zusammenhängt*. Here he refers to Plotinus, particularly to *Enn.* II 3, 7; IV 3, 12; IV 4, 40, 43 and IV 9, 3.¹ And in *Fragmente zur Geschichte der Philosophie* No. 7 (IV 73-78 Grisebach) he mentions the title of the last named essay (*Εἰ πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ μία*) in a way clearly indicating that he saw an affinity between this doctrine and his own. Indeed, in this essay, the sentence occurs: *καὶ συμπαθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἡμᾶς καὶ συναλοῦντας ἐκ τοῦ ὄραν καὶ διαχομῆτους καὶ εἰς τὸ φιλεῖν ἐλκομένους ... διὰ ψυχῆς μιᾶς* (IV 9, 3, 1-6). Could there be a more Schopenhauerian passage?

¹ Schopenhauer's clearest interpretation of magic can be found in his *Nachlass*, ed. by Grisebach, vol. IV, p. 189 and 193: magic is based on the error of mistaking the non-empirical unicity of will for an empirical one. This, of course, leaves unexplained the *efficacy* (which Schopenhauer admits) of the error, for which Schopenhauer in the long run offers no explanation.

(3) BUT as is well known the doctrine of the general consciousness (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*) is of particular importance in the Badenian branch of Neo-Kantianism. This is particularly true of Windelband.

In the last of his *Präludien* (1884), viz. *Sub specie aeternitatis*, Windelband says that immortality consists in the bliss of the moment in which I become meta-individual, elevate myself above my individuality, forget myself, i.e. raise myself to the level of the Eternally Normative (*Das Geltende*; That-which-holds) – the title which Windelband gave to what used to be called the intelligible (p. 324). It is well known that this concept is central in Neo-Kantianism. But the normative is of course nothing else but Plato's realm of the intelligible, de-substantialized, if we may say so. It was one of the central features of Natorp's interpretation of Plato's ideas to have changed them into norms. Windelband adopted the term *das Geltende*. By this he indicated the imperative character of this sphere – in other words in his own way combined the Kantian idea of the categorical imperative with the concept of ideal being. This is still Alexander's sphere of νοητά – only it is impossible for a Kantian to apply the term "being" to this sphere in the same sense in which it can be applied to the realm of phenomena. Phenomena are – intelligibles are valid or 'hold' (*gelten*) – i.e. *require us so to think and so to act* as to conform to them. Their existence consists in their claim on us. Their *esse* is neither their *percipi* nor their *percipere*. It is their *mandare*. And to the extent that we succeed in transforming ourselves to conform with their claim on us, we overcome our particularity and immortalize ourselves.

In other words, the intelligible world no longer is the object of a *theōria*, in fact it can hardly be called the object of any cognition at all. Rather, this term is reserved for the realm of appearances. The "perception" appropriate to *noumena* is the *unconscious awareness of their demands on us*.

Are we in proximity of the productive intelligence? This entirely depends on what kind of reality *we* attribute to the productive intelligence and what kind of reality Windelband attributes to it. Of course, for a Neo-Kantian it would be next to impossible to grant to it what according to orthodox Kantians is the status of things-in-themselves. Precisely to avoid Kant's realism (i.e. his insistence that things-in-themselves "exist" as that which appears) Neo-Kantians introduced the concept of the normative, which, of course, has no empirical existence. And so it is not surprising to hear Windelband continue with the statement: We refrain (or: we should refrain – the German text is for good reasons of which presently, quite ambiguous) from asking: What is the metaphysical status of this system of logical norms?

We shall immediately see that this is not Windelband's last word on this problem. But for the time being he reiterates: from a psychological point of view (i.e. empirically) that which is valid *a priori* is always an unconscious element of our empirical experiences (or to use the language of phenome-

nology, of empirical acts). In other words, empirical consciousness which is always individual consciousness contains in itself a system of higher and universal norms which are objectively valid.

But what kind of empirical connection exists according to Windelband between the system of norms and our actual acts of thinking? Or, in other words, what is the phenomenal existence of those norms?

Furthermore, one can doubt as to what Windelband really meant by elevating himself to the level of the transpersonal. What precisely was the ontic status of this transpersonal? And did therefore the moment of bliss indicate more than a strictly subjective experience?

