PETER AUREOL
INTUITION, ABSTRACTION, AND
DEMONSTRATIVE KNOWLEDGE

Introduction

Peter Aureol (c. 1280–1322) was one of the most influential and original philosophers of the early fourteenth century. A member of the Franciscan order, Aureol became a master of theology at the University of Paris in 1318. The following selection is taken from the prologue to his major work, his commentary on Lombard’s *Sentences*.

The official topic of this question concerns divine illumination: specifically, whether God could illuminate someone in this life with the articles of faith in such a way that this individual would have *knowledge* of these propositions. On its face, this might seem unlikely, because such articles—regarding the incarnation, the Trinity, etc.—are supposed to be held by faith alone in this life. (In the next life, in the “light of glory,” matters will be quite different.) But Aureol wants to know whether it would be possible, if only in principle, for God to provide illumination that would provide a “wayfarer” (someone in this life) not just with a stronger faith, but with genuine knowledge. Aureol accepts the standard medieval account of knowledge (*scientia*) as requiring a demonstrative proof. (To stress this point, we sometimes translate *scientia* as “demonstrative knowledge.”) So the present question raises the problem of whether illumination could conceivably supply this sort of demonstrative evidence. In other words, could someone granted illumination in this life ever *prove* the mysteries of the faith? Aureol’s answer is Yes.

Although the question is cast in terms of divine illumination, Aureol’s real interest is in the nature of knowledge. In the course of his affirmative answer, Aureol has to distinguish knowledge from faith. This leads him to Scotus’s influential distinction between two kinds of cognition (*notitia*), intuitive and abstractive. Scotus had claimed that intuitive cognition always takes as its object something that is present to the cognitive agent. Aureol objects to this account by describing various cases of nonveridical perception, such as afterimages and double vision, where there is no object
corresponding to what is being perceived. Aureol's own proposal is that an intuitive cognition, at both the sensory and intellectual levels, is a cognition that is direct (not inferential), and that makes the object appear present, actual, and existent.

Lurking in the background is Aureol's theory of apparent being, which is what he takes to explain how objects—even nonexistent objects—can appear to be present before one's mind. This will be the topic of Translation 9.

For further reading on this subject, see CHLMP VI.21, "Faith, Ideas, Illumination, and Experience," and VI.22, "Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition." Regarding Aureol in particular, see Tachau (1988) and Pasnau (1998a).

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Intuition, Abstraction, and Demonstrative Knowledge

*Scriptum, prooemium, Q2*

In the present section, since Master Lombard puts his trust in divine help, the question can therefore be rightly asked:

Can God provide to a wayfarer some light in virtue of which theological truths are demonstratively known (*scientifice cognoscantur*)?

**Initial Arguments**

1. **Arguments for Such a Light**

6. It seems that God could provide some light that energizes and elevates the intellect, under the influence of which we would clearly understand the articles of faith in such a way that conclusions deduced from articles so understood would be cognized as knowledge. For God can provide a light that elevates and strengthens the intellect in such a way that everything passively knowable in propositions is brought to actuality; for to every

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1 Translated in collaboration with Charles Bolyard.

2 See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 12.2. (See also Translation 5, for Ghent's more general views on illumination.)
passive potentiality there is possibly a corresponding active potentiality. Therefore for everything passively knowable it is possible that a light be correspondingly made, which would play an active clarifying role. But in propositions formed from the articles of faith, their passive knowability and cognizability lie hidden. For such propositions are either immediate, in which case they are cognizable at once, or they are mediate. In the latter case, given that between two terms (predicate and subject) there cannot be an infinite number of intermediaries, it is possible to reach immediate propositions that will be cognizable in themselves. Therefore God can provide a light by which the articles of faith are sufficiently cognized.

7. Moreover, between species maximally distant from one another, God can produce an intermediary. But the light of glory and the obscure light of faith are maximally distant from one another in species. Therefore God can provide an intermediary light, less than the light of glory, but more than the light of faith, in which the articles of faith are demonstratively known.

8. Moreover, any thing that can be cognized in three ways — by faith, as knowledge, or intuitively — can have three corresponding lights in which the thing is in these three ways cognized.° For example, when one hears from an astronomer that a future eclipse will occur at a certain day and hour, one cognizes this through faith. But if one knows it through astronomical calculation, one cognizes it as knowledge. And if one intuits it visually by the moon's position, one cognizes in a higher way, intuitively. Accordingly, there are three lights: the first being the least, the third the greatest, and the second intermediary. But with regard to the [theological] truths we believe, one can have the first cognition and the first light; this is the obscurity of faith. One can also have the third cognition and the third light; this is the clarity of heaven. Therefore, one could have had an intermediary cognition that would be knowledge and an intermediary light in which such truths are known.

9. Moreover, with respect to these truths God can provide the light of knowledge: a light that comes with necessary arguments, since knowledge stems from necessary arguments. But according to Richard of St. Victor (in De trinitate bk.1, ch. 4), to explain those beliefs that are necessary [for salvation], "there is no lack of arguments that are plausible, indeed even° necessary, although it sometimes happens that they escape our scrutiny." Therefore, with respect to such truths God can provide some light in which they are known.
10. Moreover, knowing whether something is possible in God is the same as knowing whether it is necessary. For in the case of divine truths, whatever is possible is entirely necessary, since God is a necessary being to the highest degree (according to Avicenna in *Metaphysics* I [chs. 6–7]). But God can provide a light by which such truths are known to be possible, because if their impossibility is inferred from some syllogism, it will be mistaken either in matter or in form. But every mistake in matter can be detected through one of the various branches of knowledge, whereas a mistake in form can be detected through logic, assuming logic and the various branches of knowledge are perfectly grasped. Therefore, since God can perfectly provide these kinds of knowledge, he can also provide a light with which one would refute every syllogism proving that the truths we believe are impossible. Indeed, by this light one will as a consequence know these truths to be possible. Therefore, by the same light, one will know how to separate what is necessary from what is impossible.

11. Moreover, anything God can provide suddenly and in passing, he can provide for a long time, enduringly. But God gave the light of the highest faith to the prophets in passing, suddenly. Therefore, he could provide a similar light to the faithful enduringly, for a long time.

12. Moreover, cognizing a conclusion is the effect of the premises. But God can provide every effect of a secondary cause without that cause. Therefore God could provide a clear and luminous cognition of the truths we believe without the premises’ being grasped, and as a consequence these truths would be cognized by a higher light than the obscure light of faith.

13. Moreover, a cognition of the terms is distinct in reality from a cognition of their connection and combination, as is self-evident. Therefore, God could clarify one’s cognition of the combination and connection of the terms without clarifying one’s simple cognition of the terms. Thus he could provide a clear cognition of the proposition *God is three and one*, even while one has an obscure and enigmatic cognition of both terms, ‘God’ and ‘three.’ Such a light and such a cognition are higher than faith, but lower than the beatific vision in which God and the trinity are intuitively cognized. Therefore, God can provide such an intermediary light. This is confirmed by the fact that God can provide a cognition that is certain of the proposition *The Antichrist will exist*, even given that a

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5 That is, either one or more of the premises will be false, or the form of the syllogism will be invalid.
human being does not have a simple cognition clearly of the Antichrist, as regards his form and person.

Moreover, it is neither plausible nor safe to say that the saints have spoken falsely and boastfully of themselves. But Saint Augustine, in his *Contra epistulam fundamenti* [sec. 14], says “I profess the Catholic faith, and through this I am confident of achieving certain knowledge.” Richard also says (where quoted above), “Our efforts in this work are, for the things we believe, to bring forth arguments that are not merely plausible but even necessary.” Also, Augustine often says that the light in the faithful and wise is different from the light of simple faith. Therefore it seems that such a light absolutely should be posited.

2. Arguments for This Light as an Abstractive Cognition

16. It further seems that God could provide a light that is nothing other than a clear and distinct abstractive cognition of the quidditative notion of deity, from which all truths concerning the persons and their attributes and other intrinsic features can be derived as knowledge. For whenever the memory of some object remains in any intellect from a prior intuitive act, this intellect can have an abstractive cognition of that object. This is clear, because the memory of an object is an abstractive cognition, because it abstracts from the presence (praesentialitas) of the thing. But from the intuition of deity that Saint Paul suddenly had, the memory of deity, as suddenly seen, remained in his intellect. So he himself testifies in II Corinthians 12:2, that he was *suddenly carried off to the third heaven*. According to Augustine, this should be understood as referring to a vision of deity. And in the same place the Apostle adds that he *heard secret words that human beings are not permitted to speak*. Therefore it seems that there was an abstractive cognition of deity in his intellect, even while he was a wayfarer. Hence God can similarly provide this to any of the faithful.

17. Moreover by whatever kind of cognition one cognizes an act and its relationship to an object, through that same kind of cognition one can cognize the object. But one can cognize abstractively both the act by which one cognizes God and the relationship to God as cognized, because these are wholly created. Therefore the object, God and his proper essence, could also be cognized abstractively.

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*See n.39 below.
*Cf. Scotus, Quodlibet 7.19–28.*
18. Moreover, it seems to be possible for there to be two cognitions of
God that are no different with respect to the object that is cognized, and
that differ only with respect to the cognitive agent and to the mode of
cognition. For although no diversity should be posited within God,
nevertheless there is nothing absurd about different modes of cognizing
God. But intuitive and abstractive cognition do not differ with respect to
the object that is cognized, because the very same thing that is cognized
intuitively can be cognized abstractively. In fact, we can abstractively
cognize the existence of a thing when we see a lesser part of it; for we can
imagine how the rose exists on the branch [that we now see]. Therefore,
one can have abstractive and intuitive cognition of God, because they are
simply two diverse modes of cognizing the same object.

