

gladiis suis MS) clamitavit, nisi ab obpugnatione quiescerent, non armis se adversum eos, sed principum capitibus dimicatuos" (LH)  
 - "impetus pugnantium paganorum illo die quievit" (AA)

28 March: Relief

- "feria 2. post pascha rogantes eum alii, qui evaserunt, venit dux (regis Babyloniorum AA) de Ramula" (MS); "licet paganus" (LH)/ "quamvis gentilis tamen ad liberandum nostros cum magna multitudine veniebat" (AA); "difficile credentibus, quod Satanas Satanan eicere" (LH)  
 - "fugans Arabitas accepit quingentos bisantios aureos" (MS): "cogitabat enim, si isti perirent tam miserabili caede nullum posthac causa orationis per illam terram venire et exinde se suos grave damnum incurrere" (AA)

12 April: From Ramula to Jerusalem

- "ad civitatem Ramulam pervenere ibique a duce et oppidanis retenti sunt duas heptomadas inviti resedere; tandem dimissi 2. Idus Aprilis civitatem sanctam sunt ingressi" (AA)/ "ibi (per 13 dies AA) vota sua persolventes et hostiam laudis deo offerentes" (VA)

Return

- "per christianorum fines rediens reditum facientibus omnia cedebant ex sententia" (LH)/ "non sine magno labore et difficultate" (AA)  
 - "nec duo milia de septem milibus reversi sunt" (MS); "multos ex sociis cum rebus amiserunt" (VA).

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## Some Semantic Problems in Anselm's *De grammatico*

by John Marenbon

Since the 1960s, historians have become increasingly aware of how semantic problems interested eleventh-century thinkers. Almost certainly the fullest and most influential manifestation of their enthusiasm is found in the (anonymous) *Glosule* to Priscian.<sup>1</sup> But these problems also engaged the mind of the best known philosopher and theologian of the century, Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm's semantics has not lacked expositors; most notably, Desmond Henry has offered an extraordinarily detailed account.<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless, much in Anselm's account of the relations between words and things remains hard to interpret. My paper has a very modest aim: to identify some of the difficulties in interpreting Anselm's fullest discussion of semantics, his *De grammatico*. As a preface, I shall describe the general semantics which Anselm develops and sets out very clearly in his first securely dated work, the *Monologion* (ca. 1076). This general semantics provides the context in which Anselm looks at the particular semantic problems which form the subject of *De grammatico*.

<sup>1</sup> See Margaret T. Gibson, "The Early Scholastic *Glosule* to Priscian, *Institutiones Grammaticae*: the Text and its Influence," *SM*, 3rd series, 20,1 (1979), 235–54; Karin M. Fredborg, "Speculative Grammar," in *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, ed. Peter Dronke (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 177–95, especially 177–79 and 181; Constant J. Mews, "Nominalism and Theology before Abaelard: New Light on Roscelin of Compiègne," *Vivarium* 30,1 (1992), 4–33, at pp. 12–33.

<sup>2</sup> Desmond P. Henry, *The "De Grammatico" of St. Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy*, Publications in Mediaeval Studies, The University of Notre Dame 17 (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1964)—a translation with interpretative essays; *The Logic of Saint Anselm* (Oxford, 1967)—mostly on semantics; *Medieval Logic and Metaphysics* (London, 1972), pp. 56–67; *Commentary on "De Grammatico"*. *The Historico-Logical Dimensions of a Dialogue of St. Anselm's*, Synthese Historical Library 8 (Dordrecht and Boston, 1974)—text, translation and a very detailed commentary. For other interpreters, see below, notes 12 and 26.

## I

In the *Monologion* Anselm sets out more explicitly than anywhere else his general approach to the relation between words and things. There are three ways, he writes, in which we can say a single thing ("rem unam ...loqui"). The first is by using signs which are perceptible to the senses, as when I utter the word "man." The second is by thinking of these same signs within ourselves non-sensibly; as when I bring the word "man" to mind, without actually speaking. The third way does not involve using these signs at all. Rather we say "the things themselves inwardly within our minds by imagining bodily things or by rational understanding, according to the diversity of the things themselves" ("res ipsas vel corporum imaginatione vel rationis intellectu pro rerum diversitate intus in nostra mente"). In this third case the mind sees "a man himself," either through an image of how he looks, or through reason, "when it considers his universal essence, which is mortal, rational, animal."<sup>3</sup> Anselm goes on:

Each of these three ways of speaking consists in words of its own sort. But the words of the sort I put third and last, when they are about things which are not unknown, are natural and the same among all peoples. And since all other words were devised on account of these, no other word is necessary for knowing a thing, and where these cannot be, no other word is of use in indicating a thing.<sup>4</sup>

Anselm goes on to say that "it's not absurd to say" that "words" of this third sort are truer than those of the other sorts, because they are more similar to the things and designate them more clearly: it is only in exceptional cases—such as when we use a word to stand for itself—that there is a resemblance between a word of the other two sorts and the thing for which it is the word.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> All references to Anselm's works are, except where indicated, to the pages and lines of *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, ed. Franciscus S. Schmitt, 1 (Edinburgh, 1946). *Monologion* 10, pp. 24.39–25.9.

