Since the 1960s, historians have become increasingly aware of how semantic problems interested eleventh-century thinkers. Almost certainly the fullest and most influential manifestation of their enthusiasm is found in the (anonymous) Glosule to Priscian. But these problems also engaged the mind of the best known philosopher and theologian of the century, Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm's semantics has not lacked expositors; most notably, Desmond Henry has offered an extraordinarily detailed account. Nonetheless much in Anselm's account of the relation between words and things remains hard to interpret. My paper has a very modest aim: to identify some of the difficulties in interpreting Anselm's fullest discussion of semantics his De grammatico.

As a preface, I shall describe the general semantics which Anselm develops and sets out very clearly in his first securely dated work the Monologion (ca. 1076). This general semantics provides the context in which Anselm looks at the particular semantic problems which form the subject of De grammatico.

Some Semantic Problems in Anselm's
De grammatico
by John Marenbon

Since the 1960s, historians have become increasingly aware of how semantic problems interested eleventh-century thinkers. Almost certainly the fullest and most influential manifestation of their enthusiasm is found in the (anonymous) Glosule to Priscian. But these problems also engaged the mind of the best known philosopher and theologian of the century, Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm's semantics has not lacked expositors; most notably, Desmond Henry has offered an extraordinarily detailed account. Nonetheless, much in Anselm's account of the relations between words and things remains hard to interpret. My paper has a very modest aim: to identify some of the difficulties in interpreting Anselm's fullest discussion of semantics, his De grammatico. As a preface, I shall describe the general semantics which Anselm develops and sets out very clearly in his first securely dated work, the Monologion (ca. 1076). This general semantics provides the context in which Anselm looks at the particular semantic problems which form the subject of De grammatico.

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In the Monologion Anselm sets out more explicitly than anywhere else his general approach to the relation between words and things. There are three ways, he writes, in which we can say a single thing ("rem unam...loqui"). The first is by using signs which are perceptible to the senses, as when I utter the word "man." The second is by thinking of these same signs within ourselves non-sensibly; as when I bring the word "man" to mind, without actually speaking. The third way does not involve using these signs at all. Rather we say "the things themselves inwardly within our minds by imagining bodily things or by rational understanding, according to the diversity of the things themselves" ("res ipsas vel corporum imaginatione vel rationis intellectu pro rerum diversitate intus in nostra mente"). In this third case the mind sees "a man himself," either through an image of how he looks, or through reason, "when it considers his universal essence, which is mortal, rational, animal."3 Anselm goes on:

Each of these three ways of speaking consists in words of its own sort. But the words of the sort I put third and last, when they are about things which are not unknown, are natural and the same among all peoples. And since all other words were devised on account of these, no other word is necessary for knowing a thing, and where these cannot be, no other word is of use in indicating a thing.4

Anselm goes on to say that "it's not absurd to say" that "words" of this third sort are truer than those of the other sorts, because they are more similar to the things and designate them more clearly: it is only in exceptional cases—such as when we use a word to stand for itself—that there is a resemblance between a word of the other two sorts and the thing for which it is the word.5

Anselm alludes briefly to the same idea in a couple of other passages in the Monologion.6 Near the end of the work he adds some more details. First, he explains that words of the third sort are numerically distinct between different people speaking them, and that each thinker has a numerically distinct word for each thing of which he or she thinks.7 Then he describes two ways in which words of the third sort come into existence: from a likeness or an image which either is in the thinker's memory, or, if the thing is present, which is "dragged" into the mind through the bodily senses.8

From these remarks, the following general view of semantics emerges. We are able to talk about things using spoken words because, in the mind of a listener who knows the language, these words produce words of the third sort, which resemble the things for which they stand. Some of the words of the third sort are mental images, others are what might be called abstract ideas or concepts. Although Anselm's sentence might be interpreted differently, he seems to think the thing a person talks about using, for instance, the word "man," is the same whether the corresponding word of the third sort is a mental image (of a man) or the thought of man's "universal essence"—that he is a rational, mortal, animal. If such a reading is correct, it fits with the view that Anselm did not think that there are separately existing universal things, but rather that individuals may be regarded according to the universal essence they share with other individuals of the same species.9