19. Moreover, anything whose essence differs conceptually from its
existence can be cognized abstractively. For the concept of essence without
existence will be an abstractive concept. But God’s essence differs concep-
tually from his existence, although there is no real difference. Therefore, it
seems that God can be conceived abstractively. And this is confirmed by
the fact that essence can be conceived without truth, goodness, or any
other attribute, and so likewise without existence, it seems.

20. Moreover, an abstractive cognition is said to be that which concerns
an absent thing, and which abstracts from the thing’s presence. But deity
can be conceived without its presence to us, since such presence is nothing
other than a relation of reason, and deity can be conceived apart from
every relation of reason. Therefore, it seems that deity could be conceived
abstractively.

21. Moreover, a creature is not cognizable by us in more ways than
God is, it seems. For each thing is cognized insofar as it is an actual being,
according to Metaphysics IX [1051a22–33], and so to the extent a thing is
more actual it is more cognizable, and in more ways. But a rose and any
other created quiddity can be cognized intuitively and abstractively by us.
Therefore, so can deity.

22. Moreover, what is conceptually prior (prius per intellectum) can be
detached from anything posterior. But since deity is “a sea of infinite
substance” according to Damascene, it is prior to existence, to presence,
and to every attribute. Therefore it can be conceived without existence
and presence, and as a result it can be conceived abstractively. ́

\[\text{De orthodoxa fide, ch. 9.}\]
3. Arguments against Knowledge by Illumination?

23. On the contrary, it seems that no light elevating the intellect to knowledge of our beliefs could be provided by God. For if such a light were possible, it would have been provided to the blessed Virgin, the apostles, the holy doctors, or masters in theology. But no one has ever been provided with such a light:

• Not the Virgin, because she walked through faith. According to Church teaching, faith resided in her on Holy Saturday; no one says that knowledge of our beliefs resided in her on that day.
• Not the apostles either, because Paul testifies in II Corinthians 5:6-7 that he went away from the Lord, walking through faith and not through sight.
• Nor was it provided to Augustine and the other holy doctors, because if they had possessed this knowledge they surely would have passed it on to us in their books on what is to be believed – something we don’t find them doing.
• It is also not provided to masters in theology: for no matter who is asked, however great he is, he does not say at death that he has knowledge of what is to be believed, but that it suffices for him to believe.

Therefore, such a light is not possible.

24. Moreover, if it were possible for a wayfarer to possess such a light, it ought to have been infused during baptism. For just as nature does not fail in what is necessary, but rather provides at the point of natural origin everything that contributes to achieving natural perfection, so such a light ought to be provided during the renewal of baptism, because it is necessary for achieving a great spiritual perfection – a knowledge of our beliefs. But this light is not provided during baptism: For no one has experienced it, and it is impossible for the loftiest dispositions to be possessed and be concealed from us. Therefore, such a light is not possible for a wayfarer.

25. Moreover, it is impossible for a wayfarer to possess what cannot coincide with faith, because faith is the condition of this life, as the light of glory is the condition of heaven. But such a light cannot coincide with faith. First, it would take away from the merit of faith. Also, they would be contradictory, because faith contains darkness and obscurity, since it concerns things that appear not, according to the Apostle in Hebrews 11:1, whereas this light would contain the appearance, and would supply evi-

7 Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 8.7.
dentness and clarity. Also, faith and opinion are incompatible. Also, that light would provide demonstrative knowledge, but such knowledge can in no way coincide with faith; otherwise, a mathematician could have faith in the conclusions \{183\} that he knows. Therefore, such a light is not possible for a wayfarer.

Moreover, if this light were possible, it would be intermediary between the light of faith and the light of glory, by either participation or negation. But not by participation, because then it would be more excellent than either one. For a mixture contains its ingredients virtually; thus a human being is loftier than the elements between which flesh is intermediary (according to De \textit{anima} III [429b15]). Nor can it be claimed that the light is intermediary by negation, because then it could be separated from faith and infused in an infidel. Therefore, it is not possible, it seems.

Moreover, it is impossible to provide an evident cognition of a principle without providing a cognition and distinct cognition of its terms, because this is necessarily required for the evident cognition of a principle. But no light apart from the state of glory can provide a distinct cognition of the terms ‘God’ or ‘trinity of persons,’ because beatitude consists in a distinct cognition of each. Therefore, such a light cannot be provided.

Moreover, it is impossible to adhere primarily to the same truth through two different dispositions. But the faithful always adhere to and hold onto articles through faith. Therefore, they cannot be provided with another light through which they primarily hold onto these articles.

4. Arguments against This Light as Abstractive

It further seems that a light could not be provided when it is taken as an abstractive cognition of deity under a proper and distinct notion. Such a cognition is impossible for a wayfarer. For every cognition of the divine essence is beatific. But such an abstractive cognition would be of his essence, clearly and distinctly. Therefore, it would be beatific.

Moreover, an abstractive cognition is either more perfect than an intuitive cognition, or less perfect, or equally perfect. It is not less perfect, because then God's \{184\} cognition of creatures would be less perfect.
when they do not exist than when they do. For he has an abstractive
cognition when they do not exist, whereas he intuits them when they
exist; hence the existence of a creature would make divine knowledge
more perfect, which is impossible. So it is either more perfect, in which
case it would be more beatific, or it is equally perfect, in which case it
equally beatifies. Therefore, such an abstractive cognition is not possible
for the faithful while remaining wayfarers.

31. Moreover, cognitions that concern the same object under the same
aspect (ratione) are so related to one another that if one is beatific so is the
other. But an intuitive cognition concerns God under the aspect of deity,
and in the same way so does this supposedly possible abstractive cognition.
Therefore, since the intuitive would be beatific, so likewise for the abstrac-
tive, and so it would be impossible for a wayfarer. This is confirmed by
the fact that beatitude seems to consist in God's being clearly and sheerly
cognized through his essence, either abstractively or intuitively.

32. Moreover, a single relation of reason added to a cognition does not
make it beatific, for a human being is beatified only in the highest essence,
and therefore not in a relation of reason. But an intuitive cognition does
not grasp more of deity than an abstractive cognition would, except for a
single relation° of reason – namely, presence. For the whole of deity is
cognized abstractively except that it is not conceived of as present, whereas
through an intuitive cognition it is seen as present. Therefore, the intuitive
will not be beatific unless the abstractive is also beatific. Hence it cannot
be provided in this state of life.

33. Moreover, when the quidditative concept of a thing includes exis-
tence, it cannot be conceived abstractly. For an abstractive cognition
abstracts from existence and nonexistence. But existence is included in the
quidditative concept of deity, because God is necessary existence.
Therefore deity cannot be conceived abstractly.

34. Moreover, an abstractive cognition presupposes an intuitive one.
For the universal is abstracted only insofar as the singular has been under
sense and intuition. But God cannot be cognized by a wayfarer intuitively,
and therefore not abstractly.

35. Moreover, whatever wayfarers cognize abstractly they cognize
by abstracting from a phantasm. But God is not a phantasm. Therefore, as
before.

36. Moreover, if God could be cognized abstractly, that cognition
would either extend immediately to the sheer essence of God or {185}
extend to some representation of it. But not to a representation, because
then deity would not be cognized in itself and in its proper aspect, but rather in its likeness, and also because deity cannot have a sufficient representation. So it remains that such a cognition would extend to God's sheer essence as it is in itself. Therefore, it would be intuitive.

Moreover, it seems improper to say that there is an intuitive cognition within intellect, because such a cognition is material inasmuch as it concerns a thing's presence, which is one of the material conditions under which sensory cognition occurs. Further, the phrase 'abstractive cognition' seems fictitious and improper. Therefore, deity is not open to being cognized in these ways.

Main Reply

38. In replying to this question, I will proceed in the following order. First, I will present views opposed to those of two doctors. Second, I will present a modern way of speaking and will investigate its truth. Third, I will make some remarks so that we may see the point of the question. Fourth, I will say what, it seems, ought in truth to be said regarding this question.

Article 1. Against the Views of Two Doctors

1. Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 12.2)

39. Regarding the first, then, we should consider that some have wanted to say that God can provide a light by which the articles of faith can be cognized in this life more clearly than through the light of faith, so that through this light theologians can have demonstrative knowledge of truths about God. But this view, even if it could be confirmed through the nine arguments introduced above (in what was argued in the first place [nn.6–15]), is still mainly supported by authoritative texts from the saints, who seem to place such a light beyond the light of faith. Hence Augustine\(^\text{10}\) says of John 1:4 — \textit{the life was} \{186\} \textit{the light of men} — that there are many who cannot yet be raised to a spiritual understanding of the phrase \textit{In the beginning was the Word}. “For an animate human being does not perceive

\(^{10}\text{Tractatus in Evangelium Iohannis I.1–2.}\)
this." He adds that when the Prophet says *Let the mountains obtain peace for the people, and the hills justice* [Psalm 71:72:3], he understands by 'peace' the wisdom by which greater minds are illuminated, and by 'justice' the faith by which those lesser are illuminated. But the lesser would not receive faith unless the greater had been illuminated by wisdom itself. Also, in a letter to Consentius [120.2], Augustine speaks in these terms:

(As for the unity of deity and the distinction of Persons,) in which our faith chiefly consists, see to it that you believe by authority alone, and that you do not seek to understand the reason for it. For although I undertook to see the meaning of this secret, I could not have arrived at it in any way unless God had aided my intellect.

Augustine makes many similar remarks about a double light.

