

WILLIAM ALNWICK
INTELLIGIBLE BEING

Introduction

William of Alnwick was a master of theology at both Oxford and Paris during the first quarter of the fourteenth century. He died in 1333. Hailing from the north of England, William became a member of the Franciscan order, and studied closely with John Duns Scotus. William played an important role in transcribing his master's lectures and, after Scotus's untimely death, in editing his work. But despite this close relationship, William in his own writings was by no means a slavish disciple. The discussion translated here illustrates his independence.

William's *Disputed Questions on Intelligible Being* considers what it means to say that an object exists in the mind of a person thinking about that object. Following the usage of Scotus (*Ordinatio* bk. I q.36) and Henry of Harclay (Maurer 1961), William refers to this sort of existence as intelligible being (*esse intelligibile*), represented being (*esse repraesentatum*), and cognized being (*esse cognitum, esse intellectum*). William's particular interest, in these questions, is the intelligible being of creatures in the mind of God. This gives dramatic force to the philosophical problem, since such being would have existed from eternity. But many of the same considerations apply to the fleeting sort of intelligible being that objects have within human minds, and William is also interested in those cases.

The first, foundational question (translated here) asks whether intelligible being is something over and above the being of whatever in the mind gives rise to the representation. He considers two versions of what he regards as the same question:

1. Is the intelligible being of an object equivalent to the mental form (the intelligible species or divine essence) that represents the object?
2. Is the intelligible being of an object equivalent to the act of intellect that represents the object?

William takes the trouble to distinguish these two questions because of disputes over whether there are such things as representing forms within in-

tellect. Those who deny the reality of intelligible species and similar representing forms must at least grant that there are acts of intellect (as in Translation 6). In answering each question in the affirmative, William is clashing with certain "modern" authors – in particular, Jacob of Ascoli (see Yokoyama 1967). William also seems to be moving away from Scotus, his teacher, inasmuch as the argument presented here seems contrary to Scotus's interest in giving intelligible being some sort of independent status in the mind.

But it is far from clear what Scotus and others really meant in speaking of intelligible being. One of the merits of William's discussion is that it clearly sets out his opponents' view and then examines in detail the consequences of that claim. William is often accused of being tedious and overly subtle. Even the editor of the selection translated here remarks that "he has the late scholastic defects of being excessive in his polemics and in his use of logic." Too logical? In many ways, William's work reads like what gets published in philosophy journals today.

For further discussion of intelligible being, see Perler (1994) and Pasnau (1997), ch. 2.

Intelligible Being

Question 1

[I. Initial Arguments]

Regarding the intelligible being that belongs to a creature from eternity, it is asked first in general:

Is the represented being of a represented object the same in reality as the representing form?

And (same question):

Is the cognized being of a cognized object the same in reality as the act of cognizing?

[A.] *It Seems that It Is Not*

1. That which belongs to a represented object insofar as it differs from the representing form is not the same in reality as that representing form,

because no thing [A] is the same as some thing [B] that belongs {2} to another [C] insofar as it [C] differs from that [A]. For if so then the same thing would be the basis of identity and diversity. But represented being [=B] belongs to a represented object [=C] with respect to that object's proper being, by which it differs from its representing form [=A]. For a species distinctly representing a rose represents it with respect to the rose's proper being, which is distinct from the representing form. Therefore the represented being of an object is not the same in reality as the representing form.

The same argument can be made for cognized being and cognition. For a cognized object, with respect to its cognized being, is not the cognition pertaining to the cognized object, insofar as that object differs from the cognition, because no thing [A] is the same as another [B] through that [C] which belongs to it [A] insofar as [A] is distinguished from that other [C]. But cognized being [=C] belongs to the cognized object [=A] with respect to the object's proper being, by which it is distinguished from the cognition [=B]. For someone intellectually cognizing a rose distinctly cognizes it with respect to its proper being, which is distinct from both the cognizer and the cognition. Therefore an intelligible object, with respect to its cognized being, is not the same in reality as the cognition.

2. If two things are the same in reality, then whatever produces one produces the other. But an object made in intelligible being by agent intellect produces an intelligible species, either as the total cause of that species or at least as a partial cause along with agent intellect. Yet [this object in intelligible being] does not produce the object in represented being (as will be proved). Therefore the object, with respect to its represented being, is not the same in reality as the representing species. And one can argue in the same way for cognized being relative to cognition.

I prove the minor premise in two ways. First, the same thing does not produce itself. But the stone in intelligible being due to agent intellect is the same as the stone in represented being due to an intelligible species representing it. Second, that which produces something by a real action is related to what it produces by a real relation. But an intelligible object is not related by a real relation to the same object in represented being, because as such it does not have real being, and a real relation necessarily requires a real end-term. Therefore an intelligible object does not produce that object in represented being. {3}

[B.] *On the Contrary*

1. That which exists, and is not a being of reason, if it is not distinct in reality from another, is the same in reality as that other, because *same* and *different* are the first differentiae of being (according to *Metaphysics* X [1054b18-23]). But the represented being of some object is not a being of reason, because it does not depend on an act of intellect, and it is not distinct in reality from its representing form, because if so then it would have subjective being and not only objective being. Therefore represented being is the same in reality as its representing form. And the same argument can be made for cognized being – if it is caused by a direct and not a comparative act of intellect.

2. Avicenna (*Metaphysics* V ch.1) distinguishes three ways in which a thing has being: (1) in the soul, (2) in its own proper existence, and (3) being that is indifferent to each. This last is the being of essence (*esse essentiae*), which can be in the soul and in the external world. But represented being is clearly not (3) the quidditative being of the thing, because it does not belong to the quiddity of the thing that is represented. It is also not (1) being in the soul, by which the thing cognized is within the cognizer, because it precedes being in the soul.^o Therefore, it is (2) real external being (*esse reale in effectu*), and is nothing other than the being of what is representing, not of what is represented, because something can be represented without its existing. Therefore represented being is the same in reality as its representing form.

