Re-reading *De grammatico*

or

Anselm’s introduction to Aristotle’s *Categories*¹

I. Restoring Anselm’s Good Name

In the mid-fifties, D.P. Henry began publishing a series of works² aimed at recovering St. Anselm’s reputation as a logician from blows suffered at the hands of nineteenth century commentators. Scandalized by the apparently nonsensical opening line of *De grammatico* — « Whether literate is substance or quality? » (« De grammatico ... utrum sit substantia an qualitas? ») — Cousin, Prantl, Maurice, and Hauréau found the work ridiculous. Hastening to usher it to the margin of Anselm’s corpus (the only piece — as they thought — devoted solely to logical matters), they rushed to conclude that for Anselm theology and logic have little to do with one another³. Inspired by F.S. Schmitt’s discovery of Anselm’s logical fragments⁴, Henry found them to shed new light, not only on *De Grammatico* but also on Anselm’s whole literary output, revealing Anselm to be a consummate logician whose formidable technical powers lent brilliance to his writings on other topics.

---

¹ Norman Kretzmann introduced me to D.P. Henry’s work on paronyms in the early sixties, when it first came out, and I have been worrying about it on and off ever since. More recently, I have benefitted from helpful discussions with Robert Merrihew Adams, Andrew Finch, and Calvin Normore.


Henry defends this worthy thesis by means of a distinctive interpretation, according to which Anselm the logician requires a level of technical precision that drives him to convert his Latin into a semi-artificial language that fits the truth of things, and to oppose himself to the ‘loose’ and ‘improper’ ‘context-dependent’ usage of ordinary speakers (iusus loquendi), of grammarians, and even of Scripture\textsuperscript{5}. In Henry’s estimate, it is Anselm’s animus against improper speech, his insistence upon distinguishing true logical form from surface grammar, his advocacy of linguistic reform, that makes Anselm the true pioneer and ‘father of Scholasticism’\textsuperscript{6}! For Henry, these features are also marks of kinship with the projects of mid-twentieth century Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Turning to De Grammatico in particular, Henry identifies its central task as the philosophically interesting one of developing a theory of the meaning of paronyms (terms such as ‘literate’ or ‘white’ derived from others with a variation of ending)\textsuperscript{7}. For Henry, Anselm’s fundamental insight — that the two-placed function ‘...is___’ can be taken more ways than one — is happily formulated and best appreciated through its translation into the formal system of Lesniewski’s Ontology.

We are all in Henry’s debt for books and articles that have not only enabled but forced us to recognize De Grammatico as a work with the philosophical texture characteristic of its author. It is to Henry, more than to anyone else except Anselm himself, that we owe our appreciation of Anselm’s subtlety as a logician, and our understanding that semantics is scarcely marginal to Anselm’s syllabus. All the same, I believe Henry has over-read and hence misrepresented the dialogue. I want to defend a different interpretation: that De Grammatico is Anselm’s own distinctive introduction to Aristotle’s Categories!

II. De Grammatico Semantics, Overviewed

The presenting problem of De Grammatico — «whether literate is a substance or a quality» (utrum sit substantia an qualitas) — arises because,
on the one hand, « every literate is a man and every man a substance » (omnis grammaticus homo, et omnis homo substantia) as everyone would in any event agree⁸ ; and on the other, philosophers, « authorities it would be impudent to reject » (viz., Aristotle in the Categories and Boethius in his Categories-commentary), assert that literate is a quality (grammaticus est qualitas). Yet, in the Categories, Aristotle seems to imply that category-membership is exclusive (either substance or quality, not both)⁹. Moreover, midway through, the student articulates the difficulty that helped to boggle the minds of nineteenth century interpreters: viz., that both 'literate is a quality' and 'literate is literacy' seem outrageous from the stand-point of spoken usage¹⁰.

Anselm seeks to unravel this puzzle by showing how both alternatives can be right at once. To this end, he develops a trio of semantic distinctions: [1] between 'proper'¹¹ or per se signification (what the term is 'significative' of) and appellation¹² ; [2] between per se versus per aliud signification¹³ ; and [3] between signifying significata as one (ut unum) or not as one¹⁴, respectively. Of these, [1] the first finds a parallel in the contemporary philosophical distinction between sense and reference: for a term signifies properly and per se those things that are included in its definition, but it is appellative of the things that are called (named or referred to) by it in spoken usage¹⁵. Alternatively, [2] a term signifies per se what it suffices to constitute an understanding of in the hearer’s mind (evidently, a hearer who knows the language) but signifies per aliud what the word isn’t sufficient to bring to mind all by itself. Accordingly, Anselm says that per se signification is essential (substantialis), per aliud accidental (accidentalis) to the word¹⁶.

⁸ De Grammatico, cap. I in S. ANSELMI CANTUARIENSIS ARCHIEPISCOPI Opera Omnia, vol. I, rec. F.S. SCHMITT, F. Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt 1984 (rist. an.), pp. 145, 14 - 146, 1. For a time the student operates on the assumption that this is a necessary truth, something of which the teacher seeks to disabuse him (ibid., cap. XIII, pp. 157, 10 - 158, 22).
¹¹ Ibid., cap. XII, p. 157, 4.
¹² Ibid., cap. XII, p. 156, 22-33 ; p. 157, 3-6.
¹³ Ibid., cap. XII, p. 156, 26-27 ; p. 157, 1-3 ; cap. XIV, pp. 159, 28 - 161, 4.
¹⁴ Ibid., cap. XII, pp. 156, 22 - 157, 8.
¹⁵ Ibid., cap. XII, p. 157, 5-6 : « ... Appellativum autem nomen cuiuslibet rei nunc dico, quo res ipsa usu loquendi appellatur ».
¹⁶ Ibid., cap. XVII, p. 163, 4-8.
Although [3] the third distinction is often stated as a contrast between how terms signify — whether they do or do not signify their significata ‘as one’ (ut unum)\(^{17}\) — the classification is applied as if relations among the significata themselves — whether or not they combine to constitute something ‘as one’ (ut unum) — can be a decisive negative criterion. Anselm recognizes three sorts of cases in which things combine to make one in the relevant sense: [i] the composition of parts of the same category (as when soul and body together constitute an animal); [ii] the combination of genus with one or more suitable differentiae (as when the genus body combines with multiple differentiae down the branches of Porphyry’s tree to constitute the species man); and [iii] when species (e.g., man) combines with a collection of properties to constitute an individual (e.g., Plato)\(^{18}\).

*De Grammatico*’s teacher and student agree that substance terms such as ‘man’ and paronyms such as ‘literate’ are alike in signifying both substance and quality. The above distinctions are applied to show how they do so in different ways\(^{19}\). Anselm reasons that because genus and differentia combine to constitute the essence of a species (and so satisfy condition [ii]), ‘man’ signifies them «as one» (ut unum). Moreover, because — according to the doctrine of the *Categories* — the one thing thereby constituted is substance and not quality, ‘man’ is both principally significative\(^{20}\) and appellative of substance, so that it is correct to say ‘a substance is man’ and ‘man is a substance’. But ‘man’ is not appellative of rationality, so that it is never right to say ‘rationality is man’ and ‘man is rationality’; rather one can say ‘rational is man’ and ‘man is rational’ in eo quod quale\(^{21}\).

By contrast, paronyms such as ‘literate’ or ‘white’ do not signify substance and quality «as one» because — according to the doctrine of the *Categories* — both literacy and whiteness are accidents, not differentiae of substance (and so do not satisfy condition [ii])\(^{22}\). The teacher is at pains to argue that neither signifies substance per se, on the ground that this would result in nugatory repetitions: say, if ‘literate man’ is well-formed, defining ‘literate’ as ‘man having literacy’ would yield ‘man man having literacy’ which is not well-formed; likewise since ‘something white’ is well-formed, defining ‘white’ as ‘something having whiteness’ would generate ‘something something having whiteness’\(^{23}\). Accordingly, he concludes

\(^{17}\) Ibid., cap. XII, pp. 156, 22 - 157, 8.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., cap. XX, p. 166, 2-10.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., cap. XII, p. 156, 22-24.
\(^{20}\) Ibid., cap. XII, p. 156, 32.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., cap. XII, pp. 156, 24 - 157, 1; cfr. cap. XIX, p. 165, 6-13.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., cap. XIII, p. 157, 24-27; cap. XX, p. 166, 5-10.
\(^{23}\) Anselm’s actual arguments for this conclusion are more complicated, and in my judgment,
that 'literate' or 'white' signifies having literacy or having whiteness per se, and so signifies both having and quality per se\(^{24}\), and — because they are of different categories and satisfy none of criteria [i]–[iii] — do not signify them « as one » (\textit{ut unum}) or signify one principally and the other secondarily but both equally\(^{25}\). At the same time, neither is ever appellative of having or quality because neither is used to refer to either having or quality in ordinary conversation.