It seems that Windelband in some way never ceased reflecting on this problem. But he gave a much clearer expression to his thoughts only in one of his last publications, an address on the problem of the unconscious.¹ It is of-course not surprising from our point of view that he should have devoted his attention to this problem. For we have seen to what extent the problem of the unconscious bordered on the problem of the meta-personal and that of *Bewusstsein überhaupt*.

We limit ourselves to a presentation of those of Windelband's ideas which are immediately connected with the problem of the unicity of intelligence.

The conscious activities of our mind, says Windelband, are "regulated" by objective (*sachlich*) relations – but it is only when we make these activities the subject matter of our reflections that we become conscious of those relations.

As we see, Windelband simply restates the problem of Kant: how shall we explain that we want to think in conformity with our fellow men? And Windelband answers, entirely in the spirit of Kant: unconsciously we know in what way we should think. In other words, the rules, norms, ideals or whatever we call them, of our thinking are present in our mind – though not in the conscious part of it. And now Windelband continues and says: This set of norms (*das Geltende* is the standard expression of the Badenian branch of Neo-Kantians) is what we since Leibniz and Kant are wont to call the *a priori*. In other words, according to Windelband the *a priori* is essentially our unconscious mind.

But what is the ontic status of the unconscious mind? In what way does it exist as a phenomenon?

Unhesitatingly Windelband answers: It is the social group to which we belong, in which these norms take on empirical existence. In other words, Windelband tries to replace the concept of the collective consciousness which would belong to a completely different order of reality (non-empirical reality), by something which, though obviously less real than individual consciousness – or, if not less real, certainly real in some peculiar sense of the word – is still in some sense of the word empirically real, viz. by the

¹ W. Windelband, *Die Hypothese des Unbewussten*, S.B. der Heidelberger Ak. d. Wiss., *Philos.-hist. Kl.*, 1914, Heidelberg 1914.

semi-empirical, semi-transempirical concept of social consciousness. And what is the repository of this social consciousness? First of all, says Windelband, it is the language. What is most striking in the phenomenon of language, says Windelband, is that persons belonging to the same language completely understand one another.

This, then, is Windelband's phenomenon of the noumenon "unique intelligence". Some will find that this kind of collective or group or social consciousness is not what he wants it to be, an empirical fact. Some will on the contrary insist that collective or social consciousness is nothing else but the sum total of all individual consciousnesses and thus does not call for the hypothesis of a system of objectively valid, ideal logical norms. From our point of view the most amazing aspect of Windelband's theories is the fact that he is obviously dissolving the unique intellect into a multiplicity of "linguistic" intellects and never asks himself whether the fact of mutual understanding should not force him to admit that the multiplicity of languages notwithstanding man *qua* man is an *animal loquax* and that therefore it is not this or that language which is the depository of the unique intelligence but language (speech, *langage*) as such – in Windelband's terms, the linguistic a priori of all empirical languages. Indeed, it would be most appropriate to ask Windelband: Is not the fact that the principle of contradiction is observed wherever man thinks, sufficient proof that all languages embody the ideal system of logical norms?

Themistius was of the opinion that the unicity of intelligence is proved by the fact that men understand one another. It did not occur to Themistius to limit the mutual understanding to people belonging to the same linguistic group. But Windelband is obviously inclined to dissolve mankind into a multiplicity of such groups and to limit what he calls complete mutual understanding to members of the same linguistic group. Strangely enough he never considers the possibility that the existence of languages as sharply delineated, self-contained units is perhaps doubtful, hardly more than a convenient device of grammarians to which little corresponds *in rerum natura*. Clearly, Windelband suffers from intellectual myopia – when he says "language" he thinks exclusively of the fairly uniform literary, "high" and static languages used by the fairly educated, the rules of which can be found in any high school grammar and the limits of which are delineated by a good dictionary. He is entirely blind to the conventional character of grammars and dictionaries – blind also to the fact that there is virtually no language without sublanguages such as dialects, "lingos" belonging to social subgroups, professions, etc. – and that it is entirely arbitrary whether or not we will treat these sublanguages as languages in their own right or not. Certainly the fact that we can understand each other proves that we "belong" to the same language, but the very term "to understand" is entirely ambiguous. Probably Windelband by understanding means that we can understand each other without the use of dictionaries or the necessity of

