

WILLIAM OCKHAM  
*APPARENT BEING*

Introduction

William Ockham (ca. 1288–1347) made his reputation as a brilliant logician and iconoclastic theologian. In 1324, controversy over his views forced him to abandon his scholarly work in England and confront charges of heresy before the pope in Avignon. Rather than receiving an acquittal, Ockham became involved in further controversies, was excommunicated, and spent the last years of his life in exile in Munich, where his interests shifted from logic and metaphysics to politics and ecclesiastics.

Ockham is best known today for his parsimonious ontology, exemplified by his nominalism (or at least antirealism) regarding universals, and expressed by the famous principle of parsimony known as Ockham's razor: Plurality should not be posited without necessity. The selection translated here displays this parsimony at work in Ockham's theory of cognition. The central issue is the nature of mental representation. Ockham quotes at length, verbatim, from the work of his fellow Franciscan Peter Aureol (see Translation 8). Aureol had argued that all cognition, sensory and intellectual, requires that the object itself take form in what Aureol calls "objective being" (*esse obiectivum*). The production of this sort of nonreal being is, for Aureol, precisely what accounts for the experience of being presented with an object (what we now call *conscious experience*). Ockham argues that there's no need to postulate this sort of "diminished being." The act of cognition alone, along with the external object, is entirely sufficient; no intermediary is required. The most problematic cases are those where there is no corresponding external object. Ockham here offers an account of how to explain illusory sensations and universal judgments, cases that Aureol had invoked in support of his own account, and that fourteenth-century authors would take up over and over (see Translation 10).

The occasion for the present dispute is the theological question of how to characterize the second person of the Trinity, described in the Gospel

of John as *the Word*, and analyzed in Augustine's *De trinitate* in terms of an analogy to the human mind's formation of a mental word (see Translation 6). The official question addressed here can't be rendered into English without distortion. The Latin asks

*utrum solus filius sit verbum*

but English requires choosing between definite and indefinite articles, and modern conventions call for capitalizing terms that refer to God. So we have to choose between

*whether only the Son is the Word*

which was uncontroversial among Christians, and

*whether only the Son is a word*

which was generally held to be false. Of course, it doesn't take Ockham long to disambiguate these issues. The real interest of the question lies with the underlying problems about mental representation. For further discussion of Ockham's view, see Adams (1987) pp. 73–96; Pasnau (1997), pp. 69–85, 185–89, 247–53, 277–89; Karger (1999).

## Apparent Being

### *Ordinatio* I.27.3

Regarding the uncreated Word, I ask whether only the Son is a word.

### For the Negative

1. A [mental] word is a conception or intellection, according to the previous question. But it is not the case that only the Son is a conception or intellection. Therefore, etc.

2. It seems that the Son is not the Word, since he is born precisely from the essence of the Father, since otherwise the Son would be of something other than the Father. But the Word is not born precisely from the substance of the Father, according to St. Augustine (*De trinitate* XV.14 [xxiii]), who says that “the Word was born from all the things that are in

the Father." But creatures are in the Father and in the memory of the Father. Therefore, etc.

### For the Opposite

*There are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit* [I John 5:7]. Therefore the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are three; therefore the Father is not the Word, and neither is the Holy Spirit. And it is certain that the Son is the Word. Therefore, etc.

### [Reply]

Regarding this question, the first thing to be recognized is something granted by everyone, that the Word is engendered. So we should consider

- First, what is engendered in the divine;
- Second, that {229} what is engendered is the Word;
- Third, from what it is engendered (in light of the second argument).

### [What Is Engendered]

1. Regarding the first, I say that nothing absolute in the divine is engendered, because (according to St. Augustine, *De trinitate* I [12.xxvi]) there is always a real distinction between what generates and what is engendered. But, within God, nothing absolute is really distinct from anything else. Therefore, etc.

If it be said that the Word is quasi-engendered, or that it proceeds and is engendered conceptually (*secundum rationem*), but not by a real emanation or engendering – I reply to the contrary that what is only conceptually engendered is not engendered in reality from the nature of the thing. Therefore, if something absolute in the divine is only conceptually engendered, then it is not engendered from the nature of the thing, and consequently is not truly engendered, except according to a false mode of understanding.

Moreover, there is always a distinction between what generates and what is engendered. Therefore, when something is engendered conceptually

ally, there is a conceptual distinction between what generates and what is engendered. But it was shown above, in distinction two [qq. 1-3], that nothing absolute in the divine is distinct conceptually from anything else in the divine. Therefore, it is not engendered conceptually.

2. Second, I say that what is engendered is a relational [and not absolute] person. But this cannot be proved through reason; it should be held by faith alone. And that it should be held is clear through many authoritative passages, from both the Bible and the saints. Since they are familiar, I pass over them. {230}

### [What Is Engendered Is the Word]

Regarding the second article, it should be held that what is engendered is truly the Word. But different people explain how this is so in different ways.

#### [A. *The View of Peter Aureol*]

One modern Doctor says that because in the divine, the Son emanates in perceived and objective being, but in such a way that he truly and really takes on being, so he is called the Word. Accordingly, he proves three propositions:<sup>1</sup>

First is that in every intellection what emanates and proceeds is not something distinct but the very thing itself, cognized in objective being, in virtue of which it serves as the end-term of the intellect's intuition.

Second is that an object is posited and formed and spoken within the mind where it is perceived and where it is the end-term of the cognizer's intuition; this is our mental word.

Third is that in the divine the Son emanates in a similar sort of perceived and objective being, but in such a way that it is truly and really formed and takes on real being.

From these it follows that what is engendered in the divine is truly the Word.

As he himself says, he proves the first proposition elsewhere:<sup>2</sup>

Here it needs to be seen that in an act of intellect the thing cognized is of necessity put into a kind of perceived and apparent intentional being.

<sup>1</sup> Peter Aureol, *I Sent.* d. 27 p. 2 a. 2 (ed. Friedman, pp. 429, 439, 443).