[II. Solution]

[A. *One Modern View*]

On this question, some modern authors say that 'the represented being of an object' signifies an entity distinct from {4} that which represents it, and that 'the cognized being of an object' implies an entity distinct from the cognition. In virtue of this represented being, through the divine essence, and this cognized being, from the cognizing divine intellect, a creature cognized from eternity has had some being or existence (*entitas*) actually distinct from God, beyond the operation of [God's] intellect.

They establish this as follows.

1. Wherever something is said univocally of two things through a greater univocation than the univocation of genus or species, there each is a being through its own proper existence (*entitas*). For things are univocal when they have a single substantial nature (*ratio*), whereas a being and something entirely not a being have no single substantial nature. But 'stone,' when said of a stone in cognized or represented being and of a stone produced in real being, is said with greater univocation than the univocation of genus or species (as will be proved). Therefore, a stone, with respect to its cognized and represented being, has its own proper existence (*entitas*), just as it does with respect to its external being. Consequently, a stone in cognized and represented being differs from the cognition and from that which represents it, just as it is distinct from these in its produced being in {5} effect.

The minor is proved in this way. That which is said univocally of two things due to numerical unity^o is said of them with greater univocation than the univocation of genus or species. But it is in this way that 'stone' is said of a stone in cognized being and of a stone in external reality (*in effectu*), because a stone produced in external reality either is or is not the same as the stone cognized by intellect. If it is, then we have our conclusion. If not, then the stone produced in external reality is neither cognized nor represented, which is false.

2. Based on what they say, I argue further as follows. That which is a lesser state of existence (*entitas minor*) than real existence (*entitas realis*) and is greater than the existence of reason is an intermediary state of existence distinct from each – both from real existence and from the existence of reason. But the represented being of an object is a lesser state of existence than real external existence, because it is a diminished state of existence (*entitas diminuta*), and it is a greater state of existence than the existence of reason, because the latter exists through an act of reason. Represented being, in contrast, does not exist through an act of intellect or of reason, but rather precedes the act of intellect, as when an intelligible species represents an intelligible object and the divine essence represents a creature prior to an act of intellect. Therefore, the represented being of an object is a positive being or existence (*esse sive entitas positiva*) distinct from the real existence of that which represents it.

One can argue in the same way for an object cognized by a direct act: This [cognized being] is a lesser being than real being and greater than the being of reason, because that cognized being, from a direct act, is not caused by a comparative^o act of intellect.

3. Based on what they say, I argue further as follows. There can be a distinction between two things in represented being without there being a distinction in what represents them. Therefore the represented being of those two things will not be the same as what represents them. The inference is clear, because the same thing cannot be at the same time distinct and not distinct. The antecedent is proved: For if one species represents a human being and a donkey distinctly, then these are several and distinct in represented being – otherwise the species would not represent them distinctly. But that species has no distinction within itself. Therefore two things represented by a single representation can be distinct in represented being, without there being any distinction within the {6} representation. The same can be argued for cognized being with respect to a cognition by which several things are distinctly cognized.

But what sort of being is this? And what sort of distinction is this between represented (and cognized) being and the representation (and cognition)? Those who hold this view answer that there are three sorts of being in the universe: real being, intentional being, and the being of reason.

Real being is that which belongs to a thing as it exists formally and in its proper nature. Such being belongs only to something singular or to what has being within something singular, because only the singular exists in its proper nature per se and primarily. Universals, in contrast, exist only as they have being within singulars. It is this being that the Philosopher has in mind in the *Categories* [2b5]: “If those that are primary are destroyed, it is impossible for any of the others to remain.”

Intentional being is what belongs to a thing as it has representational or represented being within some other real being. And since to be represented objectively in some other thing belongs equally^o to both the universal and the singular, it follows that intentional^o being no more assumes universal being for itself than it assumes singular being (and vice versa). It also follows that such intentional being is weaker than real being and so is always founded on it, though objectively.

The being of reason belongs to a thing as it has conceived being solely within the consideration of a working intellect. Such being, since it is diminished being, always presupposes one (*alterum*) of the two preceding beings.

Therefore they say that intentional being is not real being, because it can belong to a thing that does not exist in its proper nature. But neither is it the being of reason, because existing in reality (*in re*) is incompatible

with the being of reason, {7} whereas it is not incompatible with what has represented being in something and objective being in the soul. Hence this intentional being is intermediary, as they say, between real being and the being of reason.

They likewise distinguish between distinctions: For just as there are three kinds of being, so there are three kinds of resultant distinctions: real, intentional, and of reason. A real distinction is that by which things are distinguished as they exist in their proper natures in real existence. An intentional distinction is that by which things are distinguished in representational being, when a thing is represented in different ways. A distinction of reason is that by which things are distinguished solely through the operation of intellect.

Accordingly, they say that an intentional distinction is intermediary between a real distinction and one of reason, because there can be an intentional distinction between things in represented being even though there is not a real distinction between them in real being – for things can be distinctly represented and so distinct in represented being even though they do not have real being in the natural world. So this distinction is less than a real distinction and yet it is greater than a distinction of reason, because the one exists only through an act of intellect, whereas the other exists in represented being before an act of intellect.

In this way, then, they claim that represented being (and cognized being) is intentional being, distinct by an intentional distinction from the representing form (and from the cognition).