"learning" another language in addition to the one which we speak without ever having learned it. But "dictionaries" and "learning" represent and are only highly formalized efforts, which are always necessary to understand each other. If I and my interlocutor belong to different social or professional or regional groups, we shall have to do quite an amount of translating before we can understand each other – though the translating will be done without the benefit of printed dictionaries. And when an educated person speaks to one uneducated, adherence to rules of grammar of the allegedly identical language to which both belong will only hamper mutual understanding. Finally, to limit the concept of learning a language to activities in a classroom presupposes a very narrow concept of learning. As long as we do not monologize, we continue learning the language which we use – and even in the case of a permanent monologue the meanings attached to words, phrases, etc. – in other words the linguistic understanding of the language which we use changes with our changing experiences. The word "red" means something different after we have seen a fire from what is meant previously and should we use it now to describe an experience which we had before having seen the fire, we would have to translate it into our former language. All this is even more obvious when we think of the existence of dialects and the possibility of endless controversies as to the relation between Flemish, Dutch, and German, Masurian and Polish, Ukrainian, White Russian and Russian, etc.

In other words, Windelband in his eagerness to find a phenomenon which would be the empirical counterpart (or appearance) of the noumenon "unique intelligence" overlooked all the difficulties inherent in the concept of language.

Still Windelband continues. He knows of course that what he describes as a system of ideal norms for every empirical, individual consciousness is nothing else but what a Kantian would designate as consciousness in general or universal consciousness (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*). And so he says: the concept of universal consciousness is not a psychological (read: empirical) hypothesis – and it mustn't become a metaphysical hypothesis either. A good Kantian is speaking, eager to limit knowledge to the realm of experience in which obviously we find only individual consciousnesses but never a universal consciousness. But being a Kantian, Windelband also is familiar with what could be called the analogical use of reason and so he concludes: The assumption of a supra-individual consciousness (in other words: a unique intelligence) based on the proportion individual souls: universal consciousness = individual consciousness: group or social consciousness would be no more than analogy, helping us to present the *mystery* (italics mine) of logical normativity.

We are immediately reminded of Kant's *Träume*. Windelband here for the sake of illustration toys with the idea that our souls belong to a communion of souls, which would explain why there is agreement in their

thoughts. He would consider this an illegitimate metaphysical hypothesis, were it taken literally rather than analogically. But he does not notice that his assumption of a group consciousness, on which individual consciousness depends, is not as empirical as he imagines it to be and in fact would by many be described as precisely a metaphysical hypothesis.

With all this Windelband does not forget that the problem he started out with, is the problem of the unconscious. Only the individual, empirical activities of the mind are conscious. But they are embedded in the unconscious activities of a mind which is suprapersonal. Without these activities of which we are not conscious we could not explain the universal validity of the rules of thinking, evaluating, etc. – in short, the fact that we all obey the same ideal norms. To express the normative character of the unconscious Windelband suggests that we should distinguish two kinds of the unconscious: the infraconscious and the metaconscious. And this metaconscious in some way is a suprapersonal, supraindividual mind, consciousness, or whatever we call it, to satisfy Windelband's "criticistic" attitude.

Windelband's essay on the unconscious betrays no trace of his *Sub specie aeterni*. But it is obvious that both essays are ultimately rooted in the same concern. Only by some kind of absorption of the individual in the universal do we attain to truth and goodness, we said; and to the extent that we are able to be so absorbed, we experience the kind of immortality and bliss which corresponds to the destiny of man.

(4) A MOST striking case of the reappearance of the idea of the unity of intelligence however is provided by Schroedinger. In his *Mind and Matter* (1958), Schroedinger developed the idea that modern science finds itself involved in a contradiction. It succeeded in explaining reality only by excluding itself, i.e. the explainer from it – and thus necessarily falsifying our image of reality. Furthermore, it leaves us wondering how to reconcile the uniqueness of the world with the plurality of egos. Indeed, one of Schroedinger's chapters is entitled "The Arithmetical Paradox. The Oneness of the Mind". He sees only two possibilities of explaining this fact. Either we accept Leibniz' doctrine of a plurality of monads, each with a mind of its own, but each so "arranged" that these minds entirely conform to each other. Or we must assume the doctrine of the unification of minds – in other words the unicity of intelligence. It is this latter solution which Schroedinger prefers and he obviously would not hesitate to grant metaphysical status to this collective consciousness. For him such a doctrine is *prima facie* the doctrine of the *Upanishads* (and other similar systems); but he would certainly have greatly enjoyed seeing his two possibilities clearly expressed and discussed in Themistius. When he concludes his discussion by the dictum "mind is by its very nature a *singulare tantum*", he simply restates one of the two alternatives presented by Themistius. It is surprising that he stopped short of discussing in this context the problem of the unconscious. It is a

safe guess that he would entirely agree with the theory which we found for the first time clearly formulated in Plotinus.