3 Monologion 31, p. 48.18-20: "... omnia huiusmodi verba, quibus res qua si flet mente dicimus, id est cogitamus, similitudines sunt rerum, quam verba sunt ..."; 33, p. 52.15-18: "Quamcumque enim rem mens seu per corporis imaginacionem seu per rationem cupit veraciter cogitare, eius utique similitudinem quantum valet in ipsa sua cogitatione conatur exprimere."
4 Monologion 62, p. 72.10-13: "Si enim plures homines unum aliquid cogitatione dicant: tot eius videntur esse verba, quot sunt cogitantes, quia in singulorum cogitationibus verba eius est. Item si unus homo cogitet plura aliqua, tot verba sunt in mente cogitantis, quot sunt res cogitatae.
5 Monologion 62, p. 72.14-18: "Sed in hominis cogitatione cum cogitati aliquid quod extra eius mentem est, non nascitur verbum cogitatiæ rei ex ipsa re, quoti etiam absent est a cogitationis intitii, sed ex rei aliqua similitudine vel imagine, quae est in cogni tantis memoria, aut forte quae tunc cum cogitati per corporum sensa non pre senti in mentem attrahitur."

Nothing Anselm writes elsewhere suggests that he did not retain this general semantic position. It is a view which derives from two main sources: Aristotle and Augustine. Anselm seems certainly to have had in mind the comment at the beginning of Aristotle's *De interpretatione* (16a4), which provided most eleventh- and twelfth-century logicians with their basic semantics—that "spoken sounds are symbols of affections of the mind," and that these affections are the same for all people. But he is also looking back to Augustine's *De trinitate*, and he takes from it the use of the term "word" to describe the affections of the mind (that is, the thoughts or mental images), a choice which is potentially confusing, but essential to both his and Augustine's theological purposes.  

The *De grammatico*, which is written in the form of a dialogue between a master and a pupil, is Anselm's only complete work devoted to semantic problems. Until recently, it was generally accepted that Anselm wrote it at about the same time, 1080-1085, as he composed his *De libero arbitrio* and *De veritate*, in the preface to which he mentions the *De grammatico*. This dating comes from Anselm's biographer, Eadmer. But Sir Richard Southern has argued that Eadmer was merely following, and misinterpreting, Anselm's comment in the preface to *De veritate*. Although Anselm there groups *De grammatico* together with *De libero arbitrio* and *De veritate* and *De casu diaboli*, he makes the proviso, overlooked by Eadmer, that the works were written at different times. According to Southern, the logical and linguistic concerns of the treatise make most likely a dating to 1060-1063, when Anselm was Lanfranc's assistant at the external school at Bec. But Southern's view, although plausible, is based merely on an impressionistic judgement about subject matter and manner. It would be unwise for the interpreter of *De grammatico* to try to be guided by any presumption about the work's chronology, except that it must antedate *De veritate.*

The particular problem posed in *De grammatico* is about what were known as denominatives. Anselm and his contemporaries derived their idea from Boethius' commentary on the *Categories* and grammatical theory, but with Aristotelian metaphysics. In the *Categories* and Aristotelian metaphysics, the word for the first is "grammaticus," for the second "grammatica." The word "albus" and the word "grammaticus," which are derived from "albedo" and "grammatica," with a change of form, are denominative words. These words are used of the things which have the accidents from which the denominatives are denominated: what is rightly called "albus" has the accident of whiteness, what is rightly called "grammaticus" of knowledge about grammar. "Albus," then, plays much the same role in Latin as the adjective "white" does in English, with the slight difference that English speakers can grasp a noun or pronoun, whereas in Latin it can more easily be used to mean in many contexts (depending on the ending) a (or the) white male thing/ female thing/ neuter thing. "Grammaticus" has no consistent synonym ("Socrates est grammaticus" can mean "Socrates is knowledgeable about grammar"), it is commonly used as a noun ("Grammaticus legit"—"The grammarians read"; "Socrates est grammaticus" can mean "Socrates is a grammarians"). Both "albus" and "grammaticus," then, are denominative words. But Boethius does not just talk about denominative words, but about denominative things: whatever is called by a denominative word is a denominative thing.

