Contemporary philosophers are sometimes surprised to find themselves agreeing with their medieval predecessors. One subject of agreement between some medieval and some contemporary philosophers is this: artifacts recognized as having intentionality do not have it intrinsically. For example, none of the portraits by Ingres recently on show in London\(^1\) intrinsically represents anyone, however stunningly realistic the paintings may seem. Nor does the sequence of sounds I am producing right now have any meaning intrinsically. From facts such as these, it was inferred by some people—in the Middle Ages as well as today—that there had to exist other entities from the primitive intentionality of which such things as portraits and spoken discourse derive their intentionality. Those things, it was further assumed, can only be thoughts.\(^2\)

For the sake of pursuing a promising line of agreement, let us assume that this is the right way to tackle intentionality and that the intentionality of thoughts is indeed basic, that of other things being derived from theirs by being associated with them. The question then arises: do thoughts have intentionality intrinsically? At first sight, it seems that the answer can only be affirmative. Surely, nothing
can be a thought unless it has an object, unless it is a thought of something. If anything is a thought, it must, therefore, have intrinsic intentionality.

Adam Wodeham, for one, would have disagreed. He would not have denied that the intentionality of things other than thoughts is derived from the intentionality of thoughts. But, he would have denied that anything whatsoever, including thoughts, has intrinsic intentionality. He would even have insisted that, as counterintuitive as it may seem, a thought can exist and not be a thought of anything. This is the doctrine I propose to explore here.3

The scope of this paper will not, however, be as wide as I have been suggesting. It will not bear on thoughts in general. That would have had to include a great variety of things: feelings, wishes, beliefs, among many others. Too much for the scope of a paper. Although Wodeham’s full doctrine does apply to thoughts in general, I shall consider only part of it, namely that part which applies to acts of awareness. Acts of awareness were regarded as implied by thoughts of all other kinds and therefore as basic. And rightly so: we cannot—at least consciously—fear a thing, hope for a thing, believe a thing, unless we are aware of those things, or as I shall often say, unless we “apprehend” them.4 Acts of awareness I shall call ‘cognitions’, using the term in the precise sense in which Wodeham used, not the term ‘cognitio’ to which he gave a wider sense,5 but the term ‘apprehensio’.6 And I would describe the doctrine I am about to present as bearing on cognitions, rather than on thoughts in general.

The paper contains three sections. In the first, I present the doc-

3 I shall be quoting chiefly from Adam Wodeham’s Lectura secunda in librum pri-

4 “... omnis actus appetendi et odiiendi, et ita frui, est quaedam cognitio et quaedam apprehensio, quia omnis experientia alicuius objecti est quaedam cognitio ciusdem”, LS, d. I, q. 5 (vol. I, 278).

5 The term ‘cognitio’ and its equivalent ‘notitia’, as generally used by scholastics, apply to apprehensions but also to assents. Thus, for example, a ‘cognitio intuitiva’ is a special kind of apprehension, but a ‘cognitio evidens’ is a special kind of assent.

6 More precisely, I shall use the term ‘cognition’ to denote what Wodeham calls “simple apprehensions” (apprehensio simplex), by contrast with complex ones, which combine several simple apprehensions and which include mental propositions. On simple apprehensions, some of which are sensitive, others intellective, see LS, prol., q. 1 (vol. I, 8–33).
trine from which it follows that cognitions do not have intrinsic intentionality, but have instead extrinsic intentionality. In the second section, I show in what respect the intentionality of cognitions is an extrinsic property of a very special sort. In the third section, I explain why it follows from these special features of intentionality that logic, regarded as primarily a science of concepts, and therefore of cognitions, is a very special science, distinct in kind both from the sciences of spoken (or written) discourse and from the so-called "real" sciences.

1. Intentionality as an extrinsic property of cognitions

Wodeham believed that cognitions are things. Because they exist in minds, and because we have access only to our own minds, in order to know what kind of things cognitions are, we need to turn our attention inwards.

1.1. The things which cognitions are

What is revealed to us by introspection? Many things, Wodeham might have answered, the short duration of which would justify calling them fleeting things. Wodeham, however, was one of those thinkers who shared in the metaphysical belief that what exists in nature are exclusively substances and qualities which inhere in them. Qualities, because they tend to come and go, contribute in giving substances, primarily the material substances we are familiar with, their changing appearances. Now a mind—or rational soul—was thought to be a substance, though a spiritual one. Given this framework, the fleeting things we observe when we direct our attention inwards were quite naturally thought to be qualities inhering in our minds.\(^7\)

As long as the mind attends to external things only, it has no

\(^7\) Quoting Ockham with implicit approval, Wodeham writes: "... illud quod habet verum esse subjectivum in anima continetur sub ente quod praecipe dividitur in decem praedicamenta, quia sub qualitate. Intellectio enim, et universaliter omne accidens informans animam est vera qualitas, sicut est calor vel albedo..." *LS*, d. 8, q. 2 (vol. III, 42). (Nota: 'intellectio' and 'intentio' share the same manuscript abbreviation and the editors of the *Lectura secunda* have used both transcriptions. Preferring a uniform use of 'intellectio' in all contexts where both terms are tolerable, I have substituted here, and in other quotations below, 'intellectio' for 'intentio').
awareness, however faint, of any of those qualities existing within itself. Awareness of them can be achieved only through introspection. It is, however, possible that the mind attend simultaneously to some external thing and to some quality within itself. A person can, in this way, come to recognize, or so Wodeham thought, that, by a certain quality existing in her mind, she is apprehending a certain external thing. She could further recognize that the quality exists at most as long as she is apprehending the same thing.