<sup>4</sup> *Monologion* 10, p. 25.10–14: "Hae vero tres loquendi varietates singulae verbis sui generis constant. Sed illius quam tertiam et ultimam posui locutionis verba, cum de rebus non ignoratis sunt, naturalia sunt et apud omnes gentes sunt eadem. Et quoniam alia omnia verba propter haec sunt inventa: ubi ista sunt, nullum aliud verbum est necessarium ad rem cognoscendam; et ubi ista esse non possunt, nullum aliud est utile ad rem ostendendam."

<sup>5</sup> *Monologion* 10, p. 25.15–21.

Anselm alludes briefly to the same idea in a couple of other passages in the *Monologion*.<sup>6</sup> Near the end of the work he adds some more details. First, he explains that words of the third sort are numerically distinct between different people thinking them, and that each thinker has a numerically distinct word for each thing of which he or she thinks.<sup>7</sup> Then he describes two ways in which words of the third sort come into existence: from a likeness or an image which either is in the thinker's memory, or, if the thing is present, which is "dragged" into the mind through the bodily senses.<sup>8</sup>

From these remarks, the following general view of semantics emerges. We are able to talk about things using spoken words because, in the mind of a listener who knows the language, these words produce words of the third sort, which resemble the things for which they stand. Some of the words of the third sort are mental images, others are what might be called abstract ideas or concepts. Although Anselm's sentence might be interpreted differently, he seems to think the thing a person talks about using, for instance, the word "man," is the same whether the corresponding word of the third sort is a mental image (of a man) or the thought of man's "universal essence"—that he is a rational, mortal, animal. If such a reading is correct, it fits with the view that Anselm did not think that there are separately existing universal things, but rather that individuals may be regarded according to the universal essence they share with other individuals of the same species.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Monologion* 31, p. 48.18–20: "... omnia huiusmodi verba, quibus res quaslibet mente dicimus, id est cogitamus, similitudines sunt rerum, quarum verba sunt ..."; 33, p. 52.15–18: "Quamcumque enim rem mens seu per corporis imaginationem seu per rationem cupit veraciter cogitare, eius utique similitudinem quantum valet in ipsa sua cogitatione conatur exprimere."

<sup>7</sup> *Monologion* 62, p. 72.10–13: "Si enim plures homines unum aliquid cogitatione dicant: tot eius videntur esse verba, quot sunt cogitantes, quia in singulorum cogitationibus verbum eius est. Item si unus homo cogitet plura aliqua, tot verba sunt in mente cogitantis, quot sunt res cogitatae."

<sup>8</sup> *Monologion* 62, p. 72.14–18: "Sed in hominis cogitatione cum cogitat aliquid quod extra eius mentem est, non nascitur verbum cogitatae rei ex ipsa re, quoniam ipsa absens est a cogitationis intuitu, sed ex rei aliqua similitudine vel imagine, quae est in cogitantis memoria, aut forte quae tunc cum cogitat per corporeum sensum ex re praesenti in mentem attrahitur."

<sup>9</sup> This is the view which has been urged, most recently and with the fullest evidence, in Yukio Iwakuma, "The Realism of Anselm and his Contemporaries," in *Anselm: Aosta, Bec and Canterbury*, ed. D.E. Luscombe and G.R. Evans (Sheffield, 1996), pp. 120–35. A similar view is urged in Jasper Hopkins, *Anselm of Canterbury 4—Hermeneutical and Textual Problems in the Complete Treatises of St Anselm* (Toronto and New York, 1976), pp. 57–96; see Henry, *Logic of St. Anselm*, pp. 96–107. A very different view is argued in Katherin A. Rogers, *The Neoplatonic Metaphysics and Epistemology of Anselm of Canterbury*, Studies in History of Philosophy 45 (Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter, 1997), pp. 112–24.