The problem tackled in *De grammatico* is whether "grammaticus" is a substance or a quality. This is a question about denominative things, but Anselm also considers the parallel problem about denominative words: does "grammaticus" signify a substance or a quality. English speakers can grasp the point at issue quite easily by trying to translate "grammaticus" in the first sentence of this paragraph. If "grammaticus" is translated as "a grammarians" or "the grammarians," the answer to the problem seems clearly to be that "grammaticus" is a substance. If the sentence is translated as "Socrates is knowledgeable about grammar," the answer seems equally clearly to be that "grammaticus" is a quality. But, as explained, both translations of...
“grammaticus” are equally correct. The same problem could be posed, in principle, about most denominatives, but it is particularly striking when, as in the case of “grammaticus,” the word fits easily in Latin both as the subject of a sentence, and as a predicate with an adjectival meaning.\footnote{Although nominalization of adjectives is more common in Latin than English, many Latin adjectives do not easily take the sense of a masculine or feminine noun in the nominative. For instance, “Albus est magnus” is awkward in Latin. But there are nevertheless plenty of other denominatives which do behave much as “grammaticus”: for example, “sapiens” (“Sapiens est magnus,” “Socrates est sapiens”); cf. J.B. Hofmann, revised A. Szanty, Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik (Munich, 1965), pp. 152–56.}

The leading writer in the grammatical tradition, Priscian, had suggested that “grammaticus” was a word for a substance\footnote{In Book 2, section 25 of his Institutiones grammaticae (ed. M. Hertz, vol. I [Leipzig, 1855], p. 58.24, “grammaticus” is used as an example of a word for a substance; cf. also section 24, p. 58.17 and Henry, “De grammatico,” pp. 88–89, Logic, pp. 64–67; Commentary, p. 187.}; more generally, Priscian considered that all nouns and adjectives signify substance and quality. By contrast, the logical tradition looked back, following Boethius, to the passage in the Categories (2b28) where Aristotle makes grammaticos (“grammaticus” in both Boethian translations) an example, along with white, of a quality.\footnote{See Henry, Commentary, pp. 90–9, with further references to “grammaticus” in Boethius’s Commentary on the Categories.} Anselm does not, however, set up the problem as a difference between two traditions, but rather as a conflict between one tradition, that of the philosophers (the followers of Aristotle), which holds that grammaticus is a quality, and the following simple syllogistic argument:\footnote{“De grammatico” 1, pp. 145.14–15, 146.1–3.}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Every grammaticus is a man.
\item Every man is a substance.
\item Therefore, every grammaticus is a substance.
\end{enumerate}

About three-quarters of the way through the dialogue, Anselm seems to have arrived at a definitive solution, which is put into the Pupil’s mouth but accepted by the Master:\footnote{“De grammatico” 18, p. 163.23–25. The teacher goes on to add that Aristotle calls “words by the name of the things they signify” (p. 163.26–27) and so (DS1) is all we need to say, since to an Aristotelian interpreter it also implies (DS2).}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Every grammaticus is a man. \footnote{“De grammatico” 18, p. 161.4–161.4.}
\item Every man is a substance.
\item Every grammaticus is a substance.
\end{enumerate}