<sup>2</sup> Aureol, *I Scriptum* d. 3 sec. 14 n. 31 (ed. Buytaert vol. 2, pp. 696-98).

1. First, the internal or external senses form something no more than an act of intellect does. But the act of an external sense puts things into intentional being, as is clear in many experiences. {231}

First, when someone is carried along the water, the trees on the shore seem to be moving. Therefore this motion, which exists objectively in the eye, cannot be claimed to be the vision itself, since if it were then the vision would be the object of sight and would be seen, and sight would be a reflexive power. Nor can it be claimed that the motion really exists in the tree or the shore, because then they would really be moving. Nor can it be claimed that it exists in the air, because it is attributed to the tree, not to the air. Therefore, it exists only intentionally, not really, in seen being and in judged being.

The second experience occurs with the sudden, circular motion of a stick in the air. For some kind of circle appears to be made in the air by a stick moved in this way. So one asks what that circle is that appears to the one seeing. It can't be something real existing either in the stick (because the stick is straight) or in the air (because a colored and determinate circle cannot be in the air). Nor is it the vision itself, because then the vision would be seen, and further the vision is not in the air where that circle appears. Nor, for the same reasons, can it be anywhere within the eye. So it remains that it is in the air, with intentional being, or in apparent and judged being.

The third experience is of a stick bent in the water.

The fourth is of the doubling of candles apparent when one eye is forced upward. For there are two candles in apparent being even though there is only one candle in real being.

The fifth is of the colors on the neck of a pigeon.

The sixth is of the images seen in a mirror: sometimes beneath it, sometimes on its surface, and sometimes outside in the air between the viewer and the mirror – inasmuch as {232} the image has different locations. (The Perspectivist discusses this in books IV–VI.<sup>3</sup>) But either

- such an image is a real species implanted subjectively in the mirror, which cannot be claimed, as the Perspectivist demonstrates in book IV [I.20]; or
- the image will be claimed to be the true thing itself with real being, and this cannot be, because a face is not really beneath the mirror where the species appears to be; or
- the image will be said to be a vision existing in the eye, or something else existing there, which cannot be, because it appears beneath the mirror, with a different orientation (*situ*), as the Perspectivist proves [V.2.6–7].

What remains, then, is that it is only the appearance of the thing, or the thing with apparent and intentional being, with the result that the thing itself is beneath the mirror in seen, judged, and apparent being.

The seventh experience occurs in someone who sees the sun. For after he averts his glance, various bright spots appear in front of his eyes, which in time fade away, as Augustine says in *De trinitate* XI [ii.4].<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Alhazen, *De aspectibus*.

<sup>4</sup> For this passage, see Translation 8, n. 82.

The eighth occurs in those who have looked at bright red things, or looked through a lattice. For afterwards, when they look at letters or anything else, these appear to them to be red or latticed. This latticing or redness undoubtedly has only intentional and apparent being.

Generally, anyone who denies that many things have merely intentional {233} and apparent being, and [who holds] that everything that is seen exists externally in its real nature, denies all deception and falls into the error of those who say that everything that appears is so.

Therefore, the external senses put things into intentional being. So likewise does imagination. For my father, imagined by me, is himself put into intentional being: for [the thing I imagine] is not a species, because then my imagination would arrive not at the thing but at the species alone, and it would be a reflexive power, and many other absurdities would follow. And since this is so for the internal and external senses, it follows all the more that the intellect puts things into intentional and apparent being.

It might be said that all these appearances occur in erroneous visions, and accordingly that a true vision does not put things into intentional being, and that only an erroneous and false vision does so.

This reply clearly does not succeed. A true vision, since it is more perfect, should do this all the more. Still, we do not distinguish the image or thing in apparent being and in real being, because in a true vision they occur simultaneously.

2. Moreover,<sup>5</sup> that by which the soul is duplicated, constituted before itself, and put into its own perception as perceived seems to give things objective and intentional being, and perceived and apparent being. But Augustine says in *De trinitate* XIV.vi [8] that "the power of thought is such that not even the mind itself puts itself into its own perception, except when it thinks of itself," etc.

3. Moreover,<sup>6</sup> it is impossible for there to be a formal appearance without something's {234} appearing objectively. For just as by whiteness something is made white, by a representation something is represented, and by a picture something is depicted, so by an appearance something appears. But it is clear that an intellection is nothing other than a kind of formal appearance. For [this is so] just as vision is a kind of appearance established in the eye, so that when things are seen they appear. As the Commentator says in *Metaphysics* IV 24, "there are certain conditions in which we believe the senses to be true, and others in which we believe them to be false: for instance, the condition of things' appearing to sight from afar and up close, in health and sickness, in strength and weakness, while awake and asleep. For the same thing appears large when up close and small from afar, and color appears to be one thing up close and another from afar." From this it is clear, according to him, that vision is nothing other than a kind of appearance.

<sup>5</sup> Aureol, I *Scriptum* d.3 sec. 14 n.32 (ed. Buytaert, vol. 2, pp. 698-99).

<sup>6</sup> Aureol, I *Scriptum* d.3 sec. 14 nn. 55-57 (ed. Buytaert, vol. 2, pp. 712-14).

(Hence phantasia is so-called by the Greeks because of *phanos*, which means an appearance.) Consequently, since an intellection is a kind of spiritual vision of things, [it will be] a kind of spiritual appearance as well. So it follows that [through intellection] the things themselves take on apparent being. For it cannot be said that an intellection is an appearance such that nothing appears except for it itself. If that were the case, then the intellection would appear and be cognized, and the intellect would cognize nothing external. Therefore, it is clear *a priori* that every intellection – indeed, every cognition – is that by which things appear and are put into presentive being. {235}

4. Moreover, it is also clear *a priori* that an intellection is fully like (*est simillima*) the thing it is of. Therefore, through this likeness the thing either takes on some being or else it is only denominated. But it cannot be said that it is only denominated, so that being within intellect is nothing other than a kind of denomination, in the way that Caesar when depicted is denominated by the picture. For through this denomination Caesar is not present to the picture, nor made its object, nor made to appear. Therefore, it is necessary to say that through an intellection, insofar as it is fully like the thing, the thing takes on a kind of being, in such a way that this intellectual being is not solely a denomination, but is a kind of intentional, diminished, and apparent being. Accordingly, the Commentator says in *Metaphysics* IX 7, that intelligible things are said to have being not in an unqualified way, but to have being in the soul and in cognition.