They offer the following proof that an intentional distinction is not a real distinction, and that things can be distinct intentionally without a real distinction. If there were numerically one species distinctly representing several things (say, a human being and a donkey), then the several things distinctly represented within that species – in such a way that they would have represented being there – would not have any real distinction in the species, because by assumption the species is numerically one. {8} Consequently, the things represented in that species do not have any real being either, only intentional being. Yet those several things distinctly represented within that numerically one species necessarily are distinct intentionally from one another and from that species. Otherwise,^o the species would not represent them distinctly – unless they were to have some distinction within that representing species. For it is impossible for things to be distinctly represented within something unless they have some dis-

tion there. As a result, to say that things are represented distinctly within something and that they have no distinction there is to run together opposite claims (*oppositum in adiecto*).

From these considerations, they conclude that an intentional distinction is greater than a distinction of reason, because things that are represented distinctly in a single species are distinguished more objectively or representationally in that species than are those that are distinguished only through an operation of intellect. Therefore an intentional distinction is intermediary between a real distinction and one of reason: It is greater than the one and less than the other.

[B. *Against This View*]

It does not seem to me that these claims are true. So I show that represented being is the same in reality as the representing form, and cognized being the same in reality as the cognition.

1. Every positive entity (*entitas*) not dependent on the soul is a real entity, because such an entity would have being even if the soul were not to exist. Thus the Philosopher and the Commentator, in *Metaphysics* VI [1026a34-b1], make a first division of being into being in the soul and being outside the soul. They say that being outside the soul is real being, because they divide it into the ten categories, each of which is a real being or real entity. For it is clear that [if] no thing exists [then] nothing exists. Therefore it is clear that {9} being that is not dependent on the soul is real being. But represented being is positive being and a kind of positive entity, as they too grant, and it is not dependent on the operation of intellect or soul, as they also grant, because the species would represent even if the intellect were not cognizing. Therefore, if that which is represented is a real being or a real entity, it is nothing other than the entity of what represents it. For if it were a different real entity outside the soul, it would have subjective being distinct in reality from what represents it. Therefore, represented being is the same in reality as the representing form.

The same argument can be made of cognized being and cognition, because a cognition is a true thing perfecting the soul, since that is its proper state. Then I argue as before. Every entity (*entitas*) not dependent on a comparative act of the soul either^o is some entity perfecting the soul

or else is outside the soul. But the cognized being of an object cognized by a direct act is a positive entity not dependent on a comparative act of intellect. For it can belong to a cognitive power other than the intellect and also can belong to the intellect itself, cognizing through a direct act before its comparative act. Therefore, cognized being is real being and it is not distinct from the cognition. Therefore, it is the same as the cognition.

2. I argue secondly as follows. Whatever follows a real entity by natural necessity is truly a real entity, because if the causal antecedent is real then what follows by natural necessity is real. But by natural necessity represented being necessarily follows the representing form (and cognized being [likewise follows] the cognition). Therefore, since the representing form is a real entity (and likewise the cognition), the represented^o being is also a real entity (and likewise the cognized being). But the latter is not distinct from the reality of the representing form (and the cognition), because if so it would be a real subjective being distinct in reality {10} from the representing form (and the cognition), which is false and denied by those who hold this view. Therefore they are the same in reality as the representing form and the cognition.

3. The outcome of a real and natural production has real being. But the agent intellect, by a real and natural action, produces the intelligible^o being of an object, or produces the object in intelligible being: for its role is to make something actually intelligible from what is potentially intelligible. Therefore, the intelligible being it produces is some real being. Yet it produces nothing but an intelligible species. Therefore, the intelligible being of the object, which is its represented being through the species, is the same being in reality as the representing species. This is to argue as follows: The agent intellect makes something actually intelligible from what is potentially intelligible, as the Commentator says at *De anima* III [18]. But the agent intellect makes nothing but an intelligible species (or an act of intellectual cognition), because whatever it might be supposed to make in the faculty of imagination or phantasia would be material and extended the length of the material or corporeal faculty's organ. Therefore, the intelligible being of the object is the same in reality as the representing intelligible species (or the cognition). But represented being through the species (or through the cognition, if posited) is the object's intelligible being, not its subjective being. Therefore, represented being is the same in reality as the representing form.

4. The Philosopher shows in *Metaphysics* IV^o [1003b22--30] that "being

and one are the same in reality and one nature [. . .] because they are not separated in generation and corruption." For when a person is generated, a person with *being* is generated, and *one* person is generated. Likewise when a person is corrupted, a person with *being* is corrupted, and *one* person is corrupted. From this it is clear that two things are the same in reality when it is entirely impossible for one to be generated or corrupted without the other. But it is impossible for there to be a representing form unless there is the represented being of something. Nor is it possible {11} for there to be a cognition unless there is the cognized being^o of something.^o Likewise it is impossible for one of those not to exist unless, necessarily, the other does not exist. Therefore, they are the same in reality. So by all the means by which it is necessarily proved that two things are the same in reality it can be proved that represented being is the same in reality as the representing form. For when one is posited then necessarily the other is posited, and when one of the two is destroyed then necessarily the other is destroyed. Therefore, they are the same in reality.

5. Every entity that is neither first nor formulated by an act of intellect comes from another as its efficient cause. But the represented being of a creature through the divine essence does not come from the divine essence as its efficient cause. Therefore, the represented being of a creature through the divine essence is not an entity that is not first. Therefore if it is an entity, it will be the first entity, which is the divine essence.

I prove the major premise as follows. An entity that is neither first nor formulated through an act of intellect is either of itself a necessary being, and then it is the first entity, or it is a possible being, not of itself, and if such a thing has being it comes from another as its efficient cause.