If we combine direct observation of things and reflexive observation of qualities within our mind, we can thus realize that the act of apprehending any given thing involves in fact not just two, but three relata: the mind doing the apprehending, the apprehended thing and a quality, existing within the mind, by which the mind apprehends the thing. We could further realize that this holds generally, whether the apprehended object happens to be an external object or a quality within the mind. If the apprehended object is itself a quality within the mind, it is by another quality that the mind apprehends it. A quality within the mind is thus the necessary mediator between the mind and any given thing it is apprehending, a mediator, however, which can itself be apprehended only by a further quality.

8 "... quantumcumque ex hoc solo quod actus videndi recipitur in anima, experientur anima objectum actus, non tamen actum". LS, prol., q. 2 (vol. I, 58). An act of seeing has "subjective being" in the soul. It is therefore, a quality (as entailed by the text quoted above). The same holds of sensitive cognitions generally, as well as of intellectual ones, called 'intellections'.

9 "Ad hoc quod sim certus quod intelligo lapidem, duo actus incomplexi concurrent: unus quo apprehenditur lapis et alius quo apprehenditur ipsa intellectio.... Licet igitur neuter certificaret me causaliter, tamen ambo simul facerent. Quia per secundum certificamur de actu et per primum de objecto primi actus, hoc est de illo quod est objectum". LS, prol., q. 2 (vol. I, 61-62).

10 "... qualitas... est cognitio et signum expressivum objecti cuius est intellectus mentis in qua est". LS, d. 23, q. 1 (vol. III, 318). "Contradictio est intellectionem quamcumque esse subjective in mente... quin mens per eam formaliter aliquid concipiatur". LS, d. 8, q. 1 (vol. III, 7-8).

11 "... concedo quod scilicet visio intellectionis lapidis videtur per aliam visionem quando judicatur certitudinaliter me videre visionem primae intellectionis, et sic de tertia et quarta". LS, prol., q. 2 (vol. I, 57).

12 On this view, a cognition is that by which a cognitive power apprehends an object and it is, as Crathorn says, "a quality superadded to the cognitive power"; a view he himself rejects: "si cognition vel actus cognoscendi quo cognoscens cognoscit formaliter esset una qualitas superaddita potentiæ cognitivæ..." In I Sent., q. 1 (ed. Hoffmann, 74).
Note that this doctrine does not compromise direct realism, the doctrine that an external object can be immediately apprehended by the mind. Direct realism would have been compromised only if it had been thought that the necessary mediator between the mind and an apprehended object must itself be apprehended.\(^{13}\) If this is believed to be the case, then it does follow that an external thing can only be mediately apprehended, namely through an immediate apprehension of some quality in the mind. But Wodeham rejected such a doctrine and, therefore, the Scotist doctrine of intelligible species.\(^{14}\) The mental mediators between the mind and apprehended external things which he does recognize are emphatically not things which must first be apprehended for external things to be apprehended through them. If the thing apprehended is an external thing, the external thing only, and not also some mental entity, is what is being apprehended. One might say that, whereas an apprehended mental mediator would present to the mind a representation of the thing through which the thing would be only indirectly apprehended, a non-apprehended mental mediator presents the thing itself to the mind, the mind apprehending only the thing.\(^{15}\) Moreover, this holds whether the mental mediator is singular or general. If it is singular, it presents just one thing to the mind. If it is general, it presents to the mind all things of a certain sort.\(^{16}\)

I am not suggesting that, on Wodeham’s view, all the qualities observable by introspection are qualities by which a thing is merely apprehended. Some are qualities by which an apprehended thing is wished for or feared, for example. In general, to every type of thought, there corresponds a type of quality in the mind. Or rather every type of thought is a type of quality in the mind. Hopes, fears, volitions, beliefs, etc., these are all qualities of different types that exist

\(^{13}\) These two kinds of mental mediators are very aptly distinguished by Scotus as follows: “... aliquid esse medium cognoscendi vel in cognoscendo, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quod sit medium cognitum sic quod per ipsum cognitum cognoscatur aliud... Alio modo quod non sit medium cognitum sed ratio cognoscendi solum”. *Quaest. quod.*, q. 14 (ed. Wadding, vol. XII, 406).

\(^{14}\) “... quod immediate concipitur per intellectio per intellectio communem non est species praevia tali communi intellectioni, quae sit naturaliter representativa singularium extra vel ipsius universalis, non curio”. *LS*, d. 8, q. 1 (vol. III, 12).