What are Anselm’s reasons for adopting, or at least seeming to adopt, this solution? They appear to be based on his analysis of what is involved in signification. As the general semantics outlined in the Monologion indicates, Anselm considered that words signify by causing mental images or thoughts (the Monologion’s “words” of the third sort) in the minds of those who understand them. Indeed, “signify” as used in De grammatico can be defined in terms very close to those which Paul Spade has identified as being standard among thinkers from the twelfth to the fourteenth century: a word “w” signifies a thing x if and only if “w” causes a thought of x in the mind of a competent speaker of the language in question.\footnote{De grammatico 18, p. 164.5–7.}

Anselm shows that this is how he understands “signify” when he sets up the following test for whether “albus” signifies a (or the) white man or horse. Does someone, just from hearing the word “albus” think of a white man or a white horse? Anselm answers that “albus” does not signify a white man or a white horse, because if I say, “There’s an albus in the house,” the hearer would not, without further information, have a thought of a man, or of a horse. He contrasts with this example the case where, pointing to two horses, I say “Hit the album”; when the listener hears “album”, she does think of a horse, but that is because she has the extra information that it is horses which are in question. So Anselm admits that “albus” can signify a horse (or a man, or whatever) “per aliud”—through something else: through the information that it is horses or men, or whatever, we are discussing. But “albus” does not signify a horse or a man “per se.”\footnote{Paul V. Spade, “Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute,” Franciscan Studies, n.s. 35 (1975), 213–33, at pp. 213–14.}

It may seem, however, that this analysis of the signification of “albus” will not apply to “grammaticus,” because if I say, “There’s a grammaticus in the house,” won’t the competent speaker think of a man—a man who knows grammar? What else could be being called a “grammaticus” but a man? And so, does not “grammaticus” signify a man; that is to say, a substance? One of Anselm’s main aims in the dialogue is to show up this line of argument as mistaken. If “grammaticus” signifies a man, he believes, then it cannot be possible for there to be a grammaticus who is not a human being (for convenience, I shall call him or it “G”). Suppose that G existed, someone who understood a sentence in which G was signified by the word “grammaticus” would have to think a contradiction—that a non-man is a...
fact presenting (DS1–3) as a definitive solution, especially since there is some evidence in the text of a different train of thought.

It would clearly not be an adequate semantic theory to hold that the only relation of importance between words such as “grammaticus” and “albus” and the world is the relation of signification per se between them and the qualities from which they are denominated. Some account needs to be given of how these words relate to things which are grammatical or white. Anselm sees the need, and he uses the terms “appellatio” and “significatio per alium” to describe this relationship. Most commentators take this as a reason to regard the two terms as roughly synonymous, and as meaning much the same as the modern semantic term “reference.” But there are grounds for doubt on both points.

Anselm’s own explanations of appellatio and of significatio per alium are quite different. “Appellatio” is defined in relation to “usus loquendi,” the ordinary way of speech. The “appellative name” of a thing is, he says, “that by which the thing itself is called according to the ordinary way of speech.” To say that “grammaticus” appellates a man who knows grammar is merely to observe that, as it happens, people use “grammaticus” as the word for such a man. By contrast, significatio per alium is a type of signification and should be understood according to the general scheme of signification. If a word “w” signifies x “per alium,” then “w” makes the listener think, or have a mental image, of x through something else—that is, as result of some extra information the listener has. So, for instance, in Anselm’s example, “album” signifies a white horse “per alium”—as a result of the information the listener has that the things in question are horses.

Despite their very different origins, however, Anselm does sometimes use the terms “significatio per alium” and “appellatio” in parallel. For example, the Master says:

“Grammaticus” does not signify a man and knowledge about grammar as one thing, but it signifies per se knowledge about

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23 De grammatico 13, pp. 157.30–158.5.
25 De grammatico 21, pp. 166.32–167.11. Anselm had already used this form of argument earlier as an extra way of showing that “grammaticus” does not signify a man who knows about grammar: De grammatico 13, p. 158.23–34; cf. Henry, Medieval Logic, pp. 56–67.
grammatic, and \textit{per alius} a man; and although this word \textit{["grammaticus"]} appellates a man, it is not properly speaking said to signify him, and although it signifies knowledge about grammar, it does not, however, appelle it.\textsuperscript{29}

Anselm even, on one occasion, seems so keen to bring \textit{"appellatio"} and \textit{"significatio per alius"} together that he seems to forget his own explanation of \textit{"appellatio."} After giving the example of the white horse, where \textit{"album"} signifies a horse \textit{per alius,} both Pupil and Master say that \textit{"album"} appelles the horse.\textsuperscript{30} But \textit{"album"} is obviously not the word for a horse according to ordinary usage!