Nothing Anselm writes elsewhere suggests that he did not retain this general semantic position. It is a view which derives from two main sources: Aristotle and Augustine. Anselm seems certainly to have had in mind the comment at the beginning of Aristotle's *De interpretatione* (16a4), which provided most eleventh- and twelfth-century logicians with their basic semantics—that “spoken sounds are symbols of affections of the mind,” and that these affections are the same for all people. But he is also looking back to Augustine's *De trinitate*, and he takes from it the use of the term “word” to describe the affections of the mind (that is, the thoughts or mental images), a choice which is potentially confusing, but essential to both his and Augustine's theological purposes.<sup>10</sup>

## II

The *De grammatico*, which is written in the form of a dialogue between a master and a pupil, is Anselm's only complete work devoted to semantic problems. Until recently, it was generally accepted that Anselm wrote it at about the same time, 1080-1085, as he composed his *De libero arbitrio* and *De veritate*, in the preface to which he mentions the *De grammatico*.<sup>11</sup> This dating comes from Anselm's biographer, Eadmer. But Sir Richard Southern has argued that Eadmer was merely following, and misinterpreting, Anselm's comment in the preface to *De veritate*. Although Anselm there groups *De grammatico* together with *De libero arbitrio*, *De veritate* and *De casu diaboli*, he makes the proviso, overlooked by Eadmer, that the works were written at different times. According to Southern, the logical and linguistic concerns of the treatise make most likely a dating to 1060-1063, when Anselm was Lanfranc's assistant at the external school at Bec.<sup>12</sup> But Southern's view, although plausible, is based merely on an impressionistic judgement about subject matter and manner. It would be unwise for the interpreter of *De grammatico* to try to be guided by any presumption about the work's chronology, except that it must antedate *De veritate*.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See especially *De trinitate* 15, 10, 19. A full list of Augustinian parallels is given in Jasper Hopkins, *A New, Interpretive Translation of St. Anselm's Monologion and Proslogion* (Minneapolis, 1986), p. 320.

<sup>11</sup> p. 173.5-8.

<sup>12</sup> Richard W. Southern, *Saint Anselm. A Portrait in a Landscape* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 65 and n. 35. Alain Galonnier has also pointed to the links between the subject matter of *De grammatico* and the milieu of Anselm's early life: see his Introduction to *De grammatico* in *L'Oeuvre de S. Anselme de Cantorbéry*, ed. Michel Corbin (Paris, 1986), 2, pp. 25-49 at 26-32, and his “Sur quelques aspects annonciateurs de la littérature sophismatique dans le *De grammatico*,” in *Anselm*, ed. Luscombe and Evans, pp. 209-28, especially 211-12.

<sup>13</sup> But see below, n. 40.

The particular problem posed in *De grammatico* is about what were known as denominatives. Anselm and his contemporaries derived their idea of denominatives mainly from Boethius' commentary on the *Categories* and, as this source suggests, it is a concept bound up, not merely with grammatical theory, but with Aristotelian metaphysics.<sup>14</sup> In the *Categories* Aristotle distinguishes between substances—natural kinds and their particular members—and accidents such as whiteness or knowledge about grammar; the word for the first is “albedo,” for the second “grammatica.” The word “albus” and the word “grammaticus,” which are derived from “albedo” and “grammatica,” with a change of form, are denominative words. These words are used of the things which have the accidents from which the denominatives are denominated: what is rightly called “albus” has the accident of whiteness, what is rightly called “grammaticus” that of knowledge about grammar. “Albus,” then, plays much the same role in Latin as the adjective “white” does in English, with the slight difference that, specialized usages (“A white living in a largely immigrant neighbourhood...”) aside, “white,” like most adjectives in English, needs to qualify a noun or pronoun, whereas in Latin it can more easily be used to mean in many contexts (depending on the ending) a (or the) white male thing/ female thing/ neuter thing. “Grammaticus” has no consistent synonym in English, since although it can function adjectivally, just like “albus” (“Socrates est grammaticus” can mean “Socrates is knowledgeable about grammar”), it is commonly used as a noun (“Grammaticus legit”—“The grammarian reads”; “Socrates est grammaticus” can mean “Socrates is a grammarian”). Both “albus” and “grammaticus,” then, are denominative words. But Boethius does not just talk about denominative words, but about denominative things: whatever is called by a denominative word is a denominative thing.

The problem tackled in *De grammatico* is whether *grammaticus* is a substance or a quality. This is a question about denominative things, but Anselm also considers the parallel problem about denominative words: does “grammaticus” signify a substance or a quality. English speakers can grasp the point at issue quite easily by trying to translate “grammaticus” in the first sentence of this paragraph. If “grammaticus” is translated as “a grammarian” or “the grammarian,” the answer to the problem seems clearly to be that *grammaticus* is a substance. If the sentence is translated as “Socrates is knowledgeable about grammar,” the answer seems equally clearly to be that *grammaticus* is a quality. But, as explained, both translations of

<sup>14</sup> PL 64:167D-168D; see John A. Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 138-41.