\(^{15}\) “... illud quo offeruntur menti res extra formaliter maxime videtur ponendum esse cognitio”. *LS*, d. 8, q. 1 (vol. III, 10).

\(^{16}\) “... meum propositum scilicet quod intellectio communis immediate offeret menti singularia et terminabitur ad ipsa”. *LS*, d. 8, q. 1 (vol. III, 15).
in a mind. Among these qualities, only some are cognitions. All those qualities by which the mind is only apprehending, and not also fearing, wanting or wishing something, are cognitions.

1.2. The intentionality of cognitions

A cognition is, of course, a cognition of the thing or things which the mind apprehends by it. Wodeham sometimes says that the cognition “terminates” in those things. As pointed out by other authors, with whom he would have agreed, no cognition has intrinsically the property of being a cognition of anything; however. If a cognition has that property, it has it extrinsically.

To say that a thing has any given property intrinsically is to say that it has that property of itself, regardless of any relation it might have to anything else. If the property is relational, as it is here, then the thing should be understood as having that property regardless of any further relation it might have to anything else. The property of being of the same species as some other thing, for example, is a relational property any given thing, substance or quality, has intrinsically. A thing has a given property extrinsically, on the other hand, if it has that property in virtue of a relation it bears to something else. For example, a substance has the property of being white in virtue of there being a whiteness inhering in it. Or, taking the case of a relational property, a substance has the property of being similar to some other substance extrinsically, because it has that property in virtue of both substances having a quality of the same sort (a whiteness, for example) inhering in them.

Though not found in Wodeham but in other authors, the following argument will help drive home the fact that no cognition is intrinsically a cognition of anything. Let it be assumed first of all

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17 Thoughts of all types are called by Wodeham “vital acts”. “Omnis... forma viva in nobis est anima... omnes actus vitales in nobis recipiuntur immediate in forma viva; sed omnes sensationes, tam interiores quam exteriores, et omnes intellectiones in nobis sunt actus vitales”. *LS*, prol., q. 1 (vol. I, 11). “... omnis volitio et nolitio est actus vitalis”. *LS*, d. 1, q. 5 (vol. I, 278).
18 “... constat quod intellectio vere terminatur ad res quae sunt extra”. *LS*, d. 8, q. 2 (vol. III, 36). See also the text quoted in footnote 16.
19 I have here two authors in mind. One is Crathom, a contemporary of Wodeham, already quoted in footnote 12; the other is a later author, John of Ripa, who was active in Paris in the mid-fourteenth century.
20 See footnote 24.
21 The authors I shall be drawing from are those mentioned in footnote 19.
that a quality, by inhering in a subject, necessarily "communicates" to the subject the concrete property corresponding to whatever abstract property it has intrinsically. A whiteness, for example, communicates to the wall in which it exists the concrete property of being white which corresponds to its intrinsic abstract property of being a whiteness. But being a cognizer of a thing is the concrete property which corresponds to the abstract property of being a cognition of that thing. It follows that, if there existed a quality which is intrinsically a cognition of a given thing, and if God were to insert that quality in a stone, then, provided the thing be in its vicinity, the stone would be made a cognizer of that thing. But, of course, a stone cannot be a cognizer. Nor can there exist, therefore, a quality which is intrinsically a cognition of anything.

It must be recognized, then, that any quality which is a cognition of something has that property extrinsically. In other words, it has that property by being related in a certain way to another thing. That thing is a mind. For it is by existing in a mind, and by being that by which the mind apprehends a thing, that the quality is made a cognition of that thing. As Peter of Candia, writing in the late

22 "... quidquid per communicationem sui reddit aliquid aliquale, est prius in se essentialiter tale; sicut albedo prius est in se essentialiter et intrinsece albedo quam aliquid per communicationem sui reddat formaliter album". John of Ripa, Lect. super I Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 4 (ed. Combes, 236). The same view is already found in Crathorn: "Quando aliquid est aliquale per accidens et per alium, illud alium est tale essentialiter et per se, sicut ignis est calidus calore, qui est distincta res ab igne. Sed calor est calidus per se quia seipso essentialiter". In I Sent., q. 1 (ed. Hoffmann, 75).

23 "Si cognitio vel actus cognoscendi quo cognoscens cognoscit formaliter esset una qualitas superaddita potentiae cognitivae, tunc posset per potentiam dei ponit in lapide vel in aliquo alio non cognitivo. Facta igitur debita approximatione alcuus cognoscibilis formaliter tali qualitate lapis habens in se talem qualitatem illud cognoscibile cognosceret; igitur de potentia dei dei hoc possibile est aliquo modo: aliquid non cognitivum cognoscit, quod implicat contradictionem". Crathorn, In I Sent., q. 1 (ed. Hoffmann, 74).