Is the conclusion, then, that Anselm is really using \textit{"appellatio"} and \textit{"significatio per alius"}—despite the different explanations he gives—to mean reference in the modern sense? But, if so, why does he proceed in this baffling way? In any case, his account of reference is fundamentally different from that usual among logicians since Frege. For modern logicians, reference is the basic semantic relation. The sense of a word is a further aspect of its meaning which may be different from that of another word with the same reference (as in the case of \textit{"morning star"} and \textit{"evening star,"} to take the most famous example). Anselm may well have intuitively been searching for some concept like the modern idea of reference. But, in a semantics based on his idea of \textit{per se} significatio, there was no room for such a notion. And so he seems to have tried in two different ways—by taking into consideration contextual knowledge \textit{(significatio per alius)} and by looking to common usage \textit{(appellatio)}—to make the relation he needed between denotatives and the things with the qualities from which they are denominated, without being able to reach a unified account.

(DS3) then is not without problems. But (DS2) is far more deeply problematic. (DS2) makes a claim about things, not words—that the things which are \textit{grammatici} are qualities. It is an odd claim to make, because it is directly contradicted by the Pupil’s initial argument (1–3). The Master’s arguments about the signification of “grammaticus” contain nothing to counter its only contestable premise—(1) Every \textit{grammaticus} is a man. They do, indeed, establish the claim that,

\begin{quote}
(4) Possibly, some \textit{grammaticus} is not a man,
\end{quote}

which is all that the argument about signification needs. But (4) does not contradict (1). Moreover, the Master says explicitly that it \textit{cannot} be shown that there is any \textit{grammaticus} who is not a man.\textsuperscript{31} If the conclusion of the Pupil’s initial argument is wrong, it must be because the argument is invalid. But Anselm gives no explanation of how it is invalid, if it is.

There is, in any case, a difficulty about (DS2) itself. If \textit{grammaticus} is a quality, what quality is it? The obvious answer is that it is the quality \textit{grammatica}, knowledge about grammar, and so the sentence,

\begin{quote}
(5) \textit{Grammaticus est grammatica},
\end{quote}

is true. But whether or not Anselm wishes to hold (5) is a matter for contention among interpreters. The central feature of Henry’s reading of the De grammatico is that Anselm claims (5).\textsuperscript{32} Henry admits that (5) is, apparently, nonsense. But he believes that Anselm is making the point that logicians do sometimes have to speak what sounds like nonsense in order to express a logical relation which is not captured by ordinary speech. He explains that the “est” in (5) is not the “is” of ordinary discourse. Rather, in (5) Anselm is trying to say something he cannot say, because he lacks a symbolic language, but something that Henry is able to set out straightforwardly in the logical language of Lesniewski, which contains the higher-level “is” needed to make sense of (5). By contrast, Jasper Hopkins considers it a “trap” to consider that (5) expresses a logical truth: “This sentence is no more a logical truth than it is meaningful.”\textsuperscript{33} Hopkins’s view is certainly not contradicted by the text. Anselm never asserts (5) as such. Rather, the Master brings up the sentences “grammatica est grammaticus” and “grammaticus est grammatica” as examples of ways of speaking not sanctioned by ordinary usage,\textsuperscript{34} and later the Pupil argues (though the Master does not seem to agree) that “although … the word ‘grammaticus’ signifies knowledge about grammar, it would not be an appropriate response to someone who asks ‘What is a ‘grammaticus’?’ to say, ‘Knowledge about