40. These claims not withstanding, it should be said [in reply] that this light can be understood in one way as that by which the articles of the faith are more clearly cognized as regards their terms. Neither the connection nor any discord between these terms would be seen through this light; the light would instead remove any discord arising from arguments to the contrary or from a defect in the plausible arguments conveying an understanding of the articles. With respect to a light of this kind, God certainly can provide it to the greatest degree, beyond what can be provided to some degree through both natural ingenuity and the study of theology (as discussed in the previous question).\(^\text{11}\)

Alternatively, such a light can be understood as that by which the connection between terms in the articles of faith is seen and not merely believed. This can happen in two ways. First, it can happen under the concepts of the terms that we possess in this life of 'God,' 'three,' etc.; these are of course not proper and distinct concepts of deity and the trinity of persons. Second, it can happen under the *proper* concepts of deity, trinity, etc. If the light is proposed in this last way, as that by which these sorts of proper concepts of terms are possessed and their connections are seen, then it certainly is possible for such a light to be provided. But this coincides with and is the same as an abstractive cognition, something not understood by the proponent of this light, [Henry of Ghent,] but understood by the modern doctor who will be discussed in the second article, [John Duns Scotus]. The result, then, is that this doctor understands such a light in the second way under discussion — namely, that it happens under

\(^{11}\) Prooemium Q1, esp. nn. 92–95 (ed. Buytaert, pp. 159–60).
the concepts of terms that are either of the same kind as every wayfarer has, or at least not proper to deity {187} and the divine trinity, and that the connection and the combination of these terms are seen in the articles of faith. When the light is understood in this way, it cannot possibly be posited.

41. This conclusion can be established in many ways. For it is impossible to see the connection and combination of any terms unless one sees the foundation of the connection and the founding nature (ratio fundamenti). For a connection is a kind of relation; but one cognizes a relation only once one cognizes the foundation, the relatum, and the founding nature. Certainly, it is impossible to cognize the conformity of two things unless one cognizes that quality in which they conform. But no concept whatsoever, except that which is proper to deity and the trinity of persons, is the foundation of the connection and combination in God is three and one. For if some other concept were such a foundation, then either (1) it will be a disparate concept, concerning a being other than God, and then such a being will be three personally and one essentially, which cannot be allowed; or (2) it will be a common concept proper to God, such as that of the first actuality of being, or pure actuality, or something similar. And it is certain that such conceptions are neither the foundation nor the founding nature of this connection, because the trinity of persons is within God through the proper nature (rationem) of deity. Therefore it is impossible to see this connection clearly through any light unless one possesses proper concepts of this kind.

42. Moreover, if such a connection [between terms] is seen, it is seen either immediately, or in the terms, or through other principles and propositions seen first. It cannot be said that it is seen through the terms because these, as so [improperly] conceived, are not the cause of that connection. Nor can it be said that it is cognized through prior propositions, because either (1) they would go from the universal to the lower in concluding that there is a trinity of persons in God, which cannot be because the trinity is in God not through a common nature (rationem) but through a proper one; or (2) they would reach this conclusion a simili. But this too cannot be. First, because there is more dissimilarity than similarity between any given thing and the trinity of persons, according to Augustine in On the Trinity XV [xx.39]. Second, because the argument a simili is a sophism, as Aristotle suggests in Topics I [103a6–23], unless in each of the similar objects there is a universal nature to which applies the predicate that, through one of the similar objects, is proved of the other. So the soul of
Socrates is proved immortal because the soul of Sortes is immortal. This would not have held if immortality did not apply to both souls through a common nature. (188) But there plainly is no common nature through which the trinity applies to God and to something else. The third principle option – on which one immediately sees and cognizes the connection in the articles of faith – is also unacceptable. For a thing can be cognized only as it is naturally suited to be cognized, as is clear from Physics I [184a17-21]. But the connection [between terms] does not in fact have the character of being primarily cognizable or being a first truth. It is instead a resultant truth and is secondarily cognizable. Therefore no power could provide a light by which this connection is cognized immediately and at first. Therefore such a light is impossible.

43. Nor does it help if one says that sometimes the connection is known and yet the terms are not known. For example, without knowing the figure and form of the Antichrist, someone can know and cognize that at the Second Coming the Antichrist will appear. This does not help, because it is not a case of clearly cognizing or seeing, but only of believing and firmly adhering. It is possible to adhere through faith to the connection between terms without clearly cognizing those terms.

44. Moreover, God cannot take an act directed at an object and split off the basis (rationem) by which it is formally directed at that object. For instance, if one sees a wall through its color as the formal basis, then it is impossible for the apprehending of color to be split off from the seeing of the wall. The same goes for choosing the means to an end and intending the end. But the formal basis by which the intellect cognizes and is directed at the connection between terms is the proper concept of each term in the immediate propositions. For we cognize principles insofar as we cognize their terms (Posterior Analytics I [72b23-25]). Therefore principles are cognized through their terms, just as the means to an end is desired through its end and, likewise, conclusions are cognized through principles. Therefore, without the proper concepts of the terms, it is impossible for a light to be provided by which one cognizes the connection or combination of any proposition whatsoever.

45. Nor does it help when some say that cognizing the terms is the efficient cause of cognizing the principle and its combination, and when they say that cognizing the premises efficiently causes a cognition of the

12 Cf. n. 14 above.
intuition, Abstraction, and Demonstrative Knowledge conclusion. This is undoubtedly true for a cognition by which the terms are cognized separately. But that cognition by which the connection [between terms] is cognized includes a cognition of the terms not efficiently but formally — just as was proved in the present question [n. 44] for a conclusion, relative to {189} its principle, and for the desire for the means to an end, on account of the end.

46. Moreover, anyone who clearly cognizes and knows some connection [between terms] cognizes it as necessary and impossible to be otherwise. But a connection can be conceived as necessary and impossible to be otherwise only through its terms. For a connection derives its necessity from its terms, since of course no relation is a necessary being through itself; rather, its necessity is based on something else. Therefore, the connection cannot be known unless one preconceives the terms under that account by which they underlie the connection.

47. Moreover, as the terms when vocalized stand to the proposition when uttered, so the concepts of the terms stand to the total concept of the principle. But it is impossible for a proposition to exist as an utterance without the terms being there, as spoken words. Therefore it is impossible for the concept of a principle to exist, with a cognition of it, without the concepts of the terms being there, as parts of this principle, with a cognition of these same [terms]. But they are not parts under a confused and common concept, but rather under a proper concept. For a proposition that is immediate under a proper concept is not immediate under a common concept. For this is immediate:

\[ A \text{ triangle has three angles} \]

whereas this is not:

\[ A \text{ shape has three angles}. \]

Instead, the latter can be proved from a lower proposition, and this precludes its being immediate, according to the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics I [72a6–9, b19–22]. Therefore it is impossible to cognize clearly and sheercly the combination of any proposition without having the proper concepts of its terms.

48. Moreover, just as the connection [between terms] stands to its proper terms qua existence, so it stands qua being cognized. But it is impossible for a connection to exist without its proper terms. Therefore,

\[ \text{Cf. n. 12 above.} \]
it is impossible for it to be conceived without the proper concepts of these same terms.

49. So from the above it is clear that a light by which the connection [between terms] is seen and clearly cognized cannot be granted. But a light can be granted by which the terms are more clearly cognized, by which all discord among the terms (arising from contrary arguments) is removed, and which nourishes the connection between these terms in the minds of the weak, who on account of such doubts strongly resist [the faith] unless they have plausible arguments in favor of the connection. This light is the theological disposition discussed above; all the authoritative passages {190} from Augustine concern this light, not that fictitious light that cannot possibly be posited.

2. Godfrey of Fontaines (Quodlibet 8.7)

50. On this account, others say that such a light is impossible, and for this there are the six arguments introduced in the third section above [nn. 23–28]. This position maintains its conclusion above all because such a light, if granted, could not coincide with faith. But though such a claim is true as regards its conclusion, still its means of argument do not go through, as will become clear when I answer them [nn. 140–46]. Also, the claim that such a light is incompatible with the faith needs scrutiny. But this has more of a place in book III of the Sentences, and so it should be passed over for now.

Article 2. A Modern Account

1. The View of Scotus (Quodlibet 7.19–28)

51. With respect to the second article, then, it should be noted that some, coming closer to the truth, said that God can provide {191} a light by which the terms of the articles of faith are cognized under their proper concepts. ‘God,’ for example, would be cognized under the notion of deity, properly and distinctly. This light would be nothing other than an abstractive cognition of the sheer and unmixed essence of deity. And these doctors present four arguments, in sequence.

16 Cf. n. 40, and also Proemium Q1, esp. nn. 92–95 (ed. Buytaert, pp. 159–60).
52. First, they explain what abstractive and intuitive cognitions are. An intuitive cognition is that which concerns the presence and existence of a thing and has as its terminus the thing as existing in itself. An abstractive cognition is said to be that which abstracts from being and nonbeing, existing and nonexisting, and from the thing's presence. In this manner I intuit a rose when I grasp its presence, whereas I cognize it abstractively when I consider its quiddity and nature. Each of the two are possible for the intellect. For it is certain that an angel intuits a rose, when it exists, whereas when the rose does not exist the angel considers its essence abstractively.

53. Second, they prove that the divine essence can be cognized abstractively, just as can every quidditative nature. For God can do through his will alone whatever he can do by means of his essence. But by means of his essence he moves the intellect of the blessed to a clear and sheer cognition of himself. This is of course an intuitive cognition, in that the intellect has as its terminus God's essence as truly present and existent, since it moves [the intellect] in this way. Therefore God could move that intellect to a cognition of his sheer and clear essence through his will alone. But it is certain that such a cognition has as its terminus the divine essence under the same notion under which the intellect is moved toward it. But it is moved not through the presence and existence of the divine essence, but through the command of God's omnipotent will. Therefore, such a cognition will have as its terminus God's essence not as existing and present, but solely by abstracting from existence and presence. Accordingly, it will not be an intuitive cognition, but rather an abstractive one.