24 Because he assumes that, if a cognition were a quality existing in the mind, it would be essentially and intrinsically a cognition of a given object, Crathorn concludes from this argument that there are no such qualities (see footnote 12). But it can be inferred instead, as it was later done by John of Ripa, that, though a cognition is a quality existing in the mind, it is not essentially nor intrinsically a cognition, because it is not essentially nor intrinsically a cognition of any object. "Nulla cognitio vel volitio, quae est qualitas, est essentialiter et intrinsece cognitio vel volitio". Lect. super I Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 4 (ed. Combes, 236–237). Wodeham, of course, would have agreed with this conclusion, as did the anonymous follower of Wodeham who annotated Ripa’s manuscript (annotations which Combes thankfully included as footnotes in his edition) when he wrote: "dico quod... albedo (est) intrinsece et essentialiter albedo et qualitas illa non est intrinsece cognitio" (ibid., 262, footnote).
1370s, was to put the matter, the quality that a cognition is, considered in itself, just as a quality, is a cognition in its “first act”. It is only insofar as there is a mind which apprehends something by it that that quality is a cognition in its “second act”. And only a cognition in its second act is a cognition of something. As we might say, a cognition considered in its first act has no intentionality; only considered in its second act does it have intentionality.

Not only can a cognition be considered in its first act rather than in its second act, it can even exist in its first act without existing in its second act. This is not naturally possible, however. Yet, it would be the case if God were to separate a cognition from the mind in which it exists, letting it enjoy existence on its own. Given that a mind can apprehend a thing only by a cognition existing in it, no mind could apprehend anything by a separately existing cognition. But a cognition has an object only by there being a mind which apprehends that object by it. Consequently, a separately existing cognition would fail to be a cognition of anything. It would be a cog-

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25 “... per prius est actus primus actu secundo; sed esse talis qualitatis est actus primus respectu eius operationis quae est vitaliter immutatio, quae est actus secundus”. Super libros Sent., prol., a. 2 (ed. Brown, 266). And a few paragraphs later: “... actus potest considerari dupliciter, videlicet ut quaedam entitas de genere qualitatis vel ut actualis cognition, hoc est vitaliter immutans perceptive potentiam” (ibid., 273).

In this article, Peter of Candia heavily relies on John of Ripa who was, it seems, responsible for having introduced the term ‘vitalis immutatio’. The quality which a cognition is “vitally moves” a mind if and only if the mind apprehends something by it. Peter of Candia’s original contribution is his calling the quality which a cognition is a cognition “in its first act” and the same quality a cognition “in its second act” only insofar as a mind apprehends something by it.

26 Speaking more particularly of sensitive intuitive cognitions which are visions, Wodeham writes: “... non (est) idem rem istam quae est visio esse rem talem et ess visionem eo quod si talis res per divinam potentiam fieret sine subjecto posset non esse visio”. Adam Goddam super IV lib. Sent. IV, q. 12 (ed. Major, fol. 152 ra). What he is saying here of visions holds of cognitions generally. On his doctrine, therefore, the quality which a cognition is could exist without being a cognition of anything, namely if, by God’s power, it were to exist separately. If Wodeham had used the terminology proposed by Peter of Candia, he might have said that a cognition “in its first act” would exist without being a cognition “in its second act” if, by God’s power, it were to exist separately.

Scholastics generally admitted that God could make a quality exist separately because it was thought that he actually brings this about in the Eucharist. Specifically, it was thought that the qualities which naturally inhere in the sacramental bread are caused by God to exist separately when the body of Christ is substituted for the substance of the bread. But if God can bring this about for qualities existing in bread, he can, of course, bring it about for all qualities, whatever their subject, and thus, in particular, for those qualities which cognitions are.
nition in its first act only. In other words, it would fail to have any intentionality.

Wodeham himself did not use here the distinction between first act and second act. He considered instead that the word 'cognition' could be taken in two senses. In one sense, it is an absolute term, simply designating qualities of a certain sort, qualities which, by nature, exist in minds but which, by God's power, could exist separately. But it can also be taken as a connotative term. When so taken, it applies to some of those qualities only, namely to each of those which exist in a mind and by which the mind apprehends something. If this is admitted, the following seemingly paradoxical sentences can be asserted: 'no cognition is intrinsically a cognition' and 'a cognition can fail to be a cognition'. If the first occurrence of the word 'cognition' is taken as an absolute term and its second occurrence as a connotative term, those sentences are true.28

2. Intentionality: an extrinsic property of cognitions of a very special sort

If a publicly observable thing has a given property extrinsically, in virtue of a relationship it has to some other thing, no observer will know that the first thing has the property unless he or she knows that it is related to that other thing and in which way. Wodeham applied this principle to cognitions.

He did this on the basis of an assumption which seems today an extraordinary one to make. He assumed that cognitions are publicly observable things. His basis for assuming this is his belief that all things without exception are publicly observable. And the basis in turn for that belief is the further belief that being and intelligibility are coextensive. Consequently, any intellect, divine or created, can,

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27 “Et etiam dicendum quod hoc nomen ‘intellectio’ potest accipi, vel apud diversos de facto accipitur, pro signo subordinato conceptui absoluto illius qualitatis quae est intellectio... Vel potest accipi pro signo subordinato conceptui relativo illius qualitatis, pro quanto ipsa est cognitio et signum expressivum objecti cuius est intellectus menti in qua est”. LS, d. 23, q. 1 (vol. III, 318).