\begin{quote}
29 \textit{De grammatico} 12, p. 157.1–5: “Grammaticus vero non significat hominem et grammaticam ut unum, sed grammaticam per se et hominem per alius significant. Et hoc nomem quamvis sit appellativum hominis, non tamen proprie dicitur eius significativum; et licet sit significativum grammaticae, non tamen est eius appellativum.”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
31 \textit{De grammatico} 9, p. 153.30–31: “... utrum sit aliquis grammaticus non homo, quod vides monstrari non posse.”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
33 “Anselm,” p. 290.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
34 \textit{De grammatico} 12, p. 157.6–8.
\end{quote}
grammar' or 'A quality'. But, since Anselm does assert (DS2), Hopkins is left with the question: what quality? It does not help to say, as Hopkins does, that Anselm is claiming, not (5), but,

(6) Grammaticus est sciens grammaticam.

(6) reads more easily than (5), because "sciens grammaticam" can be taken as "someone who knows about grammar." But if, as Anselm insists in (DS2), grammaticus is a quality, then (6) should not be read in this way, but rather as "Grammaticus is knowing about grammar," which is as awkward as (5).

Historians perhaps face a harsher choice than many have realized. Either they can follow Henry's reading. It has the advantage of being coherent and sophisticated, but it also suffers, from an historian's point of view, from the weakness that it is offered less as an interpretation of what Anselm actually thought, than as an explanation of how Anselm might have carried through his logical intuitions, if he had been granted a twentieth-century technical apparatus. Or, if readers of De grammatico find Henry's view historically unconvincing, they must accept that one element, at least, of the definitive solution, (DS2), is puzzling and apparently incoherent.

There is also a more general problem about the coherence of De grammatico. At the beginning of the dialogue, as explained above, the Pupil sets out what he understands to be a pair of alternatives ("ut quodlibet horum sit alterum non sit, et quodlibet non sit alterum necesse sit esse")36: either grammaticus is a substance, or a quality. After the Pupil has given the arguments for each solution, the Master replies:

The arguments you propose for each of the opposed solutions are sound, but not your assertion that if one is the case, then the other cannot be. And so you shouldn't require me to show that one or other of the opposed solutions is false. No one could do this. Rather, I shall explain how it is that the solutions are not incompatible with each other....

Yet, by the time he advances (DS1–3), the Master seems to have forgotten all about this plan. (DS2) directly asserts one of the two opposed solutions, that grammaticus is a quality, and it seems quite clear that, by this stage,

...35 De grammatico, 16, p. 161.28–30: "Quamvis ... grammatici aenon significativum sit grammaticae: non tamen conveniener respondetur quaerenti quid grammaticum sit: grammaticam, aut qualitas."
36 De grammatico, 1, p. 146.4–5.
37 De grammatico, 2, p. 146.10–14.

"grammaticus is a substance" would not be accepted as true. By contrast, in the earlier part of the dialogue, the Master does seem to follow his initial, explicit intention and succeeds in finding a way of explaining how grammaticus is both a substance and a quality. This intermediate solution is brought out best in the following passage:

M. Tell me, when you speak to me about a grammaticus, what should I understand (intelligam) you to be talking about—the word "grammaticus," or the things it signifies?
N The things.
O. What things, then, does it signify?
P. A man and knowledge about grammar.
Q. So when I hear the word "grammaticus," I may understand a man or knowledge about grammar, and when I am speaking about a grammaticus, I may be speaking about a man or knowledge about grammar.
R. So it must be.
S. Tell me then, is a man a substance, or is it in a subject?
T. It's a substance, not something in a subject.
U. Is knowledge about grammar a quality and in a subject?
V. It's both.
W. Why then is it strange if someone says that grammaticus is a substance and not in a subject with respect to a man (secundum hominem)?
X. If grammaticus is a quality and in a subject with respect to knowledge about grammar (secundum grammaticam)?