(5) It is still left to us to discuss the problem of mysticism. We said that the doctrine of the necessity (or desirability) of transforming the human intellect into the universal intellect represents something like a peculiar brand of mysticism. In Plotinian terms we said: if the union with the divine is considered the ultimate goal of all mystics, then the mysticism of the union with the intelligence can be described as the *unio mystica cum secundo deo*, whereas the *unio* of which Plotinus speaks would be the *unio cum primo deo*. Now, if our interpretation of Kant was correct, if we can say that according to Kant man achieves truth by transforming his empirical consciousness into universal, pure, "theoretical" consciousness and goodness by transforming his empirical will into universal will (pure "practical" consciousness) we should expect that some mystics of the type described above, i.e. mystics practicing the transformation of the human intelligence (theoretical and/or practical) into universal intelligence should feel some affinity to Kant. And this is indeed what historically happened.

In an appendix to his *Streit der Fakultäten* under the title *Von einer reinen Mystik in der Religion*,¹ Kant printed a letter from C. A. Wilmans, appended by him to his dissertation *De similitudine inter Mysticismum purum et Kantianam religionis doctrinam* (Halle 1797),² in which the latter turns Kant's attention to the affinity of his doctrine with the practice of a Quaker-like sect in Germany. What is surprising is that Kant should have reprinted the letter. Not unexpectedly, he says that he cannot accept everything said by Wilmans.³ But he is obviously able to see Wilmans' point. This point Wilmans expressed by saying that the so-called separatists, who call themselves mystics, practice Kant's philosophy. They use the concept of "inner law" which confirms the divine character of the Scriptures. Kant is inclined to agree.

But there is some aftermath to this. Wilmans directed a letter to Kant in which he obviously tried to develop his ideas. This letter has not been preserved, but Kant's answer has.⁴ From it, it becomes clear that Wilmans, continuing ideas already expressed, attempted to differentiate between a *Verstand* which was essentially bound to the body and therefore does not survive the latter's destruction, from *Vernunft*, which, not being body-bound, would survive. In other words, whether he knew it or not, Wilmans was restating the doctrines usually going under the name of Aristotle and Alexander. *Verstand* is the (perishable) νοῦς παθητικός, *Vernunft* the (imperishable) νοῦς ποιητικός. But it seems he expressed himself

¹ Kant, *Schriften* 7, p. 1-116, esp. p. 69-75.

² Unavailable to me.

³ Kant, *Schriften* 7, p. 69, note, end.

⁴ Kant, *Schriften* 12, p. 279.

uncautiously and designated the perishable *Verstand* as corporeal. This, of course, Kant could not accept. And in his answer he limits himself to this one point. It could be that at this late age he was not willing to re-think the problem of personal immortality in relation to *Bewusstsein überhaupt*.¹

(6) THE publication of the literary remains of Husserl brings some surprises.² One of them is to see Husserl toying with the idea of "interpenetration" of spirits. This was supposed to solve the problem of intersubjectivity – a problem which as is well-known disturbed Husserl very much.³ Time and again Husserl felt that phenomenology seems to amount to transcendental solipsism, time and again he tried to prove that it did not have to be so. One of his attempted proofs reads somewhat like this.

When we continue with the transcendental reduction (i.e. ascend to the constitution of the world of objects in subjectivity or consciousness), we ultimately are led to a point where we transcend the realm of personal transcendental consciousness and find ourselves in the realm of a completely impersonal transcendental consciousness. In other words (which are not Husserl's own), we find that personal transcendental consciousness is constituted by an impersonal transcendental consciousness (the affinity to Fichte's ideas is obvious). But this being so, suddenly any plurality of personal "consciousnesses" disappears. What we are left with, is as Husserl once says, an omnitude of pure souls (*Allheit der reinen Seelen*). Who can read these words without being reminded of Kant's community of spirits on one hand, of the problem of the unicity of all souls on the other? And indeed Husserl corrects the expression "omnitude" by suggesting another, viz. omniunity (*Alleinheit*). This expression he justifies by saying that it would perhaps be possible to demonstrate a purely psychical (mental) unity connecting souls with souls.⁴

These formulas are not entirely isolated. Thus we read that all phenomenological reductions performed with regard to single acts of consciousness result in distilling from them the single *pure* acts which are moments of

¹ See the paper of H. Leisegang, "Kant und die Mystik", *Philosophische Studien* 1 (1949), p. 4–28, especially on the aftermath of the interest of Kant in Wilmans. However, in the subsequent discussion the problem of naturalism vs. supernaturalism obscured all other aspects. Kant, as it is known, acknowledged the existence of what is *übersinnlich*, whereas he rejected anything *übernatürlich* (see, e.g., *Schriften* 7, p. 59).