The minor premise is proved as follows. Whenever the divine essence is the effective principle of a thing by means of its essence, it effectively produces that thing naturally, to the full extent of its power. Such a thing necessarily has real external being. But the represented being of a creature does not necessarily have real external being, because if so then the thing would exist externally from eternity. Therefore the represented being of a creature does not come from the divine essence as its efficient cause.

6. If represented being is a positive entity distinct from that which represents it, then it is an entity having either subjective or objective being. Not the first, because then there would be a real external entity distinct from what represents it, which is false and denied even [by them]. Not the second, because that which^o has objective being in the representing form is the end term of the representation, and that which has objective being

in the cognition is the end term of the cognition,^o whereas represented being is not the end term of the representation, and cognized being is not the end term {12} of a direct act of cognition. Therefore, represented being is not a different entity from what represents it, nor is cognized being a different entity from the cognition.

7. Everything naturally prior to something absolute can, without contradiction, exist without the other. And insofar as the one that is naturally posterior belongs to a lesser state of existence (*minoris entitatis*), the one that is naturally prior can exist that much more without it, because it depends that much less on the other. But if represented being and cognized being are their own states of existence, distinct from the representing form and the cognition, then the latter are naturally prior to the former, because then represented being would naturally follow the being of what represents it, and cognized being would naturally follow the being of the cognition. Therefore that which represents an object could exist without the represented being of that object, and the cognition of an object could exist without the cognized being of that object. That involves a contradiction.

8. If represented being is a positive entity (*entitas*) beyond the operation of intellect and distinct from the representing form, then it is a distinct entity either absolutely or relatively. Not the first, because then it would be either a substance or a quantity or a quality – and whichever is proposed, it would be a real being. If the second is proposed then, on the contrary, it is not *only* the relationship, since (according to *De trinitate* VII [1.2]) “everything spoken of relatively is a thing, the relation aside.” So beyond the relationship it involves something absolute, and according to you it does not involve the absolute thing that represents it nor does it belong to the thing represented. Therefore, as before, it involves something absolute [in the category] of substance, etc. Whichever is proposed, it would be a real being and would not be distinct in reality from what represents it; for if it were distinct it would possess subjective being. Therefore, it is the same entity in reality as what represents it.

9. If represented being is a positive entity (*entitas*) distinct from what represents it and beyond the act of intellect, {13} then in virtue of that represented being a creature is related to the divine essence that represents it. The consequent is false, therefore so is the antecedent. The inference is clear:

- First, because everything possessing being distinct from God and beyond the operation of intellect is related to God in virtue of that being, because it depends on God in virtue of that being.

- Second, if represented being is a distinct entity from what represents it, then since it is possible to understand represented being as such only when one also understands the being of what represents it, represented being would involve a relation to the being of what represents it.
- Third, if represented being is distinct from what represents it and beyond the operation of intellect, then that which is represented in represented being will be assimilated to its representing^o form and consequently that which is represented would be related, in virtue of its represented being, to what represents it.

That the consequent is false, I prove as follows. The relation would be either a relation of reason or a real relation. Not the first, because it is beyond the operation of intellect, just as its foundation is too. For, as they concede and as is true, the represented being of that creature, through the divine essence, is beyond the operation of intellect. Not the second, because then from eternity there would have been a real relation from the creature to God. Also, a real relation requires a real foundation, because a relation does not possess a more perfect existence (*entitatis*) than does its foundation. Thus a creature having represented being from eternity would have a real existence from eternity, which is false and they deny.

Nor can one suppose that it is an intentional relation intermediary between a real relation and a relation of reason. For according to those who hold such a view, intentional being is represented being or cognized being. But from the fact that something represents an object, it does not represent the relation of the represented object to the representing species — just as from the fact that a species represents an intellectually cognized object it does not represent the relation of that object in {I4} represented being. Also, an intellect cognizing an object represented by a species would by that very fact cognize the relation of that represented object and consequently it would also cognize the representing species. Each of these is false. Also, a species in the eye, from the fact that it would represent some visible object, would represent the relation of that object in represented being to the species. As a result, someone seeing a visible object through a representing species would by that very fact see, through his corporeal eye, a relation that is in fact not visible through corporeal vision. Therefore, from the fact that an object has represented and cognized being, it does not follow that the relation of that object has represented and cognized being, which you call intentional being. Therefore represented being is not distinct from what represents it.

10. If represented being is a positive entity (*entitas*) distinct from the

species that produces it, then it is produced by a distinct production – otherwise it would be a necessary being. Therefore it is produced either by (i) the representing species or by (ii) something else producing it. Not the first (i), because then God could concur in the production of the species without concurring with the species in the production of the represented being. This is false, because then the species could exist without the represented being of its object. Not the second (ii), because then it is produced either by a producer other than what produced the species – which cannot be the case for the same reason: that then God could concur in the production of one without concurring in the production of the other – or it is produced by the same thing that produced the species, as a concomitant end product, accidental to that production. This cannot be the case for two reasons.

- First, because God can influence its production and operation so that it has the essential (*per se*) end product as its end, without influencing it so that it has the accidental end product as its end. For the blessed can see the divine essence without seeing any creature.
- Second, the end product of a production – not just its essential (*per se*) but even its accidental end product – has something real as its necessary concomitant. This is clear for a relation that is produced accidentally with the production {15} of its foundation. But, according to those in question, represented and cognized being is not real being; it is, as they say, less than real being. Therefore, etc.