“grammaticus” are equally correct. The same problem could be posed, in principle, about most denominatives, but it is particularly striking when, as in the case of “grammaticus,” the word fits easily in Latin both as the subject of a sentence, and as a predicate with an adjectival meaning.<sup>15</sup>

The leading writer in the grammatical tradition, Priscian, had suggested that “grammaticus” was a word for a substance<sup>16</sup>; more generally, Priscian considered that all nouns and adjectives signify substance and quality. By contrast, the logical tradition looked back, following Boethius, to the passage in the *Categories* (2b28) where Aristotle makes *grammatikos* (“grammaticus” in both Boethian translations) an example, along with white, of a quality.<sup>17</sup> Anselm does not, however, set up the problem as a difference between two traditions, but rather as a conflict between one tradition, that of the *philosophi* (the followers of Aristotle), which holds that *grammaticus* is a quality, and the following simple syllogistic argument:<sup>18</sup>

- (1) Every *grammaticus* is a man.
- (2) Every man is a substance.
- (3) Every *grammaticus* is a substance.

About three-quarters of the way through the dialogue, Anselm seems to have arrived at a definitive solution, which is put into the Pupil’s mouth but accepted by the Master:<sup>19</sup>

(D[efinitive] S[olution]1) The word “grammaticus” is a word which signifies a quality.

(DS2) *Grammaticus* is a quality.

Also part of the definitive solution is the idea that

<sup>15</sup> Although nominalization of adjectives is more common in Latin than English, many Latin adjectives do not easily take the sense of a masculine or feminine noun in the nominative. For instance, “Albus est magnus” is awkward in Latin. But there are nevertheless plenty of other denominatives which do behave much as “grammaticus”: for example, “sapiens” (“Sapiens est magnus,” “Socrates est sapiens”); cf. J.B. Hofmann, revised A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik* (Munich, 1965), pp. 152–56.

<sup>16</sup> In Book 2, section 25 of his *Institutiones grammaticae* (ed. M. Hertz, vol. 1 [Leipzig, 1855], p. 58.24, “grammaticus” is used as an example of a word for a substance; cf. also section 24, p. 58.17 and Henry, “*De grammatico*,” pp. 88–89, *Logic*, pp. 64–67; *Commentary*, p. 187.

<sup>17</sup> See Henry, *Commentary*, pp. 90–9, with further references to “grammaticus” in Boethius’s *Commentary on the Categories*.

<sup>18</sup> *De grammatico* 1, pp. 145.14–15, 146.1–3.

<sup>19</sup> *De grammatico* 18, p. 163.23–25. The teacher goes on to add that Aristotle calls “words by the name of the things they signify” (p. 163.26–27) and so (DS1) is all we need to say, since to an Aristotelian interpreter it also implies (DS2).

(DS3) “Grammaticus” appellates a substance.<sup>20</sup> (On the meaning of “appellates,” see below).

What are Anselm’s reasons for adopting, or at least seeming to adopt, this solution? They appear to be based on his analysis of what is involved in signification. As the general semantics outlined in the *Monologion* indicates, Anselm considered that words signify by causing mental images or thoughts (the *Monologion*’s “words” of the third sort) in the minds of those who understand them. Indeed, “signify” as used in *De grammatico* can be defined in terms very close to those which Paul Spade has identified as being standard among thinkers from the twelfth to the fourteenth century: a word “w” signifies a thing x if and only if “w” causes a thought of x in the mind of a competent speaker of the language in question.<sup>21</sup> Anselm shows that this is how he understands “signify” when he sets up the following test for whether “albus” signifies a (or the) white man or horse. Does someone, just from hearing the word “albus” think of a white man or a white horse? Anselm answers that “albus” does not signify a white man or a white horse, because if I say, “There’s an *albus* in the house,” the hearer would not, without further information, have a thought of a man, or of a horse. He contrasts with this example the case where, pointing to two horses, I say “Hit the *album*”; when the listener hears “album”, she does think of a horse, but that is because she has the extra information that it is horses which are in question. So Anselm admits that “albus” can signify a horse (or a man, or whatever) “per aliud”—through something else: through the information that it is horses (or men, or whatever), we are discussing. But “albus” does not signify a horse or a man “per se.”<sup>22</sup>

It may seem, however, that this analysis of the signification of “albus” will not apply to “grammaticus,” because if I say, “There’s a *grammaticus* in the house,” won’t the competent speaker think of a man—a man who knows grammar? What else could be being called a “grammaticus” but a man? And so, does not “grammaticus” signify a man; that is to say, a substance? One of Anselm’s main aims in the dialogue is to show up this line of argument as mistaken. If “grammaticus” signifies a man, he believes, then it cannot be possible for there to be a *grammaticus* who is not a human being (for convenience, I shall call him or it “G”). Suppose that G existed, someone who understood a sentence in which G was signified by the word “grammaticus” would have to think a contradiction—that a non-man is a

<sup>20</sup> *De grammatico* 18, p. 164.5–7.