5. The same is evident *a posteriori*. For it is clear that the intellect is brought to absolute rose (*rosam simpliciter*), and experiences it as its object objectively. Hence that which is made an object in this way is either

- a. a species informing the intellect;
- b. an act of intellect;
- c. a thing made by intellect;
- d. a subsistent thing, beyond intellect; or
- e. all externally existing roses, put into intentional and apparent being as if they were one whole rose.

(a) The first (that it is the species of the rose, existing within intellect) cannot be maintained. For since that is made the object of intellect and is discerned by it, either the intellect stops there – which cannot be held because then (i) it would cognize not the external thing but only the species; also, {236} (ii) knowledge would then be of species, and (iii) the proposition *a rose is a flower* would not be true, because the species of a rose is not the species of a flower – or the intuition of intellect does not stop with the species but extends, mediated by the species, to the thing. In that case, we've reached our goal. For the thing itself's existing in the intellect's ultimate intuition in the mode of an appearance is the target of the present inquiry.

(b) Nor can it be held that this apparent rose is the act itself of intellect. For (i) the intellect would first discern its own act and then, mediated by that, discern

the object, and consequently would not cognize things directly. Further (ii), this would lead back to the error of the Commentator, that there is a single intellect in everyone: for it is certain that this apparent rose is not and cannot be multiplied, and so it is one in me and in you, and consequently its subject, the possible intellect, would be the same in me and in you, not multiplied.

(c) Nor can it be held that it is some thing made by intellect in real being. For (i) intellection is an immanent operation, from which nothing active follows (as is clear in *Metaphysics* IX [1050a23–b2]). Also (ii), if the intellect's attention stops at that thing, then knowledge would be of these things and not external things, and propositions would not be true because the intellect in conceiving the subject would form one thing and in conceiving the predicate would form another, and so the one thing will not be the other.

(d) Nor can it be said that there is some thing preceding the intellection and possessing some real being. For (i) even if every {237} particular rose were destroyed, absolute rose would still remain. This goes against the Philosopher's remark in the *Categories* [2b5–6] that "if those that are primary are destroyed, it is impossible for any of the others to remain" – speaking of secondary substances. Also, (ii) we would be back to Platonic Ideas. For Plato held that subsisting *human being* is the end-term of the attention of an intellect conceiving of absolute human being. He spoke of these as *human being per se* and *rose per se*, as if they were natural forms subsisting per se, and he called them *ideas*. Also, (iii) predications would be false, as was argued in other cases; also, (iv) neither definitions nor knowledge would be of externally existing things, as the Philosopher argues in *Metaphysics* VII [1039b31–40a2]. So in truth the intellect would know nothing of things that are within us, if the attention of an intellect considering the natures of absolute things had as its end-term something possessing real being.

(e) So we are left with maintaining the last option: that it has only apparent and intentional being. Thus all roses, which are distinct in real being, are held to be one whole rose not in real but in intentional being. In this way, all the difficulties raised are accounted for: for that rose is really the same as all roses, since when it is perceived, all roses are perceived as one, not distinct roses; in this way, too, knowledge is of things, as is predication and definition, and the things are cognized directly. {238}

Therefore, it appears *a priori* and *a posteriori* that a thing cognized by intellect takes on a kind of apparent and intentional being.

#### [B. *Against Aureol's View*]

This view seems to me false as regards the conclusion for which the above arguments are advanced. But because I have seen little of what this Doctor says – for if all the time I have had to look at what he says were put together, it would not take up the space of a single natural day – I do not intend to argue much against the one who holds this view. For from



ignorance of what he says, I might facilely argue against his words rather than against his meaning. But since his conclusion appears to me false, based on what he says, I will argue against it, regardless of whether these arguments run contrary to his meaning. The arguments that I made in distinction 36 of this book, against one view of cognized being, could also be advanced against this conclusion. I composed that material, and almost everything else in book one, before I had seen the view recited here. Whoever wants to should look for those arguments there and apply them.

For now I argue as follows.

1. I ask of that apparent and intentional being whether it has only objective being, so that it nowhere has subjective being, or whether it somewhere has subjective being. {239}

The first cannot be held, because (i) then a true quality would never be apprehended through the senses, or else two objects would be apprehended in sensation, a real quality and that which has only objective being; also, (ii) nothing is a per se and proper object of sense except for a real sensible quality; also, (iii) such a thing is nothing other than a being of reason, but a being of reason cannot be apprehended per se by the senses.

The second also cannot be held, because (i) that which somewhere has subjective being, when it has subjective being, is truly a real being, not only an intentional one. Therefore if this sort of apparent and intentional being were to have subjective being, it would truly be a real being. Moreover, (ii) if it has subjective being, then it is necessarily a substance or an accident, and so it will necessarily be a real being.

2. Moreover, I ask of that apparent being in which whiteness is constituted when whiteness is seen: Is it or is it not really the same as whiteness?

If it is said that it is really the same, then on the contrary: when things are really the same, they coincide as regards generation and corruption, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* IV [1003b26–30]. Consequently, whenever that apparent being is produced, that whiteness is produced. Likewise, whenever two things are really the same, it is impossible for one of them to exist when the other does not. But this (pointing to whiteness) can exist when this (pointing to the apparent being) does not, because otherwise the apparent being would exist without the vision, just as the whiteness exists without the vision. Therefore, whiteness and that apparent being are not really the same. {240}

If they are not really the same – and certainly neither is part of the other – then they differ totally and with respect to their whole selves. From this I argue as follows: When things differ with respect to their whole selves,

whether they are distinct things or one is an absolute thing and the other a being of reason, the absolute thing can (at least through divine power) be apprehended by a power it is the *per se* object of, without the other's being apprehended. Therefore, whiteness can be apprehended by sight without the apparent being's being apprehended. Consequently, its being sensed does not require such intermediary apparent being, and consequently it is pointless to postulate such being.