² For some of them see W. Szilasi, "Werke und Wirkung Husserls", *Die Neue Rundschau* 70 (1959), p. 636–655.

³ See e.g., H. Zeltner, "Das Ich und die Anderen", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 13 (1959), p. 288–315; A. Schuetz, "Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl", *Philosophische Rundschau* 5 (1957), p. 81–107; N. Uygur, "Die Phänomenologie Husserls und die Gemeinschaft", *Kant-Studien* 50 (1958/9), p. 439–460. All subsequent quotations from Husserl refer to *Husserliana*, Husserl, *Werke*, esp. vol. 5 (1952) and 8 (1959).

⁴ *Husserliana* 8, 142, 444f.

the one pure universal soul (*die einzelnen reinen Akte als Momente der einen reinen Gesamtseele*).¹

Even clearer is another passage. As is well known, according to Husserl only consciousness (subjectivity) is self-contained being, whereas all other being is "relative" being, i.e. exists only as that which consciousness refers to.² But what is meant by subjectivity? And Husserl answers: this subjectivity which is ultimately constitutive of all "objective" reality is not what we could call personal subjectivity.²

Thus the only non-relative or non-related (*nicht-bezogen*) being is some kind of impersonal subjectivity. This impersonal subjectivity can be conceived either as a unique subject or – more in accord with the idea of a community of souls or spirits – as a kind of realm of transcendental subjects. Thus we find in Husserl the formula: all non-relative (absolute) being is identical with the universe of transcendental subjects who form a community.³ Husserl does not ask himself in this place whether it still makes sense to speak under such circumstances of a plurality of transcendental subjects as it becomes impossible to state what their *principium individuationis* would be. In any case it should be obvious that this community is more than and different from, a community constituted by some acts of consciousness. For the idea of this community was introduced precisely to explain how it is possible to escape the predicament that all (objective) being is nothing more than a correlate of an appropriate intentional act and has therefore no independent existence so that intentionality is not sufficient to explain true intersubjectivity. And therefore another formula in Husserl says that in some mysterious way the intentionality of every single subject penetrates the intentionality of every other single subject. Therefore, says Husserl, there is no such thing as a plurality of single souls – there is only one psychical coherence (*In wunderbarer Weise . . . reicht jedes Intentionalität in die des anderen hinein – als Resultat gibt es keine Vielheit von getrennten Seelen, sondern nur einen einzigen seelischen Zusammenhang*).⁴ And as a variant of this formula we find another: ultimately all absolute (absolutely constitutive) being is nothing but the transcendental *Allego*, which *Allego* is the transcendental community of transcendental single egos (*das transzendente Ich als transzendente Gemeinschaft transzendental gefasster Einzeliche*).⁵

The same idea is expressed when Husserl speaks of a double *epochê*.

¹ *Ibid.*, 8, 317.

² *Ibid.*, 8, 496. The most succinct formula: *Nur die transzendente Subjektivität hat den Seinsstn des absoluten Seins, nur sie ist "irrelativ", d.h. nur auf sich selbst relativ, während die reale Welt zwar ist, aber eine wesensmässige Relativität auf die transzendente Subjektivität hat, da sie nämlich ihren Sinn als seiende nur als intentionales Sinngebilde der transzendentalen Subjektivität haben kann; Ideen, Nachwort = Husserliana (1952), 5, p. 153.*

³ *Ibid.*, 8, 190.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 6, 257f.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 8, 129.

Through the first, he says, I gain myself as a transcendental ego, through the second I ascend to transcendental intersubjectivity. And this concept is explained as being tantamount to a transcendental Egoall, a transcendental community of transcendental individual egos.¹

Finally: the genuinely universal *epochè* destroys the appearance (*Schein*) that souls are exterior to each other.²

All these passages prove clearly: Husserl toys with the idea of a collective consciousness, collective soul, collective or impersonal subject.