<sup>21</sup> Paul V. Spade, “Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute,” *Franciscan Studies*, n.s. 35 (1975), 213–33, at pp. 213–14.

<sup>22</sup> *De grammatico* 4, pp. 160.4–161.4.

man. But it is easy enough to imagine that G exists, says Anselm: that there is some non-human, but rational animal who knows grammar just as a man does, and so would be a *grammaticus* but not a man.<sup>23</sup> At the back of this argument, as Desmond Henry has pointed out, is the plausible requirement that the meaning of a word should not change just because an unexpected sort of thing happens to have the attribute indicated by the word: the meaning of "consul" was not changed when Caligula appointed his horse to that office.<sup>24</sup>

Anselm adds a second argument to deny the possibility left open by the first argument that, although "grammaticus" does not signify a man, it signifies *something* which is knowledgeable about grammar (and so, presumably, a substance). Using the example of "album," Anselm argues that if "album" signifies something white ("aliquid album"), then the "white" in that phrase can itself be replaced by "something white," giving "something something white" and so on to infinity.<sup>25</sup>

### III

Historians of philosophy are almost all agreed that (DS1–3) constitute the kernel of Anselm's solution to the problem he poses in *De grammatico*.<sup>26</sup> But there are serious questions both about the interpretation of this solution and about its adequacy. With regard to (DS1) and (DS3), there is a problem about Anselm's notion of reference; with regard to (DS2), there are difficulties both about seeing how it is justified by the arguments which have been advanced, and in deciding exactly how it is to be understood. I shall now look at these problems, and end by querying whether Anselm was in

<sup>23</sup> *De grammatico* 13, pp. 157.30–158:5.

<sup>24</sup> Henry, "De Grammatico," pp. 103–4, 117.

<sup>25</sup> *De grammatico* 21, pp. 166.32–167.11. Anselm had already used this form of argument earlier as an extra way of showing that "grammaticus" does not signify a man who knows about grammar: *De grammatico* 13, p. 158.23–34; cf. Henry, *Medieval Logic*, pp. 56–67.

<sup>26</sup> See e.g. Desmond Henry in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), p. 137 (summarizing a view proposed at length in his works listed above, n. 2); Jan Pinborg, *Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter: Ein Überblick* (Stuttgart and Bad-Cannstatt, 1972), pp. 43–44; Marcia L. Colish, *The Mirror of Language. A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge* (rev. ed., Lincoln and London, 1983), pp. 76–77; Wolfgang L. Gombocz, "Anselm über Sinn und Bedeutung," *Anselm Studies* 1 (1983), 125–41, at pp. 133–35; Jasper Hopkins, "Anselm of Canterbury," in *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, ed. E. Craig, vol. 1 (London/New York, 1998), pp. 283–97, at 289–90.

fact presenting (DS1–3) as a definitive solution, especially since there is some evidence in the text of a different train of thought.

It would clearly not be an adequate semantic theory to hold that the *only* relation of importance between words such as "grammaticus" and "albus" and the world is the relation of signification *per se* between them and the qualities from which they are denominated. Some account needs to be given of how these words relate to things which are grammatical or white. Anselm sees the need, and he uses the terms "appellatio" and "significatio per aliud" to describe this relationship. Most commentators take this as a reason to regard the two terms as roughly synonymous, and as meaning much the same as the modern semantic term "reference."<sup>27</sup> But there are grounds for doubt on both points.

Anselm's own explanations of *appellatio* and of *significatio per aliud* are quite different. "Appellatio" is defined in relation to "usus loquendi," the ordinary way of speech. The "appellative name" of a thing is, he says, "that by which the thing itself is called according to the ordinary way of speech."<sup>28</sup> To say that "grammaticus" appellates a man who knows grammar is merely to observe that, as it happens, people use "grammaticus" as the word for such a man. By contrast, *significatio per aliud* is a type of signification and should be understood according to the general scheme of signification. If a word "w" signifies *x* "per aliud," then "w" makes the listener think, or have a mental image, of *x* through something else—that is, as result of some extra information the listener has. So, for instance, in Anselm's example, "album" signifies a white horse "per aliud"—as a result of the information the listener has that the things in question are horses.