3. Moreover, I ask whether or not whiteness itself truly appears to the senses. If not, then it is not seen, which is plainly false. If it appears, and in addition apparent being appears, then there are two apparent and observed things here. From this I argue as follows: Whenever there are two appearances before a single power, by whatever reason one of them is brought into apparent being so is the other. Therefore, if whiteness exists in apparent being that is somehow distinct from the whiteness, then for the same reason that apparent being will itself be brought into a somehow distinct apparent being. Consequently, there will be an infinite regress in such cases, which is plainly absurd.

If it is said that this apparent being appears through itself, without any intermediary, then on the contrary: When one thing is just as much the *per se* object of a power as another is, if the other can appear to the power without any intermediary between it and the power's act, then for that same reason the *per se* object could appear to the power without any intermediary between the object and the power's act. Therefore, whiteness {241} could be seen without any apparent being intermediary between whiteness and the vision. Therefore, it is pointless to postulate this sort of intermediary apparent being.

4. Moreover, the immediate end-term of some power's act does not require an intermediary for it to be apprehended by the power. But whiteness is the immediate end-term of an act of seeing. Therefore it does not require this sort of intermediary apparent being.

5. Moreover, when something is naturally apprehended by a power without two items in turn, so that it is apprehended first without one and then without the other, it can by divine power be apprehended without either one of them, with the result that neither of them is apprehended. But the same object – say, whiteness – is apprehended first without true apparent being, and then without false apparent being, as he himself makes quite clear. Therefore, it can be apprehended without any apparent being, and consequently it is pointless to postulate such being.

An argument could be made from the foregoing against the second proposition [p. 222]: for if this sort of apparent being is not in every intellection, then it is clear that such being is not universally our mental word. So with respect to these two propositions I reply in short that the first claim, taken universally, is false.

First, I say that in no intuitive cognition (*notitia*), sensory or intellectual, is a thing constituted in any being that is intermediary between the thing and the act of cognizing (*cognoscendi*). I say instead that the thing itself is immediately seen or apprehended, without any intermediary between it and the act. Further, there is no more an intermediary between the thing and the act by which the thing is said to be seen than there is an intermediary between God and a creature {242} by which God is said to be the Creator. Rather, by the very fact that God exists and a creature exists – since a creature could not exist if God did not exist – God is said to be the Creator, and so he is really the Creator without any intermediary. In just the same way, by the very fact that a thing exists and a cognition of this sort exists, the thing is said to be seen or cognized without any intermediary. Nor is there anything else seen there except for the thing itself – just as nothing conceivable (*imaginabile*) is the Creator except for God.

Second, I say that through an abstractive cognition immediately following an intuitive cognition, nothing is made nor does anything take on being beyond the abstractive cognition itself. For the object of an intuitive cognition and of an immediately following abstractive cognition are entirely the same, and under the same aspect.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, just as there is no intermediary between an intuitively cognized object and the intuitive cognition, so there will be no intermediary between an object and an abstractive cognition.

Third, I say that when there is an abstractive cognition by which a universal is held within intellect, one can plausibly maintain either that there is an intermediary or that there is not. If an intermediary is posited, it can plausibly be said (as I've said before)<sup>8</sup> that this intermediary is itself understood, and is nothing other than a kind of *factum* common to all the singulars. In this case no singular is understood through that intellection. Alternatively, it can be said that it is a certain intellection of the soul,

<sup>7</sup> Compare Aureol's account in Translation 8, nn. 102–11.

<sup>8</sup> See *Ordinatio* 2.8, translated in Boehner (1990), pp. 41–43.

possessing subjective being in the soul really distinct from every other object of the soul. It can also be said plausibly that there is no such intermediary, and that the universal {243} is the confused cognition itself, having as its immediate end-term all the singular things to which it is common and universal. (This is in line with how I have recited this view elsewhere.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, whatever I say in support of or against such fictive being I am merely reciting, even if this is not always explicit.)

Fourth, I say that not every [mental] word is an apparent being of this sort. For, as was shown in the previous question, every intellection is a word, but not every intellection is this sort of apparent being. Therefore, etc.

A reply should be made to the arguments for the earlier view. Perhaps out of these replies some points will become clear that go against the meaning of the one who proposes this view. But I am not certain of this, because I have not seen him anywhere else on this subject.

To the first [A1], I say that the act of an external sense does not put things into intentional being – in such a way, that is, that beyond the act of sensing and the external thing there is some intermediary intentional being. Now on account of an act of sensing's being put into real being, the external thing can be denominated as *being sensed*, without anything's being added to it except perhaps, on one view, through predication. But this occurs only through an act of intellect, just as something is added to God from the fact that a creature is put into real being. If this is what the proponent of this view had in mind, I don't disagree with him. But his words suggest the first interpretation.

So I reply to the proof. To the first experience, I say that when someone is carried along the water, there is no motion in his eyes, neither objectively nor subjectively, because there is no motion belonging to {244} the trees themselves. But the proposition

*The trees are moving*

exists objectively within intellect, and it certainly is true that the intellect can form propositions and assent to them or dissent. This, however, is beside the point.

One might say that the trees seem to be moving not only to intellect

<sup>9</sup> E.g., *Expositio in Perhermenias*, prooem. §6, translated in Boehner (1990), pp. 43–45. And see below, p. 237.

but also to the senses, inasmuch as they seem to be moving even to brute animals that have no intellectual cognition. To this it should be said that if the proposition

*The trees seem to the senses to be moving*

is understood in such a way that some motion, real or otherwise, is apprehended by the senses, then it is false. For no motion other than a real one, or one that can be real, is apprehended by the senses, just as no whiteness except for a real one, or one that can be real, is apprehended by the senses. Hence no motion, real or apparent, is constituted by the senses, nor does any motion whatsoever appear to the senses.