This being so, we must be prepared to meet in Husserl also the attendant doctrine, viz. that we as empirical subjects are not conscious of this impersonal consciousness, in other words that there is in us a double consciousness, one of which is our empirical consciousness, the other which we as empirical persons do not fully possess – whereas we obviously possess it to the extent that we are non-empirical persons. And indeed here is a passage meeting our expectations.

It could seem, says Husserl, that to differentiate between transcendental subjectivity and the soul leads to some kind of myth.

What Husserl here clearly has in mind is the problem of the presence of the impersonal transcendental subjectivity in us. And Husserl is obviously reluctant to assume this presence. But again he toys with a possibility. We should perhaps, Husserl says, learn to see the difference between our surface life from our depth life.

Quite rightly the editor of this passage, E. Fink, felt reminded of psychoanalysis. To explain the terms surface life and depth life he adds in parenthesis: patent, latent.

And indeed – Husserl pleads for an adequate concept of the unconscious, which he says, should not be simply equated with phenomena such as sleep, fainting, or libido.³

Expressions repeatedly used in the preceding prove that Husserl toys with the idea of a collective subject (consciousness) or with the concept of the unconscious (double consciousness). Be it stressed: we are not interested in ascertaining whether Husserl in the long run took these ideas seriously. We are interested exclusively in the problems themselves, regardless of their ultimate significance for Husserl.

(7) TO THE EXTENT that consciousness seems to presuppose a subject, the problem of the unicity of the soul or of the intelligence can also be stated as the problem of the unicity of the subject. In other words, instead of the question 'are all souls one?' or 'are all intelligences one?', we can equally

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, 6, 514.

³ *Ibid.*, 6, 120–123; 192; 473–475. From a different point of view the problem of the unconscious is connected with Husserl in: A. Waelhens, "Réflexions sur une problématique husserlienne de l'inconscient, Husserl et Hegel", *Edmund Husserl (Phenomenologica 4)*, Hague 1959, p. 221–237.

well ask 'are all subjects one?' Now, in some sense of the word, everyone will admit that there is a plurality of subjects. But while to some this might seem to be the last word on this question, some others will insist that in addition to the plurality of subjects, there is something which can be called 'one subject', or 'transcendental (χωριστός) subject', or 'subjectivity'. And from here on quite naturally the problem emerges how the transcendental subject is related to the non-transcendental subject, i.e. the empirical subject. Or, if we substitute 'ego' for 'subject', how is the empirical, private single ego related to the universal transcendental ego?

Of course, terminology is changing. It is conceivable that 'ego' is used to designate the empirical subject only, whereas by definition the transcendental subject would be designated as non-egological. It is equally possible to introduce the term 'personal' and thus to designate empirical consciousness or the empirical subject as personal, the transcendental subject as impersonal. But no matter how we change terminology – behind it we discover the problem posed by Aristotle to his Greek interpreters. It is the problem of the relation between νοῦς and ψυχή. And it is obvious that the tendency to solve this problem by the assumption of the unicity of intellect or monopsychism is perennial.¹

(8) Among more recent critics of Kant Simmel deserves particular mention. Time and again he deals with Kant's concept of a transcendental subject.² Small wonder. As is known, Simmel subscribes to an ideal which can be stated by the formula "so act that the maxim of your action expresses a law valid for you alone".³ This concept of an individual law is, if we may say so, 20th century neo-Schleiermacherism. It was Schleiermacher who clearly formulated the romantic attitude in ethics (in its broadest sense of the word, including one's whole way of life) as opposed to that of the enlightened Kant in saying: Far from its being my duty to act according to a maxim which could become a universal law, I should try to live in a way

¹ The problem of metaconsciousness or metapersonal consciousness sometimes emerges in even more unexpected quarters. I am thinking of J. Romains and his concept of unanimism (cf. e.g. his *Manuel de déification*, Paris 1910). To what extent Romains was inspired by contemporary sociological theory, particularly Durkheim, remains to be investigated. Cf. B. F. Stoltzfus, "Unanimism Revisited", *Modern Language Quarterly* 21 (1960), p. 239–245.

In fact, instead of using the term monopsychism we could equally well have spoken of unanimism and this word would immediately have reminded us of the problem of deification and thus of the problem of the *conjunctio* with the active intelligence. Of course, it is not easy to determine how seriously Romains took this concept of deification; and it cannot be overlooked that Romains assumed the existence of many collective souls rather than of a single one; furthermore, that he often spoke in such a way that we have the impression that all these collective souls are created by man at will.