Despite their very different origins, however, Anselm does sometimes use the terms "significatio per aliud" and "appellatio" in parallel. For example, the Master says:

"Grammaticus" does not signify a man and knowledge about grammar as one thing, but it signifies *per se* knowledge about

<sup>27</sup> See e.g. Henry, *Commentary*, p. 198: "oblique (*per aliud*) signification (i.e. *appellatio* [translation] reference, in the case of names," and *ibid.*, pp. 211–14; Pinborg, *Überblick*, pp. 43–44; Colish, *Mirror*, p. 77; Gombocz, "Sinn und Bedeutung," p. 135; Galonnier, Introduction, p. 39; but cf. Hopkins, "Anselm," p. 289, who accepts the identification of *appellatio* and *significatio per aliud* but queries whether it is has to do exclusively with reference. On the relations between Anselm's use of the terms "significatio" and "appellatio" and semantics in the following generations, see A. Galonnier, "Le *De grammatico* et l'origine de la théorie des propriétés des termes," in *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains*, ed. J. Jolivet and A. de Libera (Naples, 1990), pp. 353–75.

<sup>28</sup> *De grammatico* 12, p. 157.5–6: "Appellativum autem nomen cuiuslibet rei nunc dico, quo res ipsa usu loquendi appellatur."

grammar, and *per aliud* a man; and although this word ["grammaticus"] appellates a man, it is not properly speaking said to signify him, and although it signifies knowledge about grammar, it does not, however, appellate it.<sup>29</sup>

Anselm even, on one occasion, seems so keen to bring "appellatio" and "significatio per aliud" together that he seems to forget his own explanation of "appellatio." After giving the example of the white horse, where "album" signifies a horse "per aliud," both Pupil and Master say that "album" appellates the horse.<sup>30</sup> But "album" is obviously not the word for a horse according to ordinary usage!

Is the conclusion, then, that Anselm is really using "appellatio" and "significatio per aliud"—despite the different explanations he gives—to mean reference in the modern sense? But, if so, why does he proceed in this baffling way? In any case, his account of reference is fundamentally different from that usual among logicians since Frege. For modern logicians, reference is the basic semantic relation. The sense of a word is a further aspect of its meaning which may be different from that of another word with the same reference (as in the case of "morning star" and "evening star," to take the most famous example). Anselm may well have intuitively been searching for some concept like the modern idea of reference. But, in a semantics based on his idea of *per se* signification, there was no room for such a notion. And so he seems to have tried in two different ways—by taking into consideration contextual knowledge (*significatio per aliud*) and by looking to common usage (*appellatio*)—to make the relation he needed between denominatives and the things with the qualities from which they are denominated, without being able to reach a unified account.

(DS3) then is not without problems. But (DS2) is far more deeply problematic. (DS2) makes a claim about things, not words—that the things which are *grammatici* are qualities. It is an odd claim to make, because it is directly contradicted by the Pupil's initial argument (1–3). The Master's arguments about the signification of "grammaticus" contain nothing to counter its only contestable premise—(1) Every *grammaticus* is a man. They do, indeed, establish the claim that,

<sup>29</sup> *De grammatico* 12, p. 157.1–5: "Grammaticus vero non significat hominem et grammaticam ut unum, sed grammaticam per se et hominem per aliud significat. Et hoc nomen quamvis sit appellativum hominis, non tamen proprie dicitur eius significativum; et licet sit significativum grammaticae, non tamen est eius appellativum."

<sup>30</sup> *De grammatico* 14–15, p. 161.4, 10.

(4) Possibly, some *grammaticus* is not a man,

which is all that the argument about signification needs. But (4) does not contradict (1). Moreover, the Master says explicitly that it *cannot* be shown that there is any *grammaticus* who is not a man.<sup>31</sup> If the conclusion of the Pupil's initial argument is wrong, it must be because the argument is invalid. But Anselm gives no explanation of how it is invalid, if it is.

There is, in any case, a difficulty about (DS2) itself. If *grammaticus* is a quality, what quality is it? The obvious answer is that it is the quality *grammatica*, knowledge about grammar, and so the sentence,