If, however, the above proposition is understood in such a way that within sense there is some apprehension (or apprehensions) of different objects in virtue of which the person sensing can elicit operations just like those elicited by someone sensing a body that truly is moving, then the proposition is true. But it does not follow from this that any motion appears. What follows is that within the sense there are apprehensions equivalent, as regards the operations to be elicited, to an appearance or vision through which motion does appear. (Here I speak in the manner of one who claims that motion can be seen.)

I confirm this reply. For this inference:

*The trees appear to be moving; therefore, some motion appears or has objective being*

no more follows than does this one:

*The trees appear to be moving {245} in reality; therefore, some real motion appears or has objective being*

since the mode of arguing is just the same. But everyone agrees that the second inference is not valid. Therefore, neither is the first. And so I say that when it is granted that

*The trees seem to be moving in reality or by a real motion*

it should not be granted that some real motion appears. Grant instead that one has apprehensions equivalent, as regards the operations to be elicited, to apprehensions by which the trees are truly apprehended to be moving. Just the same should be said for

*The trees seem to be moving*

and so no motion exists intentionally through the senses in seen being or in judged being – no more than it exists in reality – because no motion is seen.

I confirm this reply in a second way. For if some motion is seen there, and it is not a real motion, then it is only a motion with objective being. But such intentional motion is more distinct from real motion than it is from whiteness or blackness. Therefore, through a vision of such intentional motion one would no more judge that there is real motion there than that there is real whiteness or blackness there, which they deny. So I say that no motion is seen there.

Yet because of the motion of the one on the boat, who is moving only with the motion of the boat, he sees those trees from various distances and angles. For this reason, the trees seem to be moving. As a result, these propositions are equivalent:

- (i) *The trees, without any intermediary produced or made in any sort of real or intentional being, are seen successively from various {246} distances and angles by an eye moving with the motion of the boat;*
- (ii) *The trees seem to the eye to be moving.*

So just as it does not follow from the first proposition that any intentional motion appears, so neither does it follow from the second.

If one says that the trees do not seem to every such eye to be moving, since many viewers judge and know that they are not moving, one should reply that this is because of intellect, which judges that they are not moving. Or, if this occurs in brute animals or in those who lack reason, it is because of an apprehension impeding the action of some natural cause. For the sake of brevity, I refrain from explaining how this could happen.

In the same way, I say to the second experience that no circle appears to the eye. The intellect does sometimes believe this proposition to be true:

*A circle is in the air.*

But no circle appears to the eye except equivalently – that is, it has an apprehension (or apprehensions) equivalent, as regards the operations to be elicited, to an apprehension (or apprehensions) of a circle. How this could happen would take a long time to set out, but it could to some extent be evident to anyone studious, from what is said in this question.

What the argument infers:

*That circle is in the air with intentional being, or in apparent and judged being*

is unconditionally false, based on what he says, because nothing is conceivable {247} in the air except for what is real. For if it has being in the air, this is either subjective or objective being. If subjective, it is real. If objective, this is impossible, because air is neither cognitive nor volitional. So even if we should postulate this circle, it is not in the air. Nor does it follow:

*It is judged to be in the air; therefore, it is in the air*

no more than it follows:

*God is judged to be a body; therefore, God is a body.*

And from this we can derive an argument that goes against his thesis rather than for it. For just as it does not follow from the fact that a circle is judged to exist in the air that a circle exists in the air, really or intentionally, so it does not follow from the fact that a circle is judged to exist that a circle exists, really or intentionally.

In the same way, I say to the third experience that no bend exists due to the sensation, although due to intellect this proposition is believed to be true:

*The stick is bent.*

Also, there is within the sense an apprehension (or apprehensions) equivalent as regards causing within intellect a state of belief of the sort that a sensation would cause if the stick were out of the water, were apprehended, and were bent.

In the same way, I say to the fourth experience that the sensation (or sensations) there are equivalent, as regards the operations to be elicited either within intellect or within the external or internal powers, to the sensation (or sensations) of two really existing candles. Nor are there two candles there in apparent being [in such a way] that this apparent being mediates between the sensation (or sensations) and the candle itself (or parts of candles). If, however, the claim that there are two candles in apparent being is meant in this {248} way, that there is a judgment there by which two candles are judged to exist, then this can be granted in the cases of intellect and, equally, the senses. But it does not follow from this that anything exists in any way at all other than the candle (and its parts) and the act of cognizing within the [cognitive] power.

To the fifth experience I say that wherever those colors may be, the colors truly have real existence there. As for whether they existed subjectively in the neck of the pigeon or in the nearby air, this is more doubtful and each can plausibly be maintained. This will be discussed in book II, where I will examine the species that are posited *in medio* and in our cognitive powers.<sup>10</sup> One's judgment regarding these colors on the neck of a pigeon is thus the same as for the redness caused on a wall by the course of the sun's rays, and also for other cases that some say involve species.

To the sixth experience I say that the thing itself is seen in the mirror, not its image. And I say that the thing itself is not beneath the mirror, nor is anything seen beneath the mirror, although it can be judged by intellect to be beneath the mirror. But the only conceivable things required for this are the thing cognized by intellect, the mirror and other really existing things, and the judgment itself existing subjectively within the soul, which is not beneath the mirror, neither intentionally nor in reality. In this way, if the sense were to have a judgment distinct from the sensation, it could without intermediary judge that the thing is in the mirror, without anything's causing it, intentionally {249} or really, except for that judgment. Still, because the judgment exists, the thing itself would really be judged to be beneath the mirror. Indeed, these propositions are equivalent:

- (i) *That judgment exists within the eye, nothing else having been caused in any sort of being, real or intentional;*
- (ii) *The thing is judged to be beneath the mirror.*

One might say that if the thing itself is now judged to be beneath the mirror and before it was not, then it now has judged being, which it did not have before. And, [since] it does not have any real being that it did not have before, it now has intentional being, which it did not have before.