54. Third, they prove that this kind of cognition is possible for a wayfarer. For every cognition is possible for a wayfarer that does not put him in a beatific state of understanding. But an abstractive cognition of the divine essence is not beatific. Rather, only an intuitive cognition of the divine essence is not beatific. First, because to see God through his essence, which is beatific, is to know him intuitively. Also, because there could be an abstractive cognition even supposing per impossibile that God did not exist — in the way that the quiddity of a rose (192) is cognized abstractively when the rose does not exist. Therefore, this kind of cognition is possible for a wayfarer.

55. Fourth, they prove that through this cognition theological truths could be demonstratively known, even a priori. For whoever cognizes a subject under its proper and quidditative account (ratione) can cognize all the truths contained virtually within that subject. For the truth of the conclusion is contained virtually in the truth of the principle, and the
cognition of the other term of that principle (the predicate) is contained virtually in the account of the subject. For according to the Bishop of Lincoln [Robert Grosseteste] in *Posterior Analytics* I [ch. 4], principles belong to the second mode of *per se* predication when in them a proper attribute (*passio*) is predicated of the defining account of the subject, on which depends a cognition of the attribute. Hence all demonstrative truths are reduced to the defining account of the subject. But this is an abstractive cognition, because demonstrative knowledge abstracts from the subject's being and nonbeing. For it remains when the thing is destroyed, and for this reason there can be no knowledge of singulars, only estimation (according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VII [1039b27–40a7]). Therefore, since an abstractive cognition of the quidditative notion of deity could be provided to the intellect of a wayfarer, as was stated [n. 54], it follows that a light could be provided to a wayfarer by which he would know the articles and truths of faith — those truths, I mean, that are by the nature of things necessary, not voluntary and contingent. And this way of positing [such a light] seems entirely rational, beautiful, and subtle.

2. Against Scotus (Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet 2.5)

56. To some this view seems unreasonable in both its conclusion and its proof. In its conclusion it seems unreasonable because every first cognition, which no other precedes, seems to have as its terminus the thing as it is in its existence (*entitate*), and consequently it is an intuitive cognition. For if it is first then the intellect forms through it a determinate concept of the thing — not under this or that posterior notion, but {193} under the existent (*entitativa*) reality of it, which is both prior and fundamental, and from which other concepts are formed under secondary notions. But a cognition of the divine quiddity is immediately first; nothing else precedes it. For if something else precedes this cognition, either (1) it is a cognition of something other than God, in which God is revealed, which cannot be because it is impossible for deity to be revealed in anything created that is cognized objectively; or (2) it is a cognition of God himself, and then either (a) it would concern the existence of God, which cannot be because then existence would precede essence, and the cognition of existence would precede the cognition of quiddity; or (b) it would concern the quiddity itself — in which case we have our conclusion: that it is first. Therefore a cognition of the divine quiddity always has as its terminus the thing as it is in its existence, and consequently it will always be intuitive.
57. Moreover, if one has an abstractive cognition of God's quiddity, one grasps either the nominal quiddity alone or the real quiddity (*quid nominis aut quid rei*). It cannot be said that one grasps only the nominal quiddity, because then one would not have a greater cognition than one has of fictitious entities. Therefore, it remains that it is a real quiddity. But it is impossible to cognize the real quiddity of a thing without cognizing that it is a certain nature actually existing in the natural world, or that it possibly exists. But someone who perfectly and evidently cognizes the divine essence cognizes it as actually existing, not as naturally suited to exist and as merely possible. Therefore someone who cognizes the divine essence always cognizes it as actually existing and as a consequence cognizes it intuitively.

58. Moreover, it is impossible to cognize a real quiddity without cognizing whether it exists – actually and potentially, in the case of things other than God, but in God's case [the existence must be] actual. This is clear, because the question *What is it?* presupposes the question *Does it exist?* (see *Posterior Analytics* II [92b4–8]). But an abstractive cognition concerns God's real quiddity – what he really is. Therefore, it necessarily concerns whether he exists, and as a consequence it will be an intuitive cognition.

59. In its proof, the view seems unreasonable in three ways. First, it falsely supposes that God imprints a vision on the beatified intellect as if he were bringing it about naturally and acting from the necessity of his nature. This is of course not true, because whatever God does in creatures he does through free choice and not by natural necessity, according to the truth of the faith.

60. Second, if this assumption is true, then the proposition by which the entire proof is supported is destroyed – namely, that whatever God can do by reason of a naturally moving object, he could do through his will alone [n. 53]. But if God moves by natural necessity then this proposition is false. For those things that are contained in God by the necessity of his nature are not within his will. For example, it is not within the will of the Father to generate the Son or to be God.

61. Third, by parity of reason it is concluded from this proof that God

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15 This is suggested by n. 53, where the claim is that God would produce an abstractive apprehension of himself through his will, and an intuitive apprehension through his essence, directly. So it might seem that in the latter case, the will isn't involved at all, and hence that "God imprints a vision on the beatified ... from the necessity of his nature."
could bring about an intuitive cognition without the presence of an existing object moving [the intellect] by its own reality. This follows from the claim that he can bring about by will alone whatever he brings about through the movement of his essence [n.53]. For by his will alone he will make an intuitive cognition exist without that which moves [the intellect] – something that is rejected by those who advance this proof.

3. Defense of Scotus

62. But these objections notwithstanding, the position of the earlier Subtle Doctor still remains, unless another objection is raised. For the first three arguments [nn. 56–58] are supported by a false supposition and a shaky foundation. For they assume that the existence and actuality of a thing cannot be cognized abstractively, which appears false in many ways.

63. First, an astronomical cognition, since it counts as demonstrative knowledge, certainly counts as abstractive. But an astronomical cognition can concern the existence and actuality of a thing: first, in the future, because an astronomer knows that the actuality and existence of an eclipse will come at a certain day, hour, and minute; second, in the past, because the astronomer knows that an eclipse did occur at a certain time; third, in the present, because even if he is in a closed vault, he would know to say at the time of the eclipse: “Now it begins, now it is at the halfway point, now it ends.” Yet it is clear that he does not intuit it. Therefore, an abstractive cognition can concern the existence and actuality of a thing.

64. Moreover, memory and its act (the act of remembering) fall within abstractive cognition. But memory pertains to the existence and actuality of a thing. For we recollect only the actual occurrences of things that have happened. Therefore an abstractive cognition can concern the actuality of a thing. {195}

65. Moreover, imagination is an abstractive cognition directly contrary to intuitive cognition. But imagination reaches directly toward the existence, presence, and actuality of a thing. For example, someone within a vault can imagine that there is an eclipse now, or someone hearing the voice of a man without seeing him can imagine that he is a certain sort of man. Therefore, as before.

66. Moreover, a cognition that comes via a demonstration is knowledge and is consequently abstractive. But an astronomer demonstrates that the actual earth is round and that the heavens are spherical, and a medical
doctor who sees urine infallibly cognizes that there is a certain disease in
the body. Therefore, an abstractive cognition, preeminently, can concern
the actuality, presence, and existence of a thing.

67. So the three arguments do not work. The first [n. 56] does not,
because granted that a cognition of God’s quiddity has as its terminus the
reality and existence of God, it nevertheless has its terminus not intuitively
but abstractively, in an imaginary like way (quasi imaginari) – just like the
cognition with which the astronomer in his vault imagines and knows that
an eclipse is actually occurring at this time. In the same way the second
argument [n. 57] also fails, because through an abstractive cognition one
cognizes the real quiddity of God and that he really exists. But the whole
is cognized abstractly, in an imaginativelike way, as was said of the
eclipse. And it is clear for the same reason that the third argument [n. 58]
does not go through.

68. The other three arguments [nn. 59–61] proceed from two false
suppositions. The first of the two is that the Subtle Doctor means to say
that the divine essence moves the intellect of the blessed naturally and by
the necessity of its nature, not freely and from the power of the will. He
does not say this. For it is clearly one thing for the divine
essence to move the intellect as the executive cause (executive), through a command of the
will directing it toward such motion. (It is in this way that the nature of a
human being is said to generate another human being, even though this
occurs only through the will’s direction.) It is another thing for the divine
essence to move the intellect by the necessity of its nature. This is certainly
false, and was never said by this Doctor.

69. Therefore, the first argument [n. 59] shows that the divine essence,
with respect to moving the intellect of the blessed, acts through divine free
choice, directing God’s essence toward this kind of motion. Nor does it
show anything but that this motion comes from his essence immediately,
as the executive cause. {196}

70. The second argument [n. 60] would go through if the Doctor had
accepted that God’s essence produces movement by the necessity of its
nature. But he accepts the opposite, namely that God’s essence, in produc-
ing movement, is under the control of will. And so it is reasonable to
conclude that God can do immediately through his will alone that which
he can do by means of his essence, as the executive cause.

71. The third argument [n. 61] is supported by a [second] supposition
that is not true according to this Doctor: namely, that an intuitive cogni-
tion is a thing by itself (solum quid) and absolute, not implying anything relative (ad aliquid) or an actual relationship to the existence of the object. And so it should be said that, on his [Scotus's] view, it is a contradiction that an intuitive cognition could be separated from its actual relationship to the object's actuality and existence. For this relationship exists formally within an intuitive cognition, and on his view this is what differentiates it from an abstractive cognition. But if a relationship to an object is posited, then it is necessary for that object's actuality to be posited. Therefore if an intuitive cognition is posited, then it is necessary for that object's actuality to be posited.