Ordinary usage tells us that 'literate' is appellative of human beings who have literacy, just as 'white' is appellative of things that have whiteness. Anselm reasons that semantic connections between terms and things of which they are not \textit{per se} significative can only be established \textit{per aliud}, through something other than the term itself. Thus, when someone says that a white or a literate is in this building, the hearer does not understand through the meaning of 'white' or 'literate' alone what substance is in this building. But she may gather this from sense perception of or independent information she has about what substance has whiteness or literacy or from some past association she has made between certain substances and having whiteness or literacy. By contrast, when someone says that a man or a horse is in this building, the hearer knows from the meaning of 'man' or 'horse' alone what sort of substance is in the building\(^{26}\). Besides these 'extraneous' epistemological and psychological factors, genuine (or apparent) metaphysically necessary connections between the \textit{per se} significatum and other things — e.g., that nothing is literate except by participation in literacy\(^{27}\) — may help link words to their \textit{appellata}. Yet, the teacher warns the student, not everything that follows from the \textit{per se} significatum by metaphysical necessity is included within the term's signification\(^{28}\).

problematic. His arguments for an infinite progression of nugatory repetitions seem to involve equivocating between letting 'literate' = 'man having literacy' (\textit{ibid.}, cap. XIII, ed. cit., p. 158, 23-27) and letting 'literate' = 'having literacy' (\textit{ibid.}, cap. XIII, p. 158, 29); likewise, between equating 'white' with 'someone having whiteness' (\textit{ibid.}, cap. XXI, p. 167, 12-15) and 'having whiteness' (\textit{ibid.}, cap. XXI, p. 167, 17-18).

\(^{24}\) At first, the opening gambit focuses attention on the fact that 'literate' \textit{per se} signifies quality. It is only at the end, when the student is attempting to secure his understanding of what has been said, that they arrive at the further conclusion that 'literate' or 'white' would \textit{per se} signify both having and quality (\textit{ibid.}, cap. XIX, p. 164, 16-27), whereupon the teacher hastens to add that they would not signify them « as one » (\textit{ut unum}) either (\textit{ibid.}, cap. XIX, p. 165, 3-11) and so would not signify anything « principally » but would signify quality and having equally (\textit{ibid.}, cap. XIX, p. 165, 20-24).


\(^{26}\) \textit{Ibid.}, cap. XIV, pp. 159, 26 - 161, 4.

\(^{27}\) \textit{Ibid.}, cap. XVI, pp. 161, 30 - 162, 2.

\(^{28}\) \textit{Ibid.}, cap. XXI, p. 166, 28-32 : « Multa namque necesse est rem quamlibet esse, quae tamen
It is easy to move from the *de voce* comment that ‘literate’ appellates human beings who have literacy to the *de re* assertion that a literate is a man and therefore a substance, as argued at the outset of *De Grammatico*. To get from the *de voce* claim that ‘literate’ *per se* signifies literacy and so *per se* signifies a quality, to the other disjunct — that literate *is* a quality — requires some hermeneutical clues, which the teacher supplies. The first is that (on his/Anselm’s reading) Aristotle’s principal intention in the *Categories* (as its very first line suggests) is not to speak about what *things* there are (although, since words signify things, ontology is presupposed in discussions of semantics); neither is it to discuss what words are appellative of, but what they are significative of — *i.e.*, what they signify *per se*²⁹. This explains why Aristotle and his followers never use words to exemplify the categories of things they are merely appellative of, but rather the categories of those they signify *per se*, and so why they instance literate in connection with quality and not with substance³⁰. The second is that « this same Aristotle » « in this same book » appellates words by the names of the things of which they are significative (e.g., he writes « every substance seems to signify a certain ‘this’ », instead of « every word that signifies substance »). It is this distinctive usage, adopted also by his followers, that explains why, when logicians ask « what is literate? » (*quid sit grammaticus?*) they customarily expect the reply « literate is a quality » (*grammaticus est qualitas*)³¹. This sounds absurd to non-logicians, because they misconstrue the logicians’ words to imply that ‘literate’ is appellative of quality.

It is tempting to recap Anselm’s solution as follows: where logicians’ usage is concerned, it is necessary to distinguish two sets of truth conditions for statements of the form ‘*S is P*’ — one for those statements in which the substitution for ‘*S*’ exercizes its appellative function (as in ‘Plato is a man’ and ‘A literate is a man’); and another for those in which the substitution for ‘*S*’ exercizes, not its appellative function, but its function of signifying something *per se* (as in ‘literate is literacy’ or ‘literate is a quality’). Looking back through the lenses of later medieval supposition theory and even of mid-twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy of language, it is natural to read the text as implying (without explicitly stating) the following pair: [i] a statement of the form ‘*S is P*’ in which the substitution for ‘*S*’ exercizes its

appellative function is true if and only if the substitution for ‘S’ names something that is likewise named by the substitution for ‘P’; while [ii] a statement of the form ‘S is P’ in which the substitution for ‘S’ does not exercise its appellative function but only functions to signify something per se, is true, if and only if the substitution for ‘S’ signifies per se something that the substitution for ‘P’ names. Thus, ‘a literate is a man’ would be true by [i] because ‘literate’ names something that ‘man’ also names; while ‘literate is literacy’ would be true by [ii] because ‘literate’ signifies per se something that ‘literacy’ names — viz., the quality of literacy.

The obvious objection to this proposal is that Anselm does not explicitly say that substitutions for ‘P’ in statements of the form ‘S is P name’ anything. In this dialogue, he does not discuss how subject versus predicate position affects a term’s semantic function in the proposition. Not only does he not say that « abstract » nouns such as ‘literacy’ (grammatica) and ‘whiteness’ (albedo) ever name anything, he gives no attention to the semantics of abstract nouns in De Grammatico. Focussed as he is on paronyms, he does not even — pace Henry — fill out his account of substance terms such as ‘man’. For example, the teacher’s comment (in De Grammatico, cap. XII) that ‘man’ is both principally significative and appellative of substance, seems compatible with the interpretation that the subject term in ‘man is a substance’ is appellative of the species man rather than individual humans such as Plato. Such species-appellation would seem to qualify as per se signification, since the word ‘man’ does seem sufficient to bring the species to mind (where the hearer knows the language). But if Anselm mentions how substance species and substance individuals are differently constituted (cf. ut-unum conditions [ii] and [iii] above), he fails to make explicit whether ‘man’ would appellite Plato per se (which runs contrary to Anselm’s criterion) or per aliud (as seems to fit it). When Anselm returns to the topic in his Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, he confirms that « in the name ‘man’ ... only the nature is understood » with the result that « ‘man’ signifies only the nature that is common to all men » . By contrast, by ‘this man’ or ‘that man’ or the proper name ‘Jesus’ is understood and therefore designated (designari) a person which includes both the nature common to all men and the collection of properties by which he is distinguished from others — from which it seems to follow that such « singular

---

32 Henry, The Logic of St. Anselm cit., 2.13, p. 20; cfr. Id., Commentary on « De Grammatico » cit., n. 4, 232b, 204; n. 4, 232c, 207; n. 4, 233a, 208.
33 De Grammatico, cap. XX, ed. cit., p. 166, 2-10.
36 Ibid., cap. XI, p. 29, 6-12; 24-26.
terms » appellate their individuals per se. But in this later work, Anselm skirts the issue of whether species terms appellate individual humans per aliud to mount the alternative suggestion that (what are later called) indefinite propositions (e.g., ‘homo currit’, ‘homo est albus’) are elliptical for statements in which a demonstrative pronoun or proper name is supplied (e.g., ‘iste homo currit’, ‘ille homo est albus’, ‘Plato est albus’)

III. Henry’s Interpretation: Anselmian Technical-Speak?

Henry is mightily impressed by Anselm’s De Grammatico semantics, and bills it as an ambitious achievement of a highly technical sort.