[C. Main Reply]

1. I reply to the question that the represented being of an object is not a thing distinct from the representing form. The represented being of Caesar, for instance, represented by a statue, does not differ from the representing statue except in mode of signifying. For when I say that a stone is represented by a species (or by the divine essence) and cognized, this description (*denominatio*) is based on either an intrinsic or an extrinsic form. But not on an intrinsic form inhering in the stone, because then represented being would have real subjective being in the stone. This cannot be the case because [represented being] belongs to the stone even if the stone does not exist. It also would follow that the cognized being of a stone would have being formally inhering in the stone. As a result, our intellect, in understanding the stone, would be the cause of a form's inhering in the stone,

which is false. Therefore, when I say that a stone is represented or cognized, this description is based solely on an extrinsically describing form, which is nothing other than the form that represents it or the form of the intellection. So when a stone is said to be in a place (*locatus*), this is an extrinsic description, based on the surrounding place (*loco*), whereas when a stone is said to be positioned (*ubicatus*), the description is based on the position (*ubi*) inherent in the stone. Likewise, when a stone is said to be represented or cognized through a species, this description is based solely on the representing species and on the cognition having the stone as its ultimate object. And just as, when a stone is said to be in a place, being-in-a-place is nothing other than the place as it surrounds and coalesces with the stone, so when a stone is said to be {16} represented or intellectually cognized through a species, its represented being is no other entity than that of the species signified in a kind of coalescence with the stone, and the intellectually cognized being of the stone^o is nothing other than the intellection of the stone signified in a kind of coalescence extrinsic to the stone.

2. I establish this conclusion in the following way as well. A thing that has been or^o can be created possesses being in the divine essence perfectly inasmuch as that essence eminently contains all perfections. Second, it possesses being in the divine power virtually inasmuch as that power contains all causality. Third, it possesses being in the divine essence in a representational mode insofar as that essence distinctly represents and expresses all other things. Fourth, it possesses being in divine knowledge insofar as that knowledge cognizes all other things. So just as a thing that has been or^o can be created is nothing other than the divine essence, inasmuch as it is perfectly and eminently contained in the divine essence, and is nothing other than the power of God, inasmuch as it is virtually contained in God, so it is nothing other than the representing divine essence, inasmuch as it has represented being in the divine essence, and is nothing other than the knowledge of God, inasmuch as it has known or cognized being in the knowledge of God.

3. All these conclusions are confirmed by the blessed Augustine, in *On Genesis V* [xvi.34], where he says, speaking of God, "he possesses all things from the start, just as he himself exists." Augustine proves this as follows:

He would not have made them unless he had known them before he made them, he would not have known them unless he had seen them, he would not have seen them unless he had possessed them, and he would not have possessed what

had not yet been made unless in the way that he himself exists without being made.

So Augustine says two things: that God would not have seen other things unless he had possessed them, and that inasmuch as he possesses them, they are God himself. For he says, "he would not have possessed what had not yet been made unless in the way that he himself exists without being made." From these two claims I make the following evident argument: God would not have seen anything unless he had possessed those things, but to possess them only perfectly and not in a representational mode would not have sufficed to have cognized them. For however much {17} and however eminently God might possess the perfections of other things, he would not represent those things, nor would this be sufficient for cognizing other things. So what Augustine means is that unless God had possessed other things perfectly *and* in represented being, he would not have seen them. And he secondly says that as he possesses them, they are God himself. Therefore creatures as possessed by God in a representational mode and perfectly are God himself, whose essence represents all things.

Augustine says in the same place that a creature, according to its cognized being from God, is God himself: "Before things had existence from God, they existed within him, known in such a way as to live eternally and unchangeably and to be life [itself]" [xv.33]. Therefore, as they possess known being from God, so they are eternal and unchangeable life, which is nothing other than God. Augustine also says in the same place,

All these things, before they existed, were within the knowledge of the one who made them, and indeed were better where they were more true, and where they were eternal and unchangeable. [xv.33]

Therefore, inasmuch as they exist in the knowledge of the one who made them, in virtue of their known being, they are eternal and unchangeable and more true, and consequently they are nothing other than God and his knowledge.

Also, Anselm says (*Monologion* ch. 34):

Just as a work made in keeping with some art is always within that art and is nothing other than what the art itself is, so all things that have been made are always within the highest spirit: not what they are in themselves, but what is the same as that spirit.

But art is representational, relative to the thing made through that art. Therefore, a thing, inasmuch as it exists in virtue of its represented being

within what represents it, is the representing form itself. So too all things, inasmuch as they exist in the Word that represents and says all things, are the Word itself — as Anselm said above. {18}

Also, according to Anselm (in the same work, ch. 35): “Just as all things are life and truth within the Word, so are they within his knowledge.” But they are within his knowledge as what is cognized is within a cognition. Therefore, all things other than God, in virtue of their cognized being, are the same as God’s cognition and knowledge.

[D. Reply to the Earlier Arguments]

1. To the first argument for the other view [II.A.1], when it is argued:

When something is said of two things through a greater univocation than the univocation of genus or species, each of those is a being through its own proper existence; but so ‘stone’ is said of a stone in cognized being and a stone in produced being,

here I will first show that this argument reaches a conclusion that is false and contrary to their view. Second, I will reply to the form of the argument.

I show the first as follows. I take this as the major premise:

If something is said of two things through a greater univocation than the univocation of genus or species, then each of those things is a real being.

I prove this major premise in the same way as he proves his own: for things are univocal that have the same substantial nature (*ratio*). But that which is a real being and that which is not a real being but purely nothing (such as something that *could* be created) do not have the same substantial nature. For example, the soul of Peter and the not-yet-existent soul of the Antichrist do not have the same substantial nature, because the soul of the Antichrist has no quiddity, as I suppose with him. Next, I take this as his minor premise:

‘Stone,’ said of a stone in cognized being and of a stone in external reality, is said with greater univocation than the univocation of genus or species, because it is said according to numerical unity.