72. So when this Doctor asserted that whatever [God's] will can bring about by means of his essence it can bring about immediately [n. 53], he was explicitly referring to whatever is not relative to another. Thus he indicated that [God's will] could not bring about that which implies a relationship to and is relative to his essence and its actuality, like an intuitive cognition. If he had in fact said this, then the proposition in question would be false. For God cannot bring about any relative thing without the presence of its relatum: He cannot bring about the Father without the Son, and so too in other cases. But he can bring about an abstractive cognition, because it does not involve a relationship to his essence and its actuality.

Article 3. Further Remarks on Scotus's Position

73. As for the third article, we should consider that the subtle and modern Doctor's position is true {197} in two respects: first, that there can be an abstractive cognition of deity [n. 53]; second, that this is not beatific and so is possible for a wayfarer [n. 54]. From this it follows, third that God can provide such a light by which theological truths are demonstratively known [n. 55]. Yet in two other ways he seems to speak less truly [n. 52]: first, when he says that an intuitive cognition cannot be separated from the actuality and presence of its object; second, when he defines an intuitive cognition as that which has as its terminus the actuality, presence, and real existence of an object, whereas he defines an abstractive cognition as that which abstracts from these things, and does not have them as its terminus.
1. Intuitive Cognition of Absent Things

Scotus's view

74. The first of these errors, that an intuitive cognition can occur only when its object is actually existing and present, seemingly can be proved. For no relational designation can be posited without its proper relatum: for it is impossible to posit the Father without positing the Son. But an intuitive cognition seems to be said relatively, designating the existence and actual presence of its object. For when one says

*I see Peter,*

it seems to follow that

*Therefore Peter exists,*

insofar as *to see* entails the existence of that which is seen, as its relatum. Therefore, it is impossible for an intuitive cognition to occur without the object's being present. This is confirmed by the fact that an actual relationship to an existing object is in reality the same as an intuitive cognition, even if not formally the same.

75. Moreover, it is impossible for an intuitive cognition to occur without the differentia that distinguishes it from an abstractive cognition, both because a differentia cannot be separated from its object and because it would occur and then in time cross over into an abstractive cognition. But the differentia by which an intuitive cognition is distinguished from an abstractive is that it requires the existence of its object. For they do not differ with respect to their objects; rather, everything actual, existent, and present — everything that is cognized intuitively — can be cognized abstractively. They are instead distinguished on account of what is required, since an intuitive cognition requires the existence of the thing cognized, which an abstractive cognition does not require. Therefore, an intuitive cognition cannot be separated from the existence of the thing cognized.

76. Moreover, just as an abstractive cognition is related to an object placed in cognized being, so too an intuitive cognition is related to an object placed in real being. But an abstractive cognition cannot exist unless there is an object in cognized being. Therefore, an intuitive cognition cannot exist unless the object is in cognized and real being.

77. Moreover, touch, taste, and the other senses no more require an
object’s presence than sight does. But it is possible to touch or taste only that which is present. Therefore, so too for seeing or intuiting.

78. Moreover, something is necessarily required for intuition if, when it is withdrawn, we are said right away not to intuit. But when the object is removed we are said right away not to intuit, but to be deceived – as is clear in the case of those who are tricked (ludificatis). Therefore, as before.

79. Moreover, if an intuitive cognition did not necessarily require the actuality of its object, then (since an intuitive cognition of God is beatific) a beatific cognition could occur without God’s actuality and existence. But this is an absurd conclusion to reach. Therefore, the assumption is also absurd, it seems.

**Aureol’s View**

80. But these arguments notwithstanding, it should be said that an intuitive cognition can occur when the object is absent and not actually present. This can be shown in two ways.

81. First, by way of experience, which we should adhere to before adhering to any logical arguments. For knowledge has its origin in experience and, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* I [981a7], the common judgments that are the principles of art are also taken from there. Thus a sign that words are true is that they agree with what is perceived. But experience teaches that an intuitive cognition in the senses and a sensory vision do not necessarily require the thing’s presence. There are five experiences to show this.

82. The first occurs in visions left over from something intensely visible. Augustine discusses this in *De trinitate XI*, ch. ii [sec. 4]:

Commonly, after we have looked at the sun or anything luminous and then closed our eyes, certain bright colors continue to hover (so to speak) in our vision, variably changing and becoming less bright until they completely go away. They should be understood as remnants of the form produced in the sense.

And he concludes,

it was there even while we were seeing, and it was clearer and more distinct, but it so coincided with the species of the thing discerned that it could not in any way be distinguished from it. This was our vision.

{199} Thus it is clear that a vision of the sun or of other luminous objects remains in the eye when the object recedes, according to Augustine and to every experience.
83. The second experience is in sleep and dreams. The Commentator discusses this near the middle of his treatise *De somno et vigilia* [pp. 98–99]:

While asleep a human being sees and senses through the five senses without any external sense-object’s being there. But this happens through a motion contrary to what occurs while awake. For while awake external sense objects move the senses, and the common sense moves the imaginative power. But in sleep the imagined intention will be turned around: It will move the common sense, and the common sense will move the particular power. So it happens that someone grasps sense objects even though they are not external, because their intentions are in the organs of the senses, and it makes no difference whether the intentions come from within or without.

Thus it is clear that sight is in the eye of someone who dreams he is seeing, and hearing in the sense of hearing, and touch in the sense of touch—all in the real absence of objects.

84. The third experience appears when people are afraid. Disabled by fear, they hear sounds and see terrible things. The Commentator attests to this (ibid.), saying that “this happens to those who are afraid and to those who are sick, because of a weakness in the cogitative power, which is disabled. As a result, such a thing happens to them.”

85. The fourth experience occurs in those who are tricked. It is clear and known to all that they see things that are not there, such as camps, dogs, rabbits, etc.

86. The last experience occurs in those who have soft eyes. In their case, when they see something red, the vision of red remains, so that everything they see appears red.

87. These experiences can therefore prove the thesis [n. 80]. For an intuitive cognition within intellect requires the object’s presence no more than does an intuitive cognition within sense. This is clear from the fact that the term ‘intuitive cognition’ comes to intellect as derived from the senses. Further, the intellect is more abstract and independent than the senses. But multiple experiences have proved that sensory intuition can be separated from the real presence of the object. Therefore the intellect’s intuition could be separated all the more.

88. Moreover, God is more powerful than either art or nature. But a

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16 It is clear from n. 88 below that the *ludificati*, here and elsewhere, are people who have been purposefully deceived by illusions, hence tricked. This then is just one category of deception. In Translation 9 (p. 235), Ockham suggests that this sort of deception is often brought about by an evil demon.
vision is produced through art without the presence of the visible object, as is clear from those who are tricked. A vision is also produced through nature, in those who are asleep, afraid, and sick (as both the Commentator and Augustine taught above [nn. 82–84]). Therefore God can produce this all the more.

89. But perhaps it will be said against these experiences first that such visions are false, deceptively, and errors, and from errors and deceptions one should make no arguments about true visions. Second, one might say that they are not visions, but a judgment of the common sense, through which we judge ourselves to see (as is clear in De anima II [425b20–24]). Hence those who are tricked do not see such things; rather, it seems to them that they see, when the common sense judges that they do.

90. But these rebuttals do not block the demonstrations given above. The first does not rebut but rather confirms the point. For there is no act within the visual power that does not share the specific nature of vision. But such [illusory] acts are in the eye, as both Augustine and the Commentator explicitly say. Augustine concludes, "this was our vision" [n. 82]. The Commentator says that "a human being senses through the five senses" [n. 83]. Therefore, such experienced apprehensions share the specific nature of vision. Therefore, no vision, by its specific nature, requires the presence of the object.

91. Moreover, true and false apply to numerically the same cognition without its undergoing any change, with only a change in the object (as is clear according to the Philosopher in the Categories [4a21–27]). Hence the assessment that Sortes is sitting is true when he is sitting but at once becomes false when he stands up, though the assessment remains numerically the same. But appearances of the above sort are false visions and errors, according to this rebuttal. Therefore, they can be true while remaining numerically the same — or at least they are of the same species as true visions. As a consequence, the reality of the vision does not require the real presence of an existing object, although the truth of a vision requires this, since truth adds to the reality of a vision the relationship of conformity to the thing.

92. The second rebuttal also does not go through, first because it clashes with the Commentator and Augustine, who explicitly say that such appearances occur in a particular sense [nn. 82–83]. Also, the common sense is never actualized except through the particular senses' [201} coming into actuality (as is clear from De anima II [425b12–19]). Also, if the common sense judges that the eye sees then there must be something in the eye that
it judges — namely, the appearance of the thing. But the appearance of a thing existing in sight just is the vision itself. Also, the common sense does not judge anything external. But, on this proposal, things that appear external are judged. Also, even granted that this occurs in the common sense, our conclusion is still reached, because there is an intuitive cognition without the object’s presence. Therefore, the thesis is clear by way of experience, which produces knowledge.

93. The second way proceeds \emph{a priori}. For it is certain that God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, even preserve the foundation of a relation after the relatum is destroyed and the relationship is no more — as Sortes is preserved after his son Plato is destroyed and Sortes’s being a father is no more. But an intellective vision, a sensory vision, and in general every intuitive cognition are something absolute, the basis of a relationship to the thing intuitively cognized. Therefore, God could preserve an absolute intuition of this sort, even after the relationship is destroyed and there is no present object.