3.1. Tightening the Usage Henry looks to the Schmitt Fragments for his clue in recontextualizing De Grammatico. In the former work, Anselm detects systematic deviations of improper from proper usage. His procedure is to identify and/or clarify the proper usage and then catalogue the improper ones. For example, letting ‘to do’ (facere) serve as a « dummy » for which other verbs may be substituted, Anselm explains that ‘x does so that p’ (e.g., ‘x does so that y is dead’) is used properly to say that x is the cause of p’s being the case (e.g., x kills y directly). But that same form of words is often improperly used to mean that x does not do so that not-p (x does not take steps to insure that y is not dead), or that x does so that q (where q is not identical with p) (e.g., x provides z with arms to kill y), or that x does not do so that q (e.g., x does not provide x with arms), or that x does so that not-q (x deprives y of arms), or that x does not do so that not-q (x does not deprive z of arms). Similar analyses are offered for modal verbs such as ‘ought’ (debere) and ‘will’ (velle), along


38 HENRY, The Logic of St. Anselm cit., 4.011, p. 119. But having re-read Anselm’s theological corpus through the lens of the Schmitt Fragments, he at one point concludes that we should be able to recognize Anselm’s logical prowess even without them (Ibid., 2.132, p. 22), because the theme of identifying and advocating proper versus improper usage is « identical » in each.


with treatments of generic subject terms such as ‘cause’ and ‘something’ (aliquid). Henry thinks Anselm offers these analyses as tools for linguistic reform, as a guide for detecting and replacing improper with proper usage. And Henry hears the same theme sounded repeatedly in Anselm’s theological corpus.

Turning to De Grammatico, Henry notes Anselm’s own association (in connection with substance-terms) of proper with per se signification, and concludes that per aliud signification must be improper. Surely, semantic linkage that is derivative from something else, is not in the best sense the word’s own! Focussing on Anselm’s explicit comment (in connection with paronyms) that their appellation is per aliud, Henry lumps appellation together with the other improper usages catalogued in the Schmitt Fragments. But in De Grammatico, it is the logicians who are interested in per se signification, while people in general, the ‘peasants’ (rustici, as Henry notes, monastic slang for the less well educated brethren), and the usage-based grammarians look to the appellative function, which (as Anselm’s explanatory examples show) is context-dependent. Henry reasons that since the Schmitt Fragments and the De Grammatico are the only works in Anselm’s corpus devoted exclusively to logic, the latter would share in the former’s aim at linguistic reform. Consequently, Henry understands Anselm to be not only expounding but endorsing the logicians’ technical language, as over against and in preference

---

44 Henry, The Logic of St. Anselm cit., 2.132, p. 22.
46 Ibid., 2.13, p. 20 ; 3.23, pp. 88-89.
47 Ibid., 2.14, p. 23, where Henry writes : « ... it is clear that an utterance used in its per se, proper, sense accords with the requirements of a logical language, free from redundancies and regresses. In the case of a sentence we have a showing forth of exactly that which is essentially or properly signified by the utterance: the true logical form as opposed to the apparent or grammatical form (cfr. sec. 4, sec. 6) ».
48 Ibid., 1.1, p. 5.
49 Ibid., 2.14, p. 22 - 2.15, p. 243. Especially, 2.15, p. 23 : « In contrast the realm of oblique signification, of usus loquendi, the current course of non-technical utterance, is one wherein word-tokens are, in particular contexts, deployed loosely, non-strictly, or even, by logical standards improperly. This comes out most clearly in the case of verbs, as when ordinary usage permits the employment of affirmative verb-forms where, strictly speaking, negative forms are called for (N 26-27, cfr. sec. 4.2). The paronyms which are treated in De Grammatico best exemplify the manner in which the per se import of names becomes engaged in the contingencies of extra-linguistic contexts and purposes ».
50 Ibid., 2.11, p. 12 ; 2.13, pp. 20-21 ; 2.131, p. 21 ; 2.14, p. 22.
to the grammarians\textsuperscript{51}. Henry takes the dialogue to be ‘logicians against grammarians’, and sees Anselm as out to overturn Priscian’s tag that all nouns signify both substance and quality\textsuperscript{52}.

3.2. Two Senses of ‘...is___’ Turning to the logician’s proposal itself, Henry detects the teacher’s effort from the beginning to distinguish two senses of ‘...is___’ which he endeavors to communicate to the student who is always slipping from the technical back into the ordinary/grammarian’s usage. For instance, the student’s very first argument against the proposition that literate is a substance — ‘No literate can be understood without literacy, but every man can be understood without literacy; therefore no literate is a man’ — occasions an extended discussion of ellipsis, and how one form of words may be understood in several different ways and so in effect has multiple ‘subauditiones’\textsuperscript{53}. Counseling that it is not words but thought (sententia) that binds the syllogism\textsuperscript{54}, the teacher agrees that the explicit premisses ‘every man can be understood to be man without literacy while no literate can be understood to be literate without literacy’ do not entail ‘literate is not man’ the way the student understands it (i.e., to imply that human beings are not among the things ‘literate’ appellates), but they do entail ‘literate is not man’ when it is taken as equivalent to ‘literate is not the same as man’ or ‘literate does not have the same definition as man’\textsuperscript{55}. Over the next several chapters, the teacher has several times to admonish the student, that ‘the definition of S is not the same as the definition of P’ (‘S is not P’ taken the second way) does not entail the falsity of ‘S is P’ or even ‘Every S is P’ (taken the first way, where ‘S’ is understood to function appellatively), but only the truth of ‘it is possible that some S is not P’ (once again, where ‘S’ has its appellative function)\textsuperscript{56}. And,

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 2.11, p. 12 ; 2.12, pp. 12,17-18 ; 2.13, pp. 18, 20 ; 2.14, pp. 22-23 ; 3.133, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 3.124, p. 64. At Ibid., 3.124, pp. 66-67 ; 3.131, p. 67, Henry says that Anselm rejects the grammarians thesis because he denies that ‘grammaticus’ signifies substance ; at Ibid., 3.124, p. 65, because grammarians put ‘homo’ and ‘grammaticus’ on a par. My contention is that Anselm accepts the grammarians’ thesis but then nuances it with logical distinctions.
\textsuperscript{53} De Grammatico, capp. II-IV, ed. cit., pp. 146, 10 - 149, 14.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., cap. IV, p. 149, 11-14 : « Communis terminus syllogismi non tam in prolacione quam in sententia est habendus. Sic enim nihil efficitur, si communis est in voce et non in sensu : ita nihil obest, si est in intellectu et non in prolacione. Sententia quippe ligat syllogismum, non verba ». (Italics mine).
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., cap. V, p. 149, 30-33 : « Non tamen ideo consequitur grammaticum non esse hominem, sicut tu intelligebas. Sed si ita intelligas : grammaticus non est homo, ac si dicitur : grammaticus non est idem quod homo, id est non habent eandem definitionem : vera est conclusio ».
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., capp. VII-IX, pp. 150, 32 - 154, 21.
of course, it is the second understanding of ‘S is P’/‘S is not P’ that the teacher eventually attributes to Aristotle and his followers, when they contend that literate is a quality.

Henry, however, has quite different ideas (from those ‘floated’ in section II above) about truth conditions for the logicians’ use of ‘S is P’/‘S is not P’ to express claims about per se signification. More precisely, he wishes to offer an account according to which only literates and havers of literacy but not any such thing as the quality of literacy, would be named. Inspired by the suggestions of C. Lejewski, Henry is convinced that this can best be done by translating Anselm’s statements into the formulae of S. Lesniewski’s formal system called Ontology. This system can be developed from a single primitive term ‘...is___’ that takes names or name-like expressions — whether empty (such as ‘Pegasus’ or ‘the present king of France’) or non-empty, shared (such as ‘man’ or ‘literate’) or unshared (such as ‘Cicero’ or ‘the present President of the United States’). Letting lower case letters such as ‘a’ and ‘b’ be variables ranging over such names and name-like expressions, a statement

\[(1) \text{ } a \text{ is } b \]

is true, if and only if ‘a’ is a non-empty unshared name, and ‘b’ is a non-empty shared or unshared name, and ‘a’ names something named by ‘b’ (compare with [i] above). For example, ‘Cicero is Tully’ and ‘The present President of the United States is a man’ are true instances of (1), but ‘Pegasus is a horse’ and ‘The present President of the United States is a woman’ are false. Once the truth conditions for the primitive ‘...is___’ are established, it is also possible to define a higher-order ‘...is*___’ whose completions do not function as names or name-like expressions, but rather are predicate expressions. Paradigm predicate expressions are verbs such as ‘runs’ that can combine with a name-like expression to form a proposition. But in the end, Henry expands the class of predicates to include infinitives such as ‘to run’ and many other sorts of expression as well. Before defining the higher-order ‘...is*___’, it is helpful to define the notion of Weak Identity as follows:

\[(2) \text{ For all } a \text{ and } b, a \text{ is weakly identical with } b, \text{ if and only if for all } c, c \text{ is } a \text{ if and only if } c \text{ is } b. \]

That is, an instance of ‘a is weakly identical with b’ is true, if and only if the

58 HENRY, Commentary on « De Grammatico » cit. Acknowledgements; Id., The « De Grammatico » of St. Anselm cit., pp. VII-VIII.
59 Henry uses symbols, but I will give the more nearly 'Englished' versions of his translations.
60 To use the notation of HENRY, The Logic of St. Anselm cit., 3.3, pp. 102 ff.
term substituted for ‘a’ names all and only the same things as the term 
substituted for ‘b’ (i.e., if and only if the terms substituted for ‘a’ and ‘b’ have 
extactly the same extension). Now letting upper case letters such as ‘F’ and ‘G’ 
be variables ranging over predicate expressions, the higher-order ‘...is*___’ 
can be defined as follows:

(3) For all F and G, F is* G, if and only if (for some a, F of a and G of a ; and
for all b, F of b if and only if a is weakly identical with b).