28 See the quotations in footnote 24. Only if the term ‘cognition’ is, in both its occurrences, taken in its relative sense is it true to say that every cognition is necessarily a cognition of something.

29 Although I have not found it explicitly stated in his writings, this is a principle to which Wodeham is committed. It is presupposed in the statement quoted in the next footnote. One of the earliest authors I know who subscribed to this principle and who, moreover, explicitly stated it, is Richard Rufus. In Qu. de int. ideisque,
in principle, apprehend any being or thing whatsoever. Minds being created intellects, any mind can therefore, in principle, apprehend any thing whatsoever. In particular, any mind can, in principle, apprehend any cognition or thought whatsoever, including cognitions and thoughts in another mind. Of course, Wodeham was well aware that, as a matter of fact, we never observe another mind nor its contents. But he had an explanation for that fact. God, he said, has ruled that, for this life, we would be allowed to apprehend a thing external to our own mind only through our senses. But only material things can be apprehended through the senses, not spiritual ones such as minds and the qualities which exist in them. Because of God's ruling, then, we cannot in this life apprehend the minds of other people, nor their contents. But we still have the ability to do so, because we have it by nature. And perhaps we will exercise this ability in the next life.30

Since minds and their contents are publicly observable, suppose that I am now observing your mind and the qualities existing in it. What can I know on the basis of my observation? I can recognize that some of the qualities I see in your mind are not only numerically, but specifically different from each other. Giving a name to the different sorts of qualities I observe, I might call qualities of one sort "cognitions". By additionally observing things external to my mind and yours, I could know that some of your cognitions are caused by an external thing, whereas others are caused by other cognitions. By observing in your mind qualities of another sort as well, qualities which are not cognitions nor thoughts, but which are instead relatively permanent dispositions or "habits", I could further recognize that some of your cognitions have one of those as their immediate cause.31 But there is one thing I could never know on

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ad q. 1 (ed. Noone, P1437, fol. 36rb; Q312, fol. 84rb), he writes: "omne ens et natura essentialiter est intelligibile ab intellectu primo, simpliciter autem et quantum est de se, ab intellectu creato".

30 "Intellectus enim humanus, si non impediretur ex condicione status poenalis, et etiam intellectus angelicus, posset per actus rectos, circumscriptis actibus recessis, habere notitiam perfectam intellectionum, et quarumcumque cognitionum et actuum vitalium in aliena potentia". LS, d. 23, q. 1 (vol. III, 317–318).

31 "Intellectus enim humanus ... posset per actus rectos ... habere notitiam perfectam intellectionum, et quarumcumque cognitionum et actuum vitalium in aliena potentia, et multarum proprietatum naturalium earum. Puta quod quidam actus vitales necessario eliciuntur et causantur, et quidam contingenter, quod quidam natu sunt relinquere habitus inclinativos in similis actus, et quidam non; et multa simi-
the sole basis of my observation: it is the intentionality of the cognitions I observe in your mind, the property they have of being cognitions of something.32

To make the point quite clear, suppose that I am observing in your mind a certain quality and that this quality is a cognition by which you are apprehending the tree over there, which I am apprehending too. Though I am apprehending the cognition within your mind and the tree, I cannot, solely on that basis, know that you are apprehending the tree by the cognition, nor indeed anything else. Why not? Presumably, because apprehending is something which can only be experienced. But, if I do not know that you are apprehending the tree, or anything else, by that cognition, I do not know that your cognition is a cognition of the tree, or indeed that it is a cognition of anything at all. I do not, therefore, know the intentionality of your cognition, nor that it has intentionality at all. This is something I could know on the basis of observation alone only in my own case, for my own cognitions.33 As we saw earlier, if I apprehend simultaneously an object and the cognition in my own mind, by which I am in fact apprehending the object, I can know that fact on the sole basis of those observations.34 But I cannot know that you are apprehending the same object by a cognition in your mind, though I am apprehending both the object and your cognition, at least not on the sole basis of those observations.
This result can be generalized. We may say that, according to Wodeham's doctrine, though cognitions and other thoughts are publicly observable things, their intentionality is not knowable by each and every possible observer on the sole basis of his or her observation. The intentionality of a cognition or other thought is knowable on the basis of observation alone by one mind only, the very mind in which that thought exists. In other words, the intentionality of a cognition is knowable on the basis of observation alone only if the observation is introspective.