² G. Simmel, *Kant, Sechzehn Vorlesungen* (1st ed. Munich 1904; 6th ed. 1924; the subsequent page references are to the 4th – 1918 – ed.; preceded by the number of the *Vorlesung* in Roman numerals).

³ X, p. 132f. Cf. XVI, p. 210.

expressing my particularity – in other words follow the law of my nature, do what only I can and therefore ought to do.¹ Schleiermacher's attitude is evidently that of Simmel, the *Lebensphilosoph*. Clearly anticipating an idea central in existentialism² Simmel says: If we try to universalize ourselves, we act as if our individuality were something like a quality or determination of a universal 'man'. In other words (not quite Simmel's own), we try to act as if we *had* an individuality or as if individuality were an accident (συμβεβηκόσ), a quality (ποιόν), determining a universal substance 'man' of which the several individuals are mere instances. But in fact, says Simmel, we do not have an individuality – we are individuals.³ Still in other words, no longer those of Simmel – man in his totality is an accident with no substance in which it inheres.

This being the attitude of Simmel, he is particularly adverse to all the 'universalizing' tendencies of Kant (and the Enlightenment in general). Time and again he stresses that Kant's subject is by no means a personal ego, that it on the contrary exists in the singular only.⁴

We noticed the way in which Windelband, unwilling to grant some ontic status to Kant's *Bewusstsein überhaupt* tried to interpret it as some kind of semi-empirical, or as others would say, semi-metaphysical collective consciousness, embodied particularly in the various languages. Simmel is aware of the possibility of such an interpretation. Commenting that Kant's ethics is based on an appeal to that which is universal in man, Simmel says that in our time Kant's categorical imperative would probably taken to be the social imperative, i.e. as the demands of society made with regard to its members.⁵ But Simmel clearly perceives that such an interpretation would not do justice to Kant's intentions. Any kind of social imperative would still fall short of the categorical imperative by being limited to a particular place or age and thus not be truly universal. But Kant's categorical imperative transcends any particularization.

And thus Simmel sums up his interpretation of Kant by saying that one of the ideals of modern times is the universal man who is at the same time an individual⁶ (a somewhat misleading formula, it seems) and that in Kant this ideal finds its most sublime expression.⁷ To this ideal corresponds the conviction that there is only one ego and therefore only one and the same truth for every individual ego.

Simmel could have added: just as there can be one truth only, so there can only be one good. And this is tantamount to saying that there is only

¹ Schleiermacher, *Monologues*, esp. 2nd and 4th.

² Cf. P. Merlan, "Existentialism – A Third Way", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 33 (1960), p. 43–68, esp. p. 59f.

³ X, p. 136.

⁴ V, p. 60; 66; X, p. 136.

⁵ IX, p. 114.

⁶ XVI, p. 203.

⁷ XVI, p. 205.

one pure theoretical and one pure practical reason (νοῦς), common to all men. Let it be repeated: faced with the point blanc question whether such a doctrine implies the denial of personal immortality, Kant would probably have answered in the negative. But it should be obvious that the logic of his system could have led him to the opposite conclusion. Man is capable of availing himself of that which is true and that which is good only *qua* member of a community of spirits. But in this community the *principium individuationis* no longer holds. Are, then, these spirits universals? We are back in the controversy between Plato and Aristotle. We are back to the question what the status of Aristotle's (or Alexander's) pure νοητά is. Shall the term 'reality' (which in Kant means phenomenal reality) be exclusively reserved to individuals?

Simmel the *Lebensphilosoph* is of course opposed to all universalizing tendencies. For him universalization would probably *always* mean a loss of that which is concrete and truly alive. To the extent that universalization *always* means the elevation of man's intelligence (νοῦς, reason) over all the other, 'irrational' aspects of man's nature, Simmel, for whom intelligence is just one of the different, co-ordinated possibilities of man's facing reality, would be highly critical of such an elevation. He in all likelihood to Aristotle's ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή would oppose the formula ἡ γὰρ ζωῆς ἐνέργεια νοῦς. Thus, Simmel's interpretation of Kant is indicative of a very characteristic reaction to everything indicated by the terms monopsychism, mysticism, metaconsciousness in the title of the present writing.