To say that F is* G is thus to say that for some a, a satisfies F and G and 
everything that satisfies F satisfies G. For example, the statement ‘To run is*
to move’ means that for some a, a satisfies to-run and to-move (i.e., a runs and 
moves) and everything that satisfies to-run (i.e., that runs) satisfies to-move 
(i.e., moves). Given this analysis, it is clear that neither ‘to run’ nor ‘to move’ 
functions to name anything ; and the only things that purport to be named are 
things that run and things that move, not the properties of running and 
motion themselves. Further, since the right hand side of (3) may be true even 
if the name substituted for ‘a’ is an empty name, neither the right hand side of 
(3) nor the statement ‘F is* G’ entails the existence of any particulars either. 
Henry’s proposal is that Anselm understood statements of the form ‘S is P’ in
which the substitution for ‘S’ does not exercise its appellative function but 
functions only to signify something per se, to be instances of ‘F is* G’ as 
analyzed by (3), with truth conditions to be rendered accordingly.

In order to apply this hypothesis to Anselm’s statements, Henry finds it 
worthwhile to define still other functions, of which two must be mentioned
here. In English and Latin, there is sometimes a name-like expression that is 
cognate with a given predicate expression (e.g., ‘deputy’ with ‘deputizes’ or
‘rex’ with ‘regnat’). But within Lesniewski’s Ontology, it is possible to define 
a function ‘trm {F}’ which makes available a name-like expression 
corresponding to any given predicate expression ‘F’:

(4) For all a and F, a is trm {F}, if and only if a is a and F of a.

For example, if ‘F’ is ‘runs’, then ‘trm {F}’ is ‘runner’. And an instance of the
statement ‘a is trm {F}’ is true if and only if the term substituted for ‘a’ is a non-
empty, unshared name and the thing it names satisfies F. On the other hand,
one can also define a function ‘Cl[a]’ which makes a predicate expression 
available corresponding to any given name-like expression ‘a’:

(5) For all a and b, Cl[a] of b, if and only if b is weakly identical with a.

‘Cl[a]’ can be read as ‘being a’.

Turning now to Anselm’s assertion
(6) Literate is literacy (*Grammaticus est grammatica*),

Henry offers the following translation (where ‘G’ is a constant abbreviating ‘literacy’ and ‘g’ is a constant abbreviating ‘literate’):

\[(6.1) \text{Cl}[g] \text{ is}^* \text{Cl[trm } [G]]\]

which can be read as ‘Being literate is* having of literacy’\(^{61}\). Again, since Anselm says that « the being of each thing rests in its definition » (*esse uniuscuiusque in definitione consistat*), Henry renders Anselm’s statement

(7) Being literate is not being a man (*Esse grammatici non est esse hominis*)

by the following (where ‘h’ is a constant abbreviating ‘man’):

\[(7.1) \text{It is not the case that Cl}[g] \text{ is}^* \text{Cl}[h]\]

Again, Henry formulates Anselm’s claim

(8) The essence of man is not the essence of literate (*Essentia hominis non est essentia grammatici*)

by

\[(8.1) \text{It is not the case that Cl}[h] \text{ is}^* \text{Cl}[g]\]

Assuming that ‘literate’ is appellative in the statements

(9) Every literate is a man (*Omnis grammaticus est homo*),

and

(10) Every man is literate (*Homo est grammaticus*),

they are analyzed as

\[(9.1) \text{For all } a, a \text{ is } g \text{ only if } a \text{ is } h\]

and

\[(10.1) \text{For some } a, a \text{ is } h \text{ only if } a \text{ is } g.\]

With this construal, Henry is also able to win the result that (6) and (9) do not conflict, and so neither do the consequent assertions ‘Literate is a quality’ and ‘Literate is a substance’.

\(^{61}\) Henry, Commentary on « De Grammatico » cit., n. 344a, p. 117.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., n. 344a, p. 116.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., n. 3.543a, p. 129.
3.3. Trimming the Ontology

Henry emphasizes that these ‘Lesniewski’ translations of Anselm’s statements have the further merit of not turning Anselm into a « crude realist », where a crude realist is one who thinks that one or more of the terms in statements about properties such as ‘Literate is literacy’ or ‘Man is a species’ name abstract universal entities, which « are separate entities to be numbered as additions to concrete individuals in the world »64. Once again, when such statements are analyzed as involving Lesniewski’s higher-order ‘...is*____’, neither term is seen to name anything.

Henry’s inference assumes that philosophers admit into their ontological domain only those entities that their semantic theory allows terms to name, whereas De Grammatico, cap. XVII, attributes to Aristotle the alternative assumption that a philosopher’s ontology must be wide enough to include whatever he allows terms to signify per se:

« It was not his [Aristotle’s] aim to show the nature of individual things, nor what things individual words are appellative of; rather he wanted to show what things they signify. Since, however, words signify only things (res), he had to indicate what those things are in order to indicate what it is that words signify ... »65.

It would seem to follow that since words signify only things per se, while ‘literate’ signifies literacy per se, literacy is a thing. Likewise, if ‘man’, ‘being a man’, and ‘the essence of man’ signify the essence of man per se, it would seem to follow that the essence of man is a thing, too. To determine whether these consequences are tantamount to crude realism, it would be necessary to inquire what sort of thing literacy or the essence of man is.

Not to worry! Henry contends that Lesniewski-translations are available for ‘Literate is a thing’ and ‘The essence of man is a thing’ as well. Just as ‘is’ receives different analyses in ‘A literate is a man’ and ‘Literate is literacy’, so ‘thing’ can be given different analyses in ‘Plato is a thing’ and ‘Literacy is a thing’. Identifying the notion of being a thing or being an object with that of being exactly one, Henry contrasts ‘There exists (lower-level) exactly one a’, which is analyzed by

(11) For all a, there exists exactly one a, if and only if for some b, a is b,

with ‘There exists* exactly one F’, which is analyzed by

(12) For all F, there exists* exactly one F, if and only if for some G, F is* G.


And the right hand side of (12) is analyzed in turn by (3) into an extensional statement in which only things that have $F$ and things that have $G$ purport to be named. Thus, if ‘Literacy is a thing’ is construed as an instance, not of (11) but of (12), the resultant statement is one in which only things that have literacy purport to be named. And since only concrete things can have literacy, ‘Literacy is a thing’ will not, so construed, entail the existence of anything distinct from and additional to concrete individuals$^{66}$.

IV. Diagnostic Doubts.

In my judgment, Henry’s zeal to link Anselmian with contemporary projects pulls his interpretation out of focus at a number of points.

4.1. Anselm Against the Grammarians? Anselm does agree with Bertrand Russell that the grammatical form of an utterance is not always reliable as to the logical form of the statement made. But Henry turns this into an Anselmian campaign against the grammarians, which — in De Grammatico — is supposed to reveal itself in Anselm’s rejection of their thesis that every noun signifies both substance and quality$^{67}$. In fact, the grammarians themselves rarely get mentioned in De Grammatico. If the student’s question and the resultant title could be a winking allusion, they find their prosaic explanation in Aristotle’s giving ‘literate’ as an example of paronyms in the Categories$^{68}$. Otherwise, there are two key passages that figure among Henry’s favorites. Mid-dialogue, the student numbers grammarians among those who would find the logicians’ usage ridiculous:

« To be sure, no one who understands the name ‘literate’ is ignorant that ‘literate’ signifies man and literacy. Yet, if on the strength of this, I were to


$^{67}$ After recognizing as «another tradition of which Anselm was the inheritor» that of «the grammarians, represented principally by Priscian, according to whom names in general signify both substance and quality» (ibid., 3.124, p. 64), Henry insists that Anselm rejects it: «We do in fact find this grammatically-inherited thesis proposed in De Grammatico 11 as a solution to the alternatives proposed in the incipit of the dialogue. The proposal is rejected on the ground that it reduces to uniformity both substance-signifying and quality-signifying names» (ibid., 3.124, p. 65).