It does not follow that, if I were to observe your mind and the qualities existing in it, I would remain wholly ignorant of the fact that some of those qualities are thoughts which, as such, have intentionality. I might well be able to determine that a given quality in your mind probably is a thought of some given object, or of objects of a given sort, by comparing it with one of mine. Noting a sufficient similarity between the quality I observe in your mind and a quality I observe in mine, I could infer that yours probably has intentionality just as mine does, and that it probably even has the same object, or an object of the same sort, as mine. But this knowledge is inferential knowledge; it is not knowledge solely based on observation. Besides, it is merely probable knowledge; it is not certain or evident knowledge, as is the knowledge I have of the intentionality of qualities observed in my own mind.

The conclusion to draw from all this is that the intentionality of a cognition which, as we know, is a property extrinsic to it, depending as it does on there being a mind which apprehends something by it, is, moreover, of a very special sort. It is not a property knowable by each and every observer on the sole basis of his or her observation of the cognition and of the other things in virtue of its relation to which the cognition has that extrinsic property. Though

35 "... quod illae qualitates (in alieno intellectu) sunt cognitiones vel signa talium objectorum... hoc novit per hoc quod reflectit se super actum proprium quem perpendit esse eisdem naturae cum ista qualitate quam videt in intellectu alieno, et per experientiam novit quod sua qualitas est signum repraesentativum et expresivum talis objecti. Et ita arguit de qualitate in intellectu alieno, et ita patet quod hoc non novit, scilicet quod intellectiones sunt signa, nisi mediantibus actibus reflexis". LS, d. 23, q. 1 (vol. III, 318).

36 I refer again to the text quoted in footnote 9. As Wodeham says in that text, for me to be certain that I am apprehending a given stone, it is necessary and sufficient that I apprehend both the stone and my cognition of it. Those two observations cause me to evidently know that my cognition is of that stone.
it is a property knowable on the basis of observation alone, the observer must be the very person in whose mind the cognition exists; in other words, the observation must be introspective. And this is so in spite of the fact, acknowledged as such by Wodeham, that cognitions are publicly observable things.

3. Logic as a very special science

There is a science the primary objects of which are cognitions insofar as they have intentionality. That science is logic. How can logic be regarded as dealing primarily with such things? It can, because logic is primarily a science of concepts as signs and because concepts are cognitions and cognitions are signs insofar as they have intentionality.

On this view of logic, it follows that logic shares with the so-called "real" sciences some of the properties by which those sciences are distinct from the sciences bearing on spoken (or written) discourse as such. But, because of the unusual way in which the intentionality of cognitions is knowable, it also follows, as Wodeham was eager to point out, that logic is a science distinct in kind from the "real" sciences.\(^\text{37}\) Here is how he argued.

A "real" science is not so-called because it is more really a science than some other science. Rather, to be a "real" science, a science must study some of the natural properties which things have.\(^\text{38}\) Given that all things are, in principle, publicly observable, it follows that every real science studies natural properties of publicly observable things. A natural property of a thing is a property which the thing has independently of any creature's will. It follows that, though vocal

\(^{37}\) Duns Scotus also regarded logic as being neither a science of spoken (or written) discourse, nor a "real" science. In *In lib. Praed. Qvaest.*, q. 1 (ed. Wadding, vol. I, 125A), he writes: "Logica non est scientia realis, nec sermocinalis". He too considered logic to be primarily a science of concepts: "sicut est aliqua scientia per se de rebus, aliqua per se de vocibus significativis, ut Grammatica, Rhetorica... ita potest aliqua scientia esse per se de conceptu, et haec est Logica" (ibid.). He did not, however, consider the argument we shall see Wodeham wrestle with according to which, because concepts are things, a science of concepts would seem to be a science of things, and, therefore, a "real" science. Nor is it clear that he would have agreed that concepts are things.

\(^{38}\) "...omnis scientia est realis quae tractat de rebus pro quanto res sunt, quae affirmat de rebus ipsas esse res, et quae tractat de earum realibus et naturalibus proprietatibus". *LS*, d. 23, q. 1 (vol. III, 314).
sounds are real things, because grammar does not study their natural properties, but studies instead properties they have in virtue of the will of those who produce them, grammar is not a real science. The same holds of any science bearing on spoken (or written) discourse as such. For a science to be a "real" science, it is not, however, sufficient that it study natural properties that real things have. It is additionally required that the natural properties it investigates should be knowable on the sole basis of non-introspective observation.

Now, cognitions are publicly observable things, Wodeham pursued. As such, they have natural properties knowable on the basis of non-introspective observation. How a given cognition is caused, for example, is knowable in this way. Consequently, how cognitions and other mental qualities of various kinds are caused might be a topic within some real science. But, a cognition’s intentionality is not knowable in this way. A cognition’s intentionality, its property of having an object, is knowable on the basis of observation alone only if the observation is introspective. Therefore, the intentionality of cognitions, though a property which cognitions naturally have, is not among the properties that are studied by a “real” science. Logic, however, is a science that studies primarily cognitions insofar as they have intentionality, and not insofar as they have other natural properties. Therefore, Wodeham concluded, logic is not a “real” science. An immediate corollary is that, because logic is the only science that studies things insofar as they have natural properties which, though knowable on the basis of observation alone, are not knowable on the basis of non-introspective observation, but on the basis of introspective observation instead, logic is a very special science.