And a little later the Master repeats the idea, asking the Pupil why he cannot see that "there is no contradiction whatsoever" between holding that grammaticus is a substance and that it is a quality, "because concerning a grammaticus, on some occasions we should speak and understand with respect to a man (secundum hominem) and on some occasions with respect to knowledge about grammar (secundum grammaticam)."39

In the light of the general semantics Anselm sets out in the Monologion, he seems to have the following explanation in mind in this intermediate solution. Just like other words, a denominative word, such as
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"grammaticus," functions by bringing certain thoughts or mental to the mind of the listener. Depending on the context of utterance, "grammaticus" can bring to mind the thought or image of a substance—a man (or man in general) or the thought of a quality—knowledge about grammar. For this reason, it is true to say both that "grammaticus is a substance" and that "grammaticus is a quality" (but this does not entail that there is a sort of thing which is a grammaticus and is at once a substance and a quality).

This intermediate solution avoids the difficulties both with (DS3) and (DS2), and it fits exactly with the plan set out by the Master at the start of the dialogue. Precisely for these reasons, it is implausible to try to present it as a first attempt to reach what develops into the definitive solution. It seems clearly to be an alternative to (DS1–3), which is strangely abandoned for this, to all appearances, weaker theory.

Alain Galonnier has recently suggested that De grammatico is an exercise in detecting sophisms, apparently valid but in fact flawed pieces of argument.40 Galonnier probably underestimates the seriousness of the semantic discussion, but he may well be right to point out that De grammatico is a text full of argumentative traps, which should not be expected to have a straightforward line of argument. Perhaps it is wrong to seek in it a definitive solution to the semantic problems it explores.41

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40 "Littérature sophistmatique", Galonnier also puts forward (pp. 227–28) the tentative suggestion that the text which we have of the De grammatico may not even be Anselm's treatise, but the work of a later, twelfth-century author. He bases this suggestion on the type of fallacies which Anselm examines in the work. It is doubtful, though, whether our knowledge of the chronological development of logical doctrines between 1050 and 1150 is sufficiently exact to give much weight to such an argument, in the absence of other evidence for the same conclusion.

41 While this article was in press, there was published Marilyn M. Adams, "Re-reading "Poesia epignifica en Catalufia en el siglo XI"

por José Martínez Gázquez

El prof. J. M. Escolà pone de relieve en la introducción de su estudio sobre el latín documental del siglo XI en Cataluña, en este mismo Congreso, el asentamiento de la organización feudal en la zona cristiana en los territorios ocupados a los musulmanes y el retroceso de la frontera hasta límites ya cercanos al curso del río Ebro. En estas circunstancias la vida se normaliza en estos territorios cristianos de manera acorde con las tradiciones de los restantes pueblos de la Europa cristiana y vemos aparecer, por ejemplo, inscripciones funerarias en verso que siguen los modelos de la epigrafía clásica y cristiana, aunque también nos dejan ver las peculiaridades de una tierra de frontera en el siglo que nos ocupa.

Nos detenremos en esta comunicación en analizar algunos aspectos literarios y formales de los epígrafes latinos en verso del Corpus de las inscripciones latinas medievales de Cataluña, que se pueden fechar en el siglo XI, una etapa histórica de particular interés en la zona que se extiende a Sur y Norte de los Pirineos, de cultura e historia común en el siglo XI, como muestra en su misma persona el Abad Oliba, figura relevante de la primera mitad del siglo, a la vez obispo de Vic, abad de Ripoll y de San Miquel de Cuixà y fundador de Montserrat, y del que se conservan también algunos carmina epigraphica.

Comienza el siglo XI con el epitafio en verso de una gran figura, el abad Odón, muerto en 1010, que nos presenta la laudatio de los méritos de un hombre que actuó intensamente en las circunstancias históricas de su tiempo. Su epitafio en verso enfatiza especialmente su afán restaurador del Monasterio de san Cugat tras las devastaciones musulmanas de Barcelona y su entorno a finales del siglo X.

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