To this and to the like my reply is clear in distinction 36. The fact that a thing is now judged to be beneath the mirror, whereas before it was not, does not result in something's being added to the thing, except perhaps by extrinsic denomination, as a result of that judgment's now being within the [cognitive] power, whereas before it was not. Just as God is now said to be *creating*, whereas before he was not, because a creature now exists

<sup>10</sup> See *Reportatio* Bk. III, q. 2. Ockham denies the existence of all such intermediary representational species.



that did not exist before, so I say that the thing itself, without any intermediary between it and the vision, appears to be beneath the mirror, but yet is not there.

If someone says that it is there in apparent and judged being, I reply that if you mean some intermediary apparent being is added anew, in virtue of which it is there, then this is false. This is no more the case than that God is now in redeeming being or in glorifying being. If, however, you mean that it appears to be there, I grant this. But {250} it suffices for this that there really is a judgment within the [cognitive] power, just as it suffices for God's glorifying someone that there be glory within that person.

To the seventh experience I say that in such a case true things continue to exist in reality. As for how and where they subjectively exist, this should not be taken up now. And as for why they appear now and not before, the same ought to be said (in one respect) as would be said for why a star appears at night and not by day.

In the same way, I say to the eighth experience that this redness truly exists somewhere. As for the latticing, since it is not a proper object of sight, one's reply ought to follow the same lines as the replies made to the motion of the trees, the circle made by the stick, the stick's being bent, and other similar cases.

To the inference that one who denies such apparent and intentional being denies all deception (*ludificationem*), it should be said that this is not so. For deception occurs in many ways. Sometimes, it occurs through mirrors in nature. For a demon, with his knowledge of the natures of things, can set up various mirrors in various ways, through which far away things will be seen. He can also, in various ways unknown to me, make some parts of a thing be seen while others are not seen, and through this a person can be judged to exist where he does not exist, and so on in other ways. But for all of these, the external thing plus the acts of apprehension within the cognitive powers suffice – without any intermediary of the sort claimed [to have] intentional being.

Nor does it follow from this that those ancients were right who said {251} that all things are as they appear. For something appears to someone to be white which in actual truth is not. But this is not the result of some intermediary between the thing and the appearance. Rather, through the

apprehension itself or through the power's act, without any intermediary, a thing appears to be white which is not. This sometimes happens because it is not known whether the whiteness exists subjectively in that thing or in another, although it is believed to be in the one. And so beyond the acts of the powers by which those powers judge, and beyond the things themselves, there is nothing in either real or intentional being.

In reply to the argument, therefore, it is clear that the senses do not form things in any sort of being, no more than they form God in any sort of being. For when an act of sensation occurs within the senses, God can have a new denomination, since God truly caused that act in reality. In just the same way, when that act occurs, a thing is truly seen in reality. And I do not hold that appearances occur differently in erroneous sensations, compared to others [see p. 224]; rather, they ought to be granted in a uniform way. Accordingly, when a sense is deceived (i.e., some deception occurs), a thing is judged to be such as it is not, without any intermediary between the thing and the power's act. So when it is not deceived, the thing is judged as it is, without any such intermediary.

Also, when he says there that

*We do not distinguish the thing in apparent being and in real being, because in a true vision they occur simultaneously*

he seems to contradict his entire view. For if in a true vision there is some distinction between the apparent being and the thing, then the vision would no more cause one than the other.

To the second argument [A2], it should be said that all these are {252} metaphorical phrases: *The soul is duplicated, is put before itself, is constituted in perceived being*, etc. And if these phrases are found in any of the saints, they mean nothing else than that in the soul there is a single act of understanding by which, without any intermediary, the soul is truly understood. This is what St. Augustine means. So no being is given to the soul there except an act of understanding – no more than some being is given to God by his now damning someone and his not having done so before.

To the other [A3], it can be granted that by an appearance something appears, that an intellection is an appearance, and that by an intellection something appears. But it does not follow from this that something is *made* by the intellection – just as by creation something is created, and yet the

Creator is not by that creation made in some such being. So just as something is understood by an intellection, so something appears.

To the fourth [A4], granted that “an intellection is fully like the thing,” it should be said that the thing takes on no being through this likeness, but that it takes on some denomination now, since the thing is truly understood now and before it was not. Indeed, the thing no more takes on being by being understood than Caesar takes on being by being painted, and it is no more present to intellect through an intellection – speaking properly {253} and according to the word’s true force (*de virtute sermonis*) – than Caesar is present to someone through a picture. Still, the thing is made the object of intellect and appears to it, solely by there being an intellection. And that the thing is made an object and appears to intellect is nothing other than that an intellection of the thing exists within intellect.

To the Commentator, I say that an intelligible object’s existing within intellect or within a cognition is nothing other than its being understood or cognized.

To the final argument [A5] one can reply in a number of ways, in accord with various views. In one way, one can reply that the division is insufficient. For those who hold the *ficta* view (a view I’ve often recited) would say that when absolute rose is understood, what is understood is neither (a) a species informing intellect, nor (b) an act of intellect, nor (c) a thing made by intellect, nor (d) a subsistent thing beyond intellect, nor (e) all externally existing roses put into intentional and apparent being as if they were one whole rose. Rather, what is understood is one thing with objective being of the same sort as a particular rose has externally in subjective being. That is neither a species, nor the act, nor a thing made, nor a subsistent thing, nor external roses in any sort of being. Rather, it is one *fictum* in the soul that is not really the same as anything external, and it is common and universal, as I have explained elsewhere.

An alternative reply would come from those who hold that a concept or intention {254} of the soul is really an intellection. For they would say that the [a – e] division is insufficient because by such an intellection one would understand all external roses, but not put into intentional and apparent being as if they were one whole rose. Hence [they would say] that it is not possible, through any sort of causation, for external roses to be one whole rose. Still, these external roses serve as the end-term for an act of understanding, without any intermediary or other end-term.