$^{68}$ Categories, 1, 1a 12; 8, 10a 26 – 10b 12.
speak in public (*in populo*) and say ‘useful knowledge is literate’ or ‘this man knows literate well’, not only would the grammarians be irritated but the unlearned would laugh. So I find myself unable to believe that authors of logic treatises have both often and seriously written in their books what they would be embarrassed to say in conversation. For very often, when they want to give an example of quality of accident, they add ‘such as literate and the like’, when universal speaker-usage attests that literate is more substance than quality of accident »69.

And, towards dialogue’s end, the teacher winds up his response to this objection by a reference to the grammarians’ own technical usage:

« M. For it shouldn’t bother us that the logicians write one way about words insofar as they are significative and use them another way in speech insofar as they are appellative, if the grammarians also say one thing so far as the form of the words (*secundum formam vocum*) and another so far as the nature of things (*secundum rerum naturam*) is concerned. Certainly, they say that ‘lapis’ (stone) is of the masculine gender, ‘petra’ (stone) feminine, ‘mancipium’ (slave) neuter; and that ‘timere’ is active while ‘timeri’ is passive. But no one says that *lapis* is masculine or *petra* feminine or *mancipium* neither masculine nor feminine, or that fear is a doing and being feared a being acted upon »70.

On the face of it, however, this remark does not sound so much like a rejection of the grammarians and promotion of the logicians as it does the citation of a parallel to help situate and reassure the student: « You are already familiar from your study of grammar with specialists using technical terminology to expound their subject-matter. Well, logicians have there technical usage, too ».

Moreover, once one takes to heart the proto-*quaestio* structure of the dialogue, it becomes obvious that — so far from rejecting Priscian’s tag that every noun signifies both substance and quality — Anselm uses it to structure the dialogue, deploying the superficial parity between ‘man’ and ‘literate’ to force an articulation of their subtle semantic differences. Recall how the student poses the question — whether literate is substance or quality — and at the prompting of the teacher produces apparently ‘necessary reasons’ for each disjunct, as well as an argument for the impossibility of both disjuncts being true together71. Textual inspiration for each of these considerations can be found in Aristotle’s *Categories* itself72. The teacher’s immediate response is to insist on (what Henry takes to be) the

70 Ibid., cap. XVIII, p. 164, 7-14.
71 Ibid., cap. I, p. 145, 8-9, 14 ; p. 146, 8.
72 Aristotle gives ‘literate’ as an example of quality in *Categories*, 4, 1b 30 ; 8, 10a 27-10b 12.
grammarians' 'both/and' thesis, to refuse the assignment of proving one or the other disjunct false, and to adopt instead the project of showing their compatibility. The teacher then directs the student to do what the latter expected of the teacher: to argue against the first conjunct of the 'both/and' thesis. Most of the arguments they collaborate in formulating against 'literate is a substance' draw their textual inspiration from Aristotle's *Categories*, in particular, from the distinctive features Aristotle lists as distinguishing substance from quality. Several times, the teacher begins by citing other *Categories*-passages to contradict the student's conclusion before proceeding to unravel the argument itself. Such considerations against 'literate is substance' having been exhausted, they arrive — in *De Grammatico*, cap. IX — at the 'both/and' conclusion. Invited to bring further objections, the student cites (in the passage quoted above) the fact that non-logicians would regard the second conjunct — 'literate is a quality' — as nonsensical, and protests that the 'both/and' thesis does not explain the logicians' practice of instancing 'literate' only for quality and 'man' only for substance. The teacher's response to this is not to reject but to complicate (what Henry takes to be the grammarians') 'both/and' thesis by explaining how 'man' and 'literate' signify substance and quality differently (*dissimiliter significent*). For his part, the student spends the rest of the dialogue trying to understand and learn to apply the semantic distinctions the teacher promulgates, by raising questions and objections, once again, mostly taking their departure from Aristotle's text. Even the virtually closing concession that some paronyms (including 'literate' and 'white') *per se* signify having (*habere*) is not offered so much in the spirit of a

Aristotle says that both man and animal are called grammatical in *Categories*, 5, 3a 4-6. And the most obvious (if not in Anselm's mind uncontroversial; cfr. *De Grammatico*, cap. XIX, ed. cit., pp. 164, 30-165, 3) construal of Aristotle's doctrine in the *Categories* is that each thing (*res*) can be a member of only one category — category-membership is exclusive!  

74 [Secondary] substance ('man') is said of but not in a subject (*Categories*, 2, 1a 20 ff and 5, 3a 7), while quality is in a subject (2, 1a 20 ff); substance does not admit of more or less (5, 3b 33) while quality does admit of more or less (e.g., literate and white) (8, 10b 26). Substance does not signify *in eo quod quale* but rather the substance of a certain quality (4, 3b 23).  
76 *Ibid.*, cap. IX, p. 154, 19-21: « M. Quid ergo mirum si quis dicit quia grammaticus est substantia et non est in subiecto secundum hominem ; et grammaticus est qualitas et in subiecto secundum grammaticam ? ».  
80 *Ibid.*, cap. XIX, p. 164, 16-27. Henry seems to ignore this case at *Logic of St. Anselm* cit., 3.131, p. 67, when he writes: « ... for Anselm, the distinction between names which are paronymous and
rejection of the grammarians’ thesis — that all nouns signify both substance and quality — as a complicating precision!

4.2. Ellipsis versus True Logical Form In *De Grammatico* as in the *Schmitt Fragments*, Anselm is interested in what contemporary philosophers have called the true logical form of an utterance. In both works, he stresses that it is what is understood rather than the conventional-language expression that is key. The teacher presses the student to see that conventional language utterances should not always be taken at face-value when assessing the validity of inferences. It is because this caution is not heeded at first that the student thinks ‘no literate can be understood without literacy’ and ‘every man can be understood without literacy’ entail the falsity of ‘a literate is a man’.

In *De Grammatico*, however, Anselm does not anticipate Russell’s approach in proposing a single deep-structure analysis corresponding to a given surface-grammar form — so that ‘The *F* is *G*’ gets a constant analysis in terms of ‘there is one and only one thing *x* that is *F* and *x* is *G*’. Rather, for Anselm, ellipsis is looser, so that a given conventional-language schema is susceptible of alternative, non-equivalent construals. For example, not only can ‘no *F* is *G*’ be understood either to mean ‘nothing that «*F*» appellates is *G*’ or ‘*F* is not the same as *G*’ (i.e., ‘the essence of *F* is not the same as the essence of *G*’ or ‘*F* and *G* do not have the same definition’, e.g., where ‘literate’ is substituted for ‘*F*’ and ‘man’ for ‘*G*’) . It can also be understood as if it were said ‘*F* is in no way *G*’ (e.g., where ‘stone’ is substituted for ‘*F*’ and ‘man’ for ‘*G*’). Likewise, as Henry himself notes (see section 3.1 above), the *Schmitt Fragments* spell out multiple ways in which ‘*x* does so that *p*’ are used improperly. To discover which expansion is the correct one, Anselm thinks, it is necessary on the one hand to consider which interpretation would make the statement come out true, and on the other what were the author’s/speaker’s likely

those which are not is sufficient to distinguish between names which do not signify substance and those which do ...


85 Cfr. *ibid.*, cap. VII, pp. 151, 25 - 152, 7, where the teacher explains that while ‘no man can be understood without rationality’ and ‘every stone can be understood without rationality’ can be expanded into ‘no man can in any way be understood without rationality’ and ‘every stone can in whatever way be understood without rationality’. 
intentions. Yet, such considerations make the logical ‘deep-structure’ of an assertion context-dependent — a feature Henry numbers among the defects of ordinary usage, and one he insists would be banished from the technical language of logic.

Ironically, Henry’s hypothesis that it is the logician’s own usage — by contrast with that of ordinary speakers or grammarians — that will lay bare true logical form, fails to fit the case he is most interested in. For the assertion ‘literate is a quality’ is one that does not make its logical form explicit, either on Anselm’s reading (according to which it means that ‘literate’ per se signifies a quality) or on Henry’s own (where (6) is rendered by (6.1), which in turn receives a reductive extensional analysis via (4) and (5)). Anselm and Henry agree in finding ‘literate is a quality’ just as misleading as to its logical form (ab esse ad posse valet consequentia; it has misled the student) as Russell argues ‘The present king of France is bald’ is!