Therefore a stone in cognized being is a real being, which is false and contrary to his own view. And if it is said [in reply] that something is univocal to a being and a nonbeing (for instance, that ‘human being’ is said univocally of a nonexistent Caesar {19} and an existent William),

then the proof of his major premise collapses, when he says that a being and something entirely not a being have no single substantial nature.

Alternatively, I take this as his major premise:

If something is said univocally of two things through a greater univocation than that of genus or species, then each of those things truly is the thing said univocally of them in this way.

But, according to you, 'stone' is said in this way of both a stone in cognized being and a stone in external reality. Therefore the stone in cognized being truly is a stone. Then I argue: The stone in cognized being existed from eternity, and the stone in cognized being truly is a stone. Therefore a stone existed from eternity. The conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is false. Not the major; therefore the minor.

Therefore, [second,] I reply to the argument by granting the major and denying the minor. For 'stone' is not said univocally, through the univocation of species, of both a stone in cognized being and a stone in external reality. Consequently, it is also not said of them through a *greater* univocation than the univocation of species, because being-in-cognition, like being-in-opinion, is a diminishing modifier (*determinatio diminuens*). Thus a stone in cognized being is a stone in a qualified way (*secundum quid*), just as the being of Homer in his poetry is the being of Homer in a qualified way.¹

To the proof [of the minor], when it is argued:

'Stone' is said of both a stone in cognized being and a stone in external reality due to numerical unity, because a stone produced in external reality is the same as a stone in cognized being,

I reply as follows. Something broken apart (*distractum*) is not broken relative to what breaks it, but relative to a third [term] it is broken when qualified by what breaks it. In the same way, something diminished is not diminished relative to its diminishing modifier, but relative to a third [term] it is diminished when modified by what diminishes it. For example: A human being is not modified^o by 'dead,' because according to the Philosopher [*De int.* II, 21a22], to speak of a dead human being is to put together opposites, from which a contradiction follows. But the contradiction would not follow unless 'human being,' when matched with 'dead,' refers to a human being without qualification. For it is the same human

¹ See Aristotle, *De interpretatione* II, 21a25-28.

being, {20} without qualification, who did exist externally and was living and is dead. Hence a true human being is dead, not a qualified human being. Therefore, something broken apart is not broken relative to what breaks it, but relative to a third [term] it is broken when informed by the property that breaks it. So relative to an adjacent third [term] (such as 'human being' or 'animal'), a human being modified by 'dead' is broken.²

So when 'stone' is taken in itself and matched with 'being in cognition,' it refers to a stone without qualification. Otherwise it would not be diminished from that state, because it is not diminished from diminished being but from the unqualified being of a stone. But relative to a third [term], a stone as modified by 'being in cognition' is a stone in a qualified and diminished way. Therefore I grant that the stone is numerically the same in external reality and in cognized being. The same stone that in reality and without qualification exists externally is in cognition as well, because relative to a third [term] the stone is diminished through being-in-cognition. So it does not follow that 'stone' is said univocally or due to numerical unity of both a stone in cognized being and a stone in external reality.

2. To the second argument [II.A.2], when it is argued that represented being is a state of existence (*entitas*) intermediary between real being and the being of reason, I say that absolutely speaking there is no such real intermediary state, because every state of existence is either of first or of second intention. For there is no intention intermediary between first and second intention. But if this existence is of second intention, then it is the existence of reason, whereas if it is of first intention, then it is real, because then it is put into being by a first intention of nature and not one of reason.

To the proof, when it is argued that the represented being of a stone is not the existence of reason because it precedes the act of intellect, I grant

² In other words, whereas it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a *dead human being*, it is not contradictory to say that

A dead human being is not a human being

or

A dead human being is not an animal.

In these latter cases, when we add "a third term," the words 'human being' take on a new "broken" meaning. We are now speaking of a human being in a qualified sense, as a corpse or perhaps as a separated soul.

These two examples are offered at this point in one of our two manuscripts, but the text is so disjointed that the printed edition prefers the other manuscript.

this. And when it is further argued that it is not real existence, because it is {21} diminished being, I reply that although represented being is the diminished being of the represented stone, nevertheless it is real being, the same in reality as the being of the representing form. Analogously, although being-in-opinion is the qualified being of the opinion-holder, it is nevertheless a true thing, an act of cognition in the intellect of the opinion-holder.

But it should be noticed here that although represented being is not absolutely a being intermediary between real being and the being of reason, nevertheless, with respect to the represented object, this being is intermediary between that object's real being and the being of reason. Analogously, although there is no absolute intermediary between good and bad, nevertheless there can be an intermediary in some such respect, as a hermit who is good or bad in himself is neither good nor bad with respect to society. Thus the represented being of an object is not that object's real being. It is also not the being of reason of that object, because represented being does not belong to the object through an act of reason. So with respect to the represented object, represented being is neither real being nor the being of reason, because although absolutely speaking it is being either of first or of second intention, nevertheless with respect to this object it is being neither of first nor of second intention. For it is judged a first or a second intention not with respect to this object but in itself, according to its proper nature. From this it is clear that not every being that is in the soul objectively is the being of reason. For being that is in the soul through a direct cognition is not, nor is being that is in the soul with respect to apprehensive powers other than intellect (such as being that is in the imagination), since such being does not occur through a comparative operation of intellect. It is also clear that if a creature possessed represented being from eternity in such a way that from eternity this represented being was the creature's diminished being, still it would not from eternity have possessed its own proper existence (*entitas*), neither with nor without qualification, because represented being is not a proper existence distinct from the existence of its representing form, as was shown above. {22}

Perhaps you will say that represented being has a real relation with what represents it, because this relation is beyond the operation of intellect, since the representation itself is beyond the operation of intellect; but the end terms of a real relation are distinct in reality and their being is distinct

in reality; therefore represented being and the being of what represents it are distinct in reality.