(5) *Grammaticus est grammatica*,

is true. But whether or not Anselm wishes to hold (5) is a matter for contention among interpreters. The central feature of Henry's reading of the *De grammatico* is that Anselm claims (5).<sup>32</sup> Henry admits that (5) is, apparently, nonsense. But he believes that Anselm is making the point that logicians do sometimes have to speak what sounds like nonsense in order to express a logical relation which is not captured by ordinary speech. He explains that the "est" in (5) is not the "is" of ordinary discourse. Rather, in (5) Anselm is trying to say something he cannot say, because he lacks a symbolic language, but something that Henry is able to set out straightforwardly in the logical language of Lesniewski, which contains the higher-level "is" needed to make sense of (5). By contrast, Jasper Hopkins considers it a "trap" to consider that (5) expresses a logical truth: "This sentence is no more a logical truth than it is meaningful."<sup>33</sup> Hopkins's view is certainly not contradicted by the text. Anselm never asserts (5) as such. Rather, the Master brings up the sentences "*grammatica est grammaticus*" and "*grammaticus est grammatica*" as examples of ways of speaking not sanctioned by ordinary usage,<sup>34</sup> and later the Pupil argues (though the Master does not seem to agree) that "although ... the word 'grammaticus' signifies knowledge about grammar, it would not be an appropriate response to someone who asks 'What is a '*grammaticus*'?" to say, 'Knowledge about

<sup>31</sup> *De grammatico* 9, p. 153.30–31: "... utrum sit aliquis grammaticus non homo, quod vides monstrari non posse."

<sup>32</sup> See especially Henry, *Logic*, pp. 79–86; *Commentary*, pp. 183, 216–221.

<sup>33</sup> "Anselm," p. 290.

<sup>34</sup> *De grammatico* 12, p. 157.6–8.

grammar' or 'A quality'."<sup>35</sup> But, since Anselm does assert (DS2), Hopkins is left with the question: what quality? It does not help to say, as Hopkins does, that Anselm is claiming, not (5), but,

(6) *Grammaticus est sciens grammaticam.*

(6) reads more easily than (5), because "*sciens grammaticam*" can be taken as "someone who knows about grammar." But if, as Anselm insists in (DS2), *grammaticus* is a quality, then (6) should not be read in this way, but rather as "*Grammaticus* is knowing about grammar," which is as awkward as (5).

Historians perhaps face a harsher choice than many have realized. Either they can follow Henry's reading. It has the advantage of being coherent and sophisticated, but it also suffers, from an historian's point of view, from the weakness that it is offered less as an interpretation of what Anselm actually thought, than as an explanation of how Anselm might have carried through his logical intuitions, if he had been granted a twentieth-century technical apparatus. Or, if readers of *De grammatico* find Henry's view historically unconvincing, they must accept that one element, at least, of the definitive solution, (DS2), is puzzling and apparently incoherent.

There is also a more general problem about the coherence of *De grammatico*. At the beginning of the dialogue, as explained above, the Pupil sets out what he understands to be a pair of alternatives ("ut quodlibet horum sit alterum non sit, et quodlibet non sit alterum necesse sit esse")<sup>36</sup>: either *grammaticus* is a substance, or a quality. After the Pupil has given the arguments for each solution, the Master replies:

The arguments you propose for each of the opposed solutions are sound, but not your assertion that if one is the case, then the other cannot be. And so you shouldn't require me to show that one or other of the opposed solutions is false. No one could do this. Rather, I shall explain how it is that the solutions are *not* incompatible with each other....<sup>37</sup>

Yet, by the time he advances (DS1–3), the Master seems to have forgotten all about this plan. (DS2) directly asserts one of the two opposed solutions, that *grammaticus* is a quality, and it seems quite clear that, by this stage,

<sup>35</sup> *De grammatico* 16, p. 161.28–30: "Quamvis ... grammatici nomen significativum sit grammaticae: non tamen convenienter responderetur quaerenti quid grammaticus sit: grammatica, aut qualitas."

<sup>36</sup> *De grammatico* 1, p. 146.4–5.

<sup>37</sup> *De grammatico* 2, p. 146.10–14.

"*grammaticus* is a substance" would not be accepted as true. By contrast, in the earlier part of the dialogue, the Master does seem to follow his initial, explicit intention and succeeds in finding a way of explaining how *grammaticus* is both a substance *and* a quality. This intermediate solution is brought out best in the following passage:

M. Tell me, when you speak to me about a *grammaticus*, what should I understand (*intelligam*) you to be talking about—the word "*grammaticus*," or the things it signifies?

N The things.

O. What things, then, does it signify?

P. A man and knowledge about grammar.

Q. So when I hear the word "*grammaticus*," I may understand a man or knowledge about grammar, and when I am speaking about a *grammaticus*, I may be speaking about a man or knowledge about grammar.