94. Nor does it help when some say that such a relationship is in reality the same as the absolute entity, differing from it only formally, and consequently that they cannot be separated from one other, because they are the same thing. This clearly does not help, because it is impossible. For it is impossible for a thing that is dependent in reality and a thing that is independent in reality to be the same thing in reality. Nor is it enough for them to be distinct formally; rather, they must be distinct in reality. For having the status of a real predicate requires a real distinction in the subject, just as a formal predicate requires a formal distinction, a predicate of reason a distinction of reason, a relational predicate a relative distinction, and an absolute predicate an absolute distinction (as is clear from the Philosopher’s discussion of large and small in the \textit{Categories} [5815–6a11]). The reason for this is that a real predicate inheres only in the nature (\textit{ratione}) of the thing, and its first subject is the thing, not a formality — otherwise the subject would have less being than would that to which it is made subject. Therefore, however much formal difference there is in the subject, still, as long as it is the same reality, it is impossible for a real predicate that inheres in that reality to be denied of it without contradiction. Thus a thing that is dependent in reality and a thing that is not \{202\} dependent are not the same thing. But an intuitive cognition is independent in absolute reality from everything else formally outside it, even if it efficiently depends on God and on its object. The relationship within it to the intuited object, however, is a thing dependent in reality on its object, as its final term,
because every relationship requires a relatum for its reality. Therefore it is impossible for the absolute basis of an intuitive cognition to be the same thing as its relationship to the actuality of its object. Therefore, they could be separated by divine power, as was said.

95. Moreover, God can preserve any thing without any other thing on which it does not depend, or on which it depends only efficiently. For he can suspend the efficient causality of any creature while preserving its effect. But the absolute basis of an intuitive cognition is a certain thing from the category of quality (according to those who posit such cognitions), and as a consequence it does not depend on its object, except only efficiently. For if, as a matter of its quiddity, something were required formally and essentially for its reality, an object serving as its relatum in just the way that the real existence of a relation essentially requires a relatum — if, I say, this were so regarding the absolute reality of an intuitive cognition — then it would follow that it would not be a reality from the category of quality, nor would it have the character of something absolute. Therefore it is necessary to say that God can preserve that reality, which is there absolutely, without the presence of the object.

96. Nor are the above arguments to the contrary decisive. The first [n. 74] is not, because it assumes that an intuitive cognition is a wholly relational designation and not something absolute, the opposite of which has been said [nn. 93–95]. Further, it is not true that an intuitive cognition is said relatively — unless relatively to the object as it is intuited.

97. The second argument [n. 75] also does not go through, because it is not true that requiring the object’s real existence is the distinctive differentia between abstractive and intuitive cognition. For an intuitive cognition requires only that something appear to the senses.

98. Nor does the third argument [n. 76] go through, because it is not true that an intuitive cognition requires an object with real being; it is enough for it to have intuited being, as will be evident below [nn.102–111].

99. The fourth argument [n. 77] also assumes something false, that in the cases of taste and touch, tasting and touching cannot occur in the absence of the objects. {203} The opposite is clear in the case of someone dreaming about flavors and various tangible qualities.

100. Nor does the fifth argument [n. 78] stand. We do not say that those who are tricked see, but rather that they are deceived and that it seems to them that they see. But we say this not because there is no vision in them, but because it is a false vision. Similarly, when someone has an
understanding that is not true, we customarily say that he does not understand, although it is clear that in his intellect there is an intellection pointed at something false.

101. The final argument [n. 79] also does not go through, because an intuitive cognition of God cannot be of him if he is nonexistent. This impossibility arises not because God’s actuality is required as the object of the cognition, but because God’s actuality is required as what causes and preserves the cognition.

2. The Correct Account of Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition

102. It is clear from the foregoing that abstractive cognition is not well defined as a cognition that does not have as its terminus the existence and actual presence of its object, but instead abstracts from these things. For it was proved above, at the end of the second article [nn. 62–72], that the actuality, presence, and existence of an object can be cognized abstractively. It is also clear, through the arguments introduced just above [nn. 80–101], that intuitive cognition is not well defined as a cognition that requires the presence of its object. And so we have to see what the difference is between these cognitions, and how each can be defined.

103. It is very difficult to reach an understanding of intuitive cognition, above all due to our lack of appropriate terms. But philosophical authority teaches that one should coin words so that reality is not subject to speech, but speech to reality, as Hilary advises.17 So an intuitive cognition can be properly described in these words: as a direct presentive cognition of what it extends to, objectively actuating and (so to speak) positing existentially.18

104. In explanation of this, notice that all these [qualities] are most apparent in sensory vision, from which the name is carried over to intellectual vision. Therefore we should recognize that imaginary cognition, which is completely abstractive, and ocular cognition, which is completely intuitive, do not in any way differ with respect to their object. For everything visible is imaginable: Just as color, straightness, distance, presence, and existence can be viewed ocularly, so they can be apprehended imaginarily. They differ, then, only with respect to how they cognize. For

17 See De trinitate bk. II, ch. 7.
18...ut dicatur quod est cognitio directa praesentialis eius super quod transit obiective actuativa et quasi positiva existenter.
four conditions come together in how an ocular cognition extends to an object, and these four are lacking when an imaginary cognition extends to that object.

105. The first condition is directness. For the imagination neither extends to nor apprehends the existence of the thing immediately, but does so as if discursively from its cause, effect, or sign. This is clear in the case of the astronomer in a vault who imagines, through calculations, the actual occurrence of an eclipse, and also in the case of a doctor who imagines a disease in the stomach through a sign that appears in the urine. An ocular cognition, in contrast, extends directly and immediately, not discursively, to the existence of the thing.

106. The second condition is presence. For however much the imagination extends to the presence of a thing (by imagining, for instance, that there is an eclipse present now to such a degree, with all the surrounding details), one still imagines that thing as something absent, with respect to the way it is grasped: For one reaches toward something present in an absentlike manner. An ocular cognition, in contrast, reaches toward something present in a present manner, and even reaches toward something absent in a present manner, as is clear in those who are tricked and in all the experiences introduced above [nn. 82-86]. For though the objects are absent, if the vision is in the eye it reaches toward them in a present manner, as is clear.

107. The third condition is the actualization of the object. For however much the imagination reaches toward the actuality of the thing (as when one imagines {205} the actuality of an eclipse) it still does not extend in an actualizing manner, as if to put the eclipse in actual being through its own power. An ocular cognition, in contrast, has such an attendant actualization that it makes the object appear in its actuality, even if it does not actually exist, as is clear in the case of those who are tricked.

108. The fourth condition is its positing existence, which comes down to much the same point. For an ocular cognition makes even those things that do not exist in reality appear to be existing in reality.

109. Therefore, it is rightly said that an intuitive cognition is a direct cognition as opposed to a discursive one [n. 105], that it is present as opposed to the absent mode in which the imagination reaches even toward things that are present [n. 106], and that it actualizes the object [n. 107] and posits its existence [n. 108], since it makes the object's real existence and actual position appear, even if the object does not exist. And in contrast it is clear that an imaginary cognition lacks and abstracts from these four conditions. It extends to its object neither directly nor presently,
nor by actualizing or positing existence, even if one imagines the object to exist and be actual, and even if it is present.

110. Extending these remarks to intellect, there are these two modes of cognition. First, there is that which makes the presence, actuality, and existence of an object directly appear. Indeed, this cognition is nothing other than a kind of present and actualizing appearance and direct existence of the object. This mode of cognition is intuitive. Second, there is that which makes things appear neither directly, nor of themselves, nor presently, nor actualizingly. This mode of cognition is abstractive.

111. From the foregoing we can gather how abstractive and intuitive cognition differ, and what the nature (ratio) of each is. For there are two modes of formal appearance, given that an intellection is nothing other than a certain formal appearance by which things appear objectively. In one appearance, things appear as present, actual, and existent in reality, whether or not they exist. This is intuition. In the other appearance, whether or not a thing exists, it does not appear as present, actualizing, and existent in reality, but in an imaginary and absentlike manner. Hence this cognition could be called imaginary more properly than abstractive. For the Philosopher (in Metaphysics XII [1072a30]) and the Commentator (in the same place [XII 37] and in De anima [Book I] 3) use this word for intellect, calling such a cognition an “imagination {206} through intellect.” Also, the phrase ‘abstractive cognition’ seems appropriate for the cognition of universals, which occurs through abstraction. Also, there is this way of speaking about intellective cognitions: that one kind is intuitive and present, in the manner of a sensory vision, whereas the other is imaginary and absent, in the manner of imagination, which reaches toward the thing as absent. Therefore, by whatever name it is called, it is nevertheless more properly spoken of in this way. Their difference, in brief, consists in presence and absence. These do not refer to whether the cognized object exists, because imagination extends objectively to absent and present things, and intuition also extends to both. (The case of trickery proves that it reaches toward absent things.) Rather, ‘absence’ and ‘presence’ refer to the mode of cognizing and reaching toward an object.

3. A Poor Definition of Intuitive Cognition

112. The definition that some assign to intuitive cognition is therefore not a good one.19 They say that it is a cognition by which one cognizes a

19 Gerard of Bologna, Quodlibet II, question 6.
thing with complete immediacy, mediated neither by a species or exemplary image, nor by an object other than the thing itself, having the presence of the thing as its terminus.

This definition fails for two reasons. First, the vision or intuition that occurs in a dream is mediated by a species and comes to the eye through imagination. It does not have the true presence of the thing as its terminus, because its objects are absent. Yet this truly is an intuitive cognition, as was evident above in many ways [and] stated in the claims of Augustine and the Commentator [nn. 82–83].