I reply that when that which is represented is a true thing, then there is a real relation of what is represented to what represents, especially with respect to the representing divine essence. In that case the end terms of that relation and also the being of those end terms are distinct in reality from one another. In that case, then, that which represents and that which is represented are distinct in reality, and the being of that which represents and the being (formally and intrinsically) of that which is represented are also distinct in reality. But represented being is not formally and intrinsically the being of what is represented, and so it does not follow that represented being is distinct in reality from the being of what represents it.

But perhaps you will still argue: A relatum is distinct in reality from its correlative in virtue of the being by which it has that real relation. But when that which is represented^o is a true thing, it has a real relation to what represents it in virtue of represented being: Otherwise the thing represented, as represented, would not be related to what represents it. Therefore, represented being is distinct in reality from what represents it.

I reply that something relative is sometimes said to be related to its foundation (related foundationally), and sometimes to the relation itself (related formally). For example, something is said to be like another in one way by *whiteness*, and in another way by *likeness*. Therefore, when one takes this as one's major premise:

A relatum is distinct in reality from its correlative in virtue of the being by which it has that real relation,

the reduplication³ can be on account of the foundation or on account of the relation. If the first then this premise is true, but then the minor premise is false, when it is said that what is represented is related to what represents it in virtue of represented being *foundationally*. {23} For the foundation of the relation between what is represented and what represents is not represented being but the absolute nature of what is represented, since its absolute nature is what is represented by the divine essence.

If the reduplication is meant in the second way, on account of the relation, then the major premise remains true, because the relation of what is represented is distinct in reality from the representing divine essence.

³ That is, the phrase 'in virtue of.'

But then one must draw a distinction regarding the minor premise, when it is said that what is represented has a real relation to what represents it in virtue of represented being.

- For in one way, ‘represented being’ signifies the relation itself by which what is represented is related to what represents it. Then the minor premise is true and rightly accepted alongside the major: for this relation in virtue of which what is represented is formally related to what represents it *is* distinct in reality from what represents it and formally exists in the represented thing when that exists outside the soul.
- In another way, ‘represented being’ signifies the representation itself in a kind of coalescence (*concretione*) extrinsic to the thing represented, just as ‘being white’ signifies whiteness in a kind of coalescence extrinsic to its subject. In this way the minor premise is false, because represented being is not in this way distinct from the representing intention, nor does the thing represented^o have a real relation to what represents it in virtue of represented being that is the same as the representing form.

This reply can be clarified by a comparison. For an agent is said to be an agent due to two kinds of actions.

- One is in the genus of action, and in virtue of this action an agent brings the thing acted on into some state. As the author of the *Liber sex principiorum* [ch. 2] states: “An action is that in virtue of which we are said to act on that which is the receiving subject.” According to many, this action is not in the agent as its subject but in the thing acted on.
- Another is a relation in the mode of a capacity (from the second mode of relatives),⁴ in virtue of which an agent {24} is formally related to the thing acted on or produced. This action exists formally in the agent, just as a relation exists formally in its relata.

In just this way, when a creature represented by the divine essence has external being, it has two kinds of represented being:

- First, insofar as ‘represented being’ signifies the representation by way of an extrinsic description; this is in the representing form.
- Second, insofar as ‘represented being’ signifies the relation of the thing represented to the representing divine essence; this is in the represented creature.

⁴ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V 15, 1021a15–26.

But in this question we speak of the represented being that belongs to an object regardless of whether it exists; we are asking whether *this* being differs from the representing form. When the represented creature does not have external being, then represented being belongs to it only through an extrinsic description and not insofar as it implies a real relation, because a real relation requires an actual subject.

3. To the third argument for the other view [II.A.3], when it is argued:

There can be a distinction between two things in represented being without there being a distinction in what represents them. Therefore the represented being of those things is not the same as what represents them,

I reply by denying the antecedent insofar as represented being implies an extrinsic description. This becomes clear in replying to the proof of the antecedent. When it is argued:

If one species were to represent distinctly a human being and a donkey, then these are several and distinct in represented being — otherwise it would not represent them distinctly,

I say that just as if several bodies were in the same place those several bodies would have the same being-in-a-place through an extrinsic description based on that same place, so if several objects are represented by the same species they have the same represented being, based on the representation described extrinsically, even though there are several things represented. So such a species distinctly represents several things in represented being, but it does not represent them in distinct^o represented beings. These remarks will become more clear in replying to the following argument.

{25}

To the argument made as part of the prior view, when it is argued:

If several things are distinctly represented by one species, then the things distinctly represented in this way do not have a real distinction in that species, because that species is numerically one. Yet the things distinctly represented in this way necessarily are distinct intentionally from one another and from such a species: otherwise that species would not represent them distinctly,

I reply first by showing that the argument does not go through. For a species posited to be numerically one and to represent several things distinctly (as some say of the species by which an angel cognizes)⁵ is in itself numerically one intentionally just as it is numerically one in reality,

⁵ See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1a 55.3, 58.2.

since it is in itself one intention and not several. Therefore just as you argue that several things represented by that species are not distinct in reality in that species, because that species is numerically one in reality, so it follows that the things represented by that same species are not intentionally distinct in that species, because the species is numerically one intention. So I say that if several things are represented by the same single species and do not exist in nature, then just as they are not distinct in reality in that species (since the species is not itself distinct in reality) and just as the things represented are not distinct in reality from one another, so they are not intentionally distinct in that species (since the species is numerically one intention), nor do the things so represented (if they do not exist in nature) have being other than the being of the representing species. Consequently, their intentional being is the same in reality as the intention that represents them.