4.3. Appellation as ‘Loose’ Use? Henry equates ‘the realm of’ per aliud with ‘oblique signification’, with ‘usus loquendi’ and ‘the current course of non-technical utterance’, and declares it « one wherein word-tokens are, in particular contexts, deployed loosely, non-strictly, or even, by logical standards improperly ». If the Schmitt Fragments explore the clear case of verbs whose affirmative forms are deployed by ordinary usage when strict logic would require their negative forms (i.e., when we say ‘x does so that p’ but mean ‘x does not do so that not-p’), De Grammatico paronyms « best exemplify the manner in which the per se import of names becomes engaged in the contingencies of extra-linguistic contexts and purposes (...) In such contexts those tokens may be said (...) to suggest more than the word itself essentially symbolizes. And even in those instances where long-term association of a parronym with a given type of object (as ‘literate’ with man) has generated a disposition on the part of speakers and hearers to anticipate such an object on the occasions of the parronym’s use, any mention, within the statements of the per se signification, of the sort of object thus anticipated is, strictly speaking, improper, and really appertains to the oblique, per aliud signification of the paronym (De Grammatico, 14, sec.3.23) ».

Perhaps intending to gesture at the same point, Henry insists:

« ... The example [of a white horse] also demonstrates how the account of the
per se signification of a paronym sets up no theoretical connexion with, and in principle leaves unrestricted, the range of substantial objects (in the sense defined in sec. 2.122) in respect of which that paronym may happen to be used in ordinary speech, i.e. of which it may be appellative 88.

Henry goes on to contrast « the meaning and reference of names » generally and to insist that it is but one species of the generic opposition « between the signification essential to words insofar as they are significant utterances and the accidental component of their signification that they take on in concrete use »89.

To digest and evaluate this thesis, several points need to be taken into account. (i) First, Anselm’s criterion of per aliud signification — viz., what it is accidental to the word to bring to mind — would not automatically classify every case of appellation as per aliud. We have seen (in section II) how the text of De Grammatico does not rule out the possibility that common substance terms (such as ‘man’) and proper substance terms (such as ‘Plato’) appellate what they signify per se.

(ii) Second, it seems relevant to bring up the contemporary distinction between denotation, which is a relation between words and things, and reference, which also brings in a relation to the speaker/hearer. As noted already in section II above, Anselm’s suggestion that the connection between paronyms and what they appellate is established by epistemological and psychological factors in the speaker/hearer, invites us to assimilate appellation to reference. By contrast, personal supposition in thirteenth and fourteenth century logic is a relation between a term in its propositional context and things for which it stands, and so seems better compared to denotation. Characteristically, theories of personal supposition do posit a theoretical connection between the definition of a term and its personal supposition, so that, for example, ‘white’ would have personal supposition only for things that have whiteness. But — pace Henry — Anselm also suggests a systematic connection between paronyms such as ‘literate’ or ‘white’ and their appellata: viz., that the latter must have (or at least the speaker/hearer must believe them to have) the quality that the paronym signifies per se90.

88 Ibid., 3.23, pp. 88-89. (Italics mine.)
89 Ibid., 2.13, pp. 20-21.
90 Thus, De Grammatico student insists: « if no one is literate except by participating in literacy, it follows that man is not literate without literacy », (nullus est grammaticus nisi participando grammaticam) (De Grammatico, cap. XVI, ed. cit., pp. 161, 30 – 162, 1); while Anselm’s white-horse-in-the-house example presupposes that the speaker/hearer knows or believes the horse to be white (ibid., cap. XIV, pp. 159, 26 - 161, 4). Cfr. Monologion, cap. I in S. ANSELMI CANTUARENSIS ARCHIEPISCOPI Opera Omnia, vol. I, ed. cit., p. 14, 4; cap. XVI, p. 30, 30; cap. XVIII, p. 33, 14, 18; cap. XXV, p. 43, 6-11; cap. XLIV, p. 60, 20.
(iii) Third, it seems important to split apart — as neither Anselm nor Henry explicitly does — the issue of [a] whether it is accidental to ‘white’ to bring to mind a particular horse in a particular house, or accidental to ‘animal’ to supposit for the members of this particular collection of human individuals (as opposed to some other possible collection, were other human individuals to exist instead or in addition); from [b] whether the linguistic functions of reference and/or denotation are/is accidental to language; and [c] whether, more particularly, one or both is not essential to nouns and nominal expressions (by contrast with verbs and adverbs). Insofar as the existence of non-divine individuals is supposed to be contingent, as is their possession of this or that accident, it would seem uncontroversial that [a] it is accidental to ‘white’ to appellate this particular horse and accidental to ‘man’ to supposit for Plato. Likewise, as Henry says, whether or not they do, would be context-dependent.

Anselm seems to be in a poor position to treat reference and/or denotation as accidental in sense [b], however. For in De Veritate, he explains that the purpose of statements is to signify that what is, is or that what is not, is not. Insofar as his examples include contingent as well as necessary propositions (‘it is day’ as well as ‘every man is an animal’), he seems to be adopting the position that it belongs to the essential function of language to signify contingencies as well as necessities. But the former would seem to require context-dependent reference or denotation91. Insofar as Henry presents his Lesniewskian translations as the « language of logic », he includes names in the base-line language into which second-level statements are reductively analyzed. Insofar as some expansions hold good even for empty-name substitutions, and so simply assert correlations between the extensions of terms (if any), these translations might have some measure of context-independence. All the same, the technical language Henry sponsors does not [b] shed naming as a linguistic function and indeed [c] includes vocabulary to which the naming-function is essential.

If one brackets Henry’s Lesniewski translations, however, his remarks sometimes raise a different picture of the logician’s project, one according to which the logician qua logician speaks only about the per se significata of terms and their intensional relations. Since per se significatio is essential to a term, and relations among intensions are necessary, the resultant sentences could be context-independent. Would not appellation, therefore, have no place? According to Anselm, non sequitur. Certainly, he does not recognize this description as fitting Aristotle’s practice in his logical writings. For the teacher’s clinching hermeneutical hint is that:

this same Aristotle in the very same book [e.g. the Categories] appellates words by the name of the things of which they are significative and not only of those of which they are appellative (...) »

And, if in saying that ‘man’ is principally significative and appellative of substance, the teacher means that ‘man’ appellates the species nature that is common to all individuals, then a discussion restricted to per se significata and the relations among intentions would not thereby imply any appellation-free linguistic usage.

4.4. Appellation as Improper Even if appellation is neither ‘loose’ nor theoretically baseless, even if appellation and/or denotation is not an optional linguistic function, appellation may still be improper. Yet, it is necessary to re-examine what ‘improper’ means. My suggestion returns to the etymology: if a term’s proper signification is what is most ‘its own’, improper usage is ‘at a remove’ in the sense of being derivative from and explained by what is proper. In the Schmitt Fragments, Anselm thinks he can start with proper usage and explain how speakers get from there to a series of improper usages. Likewise, the fact that paronyms such as ‘literate’ and ‘white’ are properly and per se significative of having and quality, is key to the explanation of why speakers use them to appellate things that have whiteness. Importantly, explanatory priority stands as an asymmetrical relation: the improper is derivative from and explained by the proper, and not vice versa. Equally momentous, what is semantically derivative is not automatically thereby accidental or non-essential to language.

4.5. The Lesniewski Translations, How Apt? Henry appeals to Lesniewski’s Ontology to represent Anselm’s logical science of per se signification. Even if he were to drop the requirement that technical usage free itself from context-dependent appellation or denotation, his extensional translations would be inadequate to the task. For Anselm does not want to rest the truth of

(6) Literate is literacy (Grammaticus est grammatica),
(7) Being literate is not being a man (Esse grammatici non est esse hominis),
and
(8) The essence of man is not the essence of literate (Essentia hominis non est essentia grammatici)
on such de facto correlations between literates and havers of literacy and between literates and human beings as are rendered in (6.2)-(8.2). It is

93 Ibid., cap. XII, p. 156, 32-34.
logically possible that all and only human beings should be literate, and the actualization of that possibility would not force Anselm to admit that after all being literate is being human, or that the essence of man is the essence of literate. So far from thinking (7.2) and (8.2) exhaustively render the content of (7) and (8), Anselm would not even admit that the latter entail the former. What (7) and (8) do entail is

(7.3) It is not necessary that $Cl[g]$ is* $Cl[h]$, and

(8.3) It is not necessary that $Cl[h]$ is* $Cl[g]$, respectively — which would be true even if all and only human beings were literate. Moreover, that (7) requires (7.3) but not (7.2) for its truth is virtually explicit in Anselm’s remarks in De Grammatico, cap. IX\(^\text{94}\). Commenting on this passage, Henry in effect acknowledges the need to insert modal operators into some of his translations, but says that he won’t bother because the important facts can be described without doing so\(^\text{95}\). Worse yet for Henry’s proposal, Anselm makes it clear that necessary co- or overlapping extensions would not be sufficient to capture *per se* signification: for the teacher insists that being $F$ may be necessarily connected with being $G$ without $G$’s being included in the *per se* signification of ’$F$’\(^\text{96}\).