Second, this whole definition fits an imaginary cognition, which does not occur through the mediation of any exemplar or image or any other object that the person imagining views in cognizing. Otherwise the Rome that is imagined by the founder of Rome would not be Rome itself, but rather a kind of replica of it. Nor would a house in the mind of its builder be the same as the house in the real world, which is the opposite of what the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VII [1034a23–24]. Thus it is clear that someone imagining a thing reaches toward it without any medium serving as object, although perhaps imagination occurs through a species serving as a formal medium, just as someone seeing sees through a species. And if species are rejected in the case of sight, then it is not clear why they could not be rejected for imagination. Then imagination will be an immediate cognition reaching toward its object, without any species, image, or exemplar, or any sort of medium serving as object. Yet it will not be an intuition, because it reaches its object in an absentlike manner. Therefore, that definition is poorly assigned.

Article 4. Reply to the Question

113. Finally, as to the question itself, we should state what seems to be the case, in four propositions.

1. Intuitive Cognition Is Possible within Intellect

The first proposition is that intuitive and imaginary cognitions are possible within intellect.20 [114] Certain things seem to preclude this, however. For

20 Here context requires taking the section title (this sentence) to be part of Aureol’s original text. Other section titles in Buytaert’s edition, though present in the best manuscript, appear to be later additions to the text; hence our translation follows them only loosely.
a material cognition should not be posited within intellect, since the intellect abstracts from the here and the now. But an intuitive cognition seems to be material, both insofar as it is present and so involves simultaneity of duration and the now, and insofar as it actualizes and posits existence, and so involves the here. Therefore it is not possible within intellect.

115. Moreover, a cognition that would always put the intellect in error is not suitable for intellect. But an intuitive cognition puts the intellect in error. For it is agreed that every cognition can be preserved for a long time within intellect, since it is immaterial and incorruptible. Therefore the intellect will be tricked and deceived for as long as an intuitive cognition is within it, unless the object is in truth present. But the intellect \{208\} will not be able to detect its presence. Therefore, it will be deceived by this sort of cognition. Therefore, it should not be postulated within intellect.

116. This is confirmed by the fact that, given the above remarks, God is now deceived by having an intuitive cognition of future events. Through this cognition, of course, he judges that a thing to come exists at present—which is false.

117. These objections notwithstanding, the proposition is true. This is evident as follows: It is clear that an intuitive cognition is loftier than an imaginary cognition, for many reasons. First, because it is more desirable. For one who imagines something desires to see it, whereas one who sees has no desire to imagine it. Second, because it is more enjoyable. For it is more enjoyable to see a rose or something loved than to imagine it. Third, because it is clearer. For one who imagines something still experiences that he remains somewhat in the dark relative to that thing, whereas one who sees the thing experiences being in the most thoroughly clear of cognitions. Fourth, because it is more certain. For a vision is an experiential cognition, whereas imagination is not. And for this reason De anima II \[428a11\] attributes truth to the senses, but deception and fallibility to phantasia. Fifth, it follows from these remarks that it is more perfect and ultimate. Thus it ultimately and most perfectly unites with its object. So if intellective cognition is loftier than sensory cognition, then it is necessary to posit within it the loftiest mode of cognizing, and consequently a mode that is intuitivelike. But there is no doubt about the other mode in question—namely, imaginary cognition. Therefore, each cognition should be posited within intellect.

118. Moreover, a face-to-face cognition seems to be the same as an intuitive and present cognition. But Scripture posits a face-to-face cogni-
tion within intellect. For the Apostle says in I Corinthians 13:12 that *now we see through a glass, darkly* (that is, imaginarily), *but then face to face* (that is, intuitively). Therefore these cognitions should be posited within intellect.

119. Nor do the two arguments introduced above preclude this. The first does not [n. 114], because the materiality of sensory vision arises from the fact that presence, directness, and actuality, which are posited as its conditions [nn. 105–7], are taken materially and locationally (*situative*). Vision, for example, involves the object's locational directness, because everything seen is directly seen, along a direct line, imaginarily directed from the eye to the thing seen, as is clear from the first proposition of the book *De speculis*. Its presence too is locational, because all things are seen as they are locationally opposed and set apart (*obiecta*). Also, its actualization is material, because everything seen is judged to exist actually here and now — that is, at the present time and at a given location.

Yet as applied to the intellect's intuitive cognition, these conditions are not locational and material. For the intellect does not intuit along a direct line, at the end of which the object is located; nor does it judge the object to be locationally present. For it abstracts from all of this. But it judges its object to be present by a spiritual presence, which is not the concurrence of two things located together, nor is it even based on location, but simply on reality. So it is a presence without distance and closeness, without inside and outside, and without here and there, as will become clear elsewhere. In light of this, then, it should be said that such an intuitive cognition is immaterial and abstract, and possible for the intellect.

120. The second objection [n. 115] too does not, with respect to the natural order, preclude an intuitive cognition from being impressed on intellect by an object and preserved by that same object — just as light is, by the sun. And this does not cause the intellect to err, because once the object is absent the intuitive cognition at once ceases to be. This is not the case, however, for a cognition that is imaginarylike, because that remains according to the power of the will and is not preserved by the object. This difference arises from the proper character and nature of each cognition, insofar as nature always does what is better (*Physica* II [198b18]).

The argument introduced as confirmation⁶ [n. 116] also does not go through. For an intuitive cognition in God is a present appearance relative to (*pro*) that now in which the thing that is to be will be. It is not relative to other nows, and for this reason the cognition is true.

121. Thus each of these cognitions should be posited within intellect, although we do not experience intuitive cognition in this life because of
its conjunction with sensory intuition. For although the intellect of a
geometer intuits a triangle when he draws one in the dust and proves
through intellect something about its angles, still he does not distinguish
this by experience, because he at the same time intuits through sense. For,
as the Commentator expressly teaches in De Anima II [63, 65], the intellect
is mixed with the senses and views a sensory object placed in its presence,
just as it is mixed with phantasia and views an object of phantasia in the
absence of sensible objects. {210}

2. Intellect Can Cognize God in Each Way

122. The second proposition is that the intellect can have an imaginary
and absentlike cognition of God, and a present and intuitivelike cognition
of God, just as it can of other things. This is clear in a number of ways.
For if it were incompatible with deity to be conceived in a nonpresent,
imaginarylike manner, then this would be repugnant to it either because
it is nothing other than pure, subsistent existence, or because it is present
in reality everywhere, and so he who cognizes deity cognizes that it is
present to himself. But neither of these stands in the way, because pure
existence can be cognized imaginarily, in an absent manner. Also, a thing
can be known to be present and most intimate through its penetrating
[our minds] in an imaginary manner. One will in this way be certain of
this, yet one will not see it as present. Therefore, it is in no way incom-
patible with deity to be cognized in an imaginarylike manner.

123. Moreover, the essence of God can appear and conform the intel-
lect to itself in just as many ways as can the quiddity of a creature. But the
quiddity of a rose (and every created entity) can appear to the intellect
both in a present manner and in an absent, imaginarylike manner. Also,
the intellect can be conformed to it in both ways. Therefore, so too for
the divine essence, it seems.

124. Moreover, pure act and pure actuality can be cognized in an
imaginarylike manner. Otherwise it would not be proved in metaphysics
that God is pure act. But no other argument is offered by those positing
that God can only be intuitively cognized, except that he cannot be
cognized unless one understands that he is pure act and that he actually
exists. Therefore, there appears to be no argument why the essence of God
cannot be cognized in an imaginarylike manner. But it is granted by all
that he is intuitively cognized by the blessed. Therefore it is clear that each
of these cognitions of God is possible.
3. That Only an Intuitive Cognition of God Is Beatific

125. The third proposition is that a cognition of the distinct and sheer essence of God can be beatific only if it will have been intuitive. This is clear as follows. It is certain that the intellect's beatitude consists in its best operation (according to the Philosopher in Ethics I [1098a7–18] and X [1177a11–18]). But an imaginary cognition of the divine essence, however sheer and distinct, is not the loftiest operation of intellect. Instead, an intuitive cognition still remains the best, as was clear above in the first proposition [n. 117]. Therefore, only an intuitive cognition, and in no way an imaginary one, will make the intellect happy.

126. Moreover, a cognition that excites desire rather than quenching it does not have the character of something ultimate. As a consequence it is not beatitude, which is posited as the ultimate end. But an imaginary cognition of God does not quench the desire to see God but rather excites it, as is apparent for anything that is loved. Therefore, as before.

127. Moreover, no cognition of deity beatifies an intellect if it leaves that intellect in darkness and obscurity with respect to deity. But an imaginarylike cognition of deity — however distinctly, sheerly, and imaginatively it is conceived — would leave the intellect in darkness and obscurity. For deity would remain absent to intellect until intellect discerned it as present. Therefore, a cognition of this sort does not beatify intellect.

4. Knowledge of the Articles of Faith

128. The fourth proposition is that if such a cognition is called a light, there is no doubt that such a light can be provided to a wayfarer, nor is there doubt that through it one will demonstratively know the articles of our faith.

129. The first point is easily established. For if an imaginarylike intellection of the proper and distinct essence of God is impossible for a wayfarer, this is so for one of two reasons. First, because it is formally beatific; this is not an obstacle because the opposite has just been proved [nn. 125–27]. Second, because it has a necessary connection to intuitive cognition (as some imagine), insofar as it appears that, for us, imagination presupposes sense and the abstraction of a universal presupposes that a particular has been intuited. Also, God does not cognize things in an imaginarylike way without first having an intuition of himself. And thus it {212} seems to some that abstractive cognition is connected, as if necessarily so, to intuitive cognition. But this is not an obstacle. First, the truth teaches that one
can have an abstractive cognition of things one has had no intuitive cognition of— as appears with the infused wisdom of Solomon, in whom God perhaps infused the species of things that Solomon had never seen. Also, according to some, God could infuse the species of colors into someone born blind, and likewise the angels had the species of things infused before they had intuitively cognized them. Second, whatever the connection is between these two cognitions as regards their generation, nevertheless imaginary cognition is separate from intuitive cognition in existence, as experience teaches. Consequently, they could have been detached through divine power in their generation, so that God provides an abstractive cognition without an intuitive one. Therefore, it is not evident how an imaginary intellection of God's sheer essence is impossible for a wayfarer.