R. So it must be.

S. Tell me then, is a man a substance, or is it in a subject?

T. It's a substance, not something in a subject.

U. Is knowledge about grammar a quality and in a subject?

V. It's both.

W. Why then is it strange if someone says that *grammaticus* is a substance and not in a subject with respect to a man (*secundum hominem*) and that *grammaticus* is a quality and in a subject with respect to knowledge about grammar (*secundum grammaticam*)?<sup>38</sup>

And a little later the Master repeats the idea, asking the Pupil why he cannot see that "there is no contradiction whatsoever" between holding that *grammaticus* is a substance and that it is a quality, "because concerning a *grammaticus*, on some occasions we should speak and understand with respect to a man (*secundum hominem*) and on some occasions with respect to knowledge about grammar (*secundum grammaticam*)."<sup>39</sup>

In the light of the general semantics Anselm sets out in the *Monologion*, he seems to have the following explanation in mind in this intermediate solution. Just like other words, a denominative word, such as

<sup>38</sup> *De grammatico*, 9, p. 154.7–21.

<sup>39</sup> *De grammatico*, 11, p. 156.1–4: "Cur non satis tibi videtur ostensum, quod grammaticum esse substantiam et grammaticum esse qualitatem nequaquam sibi repugnent invicem, in eo quod de grammatico modo secundum hominem, modo secundum grammaticam loqui et intelligere oportet."

"grammaticus," functions by bringing certain thoughts or mental to the mind of the listener. Depending on the context of utterance, "grammaticus" can bring to mind the thought or image of a substance—a man (or man in general) or the thought of a quality—knowledge about grammar. For this reason, it is true to say both that "*grammaticus* is a substance" and that "*grammaticus* is a quality" (but this does not entail that there is a sort of thing which is a *grammaticus* and is at once a substance and a quality).

This intermediate solution avoids the difficulties both with (DS3) and (DS2), and it fits exactly with the plan set out by the Master at the start of the dialogue. Precisely for these reasons, it is implausible to try to present it as a first attempt to reach what develops into the definitive solution. It seems clearly to be an alternative to (DS1–3), which is strangely abandoned for this, to all appearances, weaker theory.

Alain Galonnier has recently suggested that *De grammatico* is an exercise in detecting sophisms, apparently valid but in fact flawed pieces of argument.<sup>40</sup> Galonnier probably underestimates the seriousness of the semantic discussion, but he may well be right to point out that *De grammatico* is a text full of argumentative traps, which should not be expected to have a straightforward line of argument. Perhaps it is wrong to seek in it a definitive solution to the semantic problems it explores.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> "Littérature sophismatique". Galonnier also puts forward (pp. 227–28) the tentative suggestion that the text which we have of the *De grammatico* may not even be Anselm's treatise, but the work of a later, twelfth-century author. He bases this suggestion on the type of fallacies which Anselm examines in the work. It is doubtful, though, whether our knowledge of the chronological development of logical doctrines between 1050 and 1150 is sufficiently exact to give much weight to such an argument, in the absence of other evidence for the same conclusion.

<sup>41</sup> While this article was in press, there was published Marilyn M. Adams, "Re-reading the *De grammatico* of Anselm's *Categories*." *Documenti e studi*

## Poesía epigráfica en Cataluña en el siglo XI

por José Martínez Gázquez

El prof. J. M<sup>a</sup>. Escolà pone de relieve en la introducción de su estudio sobre el latín documental del siglo XI en Cataluña, en este mismo Congreso, el asentamiento de la organización feudal en la zona cristiana en los territorios ocupados a los musulmanes y el retroceso de la frontera hasta límites ya cercanos al curso del río Ebro. En estas circunstancias la vida se normaliza en estos territorios cristianos de manera acorde con las tradiciones de los restantes pueblos de la Europa cristiana y vemos aparecer, por ejemplo, inscripciones funerarias en verso que siguen los modelos de la epigrafía clásica y cristiana, aunque también nos dejan ver las peculiaridades de una tierra de frontera en el siglo que nos ocupa.

Nos detendremos en esta comunicación en analizar algunos aspectos literarios y formales de los epígrafes latinos en verso del Corpus de las inscripciones latinas medievales de Cataluña,<sup>1</sup> que se pueden fechar en el siglo XI, una etapa histórica de particular interés en la zona que se extiende a Sur y Norte de los Pirineos, de cultura e historia común en el siglo XI, como muestra en su misma persona el Abad Oliba, figura relevante de la primera mitad del siglo, a la vez obispo de Vic, abad de Ripoll y de San Miquel de Cuixá y fundador de Montserrat, y del que se conservan también algunos *carmina epigrafica*.

Comienza el siglo XI con el epitafio en verso de una gran figura, el abad Odón, muerto en 1010, que nos presenta la *laudatio* de los méritos de un hombre que actuó intensamente en las circunstancias históricas de su tiempo. Su epitafio en verso enfatiza especialmente su afán restaurador del Monasterio de san Cugat tras las devastaciones musulmanas de Barcelona y su entorno a finales del siglo X.

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