V. INTERPRETING THE CANON

Despite his many and minute analyses, Henry’s interpretation misfits De Grammatico in so many ways, that an alternative integrative reading is desirable. Happily, one leaps to mind, once the dialogue is set back into the context of medieval methodological developments.

5.1. EVOLVING GENRE In recent illuminating studies, Bernardo C. Bazán\(^\text{97}\) and Stephen F. Brown\(^\text{98}\) have charted the evolution of medieval method from *lectio* to *quaestio* and on to *disputatio*, along the following lines. In the beginning was the *lectio*, a method of scholarly activity inherited from the


\(^{95}\) *Henry*, Commentary on “De Grammatico” cit., n.3940a, p. 161.

\(^{96}\) *De Grammatico*, cap. XXI, ed. cit., p. 166, 28-29.


Roman schools and Hellenistic grammarians and centered on mastering the letter and penetrating the deep meaning of texts. As practiced by St. Augustine in *De doctrina Christiana*, lectio was a four-part exercise: first, *lectio* itself, or the reading aloud of the texts, sometimes accompanied by the memorized recitation of key passages; second, *emendatio*, which questioned textual accuracy and authenticity and analyzed the plan, faults, achievements, and originality of the text; third, *enarratio*, or literal commentary, which set out definitions and etymologies, noted figures of speech and rhetorical devices, issuing in a paraphrase of the text; and finally, *iudicium*, or the evaluation, of the text against relevant criteria, whether by aesthetic, dogmatic (e.g., the rule of faith), or pragmatic (e.g., whether the interpretation given increased love of God and neighbor). By the twelfth century Abelard’s pupil Robert of Melun (1167) attacks those who restrict *lectio* to recitation and glossing, and promotes the goal of *lectio* as understanding the meaning of the text.

Brown notes how *lectio* was « assimilative in aim », and effectively riveted classroom attention on detail and verbal precision. Moreover, the canonical texts examined had the privileged status of *auctoritates*. For grammarians, these included the works of Donatus and Priscian; for logicians, Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, Aristotle’s *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*, and Boethius’ commentaries. Those who made glosses assigned *auctoritas* to such source-books as Isidore of Seville’s *Etymologies* and Gregory’s *Moralia in Job*; while those who probed meanings, appealed to patristic writings (by Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Hilary, Cassiodorus, Basil, Gregory, John Chrysostom, etc.) and philosophical works (by Aristotle, Cicero, Boethius, Plato, Chalcidius, Marius Victorinus, Macrobius, Denis the Areopagite).

The *quaestio* was a natural outgrowth of the *lectio*, once emphasis shifted to the meaning of the text. For obscure passages generated alternative incompatible interpretations by different *auctoritates*, forcing both *lector* and *scholares* into the more active role of weighing such readings, increasingly in terms of the arguments offered for them. By late twelfth century, Gilbert de la Porrée could codify the genre as to its form, by saying that a *quaestio* consists of contradictory statements, each supported by arguments.

---

99 Ibid., p. 82.
101 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
102 Ibid., pp. 83-84.
103 Ibid., pp. 82-83, 85.
104 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
105 Thus, Bazán quotes Gilbert: « Ex affirmatione et eius contradictoria negatione quaestio... »
Originally tied to the *lectio* and occasioned by the *explication du texte* as the *quaestio* was, its evolution into a separate classroom exercise was a function of a number of interrelated variables: (i) the shift of interest from the correct exegesis of, to the theoretical issues raised by the texts; (ii) the growing availability of dialectic as a tool for processing disagreements; (iii) the emergence of masters with competence and confidence enough to count themselves among the authorities by shouldering the task of ‘determining’ the question; and (iv) the organization of schools where a ‘critical mass’ of masters and students could gather to engage in such teaching and research.

Moreover, as intellectual work became more problem-centered, the demand to let logical order supersede the textual order mounted. This gave rise in the twelfth century to the *sententiae*-collections in which *auctoritates* from Scripture, the Fathers, even philosophers, were collected and arranged around topical *quaestiones*. The quotations were taken out of their literary context, selected for their power to frame a discussion and/or to suggest arguments pro or contra. Likewise, the purpose of raising questions changed, as Abelard’s student Robert of Melun noted: originally they signalled genuine doubt about their answer; but once *quaestiones* became the favored method of packaging inquiry, they are raised for methodological and pedagogical reasons, in systematic surveys bent on deeper understanding of their subject matter.

Both Bazán and Brown identify the twelfth century as crucible and turning-point. At first, twelfth century *quaestiones* were tied to the text (usually the Bible) first emerging and then acquiring prominence as an exegetical tool alongside *enarratio*. Abelard uses the term ‘disputatio’ to refer to a classroom exercise in which two masters or a master and a student debated a textual or doctrinal problem. Odo of Soissons (at Paris ca. 1164) made the institutionally significant move of debating *quaestiones* in a separate session.

constat. Non tamen omnis contradictio quaestio est. Cum enim altera contradictionis pars esset vera, altera vero nulla prorsus habere veritatis argumenta videtur ... autem cum neutra pars veritatis et falsitatis argumenta potest habere ... tunc contradictio non est quaestio. Cuius vero utraque pars argumenta veritatis habere videtur, quaestio est », in Bazán, Les Questions Disputées cit., p. 72. Cfr. Brown, Key Terms in Medieval Theological Vocabulary cit., p. 86.

107 Ibid., p. 87.
109 Brown, Key Terms in Medieval Theological Vocabulary cit., p. 86.
110 Bazán, Les Questions Disputées cit., p. 31; Brown, Key Terms in Medieval Theological Vocabulary cit., p. 87.
111 Ibid., p. 88.
from his *lectiones*\textsuperscript{112}, while for Simon of Tournai (ca. 1201) *disputatio* had become a separate rational discipline altogether distinct from textual exegesis\textsuperscript{113}, and Richard Fishachre (1246) could say: « Unde non differt hic legere et disputare »\textsuperscript{114}. Towards the end of the twelfth century, *disputatio* became institutionally entrenched as one of the functions proper to, in thirteenth and fourteenth century universities required of a master\textsuperscript{115}. University usage in the first half of the thirteenth century standardized the form of the *quaestio* across subject-matters, as well as a division of labor in *disputatio* between the master who presides and determines, the opponent who raises difficulties against the thesis, and the respondent who clarifies a preliminary solution to the problem posed\textsuperscript{116}.

### 5.2. Questioning and Disputing with Anselm

Interestingly, these very methodological shifts were already taking place in Anselm’s eleventh century corpus, the fact that led Martin Grabmann to call him « the father of Scholasticism »\textsuperscript{117}! *Lectio*-assimilation of a variety of *auctoritates* — on grammar, logic, and theology, as well as the Bible — is presupposed by Anselm’s works, which consistently press ‘beginners’ in his advanced school beyond familiarity, even memorization of the texts, toward rightly understanding and duly considering (*bene intelligere, bene considerare*)\textsuperscript{118} their meanings, and on to an in-depth grasp of their subject-matters. Anselm’s method in all his works is dialectical, involves questioning and disputing with oneself (as in the *Monologion*), with the teacher/author (as in his teaching dialogues and *Cur Deus Homo*), and with God (as happens explicitly in the *Proslogion*’s prayer). Typically, a question is posed, considerations *pro* and *contra* laid out, distinctions get drawn, fallacies diagnosed, problems dissolved, only to be challenged by new questions and complicating arguments, penetrating to ever deeper and subtler conclusions. All of Anselm’s works are participatory, aiming as they do to train the student/reader in the skills necessary to inquire in this way.