130. It is not difficult to prove the second point either. For every cognition by which one cognizes the cause of why something exists and that it is impossible for it to be otherwise is a luminous cognition and truly produces knowledge, according to the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* I [71b9–12]. But an imaginary intellection of God's sheer essence leads evidently to the cause and basis of those truths we believe, and shows clearly that it is impossible for those truths to be otherwise. For deity is the basis of all things believed of God, and consequently is their cause. Therefore, it is possible for a light to be provided to a wayfarer, by which he will know— even *propter quid*22— the truths* believed of God: both those regarding what is possible (for example, that God was able to be incarnated, etc.) and those regarding what is actual (for example, that God is actually three and one).

Reply to the Initial Arguments

1. The First Set of Arguments

131. Regarding the initial arguments introduced above, it should be said to the first [n. 6] that knowability lies hidden in propositions not on account of the words that are spoken, but rather on account of the

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22 Knowledge *propter quid* is knowledge based on a thing's cause: We understand an event or a fact because we understand what caused it to occur. This is superior to knowledge *quia*, by which we simply know that something is the case without understanding why it is the case.
concepts. And for this reason the articles of faith are not knowable under the concepts a wayfarer possesses of these terms \{213\} — not by any provided light [except for one] by which the proper concepts of these terms are possessed. But such a light would be nothing other than an imaginarylike cognition of the sort discussed. Nor does it help to say that these propositions are either mediate or immediate. For it should be said that they are immediate under their proper concepts, whereas they are mediate under common and confused concepts. But one cannot reach that which is mediating except through a light leading to the proper concepts from which, as if through mediating premises, these propositions can be demonstrated under their common concepts.

132. To the second [n. 7] it should be said that between the light of glory and the light of faith God can produce the intermediary light of an imaginarylike cognition of deity. But as long as one’s concepts of the terms remain confused, he cannot produce that light that is sought, because of the incompatibility touched on earlier [n. 47].

133. To the third [n. 8] it should be said that that demonstrative knowledge, intermediary between faith and vision, can be nothing other than the imaginary cognition discussed in the main reply.

134. To the fourth [n. 9] it should be said that by “necessary arguments,” Richard of St. Victor means those that are highly plausible and effective, not those that are absolutely necessary. Anselm means much the same, in *The Incarnation of the Word* [ch. 6], when he says that in his works he has added necessary arguments to what we hold by faith.

135. To the fifth [n. 10] it should be said that God could provide a light by which one would cognize that the truths about God are not impossible relative to propositions taken from creatures. But as regards whether they could be impossible relative to the proper notion of deity, God cannot make this known to someone without providing him with a light by which the notion of deity is cognized. Nor does it work, after refuting every syllogism mistaken in matter and in form, for one to infer that this or that is possible in God. For it can be self-contradictory due to its proper notion, which is unknown to us.

136. To the sixth [n. 11], it should be said that God did not suddenly provide the prophets with a light supplying evidentness. Rather, he supplied an adherence greater than the adherence of faith, on account of the syllogism discussed in the previous question.

137. To the seventh [n. 12], it should be said that a cognition of the premises taken separately is the efficient cause of a cognition of the conclu-
sion. 214 Nevertheless, that cognition has the truth of the conclusion as
the object toward which it extends, and it has the truth of the principle as
its formal basis (ratione) — inasmuch as it is [just] a single cognition pertaining
to each truth. Therefore, a cognition of the conclusion cannot be
separated by divine power from the truth of the principle. The reply to
the eighth [nn. 13–14] is clear for the same reason, because the same holds
for principles in relation to their terms.

138. To the last [n. 15], it should be said that when the saints claim to
possess demonstrative knowledge and an understanding of the creeds be-
yond faith, they mean the theological disposition discussed in the previous
question.23

2. The Second Set of Arguments

139. To the arguments introduced second [nn. 16–22], it should be said
that their conclusion is true. But those arguments that rely on a distinction
between God's essence and existence [nn. 19, 22], and between his essence
and presence [nn. 20, 22], so that his essence could be conceived without
his existence and presence, they are not framed very effectively. For they
seem to suppose that existence and presence could not be cognized in an
imaginarylike and abstractive manner.

3. The Third Set of Arguments

140. To the arguments introduced in opposition [to the first set of argu-
ments] it should be said that although in proving the impossibility of such
a light their conclusions are true, nevertheless their means of argument are
not effective.

141. So it should be said to the first [n. 23] that appealing to the apostles
and the holy doctors does not prove when a light will have been provided.
For the Apostle's claim that we walk through faith and not through sight was
spoken not in his own voice (persona) or the voice of the apostles, but in
the voice of the Church. Also, the claim that the holy doctors could not
have passed that knowledge on to us in their books is certainly true
inasmuch as we lack the light by which to cognize the progression of
their knowledge — though they have passed it on — just as a dullard does
not cognize the progression of knowledge in geometry. Or it should

23 Prooemium Q1, esp. nn. 92–95 (ed. Buytaert, pp. 159–60).
be said that although it was possible for such a light to have been provided, it nevertheless was not beneficial for it to be provided to the saints, inasmuch as it would not have made for merit [on their part].

142. To the second [n. 24] it should be said that such a light should not have been provided during baptism, because not all the faithful need it. It should have been provided only to those who are studious and who want to acquire the knowledge of theology, which one cannot acquire without that light.

143. To the third [n. 25], two things should be said. First, such a light will still be possible in the intellect of a wayfarer, even if it excludes faith. For demonstrative knowledge, even if it is supposed to exclude faith, does not suppose [anything] that falls outside this state of life; only intuition does that. Second, it is doubtful that faith could not coincide with such a light. But we should refrain from discussing this issue until elsewhere.

144. To the fourth [n. 26] it should be said that that light is intermediary by participation - not synthesized from the other two lights, but approaching each one. Of such an intermediary it is not true that it exceeds in worth the loftier extreme; this is clear for the rational soul, which is intermediary between the angels and natural forms, and yet does not exceed the angels. Nor even is it always true that a medium synthesized from its extremes exceeds the one that is loftier: for a mule is not loftier than a horse, nor is red a loftier color than white, since white is the measure of colors, as is clear from Metaphysics X [ch. 1].

145. To the fifth [n. 27] it should be said that its conclusion is entirely correct: No light can provide an evident cognition of an article of faith without providing a distinct cognition of the terms of those articles. But what it then adds is not true: that only the light of glory can provide such a distinct cognition of God. For there can be a distinct cognition short of the light of glory, even though it would not be visual, but imaginary like.

146. To the sixth [n. 28] it should be said that it is not absurd for someone having such a disposition to adhere both on the authority of Christ’s teaching (and thus through faith) and on account of such a light. For authority and reason can come together on the same point. Or, it should be said that if such a light were provided, the one possessing it would not adhere through faith, and yet he would not on that account be placed outside this state of life. {216}
4. The Fourth Set of Arguments

147. To those that were introduced last against an abstractive or imaginarylike cognition of God, it should be said to the first [n. 29] that an imaginarylike cognition of the essence of deity, however distinct, is not beatific. Only an intuitive cognition is beatific, as was stated in the body of the question [nn. 125–27].

148. To the second [n. 30] it should be said that in God an intuitive cognition is loftier than an imaginary cognition. But it does not follow from this that the actuality of things adds perfection to divine knowledge. For God had an intuitive cognition from eternity, even when things did not exist, as will be stated in the course of this book.

149. To the third [n. 31] it should be said that even when an intuitive and an imaginary cognition concern the same object, they still do not extend toward it in a uniform way, nor is their aspect the same. Consequently it is not true, as that argument concludes, that if one is beatific the other is too.

150. To the fourth [n. 32] it should be said that it is not the relation of presence that beatifies someone intuiting God, but the divine essence as apprehended in the loftiest manner of cognizing, an intuitive manner.

151. To the fifth [n. 33] two things should be said. First, the divine essence and its existence differ conceptually, as will become apparent below. Second, God's existence and actuality can be cognized in an imaginarylike way.

152. To the sixth [n. 34] it should be said that an abstractive cognition, as it is taken here, is not that by which a universal is cognized in abstraction from a singular, but is rather as an imaginarylike intellection, which God can provide without an intuitive cognition, as was said in the body of the question [nn. 111, 129]. The reply to the seventh argument [n. 35] is clear for the same reason.

153. To the eighth [n. 36] it should be said that such an imaginary cognition extends to God's sheer essence. As was stated above [n. 112], this would not make it intuitive. To what is then added about a representation, it should be said that either this imaginary cognition would not occur through an intervening species, but would be a pure act preserved in the mind through divine power, or if it were to occur through a species (not objectively representing [God] but formally determining [the intel-

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24 Scriptum d. 8 sec. 21 [= Q1], nn. 101–12 (ed. Buytaert pp. 918–22).
lect] then nothing absurd would be claimed according to those who claim that God will be seen in heaven through a species. {217}

154. To the final argument [n. 37] it should be said that a visual and intuitive cognition within intellect is not material, as was said above [n. 119]. But the phrase 'abstractive cognition' is not very appropriate. Hence it can more fittingly be called imaginary, as with these others, visual and intuitive. For each phrase is carried over from sensory cognition to the intellect.