[Second], to the proof, when it is argued:

If that representing species represents several things distinctly then they have some distinction within what represents them,

I reply that if in the antecedent the adverb 'distinctly' modifies the things represented, then it is not universally true – for instance, when the things represented do not exist. For, on this reading, it does not distinctly represent {26} things that are not distinct. On the other hand, if it modifies the verb 'represents,' then the antecedent is true, because such a species distinctly – that is, not confusedly – represents several things. But, on this reading, the inference does not hold, because the divine essence represents distinctly and discretely that which it contains in a unified way, and consequently it distinctly represents things that have no distinction within it.

But to the major statement in the reply I just made, consider the following objection. If some species or form represents several things then it represents distinct things; but not things that are distinct in reality, because they are not distinct in reality if they are not established in nature. Therefore they are distinct intentionally or in represented being. Then the argument made earlier comes back, that things are distinct in represented being without any distinction in their representing form [etc.]. And one can argue in the same way for a cognition and cognized being. For if several things are cognized by a single cognition, then they are cognized distinctly by a single cognition. But they are not cognized distinctly in

subjective being. Therefore they are distinct in cognized being and yet the cognition remains one. Therefore things are distinct in cognized being without there being any distinction within the cognition. Therefore, the cognition and cognized being are not the same in reality (*ex parte rei*).

I reply that there are two ways in which things can be distinct in cognized or represented being.

- In one way, *formally*, so that cognized being is distinct in them in virtue of some formal account^o – just as we say that two opposite species are distinct in their natures and differentia. In this way we deny that things are distinct in cognized being when they are cognized by a single cognition, and we deny that they are distinct in represented being when they are represented by a single form, just as they are not distinct by cognition.
- In another way, things can be understood to be distinct in cognized being *objectively*, because the same cognition has these things as its distinct end-terms, or has the distinction between them as its end-term, as when distinct things are cognized as distinct. {27} In this way it is true that things are distinct in cognized being even when they do not exist. For they are cognized by a single cognition in virtue of their naturally distinguishing quiddities, and the same is true for what distinguishes them in cognized being. But it does not follow from this that they are distinct in reality, because cognized being is a diminishing modifier. Hence so too are they distinct within cognition. Therefore, it is clear that when several distinct things are cognized by a single cognition, their cognized being is not made to be several, no more than the cognition is, although they are made several in cognized being objectively. And much the same should be said for represented being.

This reply is clarified by a comparison. If two bodies are put in the same place, these bodies are distinct in their containing place not formally, on account of place, [but objectively]. Likewise, two species are distinct in their genus not actually but potentially, through the differentiae contained potentially within the genus. So, as the foregoing has made clear, the claim that 'things are distinct in something' is equivocal.

[III. Reply to the Initial Arguments]

1. To the first of the initial arguments [I.A.1], when it is argued:

That being which belongs to a cognized and represented object insofar as it is distinct from the cognition and the representing form is not the same in reality as the cognition and the representing form,

I say that this is true if it belongs to it formally and intrinsically, but not — as in this situation — if it belongs to it by an extrinsic description (as has often been said⁶). For example, being-in-a-place belongs to a body in a place insofar as the body is distinct from the place, and yet being-in-a-place is nothing other than the place's surrounding the body in that place, just as being-white is nothing other than whiteness's describing a subject. In the same way, cognized being belongs to a stone insofar as the stone is distinct from divine cognition, because God cognizes a stone^o insofar as it is distinct from him, and nevertheless the cognized being of the stone from eternity is nothing other than God's cognition. Much the same should be said for represented being and the representing form. Another appropriate example concerns honor and being honored, and praise {28} and being praised. For honor and praise are within the one honoring and praising, and yet they describe the one praised and honored insofar as that person is distinct from the one praising and honoring.

2. To the second [I.A.2], when it is argued,

An object given intelligible being by agent intellect does not produce the object in represented being through a species,

I say that if the intelligible species is impressed on intellect by the object and by agent intellect, then since the species representing the object and the represented being of the object are the same, the proposition is false. For although the intelligible object does not produce the represented object, still it produces the object with respect to represented being — or, to put it more accurately, it produces the represented being of the object.

To the first proof, when it is said,

The same thing does not produce itself; but the object that is intelligible due to agent intellect is the same as the object in represented being through the species,

I say that the same thing does not produce itself with respect to one and the same being. Nevertheless, a thing with respect to one being can produce its being in another respect — or, to put it more accurately, it can produce another being belonging to itself but accidental and extrinsic to itself. In this way, although a human being cannot make himself, he

⁶ See II.C.1 and II.D.2-3.

nevertheless can make himself in a place, and with being-in-a-place. Thus although the same object does not produce itself, it nevertheless can produce itself in represented being by producing the species in which it is represented, and this is nothing other than to produce the represented being of that object.

To the other proof, when it is argued,

That which produces something by a real action is related to what it produces by a real relation,

this is granted. And when it is said,

An intelligible object is not related by a real relation to the [same] object in represented being,

I deny this, if the intelligible object impresses the species [on intellect].

And when you say,

the object in represented being does not as such have real being, and a real relation requires a real end-term,

I reply that although the object does not have real being in represented being, nevertheless the produced represented being is a real being, {29} just as the representing species is real. As a result, the intelligible object has a real relation to its represented being, just as it has a real relation to its representing species, if it produces it in intellect and impresses it on intellect.