\textsuperscript{114} BROWN, *Key Terms in Medieval Theological Vocabulary* cit., p. 89.
\textsuperscript{116} BAZÁN, *Les Questions Disputées* cit., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{118} *De Grammatico*, cap. VII, ed. cit., p. 150, 32; p. 151, 19-23; cap. VIII, p. 152, 9-13, 21-22.
Thus, where he is treating canonical texts, it is no part of Anselm’s goal to reform usage: *that* is already given, fixed centuries ago in the texts themselves. But skills of construal are surely needed, and for this purpose the *Schmitt Fragments* furnish a handy tool for detecting improper usages, finding some « method in their madness », and so burrowing under the author’s form of words to catch his *subauditiones*. If not even Christ, the Divine Word, speaks human languages with technical precision that is ever perspicuous with respect to its logical form (cfr. John 3, 20-21), how much less merely human authors!119

Right understanding and due consideration also require logical facility, for formulating definitions and distinctions, in constructing arguments and detecting fallacies, in focussing problems by generating plausible arguments for seemingly incompatible conclusions, for subtle discrimination to complicate and refine them into harmonious resolution. Like, but even more so than Anselm’s other teaching dialogues — i.e., *De Veritate, De Libertate Arbitrii,* and *De Casu Diaboli* — *De Grammatico* exercises the student/reader in such skills120. Here, as is everywhere and always necessary for learning logic, the Anselmian student is thrust into the active role, not permitted simply to raise a question, but required first to formulate arguments *for* both sides of the alleged contradiction121, and then to mount considerations *against* each part122. Given these initiatives, the teacher first models and then practices the student in the technique of formulating the parallel obviously fallacious argument123, as well as that of expounding ellipses to dissolve difficulties124. Likewise, the teacher demonstrates how to test proffered definitions for congruence both with authority and reason, thereby alerting the student to characteristic pitfalls (e.g., the generation of infinite series)125. For his part, the student is thrust into the position of testing the teacher’s constructive

---

119 Interestingly, Henry identifies this function of the *Schmitt Fragments*, but refuses to let it control his interpretation. (Henry, *The Logic of St. Anselm* cit., 4.02, p. 121.)

120 Anselm says so explicitly in his introduction to the first three dialogues, which he says are linked together insofar as they are all devoted to the interpretation (via questioning and disputing) of Scripture. By contrast, *De Grammatico* is devoted to a different subject matter: « Quartum enim quem simili modo edidi, non inutilem ut puto introducendis ad dialecticam, cuius initium est *De Grammatico* : quoniam ad diversum ab his tribus studium pertinet, istis nolo conumerare », (*De veritate*, Praefatio, ed. cit., p. 173, 5-8).


proposals, raising objections from linguistic usage\textsuperscript{126}, measuring their power to elucidate Aristotle’s usage\textsuperscript{127} and/or their congruence with his metaphysical doctrines\textsuperscript{128}. Ever insistent in his demand for further explanation\textsuperscript{129}, when the student is unable to refute the teacher’s argument, he nevertheless takes it upon himself to raise considerations, both textual and philosophical, in favor of the opposite or a further problematic conclusion\textsuperscript{130}, thereby setting up a \textit{quaestio} for the teacher to resolve. Thus, the teacher quips at the end, « at the very least, you won’t deny that we have benefited from practice in disputation! »\textsuperscript{131}.

In comparison with \textit{De Grammatico}, Anselm’s other teaching dialogues appear to target students of a more advanced stage. \textit{De Veritate} aims at a definition of truth, and in the process subordinates Boethian logic to the teleological framework of the \textit{Monologion}\textsuperscript{132}. \textit{De Libertate Arbitrii} develops and defends an account of freedom of choice. \textit{De Casu Diaboli} complements the \textit{Monologion} search for the source of goodness with a subtle analyses of evil and agency designed to account for the origin of sin\textsuperscript{133}. To whatever extent their problematic is framed (\textit{quaestio}-style) by passages from the Bible, from Boethian logic, and Augustine, they quickly move on to the problems and do not return to the hermeneutics of expounding any of these texts.

By contrast, \textit{De Grammatico} shows teacher and student questioning and disputing their way into, in order to get the most out of a text. Pray tell, which text? None other than Aristotle’s \textit{Categories}. This is not a guess, because — uncharacteristically — author and work are explicitly named by Anselm’s teacher and student many times\textsuperscript{134}. Moreover, as already noted, the dialogue

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{126} Most notably mid-dialogue in \textit{Ibid.}, cap. XI, p. 156, 5-20.
\item \textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ibid.}, cap. XI, p. 156, 15-20.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Notably at \textit{Ibid.}, cap. III, p. 148, 8-10; \textit{Ibid.}, cap. XIV, pp. 159, 26 - 160, 3; \textit{Ibid.}, cap. XX, p. 165, 26-27.
\item \textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}, cap. XXI, p. 168, 12.
\end{itemize}
begins with a puzzle arising from the *Categories*, continues by questioning and disputing claims in the *Categories*, and explicitly returns at the end (capp. XVI-XIX) to the hermeneutics of expounding Aristotle’s words in that work (as well as those of followers, unnamed but doubtless including Boethius, with whose *Categories* translation and commentary Anselm was clearly familiar).

*De Grammatico* presupposes that the student is highly familiar with Aristotle’s words in the *Categories*. The dialogue twice hints that the teacher expects the student to have read *De interpretatione* at the same level 135. On the basis of this reading, the student has even arrived at a confused grasp of Aristotle’s project. For example, he appears to be under the (to the teacher’s mind, mistaken) impression that Aristotle’s business there is not semantics but metaphysics: the effort to understand what things (*res*) there are. The student’s belief — that Aristotle has not only identified ten categories of things, but asserted that each thing can be in one and only one category — is part of what gives rise to his opening and closing puzzlements 136. When the teacher presses the student to articulate his problem, he is able (with coaching) to pit one passage against another to focus the issue not only of how all of Aristotle’s claims can fit together (an interpretive problem), but also how or in what sense they can be true. The student’s reading of the *Categories* (and *De interpretatione*) has left him with many interpretative difficulties. But his interest is not simply in *explication du texte*. True student of Anselm that he is, he does not want to understand the philosophical issues so that he may better construe the text; rather he wants to understand Aristotle’s text the better to learn about its subject matter! Thus, his opening question is formulated, not as « what did Aristotle mean ...? » but « what about literate? is it substance or quality? ».

When all is said and done, we have to admit that *De Grammatico* is a fragmentary work. Its semantic theory is partial and underdeveloped (see section II above), although not because Anselm was not interested in or good at logic. Schmitt and Henry are right to point out how Anselm regards logical subtlety as key to opening solutions to many theological puzzles. Already in the *Monologion*, his very first work, Anselm turns the semantics of the Divine Word a theological *topos*. Likewise, Anselm presents *De Grammatico* semantics as tentative. Then as now, logic (philosophy of language) was a ‘hot’ topic; and the teacher urges the student to remain open-minded and critical with respect to their conclusions 137. Rather, pedagogical considerations constrain

137 *Ibid.*, cap. XXI, p. 168, 8-11; « ... quoniam scis quantum nostris temporibus dialectici
Anselm not to work out his semantic distinctions much further than necessary for handling the question the student posed. De Grammatico is also fragmentary compared with other introductions to Aristotle’s Categories where topical coverage is concerned. Not only does Anselm — like Porphyry — defer fascinating metaphysical issues (in this case, whether the same thing (res) could belong to more than one category) to a larger and higher disputation\(^{138}\); he doesn’t offer a complete ex professo treatment of substance and only gestures in the direction of other categories at the end\(^{139}\). To complete the job (say, in the manner of Aquinas’ Quaestiones de Anima) would require more disputations of further questions.

All the same, I want to insist that De Grammatico does do the work of introducing the student-reader to Aristotle’s Categories. Restricted topical coverage is not so much a liability but may even be a virtue given the type of introduction it is. We have all learned much from Boethian-style commentaries, which lay out, paragraph by paragraph, what the treatise contains, from beginning to end. Yet, those of us who have read them know how soporific they can be, insofar as they offer the reader a merely passive role. By contrast, Anselmian introductions jerk the student-reader into an active posture, teach us how to question and dispute authorities. Concentrated and sustained attention to a single issue, trains us to be meticulous, to slice the distinctions as thinly as texts and problems require. The student-reader thus emerges from the exercise, not merely with a doctrine, but a skill that will enable him/her to return to the text and press more deeply into the problem, by carrying on in an analogous way. Perhaps in this more general feature of focus on method we find a genuine similarity between Anselm’s De Grammatico and mid-century Anglo-American philosophy of language after all!

\(^{138}\) Ibid., cap. XIX, pp. 164, 28 - 165, 3.
\(^{139}\) Ibid., capp. XIX-XX, pp. 164, 16 - 166, 22.