Conclusion

According to Wodeham’s doctrine, the intentionality of cognitions is a very special property indeed. It is not an intrinsic property of cog-

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39 "... ad scientias reales, et solum ad illas, spectat tractare de rebus pro quanto res sunt, et earum proprietatibus naturalibus quibuscumque ad quas deveniri potest naturaliter mediantibus actibus rectis, circumscripto quocumque actu reflexo". LS, d. 23, q. 1 (vol. III, 317).

40 See the text quoted in footnote 31.

41 "Sed ad logicam spectat tractare de illis proprietatibus, quantumcumque naturalibus, ad quas deviniri non potest nisi mediantibus reflexis. Talis proprietas est
nitions, as one might expect. It is, instead, an extrinsic property that a cognition naturally has insofar as it is related to a mind in which it exists and, thereby, to the object (or to the objects) which the mind apprehends by it. As an extrinsic natural property of cognitions, it is, again, very special. It is not, as other extrinsic natural properties are, knowable on the basis of observation available to any observer. Instead, it is knowable on the basis of observation alone only if the observation is introspective.

Now, there is a science of which the primary objects are cognitions insofar as they have intentionality. That science is logic. Because intentionality is a natural, not a conventional property of cognitions and because cognitions are real things, as such publicly observable, logic might seem a "real" science. This would have been deemed an unacceptable consequence by Wodeham, as it would have been by his predecessors. But, by drawing on his own theory of intentionality, Wodeham saw how this consequence could be avoided. "Real" sciences, he pointed out, study things insofar as they have natural properties which are evidently knowable on the basis of non-introspective observation. But the intentionality of cognitions, though a natural property, is not of that kind. Logic, therefore, is not a "real" science.

Appendix: The aptitudinal intentionality of cognitions

In attributing to Wodeham the thesis that cognitions should be denied any intrinsic intentionality, I have somewhat oversimplified his doctrine, as further exploration of it reveals. What should be denied instead is that cognitions have intrinsically any actual intentionality. And it should be recognized that, according to this doctrine, they have aptitudinal intentionality intrinsically.

What I am calling the "aptitudinal intentionality" of a cognition

intellctionis esse signum vel esse intellectionem vel esse apprehensionem vel cognitionem, dummodo ista vocabula subordinentur in significando conceptibus qui significant intellctiones vel cognitiones relative, quatenus sunt signa mentalia, res ipsas menti offerentia. Secus esset si qui uterentur istis nominibus sicut signis subordinatis in significando conceptibus absolutis intellectionum". LS, d. 23, q. 1 (vol. III, 317). On the distinction between the absolute and the relative sense of a term such as 'cognitio', see the text quoted in footnote 27.

42 See footnote 37.
is the capacity a cognition has for being a cognition of a determinate object, and of no other, or of objects of a determinate sort, and of no other sort. This is a capacity which a cognition would have even if it existed separately from any mind.\textsuperscript{43}

The fact that Wodeham subscribed to this view follows from what he says would happen if God were to bring about certain possible situations, which cannot naturally occur. In one such situation, an observer is supposed to be looking at a white object and, while he is looking, God is supposed to substitute for the whiteness originally in the white object another whiteness perfectly similar to it, and in an instant. The observer would, of course, believe that she is apprehending the same whiteness the whole time. But, would she be apprehending both whitenesses by a same cognition or by two distinct ones? Wodeham answered that it would be by two distinct ones. For, if a certain thing is apprehended by a given cognition, it is, he claimed, impossible that any other thing be apprehended by the same cognition.\textsuperscript{44}

Another hypothetical situation is one where God is supposed to have transferred a cognition from one mind into another. It might be a cognition I was having of my friend Janet, transferred from my mind to the mind of John, who is not acquainted with Janet. The question is: what would John apprehend by that cognition? Again Wodeham would have no hesitation in answering that John would be apprehending Janet by that cognition.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} For the use of the term "aptitudo" in this context, see the texts quoted in footnote 49. There is little difference between a "potential" property and an "aptitudinal" property of a thing. Yet there is a difference. Here is how the difference is explained by Robert Kilwardby: "esse aptitudinis... est minus quam esse potentiale. Aptitudo enim dicitur hic incompleta potentia. Oculus enim caecatus in juventute aptus natus est videre, nec est ibi potentia completa ad visum, sed aliquid de illa cum defectu, quia est ibi potentia animae visiva, sed desunt ei materiales dispositiones organi. Dico igitur... quod caecus est aptus natus videre et tamen in eo nec est visus actu nec potentia" (De ort. scient., c. 47 (ed. Judy, 149). The quality which a cognition is does not have the potency of being a cognition of a determinate thing or of things of a determinate sort unless it exists in a mind, as such capable of apprehending that thing or those things by it. Of itself, therefore, it is "aptitudinally", rather than "potentially", a cognition of that thing or of those things.