Alternatively, it can be said that what is understood is some thing made by intellect in real being. And to the first argument to the contrary (c.i), which is not successful, they would say that not *every* intellection produces something. Likewise, even when something made follows from some intellection (as is true, at the least, when a disposition is generated) it still does not follow that something is made *outside* the soul, immediately (although mediated by an act of will, a thing sometimes is made outside). This is what the Philosopher means.

To the second argument to the contrary (c.ii), it should be said (as was said before) that there are two ways in which knowledge is of things: These things are either the parts of the proposition that is known, or they are the things for which the parts of the conclusion supposit.<sup>11</sup>

In the first way, knowledge is not of external things, but of other real things (*aliis rebus*). This would be one view. On another view, knowledge is of beings of reason. Yet I am not asserting this, that knowledge is not of external things. {255} Nor does it follow from this that propositions are not true, because this does not follow:

*The subject is a distinct thing from the predicate; therefore, the proposition is not true.*

For a proposition such as

*A human being is an animal*

or

*A human being is capable of laughter*

does not denote that the subject *is* the predicate, but that they *stand* for the same thing. This is why the proposition is true.

In the second way, knowledge is of external things, because the subject and predicate of a proposition, though not one thing, still supposit for the same thing. And in this way knowledge is of external things: That is, the terms of the proposition that is known supposit for external things.

The other options that he rejects are false, but even so his arguments are not successful. The first argument against the first option (a.i) is not successful, because others don't take it to be absurd that by such an intellection only the species is understood and not the external thing,

<sup>11</sup> See *Ordinatio* d. 2 q. 4 (*Op. Theol.* vol. II, pp. 134-38). For Ockham's view that the object of knowledge is a proposition (or conclusion), see Translations 11-12. Roughly, a word *supposits* for a thing when it *refers* to that thing.

though the thing would be understood by another intellection. In this way, those who posit fictive entities (which I have often discussed) would say that when a universal is understood, no external thing is understood. Still, when a singular is understood, whether by intuitive or abstractive cognition, it is the singular that is understood.

The second (a.ii) is also not successful, because it does not consider that knowledge might be only of species, but of ones that supposit for external things – as I say that knowledge is not of external things, since these [things known] are parts of the proposition that is known, but yet the parts supposit for external things. {256}

The third (a.iii) is also not successful, because although only the species would be understood, still the proposition would be true, because the subject and predicate would supposit for external things and for the same things.

The first argument against the second option (b.i) looks to be successful (*habet apparentiam*). The second (b.ii) is not successful, because it does not consider that what is understood, when a rose is understood, cannot be really multiplied, but nevertheless can be multiplied by equivalence, as is the nature of what is predicable of many (as I have explained elsewhere).<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, the first argument against the fourth option (d.i) is not successful, because when the Philosopher says in the *Categories* [2b5–6] that “if those that are primary are destroyed, it is impossible for any of the others to remain,” he does not mean that if the individuals are destroyed then no universal predicable of many can exist in the being appropriate to it. Rather, he means that if being is denied of every individual, it will be denied of every universal suppositing personally. This is true, but irrelevant.

The second argument (d.ii) looks to be successful, although it could be blocked. The third argument (d.iii) is not successful, because although the subject and predicate would be really distinct things, it would not follow that predications would be false, unless the subject and predicate were to supposit for themselves and not for the same things. {257} Nor does the fourth work (d.iv), because knowledge is of external things not inasmuch as it concerns the things that are known, but inasmuch as it concerns the things for which the terms of the propositions supposit. Likewise, definitions are of external things not inasmuch as they concern what they are

<sup>12</sup> See *Ordinatio* d. 2 q. 8 (*Op. Theol.* vol. II, pp. 274–75), where Ockham illustrates his point with the example of how a single genus is predicated of many different species.

adequately predicated of, but inasmuch as they concern the adequate supposit of what the definitions are predicated of.

Consequently, these arguments that he brings forward all (or almost all) go against his own claim. For I ask whether that which serves as the end-term of an act of understanding, when absolute rose is understood, is or is not external roses. If it is not external roses, then by his own arguments knowledge is not of external things. Also, if that rose is really the same as all roses, as he himself says, then neither definitions nor propositions will be true. Therefore just as the roses themselves are not produced, so neither is that [understood] rose put into such being.

Moreover, he says above [p. 224] that a true vision puts a thing into such apparent being much more than a false vision does. But through a false vision something is made that is not the thing itself that is understood; therefore, [this must occur] through a true vision. Therefore, that apparent thing is not really the particular roses themselves.

Moreover, if that understood rose is not distinct from particular roses but is the particular roses themselves, then there is nothing beyond those particular roses and that intellection. Therefore if those roses now appear on account of an intellection and did not before, then, since this happens only on account of the intellection and the intellection is {258} extrinsic to the particular roses themselves, it will only be an extrinsic denomination when that rose is said to appear, something that he denies.

Moreover, if that rose is the particular roses, and the particular roses have real being, then that rose has real being and not only intentional being.

And if one says that they have intentional being from the fact that they appear, this does not work. For I might just as easily say that from the fact that God creates, God has intentional being, since he has creating being.

Moreover, if that rose is the particular roses themselves, and the particular roses exist even though the appearance does not, then it is not due to the appearance that they are that rose.

Moreover, he says above [p. 226] that it's certain that that apparent rose is not particular and cannot be multiplied. Hence it is one in me and in you. From this I argue: That which is not a particular rose [and] cannot be multiplied is also not really all particular roses. But this is how that rose is, according to you; therefore, it is not the particular roses.