\textsuperscript{44} "...sit albedo a visa visione b et post hoc instans annihilita a ponitur in eodem loco albedo c similia, conservata priore visione scilicet b. Tunc quero: aut per b videbit c vel non... dicendum est quod c albedo non est nata videri visione b qua videtur a". Adam Goddam super IV lib. Sent. I, d. 3, q. 1 (ed. Major, fol. 52rb-vb).

\textsuperscript{45} "... arguitur quod per intellectionem qua Sortes experitur se intelligere angelum si eadem ponatur in Platone Plato experiretur se intelligere angelum... (ad istud)
The way Wodeham decides what would happen in each of these hypothetical situations implies that, on his view, a cognition has by nature the capacity of being an actual cognition of one given thing and no other, if it is a singular cognition, or of things of a given sort and of no other sort, if it is a general one. Consequently, if that capacity is actualized, which it is, Wodeham believed, as soon as the cognition exists in a mind, then the cognition is necessarily a cognition of a given thing and of no other, or of things of a given sort and of no other sort.

On Wodeham's doctrine, then, the actual intentionality of a cognition depends on two things: on the aptitudinal intentionality of the cognition and on there being a mind which actualizes that aptitude or capacity of the cognition. The aptitudinal intentionality of a cognition, on the other hand, is intrinsic to the cognition itself; it is part of its nature.

dicendum quod... si intellectio qua Sortes experitur se intelligere (angelum) ponertur in Platone ille judicaret Sortem intelligere (angelum)” (ibid.). Although the example here is of a judgment rather than that of a simple apprehension, yet the judgment presupposes an apprehension, namely that of Socrates. That apprehension, when it is in the mind of Socrates, is an apprehension he has of himself; when it is transferred in the mind of Plato, it is still an apprehension of Socrates.

In the context of a remarkable argument to the effect that, if a thing is naturally caused by a given thing, it cannot naturally be caused by any other thing, Wodeham takes a vision (or intuitive cognition) of a given thing as an example of a cognition proper to just one thing, which could not be a cognition of any other thing. He then goes on to claim that such a vision can be naturally caused only by its object (LS, d. 3, q. 2 (vol. II, 153)). On his view, then, an intuitive cognition has the object it has, not because it can be naturally caused only by that object, but in virtue of its very nature and it is a further fact of nature that it can be naturally caused only by that object. Note that, if an intuitive cognition has the object it has in virtue of its nature, the same holds of an abstractive singular cognition.

“Contradictio est intellectioem quamcumque esse subjective in mente, sive propriam sive communem in significando, quin mens per eam formaliter aliquid concipiatur”. LS, d. 8, q. 1 (vol. III, 7–8). “Impossibile est rem illam que nata est esse visio vel cognitio informare potentiam cognitivam... quin eo ipso ipsa sit visio vel cognitio”. Adam Goddam super IV lib. Sent. IV, q. 12 (ed. Major, fol. 152rb).

In the case where a cognition is general, Wodeham occasionally says that the things of which it is a cognition are those things of which it is a “similitude”. In LS, d. 8, q. 2 (vol. III, 39), he writes: “habere intellectionem communem hominis non est alius quam habere unam intellectionem qua non magis intelligatur unus homo quam alius, sed indifferentiter offertur quilibet homo menti per eam, non tamen asinus vel bos vel individuum alterius speciei. Et ratio huius est quia talis cognition est expressissima similitudo individuum talis speciei et nullorum aliorum”. The so-called property of being a “similitude” of things of a certain sort and of no other sort is, however, probably little more than a label for the capacity a general cognition has, by nature, of being a cognition of things of that sort and of no other sort.

Although Wodeham attributes the following view to “others”, he presents it


———, *Quaestiones quodlibetales, Opera omnia*, vol. XII, ed. L. Wadding, Lyon 1639, reprint Olms 1969.


It is remarkable that later authors, writing as late as in the early 16th century, subscribe to this view. An echo of the passage just quoted can be found in George Lokert, who writes: “Contra illud arguitur: posito quod talis qualitas ponatur extra potentiam cognitivam, tunc non amplius naturaliter proprie significabit ... (ad istud) potest dici quod ... semper aptitudinaliter significat”.

Another author of the same period, Gervasius Waim, writes: “Qualitas ex intrinseca sua natura habet quod sit notitia huius objecti potius quam alterius sic quod a priori nulla potest dare ratio nisi natura rei. Adverte tamen quod quando dico quod qualitas ex intrinseca sua natura habet quod sit notitia huius objecti, nolo dicere quod aliqua qualitas accidens sit intrinsecce notitia, immo nulla talis est intrinsecce notitia, cum possibile sit quamlibet tale esse et non esse notitiam. Sed volo dicere quod qualitas que est notitia huius objecti ex natura sua habet quod non stat ipsam esse notitiam et non esse notitiam huius objecti. Nec habet istud ex efficientia illius vel illius objecti”. *Tract. notit.* (Paris 1519, fol. b4vb).
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