Moreover, it is constantly open to conclude that there is nothing beyond the real things themselves and the cognition itself, although on account of

the cognition a thing could now be denominated otherwise than before — just as God, on account of a creature's existing, is denominated in a new way now, compared with before, as he is said to be creating, beatifying, damning, punishing, etc. {259}

[Reply to the Question]

To the question I say that in the divine only the Son is the Word. This is clear, because only the Son is engendered, and every word is engendered. Therefore, only the Son is the Word. This is also clear from St. Augustine, *De trinitate* V [xiii.14], who says that the Father is said to be neither the Word nor the image nor the Son. For the same reason, the Holy Spirit is not the Word, and consequently only the Son is the Word. Likewise, at *De trinitate* XV [xvii.29], "in this Trinity, only the Son is said to be the Word of God." From these and many other [passages] it is clear that only the Son is the Word.

But given that only the Son is the Word (in such a way as to be called the Word only notionally and not essentially), there is a question whether 'Word' implies some relationship to creatures of a sort that neither 'Father' nor 'Holy Spirit' implies. And in general doctors defend one of three views:

- that the Word contains its own proper relationship to creatures;
- that it connotes a relationship to creatures;
- that it connotes creatures.<sup>13</sup>

I don't judge the first of these views to be true, because in the divine the only real relations are paternity, active spiration, filiation, and passive spiration. But none of these is a relation to creatures. Therefore, etc. Nor can it be said that it contains a relationship of reason, because either a relationship of reason should not be posited, or if it should be then it is not a real being and consequently does not belong to the essence of a real person. {260} The second and third views, as they stand, I don't judge to be true, because 'connote' does not apply to just any thing but only to the sign of a thing. As a result, the Divine Word no more connotes than does the Father or Holy Spirit.

<sup>13</sup> These views are defended, in turn, by Henry of Ghent (*Summa* 59.5), Thomas Aquinas (*Summa theol.* 1a 34.3), and John Duns Scotus (*Ordinatio* I.27.1-3).

So, as regards this article, I say in brief that the Word which is really the Son in God neither contains nor connotes a relationship, nor does it even connote creatures. Still, the term 'Word' is imposed to signify in such a way that it connotes creatures – due not to the nature of the thing, but to the imposition of the term. This is so because its nominal definition should contain the term 'creatures' in an oblique case, so that its nominal definition is this:

*The Divine Word is the Person engendered from the knowledge that has God and all creatures as its objects.*

But the term 'Son' does not have this sort of nominal definition. Its definition, if expressed, ought to be put this way:

*The Son is the Person engendered from the substance of the Father.*

In this definition, the term 'creatures' is not included in either the nominative or an oblique case. And for this reason, the term 'Son' does not connote creatures, whereas the term 'Word' does.

One might reply that the Divine Word and the Son are in no way distinct, neither in reality nor conceptually. Therefore, the Son connotes whatever the Divine Word connotes, and vice versa.

Moreover, not only is the Divine Word a Person engendered from the knowledge of the Father that has God and all creatures as {261} its cognitive objects. Equally, the Son of God is truly the Person engendered from the knowledge of God the Father that singly has God and all creatures as its cognitive objects. Therefore, 'Word' connotes creatures no more than 'Son' does.

To the first of these replies, it should be said that in the claim

*The Divine Word and the Son are in no way distinct, neither in reality nor conceptually*

if the terms 'Divine Word' and 'Son' supposit personally for what they signify, then it is true. In that case, if these terms are always taken in the same way, then neither the Word nor the Son connotes anything. As a result, the inference made there is not valid, because the consequent implies that the Word or the Son connotes something, which is false (as was said above). If, however, the terms 'Divine Word' and 'Son' supposit for themselves in the above proposition, then the antecedent is false. For when 'Divine Word' and 'Son' are taken in that way, they are not really



the same, because these terms are not really the same, and as a result one term connotes something that the other does not.

To the second, it should be said that the Son is the Person engendered from the knowledge of the Father, etc. — just as truly as the Divine Word is. Nevertheless, one proposition predicates a definition expressing {262} the nominal definition, whereas the other does not. As a result, one term connotes something that the other does not.

If one asks why a name for the second Person connotes creatures more than a name for another Person does, I say that just as one name for the second Person in the divine connotes creatures and another does not, because those names have different nominal definitions, so a name connoting creatures could be imposed for each Divine Person. For because the nominal definition of the term 'Word' is this:

*The Person engendered from the knowledge of the Father that singly has everything, God and creatures, etc.*

it follows that the term 'Word' connotes creatures. In just the same way, if this phrase:

*The Person engendered from his knowledge that singly has everything, etc.*

were the nominal definition of some<sup>o</sup> imposed term that was proper to the Father (just as this [definition] is proper to the Word),<sup>o</sup> then that term that is proper to the Father would connote creatures just as the term 'Word' does. For example,<sup>o</sup> if this phrase (or one like it in which the term 'creature' is included in an oblique or the nominative case) is the nominal definition for the term 'Speaker,' when taken purely notionally, then the term 'Speaker' will be proper to the Father and will connote creatures. And the same should be said for the Holy Spirit as for the Father. {263}

[To the Principal Arguments]

To the first principal argument [p. 220], it should be said that it's not the case that only the Son is a word. But only the Son is the Divine Word.

One might reply that in the preceding question it was said that every intellection is a word; but not only the Son is a divine intellection; therefore, not only the Son is the Divine Word. To this it should be said that the preceding question said that every intellection of a *created* intellect is a word, because every such intellection is engendered. But divine intel-

lection is not engendered, and so it is not at issue here. And as for whether one ought to grant that God's intellection, which is his essence, is the Word, this is not relevant to the question.

To the second, it should be said that the Divine Word is born precisely from the knowledge of the Father, and so is born precisely from the substance of the Father, as is the Son. For the essence of the Father and the knowledge of the Father are in no way distinct, neither in reality nor conceptually.

As for St. Augustine, when he says that "the Word was born from all the things that are in the Father," it should be said that he does not mean that the Word is born from all the things cognized through the knowledge of the Father. Rather, he means that the Word is born from the knowledge of the Father that singly is of all things cognized by the Father. This is how one should understand all the authoritative passages in which {264} Augustine seems to say that the Word is born from the things that are within the knowledge of the Father. That is: The Word is born from the knowledge of the Father that is singly of all things. This is how he speaks in many different places.